Gulshan Dietl replies: The United States has nourished two “special relationships” in West Asia - that is, with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both of them are adversaries of Iran. The November 24, 2013 Interim Agreement between Iran and the P5+1 major powers (5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council + Germany) has resulted in a relegitimation of Iran in the global community and, more significantly, in an improvement in the US-Iran relations. Israel and Saudi Arabia, in the circumstances, are alarmed at the future prospects of this development. The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has called the agreement a “historic mistake” and has kept up the threat of launching a unilateral attack against Iran if the Israeli security is threatened. Saudis have cautiously welcomed the agreement, though their concerns about an enhanced Iranian influence in the region and competition in the global energy market are serious.

In the aftermath of the nuclear deal, the US Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel, acknowledged the anxieties of the Gulf states regarding the American “intentions, strategy and commitment” to the region and sought to reassure them that the US would continue to improve its own presence and bolster the regional empowerment in security and defence. Secretary of State John Kerry, similarly, indulged into a highly demonstrative gesture during his visit to Israel when the missile defence organisations of the US and Israel jointly test-fired Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system. The Iran nuclear deal has impacted the US special relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia and there are sustained moves on all sides to mend the damage.

The Iran deal is certainly in our interest and we have welcomed the same. The sanctions on oil, shipping and banking are not yet lifted. Therefore, there will not be an immediate expansion in the Indo-Iran trade ties. In the longer run, the Indian import of Iranian oil is slated to go up; exploration in the gas fields allotted to India will begin; and the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline may yet see the light of the day after an inordinate hibernation.

S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: The initial diplomatic efforts on the Iranian nuclear issue were spearheaded by the United Kingdom, France and Germany (E3). Some of the few instances of successful engagement were the Tehran Agreed Statement of October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 that Iran entered into with the E3. The E3 engagement process, however, hit a roadblock in the light of Iran’s decision of August 01, 2005 to resume uranium conversion activities at Isfahan.

The P5+1/E3+3 (made up of five permanent members of the UNSC along with Germany) took forward the process of engagement spearheaded by E3 countries after the Iranian nuclear issue was referred to the UNSC by the IAEA in February 2006. Germany’s involvement therefore began as part of the E3 as early as in 2003 and continued when the negotiation process was expanded to include the other three permanent members of the UNSC in 2006. 

Brazil meanwhile was involved in such efforts as the May 2010 Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear swap deal under the terms of which (similar to the October 2009 deal involving Russia and France) Iran was to have transferred 1200 kgs of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey, in return for 120 kgs of uranium fuel rods from the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France, and the IAEA) within a year of depositing the LEU. The US and France, however, rejected the deal given that Iran’s stockpile of LEU had doubled since October 2009. Such efforts also raised the stakes in the US–Turkey/Brazil bilateral ties, with these countries’ foreign policy efforts seemingly at odds with the US interests and preferences.

For an examination of the various diplomatic-political efforts undertaken to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, please refer to the article, “In Pursuit of a Chimera: Nuclear Imbroglio between Sanctions and Engagement,” Strategic Analysis, Routledge, 36 (6), November 2012.

Reshmi Kazi replies:, Pakistan’s aim is to signal to India that any contemplation of a conventional punitive retaliation to its sub-conventional but “highly destructive and disruptive” cross-border terrorist strikes, such as the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai, would bear disastrous consequences including probable use of tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s objective thus is to dissuade India from considering the option of retaliation by lowering the threshold of nuclear option.

Pakistan’s resort to the nuclear option, however, would break down the deterrence stability. In that case, it will be highly irrelevant whether a target has been hit by a strategic or tactical weapon. A nuclear attack is a nuclear attack. To quote Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik, “Tactical or strategic, it (NASR) is a nuclear weapon. Our response would be absolutely violent, if it is used, as per our existing policy. So, it's not a game-changer.” What this essentially means is that in the event India faces a nuclear attack, New Delhi will be left with no other choice but to use nuclear weapons in the form of a massive retaliation. In that case, it makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon or a long range or short range weapon is used, since the general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

Also, see Reshmi Kazi, “NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan,” IDSA Comment, August 19, 2011.