The performance of the agricultural and industrial sectors during 1971 acquires an added significance as 1971 happens to be the first year of China’s ambitious Fourth Five-Year Plan. This Plan visualized new dimensions for the policies in these two basic sectors. This policy has aimed at optimum utilization of all factors of productions increasing the operational efficiency of both peasants and industrial labour through material incentives like private plots; and reinstalling technocrats in the respective industries.

The turn of the twenty-first century brought with it the miraculous economic rise of China in Asia and beyond; American strategy towards the region, denoted by the ‘pivot to Asia’ and acceptance of a ‘Pacific Century’ for the US,1 became increasingly China-centric. Building partnerships, forging security and commercial pacts with Asian countries and enhancing maritime presence across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) eventually became the fulcrum of America’s Asia strategy, with mainstream strategic perception in the United States on China becoming increasingly negative.

On October 6, 2020, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (parliament) passed two important Resolutions, moved by the main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). These sought to ensure ‘US military aid in combating aggression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’ and ‘a resumption of diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan.’1 The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supported the Resolutions. Such a bipartisan consensus is rare in Taiwan’s deeply divided politics.

The article looks back on China’s proposal and promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Vietnam, as well as Vietnam’s official position and response to this initiative. The implementation of agreements between the two countries is analysed by evaluating two key areas of the BRI in Vietnam, namely facilities connectivity, and trade and investment. China was active in promoting the BRI, whereas Vietnam welcomed the initiative with caution. Cooperation in the two key areas has been promoted.

The role of Indonesia in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes has been limited to being part of the ASEAN team since the country is not one of the active claimants. Jakarta has tried to sidestep its maritime row with Beijing by emphasizing the lack of a “territorial dispute’ between the two countries. The article analyzes the role and position of Indonesia in the SCS disputes and argues that despite Indonesia’s reluctance to be an active or direct claimant state, developments in recent years have dragged her into the disputes and she will remain involved until a mutually acceptable solution is achieved in the overarching problem of the SCS.