It is essential to have an army which is capable of responding to conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare requirements with bare minimum turbulence while switching roles from one form of warfare to another.

While the asymmetrical threat will have an effect on warfare at strategic, operational and tactical levels, the threat will be most dramatic at the operational level.

To prevent intelligence failures there is a need to incorporate the additional and fresh areas of intelligence interest brought on by the asymmetric and nuclear dimensions of future conflict.

The nuclear ‘backdrop’ carries dangers even in a single front let alone a ‘two front’ situation, particularly since a move to rescind the NFU tenet of doctrine may be necessary.

Over the short term, events in Pakistan dictate higher order readiness. In the middle term, equations have to be managed with China so as to gain time to get the second strike capability and infrastructure organised.

While recalling the 1962 conflict we often refer to India’s ‘humiliating defeat’ at Chinese hands and forget that the Jawan of the Indian Army invariably fought with exceptional bravery and valour in the most trying conditions often without winter clothing and in some cases even without adequate ammunition.