Nuclear Weapons

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  • Re-visioning the Nuclear Command Authority

    In a new book Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards a Credible Deterrent, Dr. Manpreet Sethi has recommended a restructuring of India’s Nuclear Command Authority. Since India’s nuclear doctrine is premised on ‘Assured Retaliation’, nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. Presently, the Nuclear Command Authority, as approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on 04 January 2003, stipulates:

    September 09, 2009

    Outlook for the Seventies: Strategic and Technological

    So far the Chinese have carried out ten nuclear tests which include one underground test, one test of a nuclear-tipped missile and three thermo-nuclear tests. In other words, the Chinese are on a comprehensive weapons programme, which will give them thermo-nuclear warheads from the megaton range down to small yield nuclear weapons of a few kiloton range and even fractional kiloton range. They are now engaged in improving the compactness of their warheads.

    September 2009

    Furthering 'No First Use' in India-Pakistan Context

    Pakistan has not subscribed to No First Use. That it could do so has been expressed informally by its President Zardari. India could take up the issue with Pakistan at a forum discussing Confidence Building Measures as and when the composite dialogue resumes. The Lahore Memorandum of Understanding posits such consultations. To get Pakistan on board, India may require initiating a strategic dialogue with Pakistan, outside of the existing composite dialogue framework. This would build trust that could impact other areas of the peace process positively.

    July 2009

    India in a Changing Global Nuclear Order

    India in a Changing Global Nuclear Order
    • Publisher: Academic Foundation (2009)
      2009

    This insightful book, with contributions by leading experts on the nuclear issue in India, covers all such important aspects and provides robust analysis of the global nuclear order in terms of its implications for India and global disarmament.

    • ISBN 978-81-7188-770-5,
    • Price: ₹. 895/-
    2009

    A Q Khan Release and Non-Proliferation

    On February 6, 2009, the Pakistani judiciary acquitted Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the symbol of Pakistani involvement in clandestine nuclear commerce. Since 2004, he had been under house arrest after the proliferation network, linking several countries, including Pakistan, was uncovered. Though he has been put under ‘unspecified security measures’, yet the release of AQ Khan – dubbed by the United States State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid as a ‘serious proliferation risk’ – is considered to be a disturbing development for the non-proliferation regime.

    July 2009

    The Danger of Nuclear Terrorism: The Indian Case

    The concept of nuclear terrorism is possibly the least understood of all dangers emanating from nuclear weapons. However, certain drivers like the nuclear black market (the AQ Khan Network), proliferation of nuclear technology, and the increasing demand for nuclear energy can make it easier for terrorist organizations like Al Qaida to acquire fissile material. The threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be ignored any longer. Nuclear terrorism is a plausible phenomenon that deserves adequate consideration, substantial countermeasures, expertise, and competence to combat it.

    July 2009

    Japanese Vulnerabilities increases following North Korea’s actions

    The delicately maintained fragile peace in Northeast Asia received a severe jolt when North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009, followed by the test launch of four short-range missiles. Earlier on April 5, North Korea had launched a long-range rocket, which drew condemnation from the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the form of a strong presidential statement.

    June 23, 2009

    India and the Non-Proliferation Regime: Looking Beyond the Nuclear Deal

    Event: 
    Fellows' Seminar
    September 12, 2008
    Time: 
    1030 to 1300 hrs

    Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons

    Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.

    May 2009

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