With elections looming large in both countries and the Indo-US nuclear deal facing its moment of truth, the inevitable question will arise as to who has gained how much from the Strategic Partnership that was signed with great fanfare in July 2005. This is not withstanding the fact that the failure of the nuclear deal would undoubtedly be a setback for both countries and besmirch the reputations of those leaders who had put their personal prestige on the line. It would also reflect poorly on the political parties and the governments involved in various ways.
The rhetoric from two noisy democracies may make it appear that the interests of India and the United States are poles apart on many issues. However, if the outside layers comprising ideological and populist pronouncements are peeled aside, it is apparent that while there would be inevitable differences in approach, there is a convergence on core values, concerns and interests. At the same time, the hindrances and obstacles that come in the way of a working relationship cannot be simply wished away. A purposeful and forward looking dialogue is one of the necessary steps required to take the Partnership to a higher plane.
The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has strongly denied news reports that the launch of an Israeli spy satellite aboard the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) has been delayed or even cancelled because of US pressure. The news reports, while speculative in nature, have certain inconsistencies that need to be contested. Foremost among these being there is a quid pro quo element by way of sharing of data; since the satellite is wholly Israeli owned and operated, ISRO is only providing a commercial service with no quid pro quo involved.
Even though the Indo-US nuclear deal has passed one more hurdle with the completion of the 123 Agreement to the satisfaction of both governments, the remaining hurdles include the signing of agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) before the Agreement can go back to the US Congress for its final imprimatur.
With the passage of a year since the visit of President George W. Bush to India, it is the business communities of the two countries that have benefited the most from the momentum created by the upsurge in Indo-US relations. While two-way trade and investment had been growing at a steady clip, the announcement and subsequent passage of the Bill on Co-operation in Civil Nuclear Energy, intended to remove the last vestiges of the adversarial relations between the two countries, have taken business relations to a new level.
The most visible manifestation of a strategic relationship between two countries is cooperation in the defence sphere. When the Defence Framework Agreement was signed in June 2005, it was widely assumed that the Agreement provided a skeleton that would be fleshed out over a period of time.
The speed and relative ease with which the Indo-US nuclear deal raced through the respective committees of Congress and the margin by which it was assented to by the House of Representatives on 27 July, scarcely four months after it was introduced in Congress, created the expectation that the same scenario would play out in the Senate. These hopes have been belied by the failure of the Senate to pass the Bill before it recessed for the mid-term elections.
The Intangibles of the India-US Strategic Partnership
With elections looming large in both countries and the Indo-US nuclear deal facing its moment of truth, the inevitable question will arise as to who has gained how much from the Strategic Partnership that was signed with great fanfare in July 2005. This is not withstanding the fact that the failure of the nuclear deal would undoubtedly be a setback for both countries and besmirch the reputations of those leaders who had put their personal prestige on the line. It would also reflect poorly on the political parties and the governments involved in various ways.