With the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) taking over command from the US-led Coalition Forces in southern Afghanistan and the United States focusing on the eastern part of Afghanistan, particularly along the border with Pakistan, crucial questions have arisen regarding securing Afghanistan and its transition to democracy. How will NATO perform its new responsibilities and what will be its counter-terrorism strategies?

Pakistan is a frontline ally of the US in its Global War on Terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the military regime was compelled by Washington to join the US effort to dismantle the Taliban-Al Qaida terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan that successive regimes had nurtured. While the Pakistani military regime’s cooperation is deemed to be crucial for the success of the US counter-terrorism strategy, there appear to be growing strains and challenges that give rise to fundamental questions about the outcomes of such cooperation.

Disruption of terrorist networks - intra-regional, inter-regional and trans-national - should be supplementary to the overall counterterrorism strategy. Larger issues including socio-economic and cultural can only be addressed in the long-term. The immediate goal, however, has to be an effective localised response. Otherwise, efforts like Bhutan’s counter-terrorism operations against ULFA, NDFB and KLO - popularly called ‘Operation All Clear’- may only have a partial impact.

The psychological dimension of a conflict is as important as its physical dimension and psychological Operations (PSYOPs) have become even more relevant in this age of information, especially for a nation-state where the threat in the socio-psychological domain is more pronounced. While combating the menace of terrorism, the psychological dimension assumes great significance, as terrorists use violence as a psychological weapon by terrorising the multitude, rather than physically affect a few, and in this sense, they fight a psychological war also.

The scourge of terrorism has haunted Indian policy-makers since independence. Some of the states, particularly the bordering states, having different cultural and ethnic composition from the heartland, suffered from a real or perceived sense of neglect and misgovernance. Inimical powers exploited this aspect and sowed seeds of sedition and secession amongst some sections of society of these states-particularly the states of the North-East, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir-by providing them with arms training and financial support and instigated them to take up arms against the state machinery.