The article analyses the current Russian regime and its possible alternatives, both nationalist and pro-Western, from the viewpoint of various theoretical approaches. It argues that applying the criteria and terminology of political science, which are usually used in studies of modern Western societies, to define contemporary Russia’s social and economic system is just as pointless as describing its political system in terms of the modern Western political system.
The stunning British vote of June 24, 2016, to quit the European Union (EU)—dubbed Brexit—has triggered a major realignment of economic and political forces across the globe, strengthening the template of a new world order tilted towards Moscow, Beijing and the rising powers of Asia and Africa. As Washington nervously recognizes, there will be a decline in the influence of the US, EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the latter two having served as instruments of US global domination.
At the turn of the 21st century, the world entered a new period of development. The customary bipolar system that prevailed after World War II had collapsed following the self-destruction of one of its poles. Russia’s refusal to follow the Western course is only the first poignant sign of confrontation between the West’s united world project and the emerging multipolar world.
The recent Australian decision to extend civilian nuclear cooperation to India, overriding its own long-term principled position, is no ordinary development. Taking that as a starting point, this article seeks to set out the context and rationale for an all-round and long-term closer relationship between the two countries.
In an ominous way the Dalai Lama recently threatened to terminate the over 400-year-old spiritual lineage of his position, saying that Tibetans no longer require the authority of the Dalai Lama and it would be a shame if a ‘weak’ person succeeded him.
In 2011, he also gave up his political authority in favour of an elected leader among Tibetans living in exile. Seemingly, the motive for these measures was to forestall any alternative plan by Beijing to appoint a successor after him and challenge the authority of such an appointment if Beijing does so.
On 3 May 2013, Australia’s former Prime Minister Julia Gillard released the Defence White Paper (DWP) 2013, making it the sixth White Paper on defence in the history of Australia, and the third since 2000. The last Defence White Paper, entitled Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, was released in 2009 when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was serving his first term.
The Arctic is beginning to test the stage-managed optics of China and Russia’s ‘strategic partnership’. Friction was most recently on display after the Arctic Council’s May 2013 decision to confer permanent observer status on Beijing. The Chinese media celebrated the move as an affirmation of the nation’s ‘legitimate rights’ in Arctic affairs.1 Russian officials were much less enthusiastic.
The Barents Euro–Arctic Region (BEAR), which in terms of land territory is one of the biggest international region-building projects in Europe, was established in 1993 to meet the new security challenges following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the opening up of the borders between East and West. Stretching over major parts of Northwest Russia and three Nordic countries, the region bridges areas, which for decades were heavily influenced by high Cold War tensions and deep social, economic and political cleavages.
Over the last two decades Kazakhstan has implemented foreign policies aimed at improving relations with many new geopolitical actors, as well as longstanding common partners such as Russia, on which it was formerly heavily dependent. By utilising its huge hydrocarbon production potential, Kazakhstan has managed to surpass all other Central Asian states in political and economic importance. Kazakhstan has now turned its eyes to China, seeing it as an important and powerful partner in the economic, political and security spheres.
This commentary will begin by giving a background of the ‘New Silk Road’ and its different versions, moving on to a discussion of the geopolitical and economic factors related to it. The commentary will then try to analyse some of the critical obstacles to the ‘New Silk Road’ and also make recommendations for a more acceptable and feasible project within the current geopolitical set-up