In June 2020, Egyptian President Fatah al-Sisi threatened military action in Libya unless the Turkish-backed forces halt their advances in Eastern Libya.1 Later on, in 2020, reports suggesting crucial defence agreements and joint-military exercises continued to highlight Cairo’s efforts in building a robust military force in the region. What explains this assertive military posturing by Cairo? Is it a consequence of Sisi’s consolidation of power, wherein he is trying to establish himself as a leader in the region? Or are there external factors that explain such behaviour on the part of Egypt? Additionally, what could be the possible repercussions of this on Egypt and the region?
Quest for Stronger Military
Since coming to office in 2014, Egyptian President Sisi has endeavoured to strengthen the Egyptian military, as evidenced by Egypt’s defence expenditure trends. From 2010 to 2019, Egyptian arms acquisitions have increased significantly compared with the previous decade (2000-10).2 As per the SIPRI database, between 2015-19, Egypt was the second-largest importer of arms in the Middle East (accounting for 16 per cent of total imports in the region), following Saudi Arabia (35 per cent).3 Cairo is also the fourth-largest recipient of military aid from Washington, worth US$ 1.3 billion.4 However, last year, the intensifying of conflict in Libya and Mediterranean theatres and the rekindling of conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region have contributed to the rise in security concerns in Cairo that have largely dictated Egypt’s quest for military posturing.
On June 06, 2020, President Sisi, alongside Field Marshal Haftar (military chief) and Aguila Saleh (head of the pro-Haftar parliament) of Libya National Army Libya (LNA), issued the Cairo Declaration, a proposal aimed to provide a political solution to the conflict in Libya. Along with the UAE and Russia, Egypt has supported the LNA against the Government of National Accord (or GNA), recognised by the United Nations and backed by Turkey and Qatar. GNA rejected the Cairo Declaration, as the GNA-led forces that include nearly 2,000 fighters of Free Syrian Army (FSA)—Turkish-backed militia—which had been successfully making advances against Haftar-led forces. To this, President Sisi had issued the threat of military action while also stressing a global legitimacy for such an action. Sisi regarded the Libyan cities of Sirte and Al-Jufra as a “red line for Egyptian national security.”5 After this particular escalation, the strengthening of military capability appears to have taken a central position in Sisi’s foreign policy. This is apparent in multiple ways, whether it is the frequent visits by President Sisi to military bases, which he generally uses as platforms to deliver strong-worded messages targeting Ankara, or the multitude of joint-military exercises that Egypt has been conducting. Moreover, Egypt’s grandiose office complex for the Minister of Defence, which is being built on the lines of the US’s Pentagon—dubbed as the Octagon—would require the corresponding defence capabilities.6
In August, reports suggesting the delivery of five Su-35 fighter jets from Russia to Egypt emerged, making Egypt the second country after China to possess these highly sought-after multi-role fighter jets.7 These fighter planes are part of the March 2019 defence deal which were to be delivered in late-2020/early-2021. Such haste, even during the pandemic, indicates Egypt’s shifting priorities in bolstering its defence capabilities. The deal was also a subject of controversy, as Washington had been displeased with it, even threatening CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions against Cairo.8
To boost its naval capabilities, Egypt has moved to secure a deal to purchase two Bergamini-class FREMM frigates and four other custom-built frigates, as reported by Italy’s La Repubblica.9 Furthermore, the Egyptian Navy undertook two joint-military exercises with the Spanish Navy in the Red Sea (June 2019 and February 2021),10 and another exercise in the Mediterranean Sea,11 which can be viewed mainly as responses to Turkish Naval exercises. Earlier, in April, Egypt had also taken delivery of a submarine from Germany (third of the four contracted in 2014).12
With Russia, the defence cooperation has only strengthened over the last year, which has followed the consolidation of earlier defence purchases, especially the US$ 3.5 billion landmark deal signed in 2015. Egypt has also expressed interest in purchasing the popular Russian defence system called “Bastion,” to secure its coasts and gas fields in the Mediterranean.13 In October/November 2019, Cairo and Moscow were involved in a joint military exercise known as “Arrow of Friendship-1.”14 This had followed more comprehensive exercises in 2020. In October, the two countries conducted a joint exercise in the Mediterranean Sea,15 followed by another exercise in the Black Sea, three months later, in January 2021.16 Evidently, these exercises have inordinate signalling value to Turkey by reminding Ankara of its vulnerability.
Interestingly, Cairo has been deft in its selection of defence suppliers, evident in the diversification of sellers from Europe, Russia and the United States. Before its departure, Trump Administration approved a deal to supply Egypt with excess air defence units to allow sales of parts to maintain Chaparral fire units along Egypt’s border.17 In 2018, the US and Egypt had signed a US$ 1 billion agreement to obtain 10 AH-64E Apache helicopters, which followed the May 2020 approval for the sale of equipment to refurbish the existing fleet of AH-64E Apache helicopters for US$ 2.3 billion.18 However, Washington has been hesitant in providing sophisticated weapons technology to Egypt on the grounds of its poor human rights record and annoyance from Israel. Naturally, this renders Egypt’s more reliant on Moscow, but as apparent by Sisi’s decision to sign agreements with Italy and Germany, Cairo prefers diversification of its defence suppliers. Undoubtedly, Cairo's increased dependence on Moscow might hurt Egyptian interests since Moscow might compromise Egyptian interests vis-à-vis Turkey’s. Recently, Egypt has also expressed interest in purchasing India’s tour de force BrahMos missiles.19
Causes
Indisputably, the Turkish behaviour in the region has attracted criticism and ire of the regional countries; however, for Egypt, Turkey presents three significant challenges, all of which manifest in various permutation and combinations. One, for Egypt, the Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood is the biggest dealbreaker. Since Sisi has come to power in Egypt by ousting the Brotherhood’s government of Mohammad Morsi, the Brotherhood has been persona non grata in Egypt. Many of the Brotherhood leaders that escaped Egypt have found asylum in Turkey. This apprehension of Egypt towards the Brotherhood is shared by the GCC countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which see the Brotherhood as a threat to their respective regimes. This is also reflected in their support to Egypt in Libya and the Mediterranean theatre. The material support and implicit military cooperation are also components of the same.
Secondly, the Turkish policies in the region have enabled an inherent suspicion among the regional countries, especially its neighbours, including Egypt. Such fears are exacerbated in Turkey’s partnerships in the region that perchance threaten Egypt’s security and monetary interests. The maritime agreement signed between Turkey and the Libyan GNA in November 2019 is a case in point.20 The deal allows Turkey rights to natural resources in a zone that is under dispute. The Mediterranean countries, especially Cyprus and Greece, have also raised concerns about this deal after Turkey officially started drilling for gas and oil in this disputed zone.21 These countries, along with Egypt, are worried that Turkish control will encumber their economic interests with regards to the export of oil/gas to Europe.22 This explains Egypt's exclusion of Turkey from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, a grouping created to bolster cooperation and coordination between natural gas producing countries.
Finally, the defence aspect of Turkish policies weighs heavily on Egyptian policies. As per the reports of Yeni Safak, a Turkish newspaper outlet considered close to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has agreed to construct a military base in Misrata city in Libya that will overlook the Mediterranean and would hence compromise Egypt’s security in the Mediterranean.23 Even though the Egyptian Navy is considered a strong navy in the region, the proposed port will allow Turkey a significant strategic hold over Egypt.
Consequences
Needless to say, Cairo’s strengthening of military capabilities must have additional objectives. No matter the endgame, such a quest for developing a robust military would not necessarily be interpreted benignly by its neighbours, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. Cairo has already denied any ulterior motives, but the phenomenon of the ‘security dilemma’ dictates that such build-up would fuel fear and instability. Israel has expressed its suspicion about the same.24 Likewise, Riyadh has reasons for caution against Cairo, given incidents in the past. For example, in November 2017, Sisi had opposed any prospects of war with Iran and Hezbollah that had made Riyadh upset.25
Bearing these caveats in mind, there are credible prospects for an arms race in the region. For now, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have headed in that direction. The motivations for which may now be different, but the amassing of large volumes of arms by either one of these countries can instigate an arms race in the future. The conflicts in other North African states should also be a cause of concern, where the disputes are nowhere close to an end. A case in point is the North African nation of Algeria, which has ranked sixth among the largest arms importers between 2015 and 2019.26 Moving ahead, Algeria may take up a cue from Egypt to strengthen its military base in light of its enduring disputes against Morocco.
To conclude, as far as the external factors are concerned, Egypt’s defence posturing, which is manifested in maritime cooperation and increased defence expenditure, is an outcome of Turkish policies in the region. In 2020, Cairo felt its interests directly under threat by Turkish policies, and as a result, Egypt took a more assertive military position. However, such bolstering of defence capabilities also comes with additional imperatives. As such, the implications of such build-up are bound to make its partners, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, nervous. Israel, too is seeing the military build-up of Egypt with suspicion. Although Cairo has insisted that these defence manoeuvres are merely defensive and borne of its national security needs, 27 but going forward, these moves may contribute to an arms race in the region.
*Prabhat Jawla is a doctoral candidate in the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Non-Resident Researcher at the Middle East Institute at New Delhi (MEI@ND).
3. Pieter D. Wezeman, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian and Siemon T. Wezeman, “SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2020, at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/fs_2003_at_2019.pdf, (accessed on 8 March 2021)
23. “Turkey is preparing to establish two permanent military bases in Libya”, Yeni Safak, June 12, 2020, at https://www.yenisafak.com/ar/news/3458729, (accessed on 8 March 2021).
Egypt’s Assertive Military Posturing: Causes and Consequences
More from the author
In June 2020, Egyptian President Fatah al-Sisi threatened military action in Libya unless the Turkish-backed forces halt their advances in Eastern Libya.1 Later on, in 2020, reports suggesting crucial defence agreements and joint-military exercises continued to highlight Cairo’s efforts in building a robust military force in the region. What explains this assertive military posturing by Cairo? Is it a consequence of Sisi’s consolidation of power, wherein he is trying to establish himself as a leader in the region? Or are there external factors that explain such behaviour on the part of Egypt? Additionally, what could be the possible repercussions of this on Egypt and the region?
Quest for Stronger Military
Since coming to office in 2014, Egyptian President Sisi has endeavoured to strengthen the Egyptian military, as evidenced by Egypt’s defence expenditure trends. From 2010 to 2019, Egyptian arms acquisitions have increased significantly compared with the previous decade (2000-10).2 As per the SIPRI database, between 2015-19, Egypt was the second-largest importer of arms in the Middle East (accounting for 16 per cent of total imports in the region), following Saudi Arabia (35 per cent).3 Cairo is also the fourth-largest recipient of military aid from Washington, worth US$ 1.3 billion.4 However, last year, the intensifying of conflict in Libya and Mediterranean theatres and the rekindling of conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region have contributed to the rise in security concerns in Cairo that have largely dictated Egypt’s quest for military posturing.
On June 06, 2020, President Sisi, alongside Field Marshal Haftar (military chief) and Aguila Saleh (head of the pro-Haftar parliament) of Libya National Army Libya (LNA), issued the Cairo Declaration, a proposal aimed to provide a political solution to the conflict in Libya. Along with the UAE and Russia, Egypt has supported the LNA against the Government of National Accord (or GNA), recognised by the United Nations and backed by Turkey and Qatar. GNA rejected the Cairo Declaration, as the GNA-led forces that include nearly 2,000 fighters of Free Syrian Army (FSA)—Turkish-backed militia—which had been successfully making advances against Haftar-led forces. To this, President Sisi had issued the threat of military action while also stressing a global legitimacy for such an action. Sisi regarded the Libyan cities of Sirte and Al-Jufra as a “red line for Egyptian national security.”5 After this particular escalation, the strengthening of military capability appears to have taken a central position in Sisi’s foreign policy. This is apparent in multiple ways, whether it is the frequent visits by President Sisi to military bases, which he generally uses as platforms to deliver strong-worded messages targeting Ankara, or the multitude of joint-military exercises that Egypt has been conducting. Moreover, Egypt’s grandiose office complex for the Minister of Defence, which is being built on the lines of the US’s Pentagon—dubbed as the Octagon—would require the corresponding defence capabilities.6
In August, reports suggesting the delivery of five Su-35 fighter jets from Russia to Egypt emerged, making Egypt the second country after China to possess these highly sought-after multi-role fighter jets.7 These fighter planes are part of the March 2019 defence deal which were to be delivered in late-2020/early-2021. Such haste, even during the pandemic, indicates Egypt’s shifting priorities in bolstering its defence capabilities. The deal was also a subject of controversy, as Washington had been displeased with it, even threatening CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions against Cairo.8
To boost its naval capabilities, Egypt has moved to secure a deal to purchase two Bergamini-class FREMM frigates and four other custom-built frigates, as reported by Italy’s La Repubblica.9 Furthermore, the Egyptian Navy undertook two joint-military exercises with the Spanish Navy in the Red Sea (June 2019 and February 2021),10 and another exercise in the Mediterranean Sea,11 which can be viewed mainly as responses to Turkish Naval exercises. Earlier, in April, Egypt had also taken delivery of a submarine from Germany (third of the four contracted in 2014).12
With Russia, the defence cooperation has only strengthened over the last year, which has followed the consolidation of earlier defence purchases, especially the US$ 3.5 billion landmark deal signed in 2015. Egypt has also expressed interest in purchasing the popular Russian defence system called “Bastion,” to secure its coasts and gas fields in the Mediterranean.13 In October/November 2019, Cairo and Moscow were involved in a joint military exercise known as “Arrow of Friendship-1.”14 This had followed more comprehensive exercises in 2020. In October, the two countries conducted a joint exercise in the Mediterranean Sea,15 followed by another exercise in the Black Sea, three months later, in January 2021.16 Evidently, these exercises have inordinate signalling value to Turkey by reminding Ankara of its vulnerability.
Interestingly, Cairo has been deft in its selection of defence suppliers, evident in the diversification of sellers from Europe, Russia and the United States. Before its departure, Trump Administration approved a deal to supply Egypt with excess air defence units to allow sales of parts to maintain Chaparral fire units along Egypt’s border.17 In 2018, the US and Egypt had signed a US$ 1 billion agreement to obtain 10 AH-64E Apache helicopters, which followed the May 2020 approval for the sale of equipment to refurbish the existing fleet of AH-64E Apache helicopters for US$ 2.3 billion.18 However, Washington has been hesitant in providing sophisticated weapons technology to Egypt on the grounds of its poor human rights record and annoyance from Israel. Naturally, this renders Egypt’s more reliant on Moscow, but as apparent by Sisi’s decision to sign agreements with Italy and Germany, Cairo prefers diversification of its defence suppliers. Undoubtedly, Cairo's increased dependence on Moscow might hurt Egyptian interests since Moscow might compromise Egyptian interests vis-à-vis Turkey’s. Recently, Egypt has also expressed interest in purchasing India’s tour de force BrahMos missiles.19
Causes
Indisputably, the Turkish behaviour in the region has attracted criticism and ire of the regional countries; however, for Egypt, Turkey presents three significant challenges, all of which manifest in various permutation and combinations. One, for Egypt, the Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood is the biggest dealbreaker. Since Sisi has come to power in Egypt by ousting the Brotherhood’s government of Mohammad Morsi, the Brotherhood has been persona non grata in Egypt. Many of the Brotherhood leaders that escaped Egypt have found asylum in Turkey. This apprehension of Egypt towards the Brotherhood is shared by the GCC countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which see the Brotherhood as a threat to their respective regimes. This is also reflected in their support to Egypt in Libya and the Mediterranean theatre. The material support and implicit military cooperation are also components of the same.
Secondly, the Turkish policies in the region have enabled an inherent suspicion among the regional countries, especially its neighbours, including Egypt. Such fears are exacerbated in Turkey’s partnerships in the region that perchance threaten Egypt’s security and monetary interests. The maritime agreement signed between Turkey and the Libyan GNA in November 2019 is a case in point.20 The deal allows Turkey rights to natural resources in a zone that is under dispute. The Mediterranean countries, especially Cyprus and Greece, have also raised concerns about this deal after Turkey officially started drilling for gas and oil in this disputed zone.21 These countries, along with Egypt, are worried that Turkish control will encumber their economic interests with regards to the export of oil/gas to Europe.22 This explains Egypt's exclusion of Turkey from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, a grouping created to bolster cooperation and coordination between natural gas producing countries.
Finally, the defence aspect of Turkish policies weighs heavily on Egyptian policies. As per the reports of Yeni Safak, a Turkish newspaper outlet considered close to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has agreed to construct a military base in Misrata city in Libya that will overlook the Mediterranean and would hence compromise Egypt’s security in the Mediterranean.23 Even though the Egyptian Navy is considered a strong navy in the region, the proposed port will allow Turkey a significant strategic hold over Egypt.
Consequences
Needless to say, Cairo’s strengthening of military capabilities must have additional objectives. No matter the endgame, such a quest for developing a robust military would not necessarily be interpreted benignly by its neighbours, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. Cairo has already denied any ulterior motives, but the phenomenon of the ‘security dilemma’ dictates that such build-up would fuel fear and instability. Israel has expressed its suspicion about the same.24 Likewise, Riyadh has reasons for caution against Cairo, given incidents in the past. For example, in November 2017, Sisi had opposed any prospects of war with Iran and Hezbollah that had made Riyadh upset.25
Bearing these caveats in mind, there are credible prospects for an arms race in the region. For now, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have headed in that direction. The motivations for which may now be different, but the amassing of large volumes of arms by either one of these countries can instigate an arms race in the future. The conflicts in other North African states should also be a cause of concern, where the disputes are nowhere close to an end. A case in point is the North African nation of Algeria, which has ranked sixth among the largest arms importers between 2015 and 2019.26 Moving ahead, Algeria may take up a cue from Egypt to strengthen its military base in light of its enduring disputes against Morocco.
To conclude, as far as the external factors are concerned, Egypt’s defence posturing, which is manifested in maritime cooperation and increased defence expenditure, is an outcome of Turkish policies in the region. In 2020, Cairo felt its interests directly under threat by Turkish policies, and as a result, Egypt took a more assertive military position. However, such bolstering of defence capabilities also comes with additional imperatives. As such, the implications of such build-up are bound to make its partners, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, nervous. Israel, too is seeing the military build-up of Egypt with suspicion. Although Cairo has insisted that these defence manoeuvres are merely defensive and borne of its national security needs, 27 but going forward, these moves may contribute to an arms race in the region.
*Prabhat Jawla is a doctoral candidate in the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Non-Resident Researcher at the Middle East Institute at New Delhi (MEI@ND).
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