

MP-IDSA *Issue Brief*

Türkiye and the PKK: Disarmament and the Path Ahead

Abhishek Yadav

August 19, 2025

Summary

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) disarmament process opens a new phase in Türkiye's four-decade-long conflict. Achieving durable and positive peace will require the State to match the disarmament process with substantive reforms that address long-standing and present-day Kurdish grievances.

Background

On 11 July 2025, thirty Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants, including 15 women, took part in a formal disarmament ceremony near Jasana cave in Dukan, in northern Iraq.¹ This indicates a historic shift in Türkiye’s four-decade conflict with the group, which could potentially end one of West Asia’s longest-running insurgencies. Under the observation of Turkish, Iraqi and Kurdish officials, and members of Türkiye’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), the fighters destroyed their weapons as part of the group’s declared dissolution. Senior PKK commander BeseHozat read the disarmament statement in Turkish, followed by its Kurdish version. The ceremony followed the PKK’s May 2025 announcement to disband and end its armed struggle, in response to a call by imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan.

While this is not the first attempt at resolving the decades-long conflict between Türkiye and the PKK, it is widely regarded as the most credible opportunity to bring the armed struggle, initiated in 1984, to a definitive end. Initially, founded as a Marxist insurgent group seeking an independent Kurdish state within Türkiye, the PKK shifted its demands in the 1990s towards greater autonomy and cultural rights for the Kurdish population, which constitutes approximately 20 per cent of the country’s population.²

The PKK has been operating from northern Iraq after being pushed out of Türkiye’s southeastern regions in recent years. Türkiye continues to target PKK positions through regular cross-border military operations and has established multiple outposts in the area.³ In 2013, Öcalan had declared a ceasefire and called on PKK fighters to withdraw from Turkish territory. This period of cautious optimism culminated in the 2015 Dolmabahçe Agreement, which outlined steps towards recognising the Kurdish language and political rights. However, the truce quickly collapsed amidst the renewal of violence, particularly in southeastern Kurdish-majority cities such as Diyarbakır, the largest city in Türkiye’s Kurdish-majority southeast.⁴

Following the breakdown, Türkiye launched air strikes on PKK positions in northern Iraq. It conducted military operations targeting Kurdish-led groups in Syria, which Ankara views as extensions of the PKK. The Turkish government subsequently ruled

¹ Ako Rasheed, [“Kurdish PKK Militants Burn Weapons in Iraq to Launch Disarmament”](#), *Reuters*, 11 July 2025.

² Burcu Karakas, [“Kurdish Pupils Denied Language Lessons in Turkey Amid Wider Curbs, Families Say”](#), *Reuters*, 4 December 2024.

³ [“Türkiye Continues to Pound PKK Terrorist Targets Across Border”](#), *Daily Sabah*, 13 January 2024.

⁴ Alex MacDonald, [“Who Caused the Collapse of the Turkey-PKK Ceasefire?”](#), *Middle East Eye*, 10 August 2015.

out any further negotiations until the PKK disarmed, a condition that is now being met, with formal steps towards disarmament and dissolution underway.

According to the official position of the Republic of Türkiye, the PKK is a terrorist organisation responsible for extensive violence since its founding in 1978 resulting in over 40,000 deaths. Türkiye asserts that the PKK’s ideology is rooted in Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles and separatist ethno-nationalism, aimed at undermining the country’s unity, suppressing its societal diversity, and obstructing the integration and participation of citizens of Kurdish origin.⁵ Kurdish political actors and human rights organisations challenge this narrative, arguing that their legitimate demands for rights were often met with disproportionate repression.

The PKK’s primary targets, as outlined by Turkish authorities, include security personnel, economic infrastructure, civilians and diplomatic missions. Türkiye also accuses the group of involvement in transnational criminal activities such as extortion, arms smuggling and drug trafficking.⁶ The PKK is designated as a terrorist organisation by several international actors, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the European Union.

Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative

The Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative is a state-led disarmament and conflict resolution effort aimed at terminating the four-decade-long armed insurgency led by the PKK. The initiative formally entered public discourse in December 2024, when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan articulated the vision of establishing a “Terror-Free Türkiye” as a national objective,⁷ marking a discursive and strategic shift in Ankara’s counter-terrorism narrative.

In official discourse, the People’s Alliance presented the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative as a keystone of its ‘Century of Türkiye’ vision. This integrated strategy links security consolidation, national unity, economic rejuvenation and enhanced regional influence. Türkiye’s Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz explicitly described the initiative as part of the “Century of Türkiye” framework focused on internal stability and unity.⁸ Erdoğan has been consistently characterising the programme as an effort by the People’s Alliance to eradicate terrorism and fortify national coherence.⁹

⁵ [“Main Issues: Terrorism- PKK”](#), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ [“We Will Realize Our Vision of a Terror-Free Türkiye and a Terror-Free Region”](#), Directorate of Communications, Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 31 December 2024.

⁸ [“Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative Vital For Region: Vice President”](#), *Daily Sabah*, 22 July 2025.

⁹ [“We Take Brave Steps for Terror-Free Türkiye, Erdoğan Says”](#), *Hürriyet Daily News*, 18 March 2025.

At its core, the initiative seeks the complete dissolution of the PKK, facilitated by a conditional offer of political recognition and reintegration for Kurdish actors willing to disengage from militancy. It includes a phased approach: firstly, Öcalan’s call for disarmament on 27 February 2025, secondly, the PKK’s declaration of intent to dissolve on 1 March 2025, thirdly, regional coordination with Iraqi Kurdish authorities, and fourthly, staged disarmament ceremonies beginning in July 2025.

In a landmark declaration on 27 February 2025, Öcalan, the imprisoned founder of the outlawed PKK, called on all Kurdish armed groups to lay down their weapons and for the PKK to disband.¹⁰ Öcalan framed his call as a “historic responsibility”, emphasising that, like any modern political organisation, the PKK must voluntarily decide to end its armed struggle and transform into a peaceful political entity. However, he argued that the dissolution of the PKK and abandonment of arms will require a legal framework and democratic politics.

Öcalan’s message was delivered in both Kurdish and Turkish by a delegation of lawmakers from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party. He thanked Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli for their support in creating political conditions for peace.¹¹ He urged the PKK to convene a formal congress to vote on dissolving its armed structures, arguing that continued violence was no longer justified given past State policies that denied Kurdish identity.

In response to Öcalan’s 27 February 2025 call for the PKK to dissolve and pursue a peaceful and democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue, the PKK Executive Committee released a statement on 1 March 2025 declaring an immediate ceasefire.¹² The statement outlined Öcalan’s appeal as a ‘Manifesto of the Age’, initiating what it described as a new historical phase of non-violent resistance rooted in democratic politics. The PKK affirmed complete alignment with the call’s content, while stressing that its successful implementation required institutional reforms, political guarantees and restoration of Öcalan’s physical freedom to lead the peace process directly.

The declaration portrayed the transition not as an end to the Kurdish struggle, but as its evolution into a new form anchored in political activism and democratic legitimacy. While reaffirming the PKK’s historic role, the leadership emphasised the need for state cooperation and structural democratisation to enable disarmament and convene a party congress under Öcalan’s guidance. The statement also appealed to Kurdish society, especially youth and women, to support this new stage, situating it within broader movements for peace and justice in West Asia.

¹⁰ [**“Öcalan Calls On PKK to Lay Down Arms, Disband, in Historic Statement”**](#), *Turkish Minute*, 27 February 2025.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² [**“PKK: We Will Comply With Leader Öcalan's Call, We Declare a Ceasefire”**](#), *Ajansa Nûçeyan a Fîratê (ANF)*, 1 March 2025.

Ankara’s disarmament plan, launched following the PKK’s self-declared dissolution in May 2025, was enacted through a multi-state coordination framework encompassing the Turkish government, the Federal Government of Iraq, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).¹³ High-level diplomatic efforts, including formal engagement by Erdoğan and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın, focused on orchestrating safe zones for weapons surrender, defining logistical modalities and embedding joint oversight responsibilities among Baghdad, Erbil and Kurdish regional authorities.¹⁴ Turkish officials explicitly stated that Iraqi federal and regional bodies would take part in supervising the disarmament of PKK members based in northern Iraq.

Afterwards, in a video statement released on 9 July 2025, the first public footage of him since his imprisonment in 1999, Öcalan formally declared the end of the group’s armed insurgency against the Turkish state, calling instead for a transition to peaceful political engagement.¹⁵ Öcalan argued that the PKK’s armed struggle was initially a response to the lack of democratic channels available to Kurdish political expression. However, he maintains that the group’s militant phase has outlived its relevance in the current context.

Öcalan emphasised that the PKK’s shift from armed struggle to democratic politics indicated a voluntary and historic transition, not a defeat. He asserted that the original objective, securing recognition of Kurdish existence in Türkiye, had been achieved, and that the group’s continued use of arms was no longer justified. Framing the decision as a strategic and ideological evolution, Öcalan stated: “Existence is recognised, so the main aim is fulfilled. I believe in the power of politics and social peace, not in arms”, urging the PKK to operationalise this principle through lawful and democratic means.¹⁶

While Öcalan’s call for disarmament was received well within the PKK, analysts also point to significant advancements in Türkiye’s surveillance and military capabilities, particularly the deployment of armed drones, which enabled targeted operations against PKK members in remote areas. These technological shifts substantially weakened the group’s operational capacity and contributed to the broader momentum towards disarmament.¹⁷ Turkish officials framed the initiative not as a negotiation but as the culmination of sustained anti-terror pressure, suggesting that the PKK’s retreat was a product of strategic weakening rather than political concession.

¹³ [“Iraq Says Ready to Help With PKK Disarmament”](#), RUDAW, 16 May 2025.

¹⁴ Cem Cetinguc, [“Türkiye Pushes Forward With PKK Disarmament Plan As Kalın Heads to Baghdad”](#), *P.A. Turkey*, 8 July 2025.

¹⁵ Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, [“In Rare Video, Jailed Kurdish Leader Declares an End to Armed Struggle”](#), *The New York Times*, 9 July 2025.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Nonetheless, the process implicitly acknowledged the need for a political resolution to the Kurdish issue within a framework that preserved the unitary state model. While the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative has been welcomed as a potential turning point in Türkiye’s domestic peace trajectory, critics point to the absence of transparency, legal guarantees for reintegration, and sustained political inclusion of Kurdish voices as potential obstacles to its long-term viability.

PKK’s Aspiration for Peace

The PKK’s recent shift towards disarmament reflects intertwined ideological, strategic, regional, international and domestic factors. Öcalan’s prison writings moved the movement away from Marxist–Leninist secessionism towards “democratic confederalism”, reframing its goals as local democracy, gender equality and ecology.¹⁸ Sustained Turkish military pressure, enhanced by armed drone capabilities, eroded the group’s operational capacity. At the same time, regional developments, such as the rise of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD)/People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) in Syria and strengthened Kurdish institutions in Iraq, offered alternative governance models and altered alliances. International terrorist designations further isolated the PKK, narrowing its political and logistical space.

In its 10 July 2025 statement, the PKK tied the success of disarmament to the reciprocal action of the Turkish government.¹⁹ It called for Öcalan’s release for meaningful participation in the peace process, amnesty for fighters, reintegration into political life, and the release of Kurdish political detainees. However, Kurds argue that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)-Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) government has responded with rhetoric about brotherhood and normalisation while avoiding substantive legal reforms or confidence-building measures.²⁰

Moreover, Kurdish actors point to continued municipal takeovers by state-appointed trustees, judicial pressure on Kurdish politicians, and the June 2025 Tenth Judicial Reforms Package, which has been criticised for institutionalising punitive measures against political dissent.²¹ They warn that the process risks stalling before consolidation without legal guarantees, amnesty provisions and transitional justice

¹⁸ Damian Gerber and Shannon Brincat, [“When Öcalan Met Bookchin: The Kurdish Freedom Movement and the Political Theory of Democratic Confederalism”](#), *Geopolitics*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2018, pp. 973–997.

¹⁹ ElmasTopcu, [“Peace With PKK Could Boost Turkey’s Status in Middle East”](#), *Deutsche Welle*, 14 July 2025.

²⁰ [“Kurds Take Steps, Turkish State Remains Passive – II”](#), *AjansaNûçeyan a Firatê (ANF)*, 4 July 2025.

²¹ [“Statement by Justice Minister Tunç on the ‘10th Judicial Package’ That Has Entered Into Force”](#), Press and Public Relations, Republic of Türkiye.

mechanisms.²² While the Kurdish movement has started upholding its commitments, the onus now lies with the Turkish state to take credible, irreversible steps towards a sustainable peace.

Peace Process or Domestic Political Calculation?

At the AKP’s July 2025 policy meeting in Ankara, President Erdoğan acknowledged that past state abuses, such as enforced disappearances, political murders, bans on Kurdish language use and mass displacement, had sustained rather than defeated the PKK’s narrative.²³ The top leadership acknowledges that Kurdish historical grievances are legitimate to a large extent. He announced the formation of a commission in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) to discuss the legal framework required for the process.

Erdoğan promised that the government would proceed respectfully, sensitive to the complexities of the process, and conducive to a swift and peaceful resolution. He affirmed that the surrender of weapons would be closely monitored. Erdoğan also announced a unified approach involving the AK Party, the MHP and the pro-Kurdish DEM Party to advance the peace process.

Consequently, on 5 August 2025, the TBMM established the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Committee, a 51-member body (representatives from most parties) tasked with drafting political and legal recommendations.²⁴ It held its first meeting on the same day (electing a chair and approving a work plan) and a second meeting on 8 August, when members agreed on a ten-year confidentiality rule. The Committee’s mandate runs until 31 December 2025.

Erdoğan’s outreach to the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, alongside ultranationalist MHP support, reflects both a peace overture and domestic political calculus: Kurdish parliamentary cooperation is critical to amend the constitution for a potential third presidential term.²⁵ However, DEM leaders have rejected talk of a political alliance, insisting on a sequenced peace framework, negative peace, positive peace, democratisation, a new civilian constitution and a truth-and-justice process.²⁶ They argue that disarmament is only the first stage and must be paired with legal reforms

²² [“Judicial Reform Law Passed in Turkey Despite Warnings Over Repression”](#), *Medya News*, 8 June 2025.

²³ [“Erdoğan: The First Step Will Be To Establish A Commission In Parliament”](#), *AjansaNüçeyan a Firatê (ANF)*, 12 July 2025.

²⁴ Fatma Zehra Solmaz, [“Turkish Parliament Holds First Meeting of Committee Formed Under 'Terror-Free Türkiye' Initiative”](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 5 August 2025.

²⁵ Loqman Radpey, [“Is Turkey’s War Against The Kurds Over?”](#), *Middle East Forum*, 26 July 2025.

²⁶ Ayşegül Başar, [“DEM Official Outlines Expectations For Legislative Steps After PKK Lays Down Arms”](#), *Bianet*, 18 July 2025.

enabling reintegration, ending municipal trusteeships and ensuring political participation. Skipping stages, they warn, risks undermining trust and stability.

Nationalist factions remain sceptical, accusing the Turkish government of legitimising terrorism. Far-right leaders have dismissed the symbolic 30-fighter disarmament as inadequate, demanding complete surrender and interrogation of militants.²⁷ This entrenched opposition limits cross-party consensus, creating a narrow political window for reform. Nationalist opposition leaders have sharply criticised the ongoing peace process with the PKK. İYİ (Good) Party leader Müsavat Dervişoğlu condemned the initiative as a betrayal, declaring, “We will not allow the Republic to be destroyed, we will not allow the Turkish homeland to be divided, we will not surrender to betrayal”.²⁸

Moreover, İYİ declined to participate in the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Committee, arguing that engagement would risk legitimising the PKK and that the Committee lacked clear procedural and legal safeguards.²⁹ Similarly, Victory Party leader Ümit Özdağ denounced the peace process as an attempt to legitimise the PKK, dismissing the symbolic disarmament event in which 30 militants burned their weapons as a mere “barbecue party”³⁰ and argued that genuine disarmament would require formal surrender and individual interrogation of PKK members.

Despite official optimism, scepticism persists over the peace process, particularly regarding the divergent narratives between the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement.³¹ The Turkish government frames the initiative under its “Terror-Free Türkiye” campaign, emphasising security and the dismantling of the PKK. In contrast, the Kurdish movement refers to the process using the language of Öcalan’s February 2025 statement, titled ‘Call for Peace and Democratic Society’, which stresses democratisation, rights and reconciliation.

Critics argue that Erdoğan’s embrace of the peace process may be driven less by a genuine commitment to resolving the Kurdish issue and more by political calculation. By positioning the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as the force that ended decades of PKK-linked violence, the government may seek to bolster its domestic legitimacy and consolidate political power ahead of future electoral cycles.³²

²⁷ Ece Toksabay and Daren Butler, [“Turkey’s Erdogan Risks Alienating Voters As PKK Peace Advances”](#), *Reuters*, 17 July 2025.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ [“Turkey’s Parliamentary Commission on PKK Peace Process Holds First Meeting”](#), *Turkish Minute*, 5 August 2025; [“Turkish Parties Discuss Forming PKK Peace Commission in Parliament”](#), *RUDAW*, 18 July 2025.

³⁰ [“Türkiye’s Erdogan Risks Alienating Voters As PKK Peace Advances”](#), *Arab News*, 17 July 2025.

³¹ Pinar Dinc, [“Why Are Turkey and the PKK Turning to Peace – And Can It Last?”](#), *The Conversation*, 14 May 2025.

³² Ibid.

Challenges and Regional Spillovers

The PKK’s emergence was rooted in long-standing political exclusion, cultural suppression and socio-economic marginalisation of Kurds in Türkiye. Addressing these causes is essential for a sustainable peace beyond the cessation of armed conflict.³³ The trust deficit between Erdoğan and the PKK stems from repeated cycles of negotiation followed by abrupt reversals, most notably the collapse of the 2013–2015 peace process after Erdoğan repudiated the Dolmabahçe Agreement and violence resumed in Kurdish-majority areas such as Diyarbakır. Many Kurds view peace overtures as politically expedient rather than sincere, recalling past promises that yielded little tangible change—“they said the same things before, nothing has changed”,³⁴ was a common refrain in Diyarbakır following Öcalan’s ceasefire calls.

Despite the start of disarmament, implementation remains uncertain. Some fighters may resist demobilisation, joining affiliated groups such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran or the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.³⁵ Türkiye considers the YPG as the PKK’s Syrian extension and has conducted repeated cross-border operations against it. Without a regional disarmament framework, these splinters could undermine progress.

Türkiye has maintained pragmatic relations with Iraq’s KRG, but views the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria as a continuing security concern. Meanwhile, negotiations are underway between Syria’s new leadership under President Ahmed Hussein al-Shara and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition supported by the US. The SDF seeks military autonomy and a separate political framework, which Damascus opposes. However, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Türkiye, Thomas Barrack, has expressed dissatisfaction with the stalled negotiations, stating that the SDF must ultimately accept a unified Syrian state and military structure.³⁶

Türkiye’s apprehension is heightened by fears that Israel could extend its military footprint into Syrian Kurdish areas, as it allegedly did in the July 2025 Suwayda unrest. At a 28 July UN Security Council session, Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yılmaz linked the Suwayda clashes, between Bedouin Arab tribes and Druze groups, to Israeli strikes on Syrian military positions, warning that such actions

³³ Gemma Ware, [“The PKK Says It Will Lay Down Its Arms. What Are The Chances of Lasting Peace Between Turkey and the Kurds? Podcast”](#), *The Conversation*, 20 March 2025.

³⁴ Mucahit Ceylan and Adnan Ahmad, [“Turkey’s Kurds Wary of Path to Peace After PKK Declares Ceasefire”](#), *The Associated Press*, 1 March 2025.

³⁵ Elmas Topcu, [“Peace With PKK Could Boost Turkey’s Status in Middle East”](#), *Deutsche Welle*, 14 July 2025.

³⁶ [“Strengthening U.S.-Türkiye Relations and Advancing Relations with Syria”](#), U.S. Department of State, 11 July 2025.

might embolden actors like the SDF to exploit instability.³⁷ For Ankara, an expanded Israeli role in Syria could weaken its leverage, disrupt coordination with Damascus, and complicate its broader goal of integrating northern Syria into a unified state structure.

Therefore, in this volatile regional environment, shaped by Israel’s war in Gaza, Iran–US persisting tensions, and post-Assad political flux, Türkiye’s PKK disarmament push is both a domestic conflict-resolution effort and a strategic move to secure its southeastern border against evolving external threats and reduce internal security threats. The peace initiative thus can be considered a deliberate strategy in response to a rapidly changing West Asia region amid Israel’s increasingly decisive military dominance.

Conclusions

The formal initiation of the PKK's disarmament in July 2025 signified a historic achievement in Türkiye’s long-running Kurdish conflict. However, while this development signals a possible end to the armed phase of the struggle, the process remains incomplete, and its sustainability is far from assured. The initiative’s success will ultimately depend on the Turkish state’s willingness to address unresolved structural and political issues.

First, the absence of a clearly defined legal framework for reintegrating former militants poses a serious challenge. Although Türkiye has established a parliamentary committee to discuss the peace process, no concrete legislative steps have been taken to facilitate the safe return or political participation of disarmed fighters. The DEM Party has repeatedly stressed that the process may stall before it matures without tailored legal instruments, including amnesty provisions and transitional justice mechanisms.

Second, the continued isolation of Öcalan, widely regarded as a central actor in initiating and sustaining the peace process, remains a significant point of contention. The PKK’s leadership has tied the success of disarmament to Öcalan’s release or at least his ability to participate meaningfully in the process. Ankara, however, has avoided engaging in this demand, creating a trust deficit that could create a rift between the parties to the initiative.

Third, systemic challenges to Kurdish political participation persist. The replacement of elected Kurdish mayors with state-appointed trustees, along with ongoing legal pressure on Kurdish politicians, undermines the very democratic space that the peace process is purported to expand. The Tenth Judicial Package passed in June

³⁷ Rabia İclal Turan, [“Türkiye Urges Continued De-Escalation, Israeli Non-Aggression In Syria”](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 28 July 2025.

2025, was widely criticised for failing to include meaningful human rights provisions, including for political detainees and life-sentenced prisoners.

Moreover, the risk of militant fragmentation looms large. Not all PKK fighters may comply with the disarmament directive. Some could defect to affiliated groups such as PJAK in Iran or the YPG in Syria, especially amid broader regional instability. These splinters could reignite conflict dynamics without a regional disarmament framework or confidence-building measures among neighbouring states.

Finally, the call for a new inclusive constitution, voiced strongly by Kurdish actors, remains unanswered. While constitutional reform is implicitly tied to Erdoğan’s broader political calculus, including his desire for a third term, its implementation remains vague. Kurdish trust in institutional change may erode without a credible timeline or public consultation process. Moreover, İYİ’s refusal to join the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Committee, citing risks of legitimising the PKK and insufficient procedural safeguards, reflects entrenched nationalist resistance, which limits cross-party consensus and narrows the political feasibility of proposed reforms.

Therefore, it can be asserted that the disarmament initiative is a necessary but insufficient step towards durable and lasting peace. Suppose Türkiye seeks to consolidate this moment into a lasting resolution. In that case, it must move beyond a security-led approach and engage with the Kurdish issue through transparent legal reforms, inclusive politics and regional cooperation. The real test of this peace process will lie not in the symbolism of disarmament ceremonies but in the everyday realities of rights, recognition and representation.

About the Author



Dr. Abhishek Yadav is Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues.

Disclaimer: Views expressed in Manohar Parrikar IDSA's publications and on its website are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or the Government of India.

© Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) 2025