

MP-IDSA *Issue Brief*

Ankara's Pakistan Tilt: Fallout on India-Türkiye Relations

Abhishek Yadav

June 10, 2025

Summary

The strategic partnership between Türkiye and Pakistan has deepened through defence cooperation, arms trade and joint ventures. Türkiye's political and military support to Pakistan has led to increased diplomatic tensions with New Delhi. In the aftermath of Istanbul's support to Islamabad during Operation Sindoor, India's private and public sector entities have taken economic, academic and tourism-related counter-measures against Türkiye.

Background

Türkiye–Pakistan strategic partnership has garnered renewed momentum in recent years, driven by shared geopolitical interests, expanding defence-industrial cooperation, and a convergence of regional aspirations. The February 2025 visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Islamabad, culminating in the signing of 24 cooperation agreements across key sectors, marked a significant inflexion point in bilateral relations. Anchored in the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council framework, the engagements between Ankara and Islamabad have transitioned from symbolic expressions of fraternity to institutionalised mechanisms for multidimensional collaboration.

This Brief examines the deepening of Türkiye–Pakistan relations. It analyses key developments in defence cooperation, joint military exercises, technological transfers and arms trade dynamics. It situates these developments within broader regional and global trends, highlighting Türkiye’s rise as a major arms exporter and Pakistan’s increasing reliance on diversified defence partnerships. In the light of Pakistan’s recent usage of Turkish-origin unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against India, India’s broader responses across the regulatory, economic, academic and tourism domains are highlighted.

Institutionalising Strategic Partnership

On 13 February 2025, President Erdogan visited Islamabad, for the seventh meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council between the two countries, marking a significant advancement in relations between the two nations. The visit focused on expanding bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors and reinforced the strategic partnership that has characterised Türkiye–Pakistan relations for decades.¹ The February 2025 joint declaration, ‘Deepening, Diversifying, and Institutionalizing the Strategic Partnership’ established a comprehensive framework for expanded bilateral relations between Türkiye and Pakistan.² This strategic initiative encompasses 24 agreements spanning defence cooperation, health, defence industries, aerospace and maritime sectors, energy, trade, technology and financial services.

Joint military exercises have become a cornerstone of Türkiye–Pakistan defence cooperation, aimed at enhancing interoperability and sharing of counter-terrorism expertise. The Atatürk series of exercises is one of the most visible manifestations of this cooperation. In February 2025, Pakistan and Türkiye concluded the joint

¹ Zeynep Rakipoglu, Irem Demir and Gizem Nisa Cebi, [“Türkiye, Pakistan Sign 24 Cooperation Agreements to Strengthen Bilateral Ties”](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 13 February 2025.

² [“Türkiye and Pakistan Sign 24 Agreements”](#), Directorate of Communications, Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, 13 February 2025.

military exercise ‘Atatürk-XIII’, spread over two weeks. The counter-terrorism exercise was held at Pakistan's Special Operations School in Cherat area in Nowshera district near Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It involved combat teams from Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG) alongside 36 Turkish Special Forces personnel.³

The 12th International Defence Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) 2024 was organised by Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organisation in Karachi in November 2024.⁴ It hosted roughly 560 defence manufacturers—including 333 international firms—from 55 countries, and was dominated by Türkiye, which fielded around 75 exhibitors, followed by over 50 delegations from China. Other participants included the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Iran and Italy. Ankara's credentials as a rising global arms exporter are strengthening its footprint in South Asia. By showcasing advanced systems, Türkiye is leveraging defence diplomacy to extend its geopolitical reach.

In November 2024, the Turkish defence company Repkon entered into an agreement with Wah Industries Limited (WIL) to establish an advanced, fully automated production facility in Pakistan dedicated to manufacturing 155mm artillery shells.⁵ The agreement entails the installation of a comprehensive, turnkey production line that includes both shell manufacturing and explosive filling capabilities, with a projected annual output of 120,000 units. Previously, Repkon had implemented a comparable production facility in Texas, United States, under a contract with the U.S. Department of Defense. Notably, WIL, a subsidiary operating under the aegis of Pakistan Ordnance Factories, is responsible for supplying arms and ammunition to Pakistan's military and caters to a diverse range of international clients.

Trends in Türkiye’s Arms Exports and Pakistan’s Imports

The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database notes that Türkiye’s arms exports surged by 103 per cent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, lifting its share of global exports from 0.8 per cent to 1.7 per cent and elevating Ankara to the world’s 11th largest arms exporter.⁶ As mentioned in Table 1, in 2020–24, 18 per cent of Turkish arms exports

³ Islamuddin Sajid, [“Pakistan, Türkiye Conduct 2-Week Joint Counter Terrorism Exercise”](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 20 February 2025.

⁴ [“IDEAS 2024: Pakistan Hosts Global Arms Fair With Over 550 Defence Manufacturers”](#), *Telegraph India*, 19 November 2024.

⁵ [“Turkish Defense Industry Firm to Establish Ammunition Production Line in Pakistan”](#), *Türkiye Today*, 21 November 2024.

⁶ Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, [“Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024”](#), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet, March 2025.

went to the United Arab Emirates, 10 per cent to Pakistan, and 9.9 per cent to Qatar, signalling Ankara’s expanding footprint across West Asia and South Asia.

Table 1. Top Three Recipients of Türkiye’s Arms Exports (2020–24)

Recipient	Share of Türkiye’s Exports
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	18 per cent
Pakistan	10 per cent
Qatar	9.9 per cent

Source: [SIPRI Fact Sheet](#), March 2025.

Over the previous two decades, Türkiye has allocated substantial financial resources, amounting to billions of dollars, to its defence industry. This strategic investment has facilitated its evolution from a state predominantly dependent on foreign-sourced military equipment to one that has established itself as a significant exporter in the defence sector. The sustained financial commitment over two decades has catalysed the development of diverse indigenous technological platforms across aerial, terrestrial and maritime domains.

This comprehensive approach to defence industrialisation has enabled Türkiye to secure international export agreements valued at billions of dollars, while simultaneously achieving near-complete self-sufficiency in meeting its domestic defence requirements.⁷ Türkiye's arms imports fell by 33 per cent, reducing its share of global imports from 1.7 per cent (2015–2019) to 1.1 per cent (2020–2024).⁸ This decline highlights its transition towards self-sufficiency and status as a net exporter. During the period 2020–2024, Türkiye ranked 22nd globally among arms importers, demonstrating its decreased dependence on foreign military equipment.

As per the SIPRI factsheet, between 2020 and 2024, Pakistan’s imports of major conventional arms grew by 61 per cent compared with 2015–19, reflecting Islamabad’s concerted efforts to modernise its military capabilities. In absolute terms, Pakistan accounted for 4.6 per cent of global arms imports during 2020–24, ranking it the world’s fifth-largest arms importer.⁹ Between 2020 and 2024, Türkiye accounted for 3.8 per cent of Pakistan’s major conventional arms imports, making it the country’s third-largest supplier after China (81 per cent) and the Netherlands (5.5 per cent). It reflects Ankara’s growing role in Islamabad’s defence-procurement

⁷ “[Türkiye's Share of Global Arms Exports More Than Doubles in 5 Years](#)”, *Daily Sabah*, 11 March 2025.

⁸ Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, “[Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024](#)”, no. 6.

⁹ Ibid.

strategy and underscores the deepening military-industrial and diplomatic ties between the two states.

Table 2. Top Three Suppliers of Pakistan’s Arms Imports (2020–24)

Supplier	Share of Pakistan’s Imports
China	81 per cent
Netherlands	5.5 per cent
Türkiye	3.8 per cent

Source: [SIPRI Fact Sheet](#), March 2025.

Turkish Arms Transfers to Pakistan (2013–2024)

The temporal distribution of Türkiye’s arms transfers to Pakistan indicates a measured progression in the bilateral defence relationship. The procurement of a Moawin-class replenishment tanker enhanced Pakistan's maritime logistics capacity. This was followed by the transfer of 34 T-37B armed trainer aircraft in 2015, representing a substantial augmentation of Pakistan's aerial training infrastructure.

Table 3. Turkish Arms Transfer to Pakistan (2013–2024)

Designation	Description	Weapon Category	Order Year	Number Ordered	Delivery Years
Moawin	Replenishment Tanker	Ships	2013	1	2018
T-37B	(Armed) Trainer Aircraft	Aircraft	2015	34	2015
ASELPOD	Aircraft Electro-Optical System	Sensors	2016	8	2017
ASELPOD	Aircraft Electro-Optical System	Sensors	2017	16	2018
Bayraktar TB-2	Armed UAV	Aircraft	2021	9	2024

Source: [SIPRI Arms Transfers Database](#), 2013–2024.

A notable pattern emerges in Pakistan's sequential acquisition of ASELPOD aircraft electro-optical systems, with initial procurement of eight units in 2016, followed by

an increased order of 16 additional units in 2017. This progressive expansion suggests a systematic enhancement of Pakistan's precision targeting capabilities and reconnaissance infrastructure. The most recent technological transfer involves nine Bayraktar TB-2 armed UAVs, ordered in 2021 with deliveries taking place in 2024. This acquisition reflects Pakistan's strategic pivot towards incorporating advanced autonomous systems with strike capabilities into its defence architecture.

Moreover, the Ankara–Islamabad defence partnership also included the F-16 modernisation programme, electronic warfare test and training range; upgradation of Agosta 90-B submarines, MILGEM corvettes, UAV upgradation, R&D in drone technology and KAAAN National Combat Aircraft Programme.¹⁰ This pattern demonstrates an evolution in the defence relationship, progressing from conventional platforms towards more sophisticated systems with enhanced technological capabilities, indicative of deepening bilateral defence cooperation between Ankara and Islamabad.

Turkish Reaction to Operation Sindoor

Türkiye condemned the “heinous attack” in Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, by stating that it is “deeply saddened to learn that many people lost their lives and many others were injured in a terrorist attack which targeted civilians in Pahalgam region of Jammu and Kashmir”.¹¹ Following the launch of India’s Operation Sindoor, Türkiye expressed concern over escalating tensions between India and Pakistan.¹² It is significant that amongst Muslim and Arab nations, only Türkiye and Azerbaijan directly condemned India's military operation, while other Islamic nations refrained from any explicit condemnation of India’s military actions.

The Turkish statement strongly condemned India’s military action (Operation Sindoor) on the night of 6/7 May, describing it as a provocative act that heightened the risk of “an all-out war”.¹³ It termed it as “provocative steps as well as attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure”. Emphasising the need for restraint, Türkiye urged both parties to avoid unilateral actions and engage in measures to de-escalate the situation. Additionally, Ankara supported Pakistan’s demand for an investigation into the 22 April terrorist attack and called for the establishment of effective mechanisms, particularly in the area of counter-terrorism, to prevent similar incidents in the future.¹⁴

¹⁰ Abhishek Yadav, “[Türkiye–Pakistan Defence Cooperation: Evolving Dynamics](#)”, Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), 9 February 2024.

¹¹ “[No: 89, Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Jammu And Kashmir](#)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye, 22 April 2025.

¹² “No: 97, Regarding the Recent Developments Between Pakistan and India”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye, 7 May 2025.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

In addition to Turkish political support for Pakistan, which was visible through the official statements, other trends are also worth observing. For instance, the Turkish Navy corvette TCG BÜYÜKADA arrived at Karachi Port (4–7 May 2025). Pakistan’s Directorate General Public Relations (Navy) specified on 4 May 2025 that:

Goodwill visit of TCG BÜYÜKADA stands as testament to ever-strengthening maritime collaboration b/w Pakistan & Türkiye. It reflects deep-rooted mutual trust & strategic partnership between two brotherly nations, anchored in centuries-old historical & cultural ties.¹⁵

While officially characterised as a goodwill visit facilitating professional exchanges, the timing attracted scrutiny given concurrent security developments. This Ada-class anti-submarine warfare vessel’s deployment coincided with a period of escalating bilateral strain between India and Pakistan following the deadly terrorist attack at Pahalgam.

On 9 May 2025, Indian government officials stated at a special press briefing that between 8 and 9 May, Pakistan had repeatedly carried out incursions into Indian airspace along the entire western border, employing an estimated 300–400 Turkish-manufactured Songar drones for extensive aerial reconnaissance and attempted strikes on military facilities at 36 distinct locations, ranging from Leh to Sir Creek. During the night of 7/8 May, Pakistani forces also discharged heavy-calibre weaponry along the Line of Control. Initial analyses, as reported by the Army Spokesperson, indicated that the UAVs in question were Asisguard’s Songar systems sourced from Türkiye.¹⁶ Moreover, concrete evidence of the usage of Turkish-origin UAVs named ‘Yiha’ was also found.¹⁷ The Indian military’s preliminary assessment of the usage of drones suggested dual objectives—systematic evaluation of Indian air defence capabilities and intelligence collection operations.

Various media reports emerged claiming that Ankara has been sending planes to Pakistan to supply weapons. However, on 28 April 2025, Türkiye’s Communications Directorate denied the media reports claiming that Ankara sent six plane loads of weapons to Pakistan. The Directorate’s Center for Countering Disinformation said the claim in some media outlets was untrue. It specifically mentioned that:

A cargo plane departing from Türkiye made a stop in Pakistan for refueling. After that, it continued on its designated route. Speculative reports made outside the statements of authorised persons and institutions should not be taken into consideration.¹⁸

¹⁵ [**“Turkish Warship Docks at Karachi Port Amid India-Pakistan Standoff”**](#), *Marine Insight News Network*, 6 May 2025.

¹⁶ Dinakar Peri, [**“Pakistan Used 400 Drones, Possibly From Türkiye: India”**](#), *The Hindu*, 10 May 2025.

¹⁷ [**“Operation SINDOOR: The Rise of Aatmanirbhar Innovation in National Security”**](#), Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, 14 May 2025.

¹⁸ Asiye Latife Yilmaz, [**“Türkiye Rejects Disinformation on Sending Weapons to Pakistan”**](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 28 April 2025.

India’s Response

In a media briefing on 22 May 2025, Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs, Randhir Jaiswal, remarked that India expects

Türkiye to strongly urge Pakistan to end its support to cross-border terrorism and take credible and verifiable action against the terror ecosystem that it has harbored for decades now.¹⁹

On 15 May 2025, India’s Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), with immediate effect, withdrew the security clearance granted to Celebi Airport Services India Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of Türkiye’s Çelebi Aviation, citing imperatives of national security.²⁰ This action followed President Erdoğan’s pronounced backing Pakistan in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor. As per its official website, Celebi’s licence enabled it to provide ground-handling services across nine major Indian airports (Mumbai, Delhi, Cochin, Kannur, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Goa [GOX], Ahmedabad and Chennai)—accounting for roughly 70 per cent of such operations and handling some 58,000 flights alongside over 540,000 tonnes of cargo annually.²¹

Celebi has filed cases in India to challenge the termination of its ground-handling contracts. This may, therefore, have a legal cost for India as well. However, the revocation of Celebi’s security clearance signifies more than just a commercial decision. It signals India’s willingness to impose costs on Turkish businesses operating in strategically sensitive sectors. Strategically, it underscores a shift towards employing economic and regulatory measures as levers of foreign policy response, a marked departure from its erstwhile restraint in economic diplomacy. It also portends further deterioration in India–Türkiye bilateral relations, with potential knock-on effects on broader trade engagements.

Moreover, IndiGo, India’s largest domestic airline, will end its aircraft leasing arrangement with Turkish Airlines by 31 August 2025, following regulatory restrictions imposed by India’s aviation authority.²² The Directorate General of Civil Aviation declined IndiGo’s request for a six-month extension and instead approved only a three-month extension, citing passenger convenience considerations. The regulator has confirmed that IndiGo remained committed to terminating the arrangement by 31 August, without seeking any further extensions. The leasing arrangement was initially valid till 31 May 2025.

¹⁹ [“Transcript of Weekly Media Briefing by the Official Spokesperson”](#), Media Briefings, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 22 May 2025.

²⁰ [“Govt Revokes Security Clearance for Turkish Ground Handling Firm Celebi Airport Services”](#), *The Economic Times*, 15 May 2025.

²¹ [“About India”](#), Çelebi Aviation.

²² Abhijith Ganapavaram, [“Indigo to Terminate Turkish Airlines Lease Deal by End of August After Final Extension”](#), *Reuters*, 30 May 2025.

The partnership, established in 2018, initially focused on codeshare arrangements that enabled IndiGo passengers to access European and US destinations through Istanbul. Since 2023, the collaboration has expanded to include Turkish Airlines leasing two Boeing 777 aircraft with crew to IndiGo, for operations on the Delhi–Istanbul and Mumbai–Istanbul routes, providing greater passenger capacity compared to IndiGo's typical narrow-body fleet. The decision to terminate the leasing agreement also reflected mounting opposition to the partnership within India's aviation sector. Additionally, the arrangement faced public criticism following Türkiye's diplomatic support for Pakistan during the recent tensions between India and Pakistan.

In response to public criticism in India regarding Türkiye's support for Pakistan, Air India is planning to shift away from its current maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) service provider, Turkish Technic.²³ According to CEO and Managing Director Campbell Wilson, the airline aims to align with public sentiment and will explore alternative MRO options. However, he noted that the transition will be gradual due to the complexity of such operations. Given the absence of domestic MRO facilities for wide-body aircraft, Air India is expected to redirect maintenance operations to other established MRO hubs in regions such as Southeast Asia, West Asia and the US.

India's collective response also extended to the education sector, where several Indian universities cancelled their partnerships and exchange programmes with Turkish institutions. In response to Ankara's pronounced support for Pakistan, a number of leading Indian universities—including Jawaharlal Nehru University,²⁴ Jamia Millia Islamia,²⁵ Maulana Azad National Urdu University,²⁶ Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay,²⁷ and Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj University,²⁸ among others, have suspended or terminated their recent memoranda of understanding with Turkish counterparts on the grounds of national security. These decisions,

²³ Sukalp Sharma, [“Air India to Look For Alternatives to MRO Player Turkish Technic in View of ‘Public Sentiment’”](#), *The Indian Express*, 2 June 2025.

²⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru University, [“Due to National Security Considerations, the MoU Between JNU and Inonu University, Türkiye Stands Suspended Until Further Notice”](#), X (formerly Twitter), 14 May 2025.

²⁵ Jamia Millia Islamia, [“Due to National Security Considerations, any MoU Between Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, and Any Institution Affiliated With the Government of The Republic of Türkiye Stands Suspended With Immediate Effect, Until Further Orders”](#), X (formerly Twitter), 15 May 2025.

²⁶ Maulana Azad National Urdu University, [“The Maulana Azad National Urdu University @Officialmanuu Cancels All MoUs With Turkey”](#), X (formerly Twitter), 15 May 2025.

²⁷ IIT Bombay, [“Due to the Current Geopolitical Situation Involving Turkey, IIT Bombay is Processing Suspension of Its Agreements With Turkish Universities Until Further Notice”](#), X (formerly Twitter), 17 May 2025.

²⁸ Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur, [“CSJMU Also Cancelled MOU The Agreement Made Earlier With Istanbul University Turkey With Immediate Effect”](#), X (formerly Twitter), 15 May 2025.

taken in mid-May 2025, reflect a strategic realignment of academic collaborations, whereby jointly funded research initiatives are subject to rigorous security vetting.

Beyond their immediate impact, these cancellations signal a broader convergence of higher-education policy and national security imperatives, underscoring the willingness of academic institutions to recalibrate international partnerships in accordance with national interest considerations. Moreover, such an academic boycott signifies an attempt to reduce people-to-people connections that might otherwise serve as bridges between the two nations, indicating the depth of Indian displeasure with Ankara's actions.

In response to Türkiye’s vocal support for Pakistan, Indian retailers and consumers have also begun a widespread boycott of Turkish products. The All India Consumer Products Distributors Federation announced a total ban on Turkish goods, impacting items like coffee, chocolates and cosmetics across 13 million grocery stores.²⁹ Major fashion e-retailers like Flipkart’s Myntra and Reliance’s AJIO removed Turkish brands, citing national interest.

The fallout from Türkiye's military support to Pakistan has triggered a swift and severe backlash from Indian travellers, likely to result in a significant blow to Türkiye's vital tourism industry. Türkiye's Ministry of Culture and Tourism data indicates that Indian arrivals grew from 119,503 in 2014 to 330,000 in 2024, marking a nearly three-fold expansion.³⁰ The number of Indian tourists to Azerbaijan also increased dramatically from 4,853 visitors in 2014 to 243,589 in 2024, representing a fifty-fold increase. These figures demonstrate the significant surge in Indian tourism to both destinations during this ten-year period. Amidst anti-India posturing by Türkiye and Azerbaijan, over 2,000 Indian tourists cancelled or deferred travel plans to these countries, scheduled between May and July 2025. Travel platforms, including MakeMyTrip, Yatra and Cleartrip, have reported a steep decline in bookings of up to 60 per cent and a surge in cancellations.³¹

Conclusion

The deepening strategic partnership between Türkiye and Pakistan has encompassed institutionalised cooperation across defence, technology and industrial spheres.

²⁹ Dhvani Pandya, [“Indian Boycott of Turkish Coffee, Chocolates and Fashion Grows”](#), *Reuters*, 19 May 2025.

³⁰ Jocelyn Fernandes, [“Amid Calls For Boycott, How Much Do Indians Contribute to Turkey and Azerbaijan's Tourism? Explained”](#), *Mint*, 15 May 2025.

³¹ Maryam Farooqui and Yaruqullah Khan, [“Around 2,000 Indian Tourists Pull Back From Turkey, Azerbaijan; Bookings Slide South”](#), *Moneycontrol*, 15 May 2025.

Some of the key observations that can be drawn from recent developments are as follows:

First, the bilateral relationship of Türkiye–Pakistan exhibits a clear trajectory of progressive militarisation and defence-industrial integration. Türkiye's emergence as Pakistan's third-largest arms supplier (3.8 per cent of imports) and Pakistan's position as Türkiye's second-largest export market (10 per cent of exports) demonstrates the mutual strategic value both nations derive from this partnership. The sequential progression of arms transfers—from naval logistics support vessels to advanced unmanned combat aerial vehicles—indicates a systematic enhancement of Pakistan's military capabilities with Turkish technological assistance.

Second, both nations are leveraging complementary strategic objectives—Türkiye's ambition to establish itself as a significant defence exporter (achieving 103 per cent growth between 2015–19 and 2020–24) aligns with Pakistan's pursuit of diversified military procurement beyond traditional dependence on Chinese systems. This convergence has facilitated joint ventures like the Repkon-Wah Industries agreement for artillery shell production, signalling a transition from transactional arms transfers to collaborative defence manufacturing.

Third, Turkish response to Operation Sindoor has had a destabilising impact on India–Türkiye bilateral relations. Pakistan's deployment of Turkish-manufactured Songar and Yiha drones against Indian targets and Ankara's diplomatic posturing in support of Islamabad during this crisis demonstrated closer defence-industrial cooperation as well as diplomatic alignment.

Fourth, India's multi-dimensional response—spanning regulatory actions against Turkish commercial entities, academic disengagement from Turkish institutions and consumer boycotts—signals New Delhi's recognition of this partnership's strategic implications. The suspension of security clearance for Çelebi Aviation and the scheduled termination of IndiGo's leasing agreement with Turkish Airlines illustrate India's willingness to employ economic and regulatory levers as instruments of strategic signalling.

Fifth, the trajectory of the India–Türkiye relationship will depend on Türkiye's willingness to acknowledge India's legitimate security concerns and recalibrate its Pakistan policy accordingly. In the absence of such recalibration, India is likely to pursue more assertive measures to protect its strategic interests.

About the Author



Dr. Abhishek Yadav is Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues.

Disclaimer: Views expressed in Manohar Parrikar IDSA's publications and on its website are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or the Government of India.

© Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) 2025