

MP-IDSA *Issue Brief*

The Israel-Hamas War and Turkish Policy Responses

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S*ummary*

Türkiye's evolving policy response to the Israel–Hamas war following the 7 October 2023 attacks highlights a sharp escalation in its confrontational stance towards Israel. Anchored in President Erdoğan's ideological alignment with Hamas and a broader neo-Ottoman foreign policy vision, Türkiye has adopted a range of diplomatic, legal, economic and security measures.

Background

The evolution of Turkish-Israeli relations shows a stark contrast between the pre- and post-2002 periods. Türkiye’s position as the first Muslim-majority country to recognise Israel’s establishment in March 1949 underscores the historically significant bilateral relationship. However, the ascendance of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership in 2002 marked a decisive shift in this dynamic, characterised by deteriorating relations with Israel and concurrent warming of ties with Hamas. This is exemplified by Khaled Meshaal’s 2006¹ and 2015 visit² to Türkiye, despite Hamas’s designation as a terrorist organisation by major Western powers.

Erdoğan’s governance has marked two fundamental shifts in Türkiye’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict *vis-à-vis* the pre-Erdoğan Kemalist period. First, Erdoğan’s ideological alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood has translated into diplomatic recognition of Hamas as a legitimate Palestinian political actor. For instance, on 25 October 2023, Erdoğan affirmed that “Hamas is not a terrorist organisation, it is a liberation group, ‘mujahideen’ waging a battle to protect its lands and people”.³ This policy manifestation is also evidenced by Türkiye’s sustained diplomatic engagement with Hamas’ political wing after its 2006 electoral victory, though notably without extending support to their military operations in Gaza.⁴

The second distinguishing characteristic relates to Erdoğan’s instrumental use of the Palestinian cause within his broader neo-Ottoman foreign policy framework. This approach interweaves Türkiye’s purported historical obligation to protect Muslim populations in the region with contemporary aspirations for regional hegemony. The Palestinian issue has become central to Erdoğan’s ‘Century of Türkiye’ doctrine, which posits Turkish exceptionalism and positions Türkiye as a counterweight to Western and Israeli influence in the West Asia region.⁵ This narrative serves both foreign policy objectives and domestic political purposes, resonating with voters who support Türkiye’s more assertive regional role.

Since 2002, the Justice and Development Party’s (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) ascendance has marked a significant reorientation of Turkish foreign policy, with Erdoğan explicitly anchoring diplomatic initiatives in Islamic values and conceptions of justice. The Palestinian cause has emerged as a central manifestation of this ideological shift. Two significant incidents exemplify this shift: Erdoğan’s public

¹ Amberin Zaman, [“Turkey Allows Hamas Visit”](#), *Los Angeles Times*, 17 February 2006.

² Bassem Dabbagh, [“Hamas Leader Continues Middle East Tour with Turkey Visit”](#), *The New Arab*, 12 August 2015.

³ Tuvan Gumrukcu and Huseyin Hayatsever, [“Turkey’s Erdogan Says Hamas is Not Terrorist Organisation, Cancels Trip to Israel”](#), *Reuters*, 25 October 2023.

⁴ Aslı Aydıntaşbaş and Kevin Huggard, [“Understanding Turkey’s Response to the Israel-Gaza Crisis”](#), *Brookings*, 7 December 2023.

⁵ *Ibid.*

confrontation with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the 2009 World Economic Forum and the 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis. The latter incident, resulting in Israeli forces killing ten Turkish activists on a Gaza-bound humanitarian vessel, precipitated a severe diplomatic crisis, with Türkiye demanding reparations and issuing strong condemnations, fundamentally altering the trajectory of Turkish-Israeli relations.⁶

The Turkish-Israeli relationship maintains certain structural elements that have prevented complete diplomatic rupture, primarily centred on geo-economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Energy politics, in particular, has served as a stabilising force, catalysing periodic reconciliation efforts. The 19 September 2023 meeting between Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly indicated a historic diplomatic breakthrough in Turkish-Israeli relations.⁷ This first-ever in-person meeting between the two leaders was a tangible step in the gradual normalisation process between the nations, whose relations had been significantly strained over divergent approaches to Palestinian issues. Mutual commitments to reciprocal state visits further emphasised the meeting’s constructive nature, suggesting a potential trajectory towards sustained diplomatic engagement.

However, this trajectory towards rapprochement was abruptly disrupted by the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks and Israel’s subsequent military response in Gaza. Erdoğan, who has positioned himself as a prominent advocate for Palestinian interests, has consistently criticised Israel since the Hamas–Israel conflict began on 7 October. Israel responded to Türkiye’s critical stance in late October 2023 by re-evaluating diplomatic relations and indicating that its ambassador, who had departed Türkiye amid security concerns during anti-Israel demonstrations, would not resume her post. The Turkish government subsequently recalled its ambassador to Israel in November, approximately ten months after the diplomat had assumed the position—a role that had previously remained vacant for four years due to bilateral tensions primarily concerning Palestinian issues.⁸

Türkiye’s position on Israel–Palestine issue

Erdoğan has been quite vocal about the realisation of “an independent, and geographically integrated Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, with (East)

⁶ Tanya Goudsouzian and Murat Aslan, [“Is Turkey’s Big Break with Israel for Real?”](#), *Responsible Statecraft*, 21 November 2024.

⁷ Humeyra Pamuk, [“UN General Assembly: Erdogan, Netanyahu Meet for First Time as Relations Thaw”](#), *Reuters*, 20 September 2023.

⁸ Ezgi Akin, [“Turkey to Take ‘Series of Measures’ Against Israel after Gaza Aid Drop Denied”](#), *Al-Monitor*, 8 April 2024.

Jerusalem as the capital”.⁹ Moreover, Ankara’s official position was also evident in the joint statement of the Antalya Ministerial Meeting held on 11 April 2025, which reiterated the need to

...achieve just and lasting peace in accordance with International Law and the two-State solution, based on the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid terms of reference, including the principle of land for peace, and the Arab Peace Initiative, through the consolidation of the Palestinian state on the basis of the 4 June, 1967 borders ...”¹⁰

On 25 October 2023, Erdoğan explicitly stated in the Turkish parliament that Ankara does not consider Hamas as a terrorist organisation, but a liberation group, which was waging a battle to protect their lands and people.¹¹ Although he condemned the civilian deaths caused by the Hamas-led 7 October rampage in southern Israel, he strongly criticised Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. On 19 April 2025, Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin met Muhammad Darwish, the head of Hamas’ Shura Council, and his delegation.¹² Reportedly, the meeting took place to discuss measures to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza, review current initiatives to halt Israel’s action in Gaza and achieve a permanent, comprehensive ceasefire.

On 4 February 2025, US President Donald Trump proposed a development plan for external administration of Gaza and Palestinian relocation to transform the region into what he characterised as a “Riviera of the Middle East”. The Trump proposal encountered substantial diplomatic opposition from Arab nations and the broader international community. An emergency Arab League summit was convened in Cairo on 4 March 2025, which resulted in the approval of Egypt’s proposed US\$ 53 billion reconstruction framework, specifically designed to rebuild Gaza while ensuring Palestinians were not displaced.¹³ On 5 March 2025, Türkiye formally endorsed the Gaza Strip reconstruction plan ratified during the Arab League summit.¹⁴

On 11 April 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasised the critical necessity for a permanent cessation of hostilities in Gaza, asserting that any

⁹ Handan Kazancı, [**“Turkish President Erdogan Calls for ‘Independent, Geographically Integrated Palestinian State’**](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 8 October 2023.

¹⁰ [**“Joint Statement of Antalya Ministerial Meeting for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution and Lasting Peace in the Middle East”**](#), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye, 11 April 2025.

¹¹ Tuvan Gumrukcu and Huseyin Hayatsever, [**“Turkey’s Erdogan Says Hamas is Not Terrorist Organisation, Cancels Trip to Israel”**](#), no. 3.

¹² Zafer Fatih Beyaz and Fatma Zehra Solmaz, [**“Turkish Intelligence Chief Meets Hamas Delegation to Discuss Delivering Aid, Ceasefire in Gaza”**](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 19 April 2025.

¹³ Sondas Asem, [**“What is Egypt’s \\$53bn Plan for Gaza Reconstruction?”**](#), *Middle East Eye*, 4 March 2025.

¹⁴ Serdar Dincel, [**“Türkiye Welcomes Arab leaders’ Adoption of Gaza Reconstruction Plan”**](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 5 March 2025.

proposition compelling Palestinian displacement was fundamentally unacceptable. The statement followed a Gaza Contact Group meeting in Antalya, Türkiye, convened under the theme of establishing a two-state solution and sustainable peace in the Middle East. With regard to the official position on the ceasefire, Fidan articulated support for the trilateral ceasefire initiative mediated by Qatar, Egypt and the US while endorsing the Arab League’s Gaza reconstruction framework.¹⁵

Turkish Contribution to UNRWA (2020–2023)

The data on contributions by West Asian states to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from 2020 to 2023 highlights the evolving patterns of regional engagement with the Palestinian refugee cause. Among these states, Türkiye stands out for its consistent and substantial financial support, underscoring its long-term commitment to Palestinian welfare through multilateral humanitarian institutions.

Table 1. West Asian States among Top 20 Donors to UNRWA

Year	Country	Total Contribution (US\$)	Relative Ranking Among Top 20
2020	Saudi Arabia	28,933,333	7
2020	Türkiye	20,561,025	13
2021	Türkiye	20,471,544	13
2021	Qatar	17,000,000	15
2021	Kuwait	11,500,000	18
2022	Saudi Arabia	27,000,000	8
2022	Türkiye	25,199,080	10
2022	Kuwait	12,000,000	19
2022	Qatar	10,500,000	20
2023	Türkiye	22,103,820	15
2023	Saudi Arabia	17,000,000	17
2023	UAE	15,000,000	19

Source: Data compiled by the author from [UNRWA](#) donor charts.

¹⁵ Esra Tekin and Beril Canakci, “[We Reject any Plan that Forces Palestinians to Leave their Homeland’: Turkish foreign minister](#)”, *Anadolu Agency*, 11 April 2025.

Over the four years, Türkiye maintained annual contributions ranging between approximately US\$ 20.5 to US\$ 25.2 million, ranking within the top 20 donors each year. It was ranked 13th in both 2020 and 2021, improved to 10th in 2022, and slightly declined to 15th in 2023 despite maintaining a relatively high level of financial support. This sustained engagement reflects an institutionalised and considered approach to aid, setting Türkiye apart from other West Asian donors whose contributions demonstrated more volatility.

Türkiye’s consistent financial commitment to UNRWA serves two objectives. Firstly, it is emblematic of Ankara’s ideological and political solidarity with the Palestinian cause, a central feature of its foreign policy, particularly under the AKP leadership. By aligning itself with the plight of Palestinian refugees, Türkiye seeks to position itself as a principled actor and moral authority within the broader Islamic world. Secondly, this pattern of aid aligns with Türkiye’s soft power diplomacy, aimed at enhancing its regional influence through humanitarian engagement. Contributions to UNRWA afford Türkiye diplomatic visibility within international forums and underscore its role as a responsible and active stakeholder in regional crises. Unlike some Gulf States whose donations have fluctuated significantly, Türkiye’s regular presence among the top donors suggests an institutional integration of humanitarian aid within its foreign policy framework.

7 October Attack and Turkish Policy Responses

Since Hamas’s 7 October attack, Türkiye has employed a multi-pronged response against Israel—ranging from diplomatic protests and the withdrawal of envoys, to bilateral trade ban, legal manoeuvres and security-related restrictions underscoring its sustained and evolving pressure on Israel.

Intervention against Israel at ICJ

On 7 August 2024, Türkiye filed its official request to join the case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which was filed by South Africa on 29 December 2023, accusing Israel of state-led genocide in Gaza. Türkiye’s intervention in the ICJ proceedings against Israel is grounded in Article 63 of the ICJ Statute, which provides third-party states the right to intervene in cases involving alleged violations of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide. Türkiye’s diplomatic establishment justifies this legal action by citing its obligations as a signatory state to the Genocide Convention,¹⁶ which mandates state parties to engage in the prevention and punishment of genocidal acts under international law.

¹⁶ Ragip Soylu, “[Turkey Joins Genocide Case against Israel at the ICJ after Months-Long Delay](#)”, *Middle East Eye*, 7 August 2024.

Türkiye’s delayed intervention in the ICJ proceedings reflects complex internal deliberations and precedent-setting concerns. This hesitation was primarily attributed to two factors: firstly, the unprecedented nature of such an intervention in Turkish diplomatic history that required careful legal preparation. Ankara claims that its intervention is the most detailed, substantial and well-defended declaration among the applicant countries. Secondly, the most significant concern centred on the possibility of reciprocal legal actions, particularly regarding the Armenian events of 1915. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) raised specific apprehensions about the potential ramifications of Türkiye’s intervention. Their concerns focused on how Article 63 might create legal precedents that could be leveraged against Türkiye by various diaspora communities—specifically Jewish, Greek and Armenian—in potential future genocide cases at the ICJ.¹⁷

It is notable to mention that on 26 January 2024, ICJ issued an Order indicating provisional measures to Israel, under its obligations from the Genocide Convention, to take all steps within its power to prevent acts defined in Article II, including killing, causing serious harm, inflicting life conditions aimed at destruction, and preventing births among Palestinians in Gaza.¹⁸ Israel was directed to ensure that its military avoids such acts, prevent and punish incitement to genocide, facilitate urgent humanitarian aid, and preserve evidence related to alleged violations of the Convention. However, the Court did not call for a ceasefire or suspend military operations in Gaza as Israel had argued that such a demand would compromise its security by potentially allowing Hamas militants to regroup and launch further attacks.

Bilateral Trade Ban

The Turkish government announced trade sanctions against Israel commencing 9 April 2024, encompassing a ban on exports of 1,019 products across 54 categories, primarily in construction sector, including cement, steel and iron materials.¹⁹ According to the trade ministry’s statement, these restrictions will persist until Israel implements an immediate ceasefire and ensures consistent, sufficient humanitarian aid access to Gaza. This policy decision followed Israel’s rejection of Türkiye’s proposal to participate in humanitarian airdrops to Gaza.

Continuing the pressure, Turkish Trade Minister Omer Bolat declared that all bilateral trade with Israel was completely suspended effective from 2 May 2024.²⁰ Trade volume between both countries was approximately US\$ 9.5 billion in 2022.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ [“Summary of the Order of 26 January 2024”](#), International Court of Justice, 26 January 2024.

¹⁹ [“Türkiye Unveils Curbs on Exports to Israel Until Gaza Cease-Fire”](#), *Daily Sabah*, 9 April 2024.

²⁰ Esra Tekin, [“Türkiye’s Customs System ‘Completely Closed’ to Trade with Israel: Trade Minister”](#), *Anadolu Agency*, 2 November 2024.

According to Bolat, this trade embargo will remain in effect until Israel established a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and ensured consistent, adequate humanitarian aid delivery to the Palestinian territory. The minister clarified that Turkish exports to Palestinian territories will continue, subject to verification from Palestine’s Ministry of National Economy confirming Palestinian importers as the end recipients of shipments.

Analysts observed that the trade ban was declared and implemented, considering that enormous pressure was mounting from opposition parties. For instance, the Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP) prominently featured criticism of Israeli-Turkish trade relations in their campaign messaging preceding the 31 March local elections, in which President Erdoğan’s AKP experienced significant electoral setbacks. YRP leader Fatih Erbakan specifically censured the government for maintaining commercial ties with Israel. Despite its small size, the YRP—which entered parliament through its alliance with the AKP in previous general elections—achieved unexpected success by winning two traditionally AKP-dominated provinces after fielding independent candidates.

Blocking of Israel–NATO collaboration

During a press conference on 12 July 2024 following the NATO leaders’ summit in Washington, D.C., Erdoğan declared Türkiye’s opposition to Israeli cooperation within the NATO framework.²¹ Erdoğan stated that the Israeli administration, having allegedly violated fundamental alliance values, cannot maintain partnership relations with NATO. Erdoğan reported raising concerns about ongoing Israeli military operations in Palestinian territories, particularly Gaza, during his bilateral discussions at the summit.

Erdoğan characterised the Netanyahu administration’s policies as “expansionist and reckless”, positing that they constitute a security threat extending beyond Israel’s borders to the entire region.²² The Turkish president explicitly affirmed that Türkiye would withhold approval for any collaborative initiatives between NATO and Israel until comprehensive, sustainable peace is established in Palestine, advocating for a two-state solution based on 1967 borders.

In March 2025, Türkiye prevented Israeli participation in NATO’s annual ‘resilience and emergency preparedness’ exercise scheduled for September in Bulgaria.²³ It is being observed that the decision might relate to tensions regarding Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements concerning the protection of Druze and

²¹ Diyar Guldogan, “[Türkiye Will Not Approve Attempts to Cooperate with Israel within NATO: President Erdogan](#)”, *Anadolu Agency*, 12 July 2024.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ragıp Soyulu, “[Turkey Blocking Israel-Nato Military Drills Until Permanent Gaza Truce](#)”, *Middle East Eye*, 11 March 2025.

Kurdish populations in Syria, which Türkiye interprets as potentially promoting the partition of Syrian territory.

However, Turkish officials explicitly denied any connection to Syrian matters, clarifying that Türkiye has consistently blocked new Israeli-NATO engagements for over a year.²⁴ Türkiye has been exercising its veto authority within NATO’s consensus-based decision-making structure to prevent additional NATO activities involving Israel until Gaza receives permanent ceasefire status and unobstructed humanitarian aid access.

Rivalry in Post-Assad Syria

On 2 April 2025, Israeli forces conducted military strikes against multiple strategic targets within Syrian territory, specifically targeting aviation infrastructure. The operation included aerial bombardments of two significant military aviation facilities—the Hama military airport and the T4 airbase situated in proximity to Homs.²⁵

According to multiple sources, Türkiye conducted evaluations of three Syrian air bases as potential deployment sites for a planned joint defence agreement prior to Israeli airstrikes targeting these facilities. These Turkish military assessment teams reportedly examined infrastructure at the T4 and Palmyra air bases in Homs province and Hama’s main airport, evaluating runways, hangars and other facilities. Another scheduled Turkish delegation visit on 25 March 2025 was reportedly cancelled following Israeli strikes on both the T4 and Palmyra bases. The intelligence source indicated that subsequent strikes rendered T4 “totally unusable”, describing the action as a strategic message against expanded Turkish presence in the region.²⁶

These developments reflect escalating regional tensions following Syria’s political transition in December 2024, when Islamist rebels established a new government after deposing Bashar al-Assad. Israel has expressed significant security concerns regarding potential Islamist presence near its borders, alongside apprehension about Türkiye’s growing influence in Syria. Turkish officials have attempted to reassure Washington that their expanded military presence does not constitute a threat to Israel while simultaneously characterising Israel as “strategic destabiliser” and “the foremost threat to (regional) security”.²⁷ Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz framed

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Suleiman Al-Khalidi and Jonathan Spicer, [“Israel Hit Syrian Bases Scoped by Turkey, Hinting at Regional Showdown, Sources Say”](#), *Reuters*, 7 April 2025.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ [“No. 75, Regarding the Statements by Israeli Ministers Targeting Türkiye”](#), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye, 3 April 2025.

the airstrikes as a protective warning, with Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accusing Türkiye of attempting to establish a “Turkish protectorate” in Syria.²⁸

Subsequently, a high-level Israeli diplomatic-security delegation led by National Security Council Director Tzachi Hanegbi met Turkish counterparts on 9 April 2025 in Baku under the auspices of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.²⁹ The meeting aimed to address regional tensions and reportedly resulted in a mutual commitment to maintain diplomatic dialogue as a means of preserving regional stability.

According to Turkish officials, the technical discussions held in Azerbaijan indicate initial efforts to establish communication channels to prevent potential military misunderstandings or confrontations in the region. One Turkish source indicated that work towards implementing this mechanism would continue, though specific details regarding the scope or timeline of these discussions were not disclosed. An Israeli political source emphasised Israel’s definitive position that alterations to foreign military deployments in Syria—specifically highlighting potential Turkish military installations near Palmyra—constitute an unacceptable boundary that would be interpreted as a violation of established parameters.³⁰

Airspace Denial

Ankara refused an official request for an Israeli Air Force plane—carrying delegates to technical talks in Azerbaijan aimed at de-conflicting military operations in Syria—to use Turkish airspace, forcing the delegation to reroute on 9 April 2025.³¹ Ironically, blocking the very flights carrying de-confliction delegates risks undermining efforts to prevent clashes between Turkish and Israeli operations in Syria. Previously, in November 2024, Türkiye similarly refused to grant Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s state aircraft permission to traverse its airspace en route to the COP29 summit in Baku. Herzog had to cancel the visit, citing security reasons.³² Repeated airspace denials indicate Ankara’s deepening disapproval of Israel’s Gaza campaign and its broader regional posture, reinforcing Türkiye’s image as a vocal critic.

²⁸ Suleiman Al-Khalidi and Jonathan Spicer, [“Israel Hit Syrian Bases Scoped by Turkey, Hinting at Regional Showdown, Sources Say”](#), *Reuters*, 7 April 2025.

²⁹ [“Pursuant to a Directive from PM Netanyahu, a Diplomatic-Security Delegation Met Last Night with a Parallel Turkish Delegation”](#), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel, 10 April 2025.

³⁰ [“Turkey, Israel Have Begun Talks to Avoid Clashes in Syria, Sources Say”](#), *Reuters*, 10 April 2025.

³¹ [“Türkiye Reportedly Blocks Israeli Delegation’s Plane, Forces Detour to Azerbaijan Meeting”](#), *Türkiye Today*, 10 April 2025.

³² [“Turkey’s Erdogan Says Israel’s Herzog Was Denied Airspace En Route to Azerbaijan”](#), *Reuters*, 20 November 2024.

Conclusion

Türkiye’s response to the Israel–Hamis war since 7 October 2023 reflects a calibrated yet confrontational shift in its regional foreign policy, combining ideological posturing with tangible policy actions. Rooted in a long-standing ideological affinity for the Palestinian cause and Erdoğan’s Islamist political orientation, Ankara has increasingly positioned itself as a leading voice within the Muslim world in opposing Israeli policies in Gaza. While Türkiye had previously sought limited *détente* with Israel, the post-7 October 2023 developments have re-intensified hostilities, revealing the enduring volatility of the bilateral relationship.

Ankara’s multi-dimensional approach—ranging from high-level diplomatic withdrawals, bilateral trade ban, legal interventions at the ICJ, and vetoes of Israeli-NATO engagement, to strategic rivalry in post-Assad Syria—demonstrates a deliberate effort to exert pressure on Israel across political, legal, economic and security domains. These actions are not merely symbolic but constitute substantive recalibrations of Türkiye’s regional strategy. Notably, Türkiye’s repeated denial of overflight access to Israeli aircraft illustrates the instrumentalisation of state mechanisms in pursuit of geopolitical signalling.

Moreover, Türkiye’s consistent support to UNRWA and endorsement of Arab-led reconstruction and ceasefire frameworks underscores its attempt to present itself as both a principled humanitarian actor and a geopolitical stabiliser. However, Ankara’s policies also reflect domestic political considerations, including pressure from Islamist parties and a broader constituency sympathetic to the Palestinian cause—factors that have reinforced Erdoğan’s assertive foreign policy turn.

Yet, while Türkiye’s actions may bolster its regional influence and domestic legitimacy, they risk further alienating Western allies and deepening fragmentation within multilateral platforms such as NATO. The intensification of Ankara’s anti-Israel posture could also constrain its room for future diplomatic manoeuvrability, particularly in light of regional security interdependencies and evolving global alignments.

Considering these developments, Türkiye’s post-7 October 2023 policy towards Israel reveals the interplay between ideological commitments, strategic calculations and domestic imperatives. It signals not merely a reactive stance to the Gaza war but a deliberate projection of regional power anchored in Türkiye’s neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic aspirations, with lasting implications for both Turkish-Israeli relations and the broader geopolitical dynamics of West Asia.

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