Patrick Bratton

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  • Patrick Bratton was Visiting International Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. <a href="/profile/pcbratton">Click here for detailed profile</a>

    The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command

    India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context?

    May 2012

    Signals and Orchestration: India's Use of Compellence in the 2001–02 Crisis

    How effective was the Indian government in sending clear, coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages during 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02? This study finds that compellence was hampered by three factors: (1) the government kept changing its demands; (2) the lack of adequate civil-military coordination; and (3) the government engaged in a dual-track policy of direct coercion of Pakistan, while simultaneously engaging the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. Ultimately, these two policy strands worked at cross-purposes to each other.

    July 2010

    Mixed Messages: India's Use of Coercive Diplomacy in the 2001-02 Crisis

    Fellows' Seminar
    November 13, 2009
    1030 to 1300 hrs