The COVID-19 pandemic has situated the policy conversation on economic security at the centre stage of national security calculus not just in US and Europe but also in Japan. For Japan, it would entail attaining “strategic autonomy” in critical supply chains at the national level, and pursuing “strategic indispensability” at the global level.

India and America enjoy amity in their bilateral relationship, but both share adversarial relations with China. What has cemented their global strategic partnership is the threat that both countries perceive from China. This pattern appears set to continue into the medium term.

China is no longer interested in maintaining previous patterns of its relationships with India and US. It seeks to forge new types of relationships that are reflective of the extant balance of power. China expects India to demonstrate awed subservience and refrain from security cooperation with US.

In this era of complex interdependence, sudden disruptions in supply chains will not only hurt Chinese businesses in the US and elsewhere, but also damage the US economy as well as its reputation as a business destination.

With John Bolton conceding that the US has limited resources to compete with the tens of billions of dollars that China is pouring into Africa, it is not clear how effective America’s new Africa strategy would prove to be in containing China.

China may or may not succeed in transforming Africa into a substitute market. If it does, the bilateral trade relationship is likely to become more unbalanced and tilted in its own favour leading to greater exploitation of Africa.

While the China-US Cyber agreement is an attempt at conflict management or risk mitigation, the India-US Cyber agreement is a joint quest for security driven by a common threat perception, democratic values and growing dependence.