India-Myanmar Relations

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  • Venu Srivastava asked: What is the spillover effect of the military coup in Myanmar on India’s Act East Policy?

    Udai Bhanu Singh replies: Myanmar is the lynchpin of India’s Act East Policy— it was from Naypyitaw that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had launched the policy in 2014. The Tatmadaw’s coup on February 01, 2021, and the establishment of a new State Administrative Council (SAC), leading to a countrywide Civil Disobedience Movement, poses a serious policy challenge to New Delhi

    Ashok Kumar asked: How badly is India affected by Myanmar being a part of the Golden Triangle?

    Pushpita Das replies: Proximity to the ‘Golden Triangle’ together with a porous and poorly guarded border provides the enabling environment for traffickers to smuggle heroin and psychotropic substances into the country through the India-Myanmar border. Heroin, which was introduced in the mid-seventies in India’s Northeast, became easily available in the region after 1984 and by 1990 the region witnessed a substantial rise in the consumption of heroin.

    Security Challenges and the Management of the India–Myanmar Border

    Being highly porous, poorly guarded and located along a remote, underdeveloped, insurgency-prone region and proximate to one of the world’s largest five opium producing areas, the India–Myanmar border is vulnerable to the activities of insurgents and drugs and arms traffickers as well as criminals. Although the Indian government has been alive to the threats that emanate from a poorly guarded India–Myanmar international border, its attention towards the problem has been woefully inadequate.

    November 2018

    Rohingya Crisis Needs a Regional Solution

    The Rohingya crisis is not just Myanmar’s domestic problem but a regional issue and it needs to be tackled at the regional level in a more comprehensive way.

    September 08, 2017

    India must step up diplomatic efforts on the Rohingya issue

    The success of India's diplomacy will lie in the extent to which it can induce Naypyitaw to take a long view in the interests of its own political stability, internal security and social harmony.

    August 16, 2017

    Marriages of Insurgent Convenience along the Indo-Myanmar Border: A Continuing Challenge

    Marriages of Insurgent Convenience along the Indo-Myanmar Border: A Continuing Challenge

    While decades of counterinsurgency operations and peace processes have taken the sting out of the region’s major insurgencies, collaboration between groups continues to pose security challenges, particularly in the exploitable border areas adjacent to the upper Sagaing Region of Northwest Myanmar.

    August 10, 2017

    Is a Border Fence an Absolute Essential along the India-Myanmar Border?

    Regulated borders with greater emphasis on developing people-to-people contact and cross-border trade initiatives are likely to yield greater security benefits as against a closed border.

    February 06, 2017

    A Joint India-Indonesia Intervention on the Rohingya Issue

    Given that both India and Indonesia have a common interest in preserving their respective democratic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities, they need to work together to induce Myanmar to control the violence against the Rohingyas.

    December 15, 2016

    Visit of Myanmar President Upgrades Bilateral Ties

    The message President Kyaw took back from New Delhi is that India stands ready to support Myanmar in every possible way on its march to security, reconciliation and prosperity.

    September 02, 2016

    Operation Golden Bird: Revisiting Counter-Insurgency on the India-Myanmar Border

    Operation Golden Bird, conducted along the Indo-Myanmar border in the North-Eastern state of Mizoram under the aegis of 57 Mountain Division (57 Mtn Div) in April–May 1995, has often been portrayed as a joint operation between the armed forces of India and Myanmar. In reality, however, this operation was planned and executed by the Indian Army alone, with troops ex 57 Mtn Div and those under operational control of Headquarters Inspector General, Assam Rifles (North) or HQ IGAR(N). The Mizoram police was excluded from the operation, at least in the initial stages.

    July 2016

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