

US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective

Zhang Guihong

Abstract

American security policy towards South Asia can basically be divided into three stages: balance of power in the Cold War era, beyond balance of power after the end of Cold War, and new balance of power after September 11.

The Cold War saw an allied US and Pakistan rival the close relations between the Soviet Union and India in the subcontinent. Yet, South Asia became a low priority in US Asia policy in the early years of the post-Cold War era compared to other regions, especially East Asia and the Middle-East.

Three events, however, drew US attention to the region in the late 1990s. First, India and Pakistan exploded a total of eleven nuclear devices in May 1998. Then the two powers came into conflict in Kargil from May to July 1999 which resulted in a bloodless military coup in Pakistan in October 1999. Third, President Clinton's visit to South Asia in March 2000 topped off a changing US South Asia strategy with a warm Washington-New Delhi rapprochement. The Bush Administration continued to transform the US-Indian relationship.

This paper begins with a brief analysis of the significant changes in US policy towards India and Pakistan during the second term of the Clinton Administration by way of case studies of the three aforementioned events that transpired in the late 1990s. The second part addresses US security policy towards India and Pakistan after September 11. And, after some observations about US policy options in post-9/11 South Asia, the implications for China of the changing US strategy in the region is discussed from the lens of 'triangles' (which include a US-China-India triangle, a US-India-Pakistan triangle and a India-China-Pakistan triangle).



Dramatic Changes in US South Asia Policy During the Late 1990s

The end of the Cold War changed US South Asia policy in two ways. First, the Soviet Union was no longer the decisive factor in US formulation of its policy towards South Asia; instead, Washington began to view the subcontinent from a regional

perspective and started to deal with India and Pakistan in a different manner. Second, US interests and threats to these interests came from within—rather than from outside—the region. Economic liberalisation, non-proliferation and promotion of democracy became the main US policy goals in South Asia.

Tilting Towards India, Alienating Pakistan

In the late 1990s, the United States began to tilt toward India, as Washington and New Delhi turned from ‘estranged democracies’ of the Cold War to ‘engaged democracies’ in the post-Cold War era.¹

The tilt can be seen in the following. First, the US developed a comprehensive and institutionalised relationship with India, covering broad fields such as economic ties, political dialogue and military exchanges. Second, the US adopted a policy on the Kashmir issue—namely, calling for respect of the Line of Control (LoC), advocating direct dialogue between India and Pakistan, and opposing the use of force to resolve the dispute that was more favourable to India. Third, the US recognised India’s leading position in South Asia and its important role broadly, and began to collaborate more with New Delhi in international affairs. Fourth, India became the largest recipient in South Asia of US development and food aid: US assistance to India in FY 2000 reached a total of \$170 million—the second largest amount in all of Asia (second only to Indonesia) and more than 45 times that of Pakistan’s (\$3.78 million).²

Pakistan, previously one of the largest recipients of American aid as a US ally (\$600 million annually in the 1980s), received very little development aid during the 1990s. In fact, prior to September 2001, Pakistan received only counter-narcotics and food assistance (totaling \$5.4 million in FY 2001) due to three layers of sanctions imposed on Islamabad by Washington: the first layer was imposed in 1990 when the Pressler Amendment went into effect; the second followed Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998; and the third was imposed in 1999 to protest against Musharraf’s military coup.

The US tilt towards India does mean ‘India first’. But it must not be translated as ‘India only.’ Clinton’s decision to have a brief five-hour stop in Pakistan during his visit to South Asia showed that Pakistan was still occupying attention in Washington. The US had to try to help Pakistan remain strong enough to prevent the nation’s collapse on the one hand and on the other to put enough pressure on it to stop its active support of the insurgency in Kashmir and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, to change its nuclear policies and to return to democratic governance.

Changing US Strategy

The US-India rapprochement and cooling US-Pakistan relations in the late 1990s were driven principally by seven factors.

First, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the principal obstacle of a US-India relationship was removed and the value of Pakistan in containing the Soviets suddenly disappeared.

Second, India's economic growth made it an important trade and investment partner for the United States. Its strong Information Technology industry strengthened India's position on the world economic scene. In contrast, the Pakistani economy survived only through foreign assistance, mostly supplied by the US, China and various international economic organisations.

Third, the growing Indian-American community, one of the wealthiest immigrant communities in the United States (many Indian Americans are doctors, engineers and business owners, and their numbers have doubled in the past decade to 1.7 million) plays an increasingly important role in day-to-day American politics. By way of contrast, Pakistani-Americans are far weaker as a political force in American society.

The fourth factor is the increasing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean which connects the oil-rich Persian Gulf with growing energy markets in East Asia. From a geopolitical perspective, the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean connect Washington's European-Atlantic strategy with its Asia-Pacific strategy. The two were disjointed in the Cold War and in the early years after the end of the Cold War. But as the United States began to contemplate the need for a new European-Asian strategy to deal with potential threats stemming from the uncertain futures of both Russia and China, it was India—not Pakistan—that could play a key role in this new strategy.

Fifth, India and Pakistan had different images in Washington eyes. India was seen as an emerging power with economic potential and a bustling democracy while Pakistan was regarded as an almost failed state with economic problems and a military regime.

Sixth, the US viewed India as a potential counterweight to balance a rising China along the PRC's southern frontier. Important in this regard, border disputes and historical bitterness complicated relations between India and China, who were competitors in economic, political and geostrategic respects.

Lastly, US strategists regarded China, Russia and India as three transition states with uncertain futures. Different from China and Russia (which have many strategic points of divergence with the US), improving relations with India, however, was the best way for the US to break through a possible Sino-Russian-Indian strategic triangle which was first proposed by the then Russian Premier Primakov in 1999. Pakistan clearly had no position in this kind of power game.

Case Studies

With the end of the Cold War, the United States has increasingly focused on the dangers of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and regional conflicts in the Third World countries. Non-proliferation and regional stability became the priorities of US security strategy. South Asia has long been one of the regions in which both the priorities converge. The theoretical concern became a dangerous reality with the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 and the Kargil conflict between the two newest nuclear states in 1999. These events greatly changed Washington's views of South Asia. America's interests and goals in South Asia and its policy with respect to the issues of non-proliferation and Kashmir changed, and these changes eventually brought President Clinton to the subcontinent before he left the White House.

The Nuclear Tests (1998): On May 11, 1998, India conducted an underground test of three nuclear explosive devices and followed it two days later with claims of two more. On May 28, Pakistan claimed that it had set off five nuclear devices, followed by a further test on May 30. Although some Western analysts have cast doubts on whether the two countries actually carried out the number and size of tests they claimed, it is nevertheless clear that India and Pakistan did conduct some nuclear testing.

According to a report by the Council on Foreign Relations, for the US, both Indian and Pakistani tests were “as much a long-term policy failure as a near-term intelligence failure.”³ Nevertheless, what was important was what Washington learned from the tests and how its policy was adjusted accordingly.

Since India and Pakistan had become *de facto* nuclear states, the US had to change the focus of its non-proliferation policy from one of one-size-fits-all to one of nuclear risk reduction and non-deployment. In addition, Washington began to turn its focus from functional non-proliferation goals to broad regional interests which included: preventing possible all-out or nuclear war; promoting democracy and internal stability; expanding economic growth, trade and investment; and developing political and—where applicable—military cooperation on a host of regional and global

challenges including, but not limited to, those posed by terrorism, drug trafficking and environmental degradation.

Second, because of ‘policy under law,’⁴ the Clinton Administration had to impose sanctions on India and Pakistan. But the US soon found that two chief elements of its policy—commerce and sanctions—were contradictory. As Senator Joseph Biden pointed out, “We use sanctions to punish proliferation at the same time we are promoting commercial ties to take advantage of long overdue market openings in both countries.”⁵

Third, after the tests, the US recognised India’s security demands and regarded it as the leading state in South Asia. The twelve rounds of strategic/security dialogue between former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and the then Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh helped the two countries not only to clear the air but also to provide “a framework to reconcile the conflicting imperatives of India’s nuclear security interests and the US-led global non-proliferation regime.”⁶

Fourth, Clinton was deeply disappointed by former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to go forward with his six tests in response to India’s five, even after the US promised to offer him “everything from a State dinner to billions in new US assistance.”⁷

Kargil and the Musharraf Coup (1999): The Kashmir issue is the centerpiece of the conflict between India and Pakistan. It caused wars between the two in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War failed to automatically stop the hot regional confrontation in South Asia; and, after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, both countries faced significant pressures from the United States to reduce tensions through direct dialogue.

In the well-known ‘bus diplomacy’ of February 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif held a summit in Lahore and signed the Lahore Declaration which stipulated that their respective governments “shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.”⁸ The so-called ‘Lahore Spirit’ was widely perceived as a workable regime to break through the deadlock of confrontation between them that had lasted half a century.

However, between April and June 1999, India and Pakistan almost plunged into another full-scale war along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. During the serious military conflict along the 150 km front in the mountains above Kargil, “the Indian Air Force flew as many as 550 sorties.” “Indeed, not since the 1971 war had

air power been used in support of military operations in Kashmir.”⁹ On the other side, Pakistani military forces were reportedly deploying nuclear missiles near the border with India.¹⁰

Aware of the danger of escalation, the US strongly urged Pakistan to withdraw behind the LoC immediately, completely and unconditionally. Under great pressure, including a critical talk with President Clinton at Blair House in Washington, D.C. on July 4, 1999, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif agreed to “take concrete and immediate steps for the restoration of the LoC.”¹¹ But as a senior Pakistani strategist reminds us, “the conflict is not unending, but the rivalry is unending.”¹²

Still, according to a senior South Asia scholar in the United States, the Clinton Administration was unwilling to mediate an end to this conflict (as Pakistan wanted) because of two factors. First, South Asia remained a fairly low priority for Clinton as it had been for most American administrations; second, the United States did not believe that it had any vital interests in the region.¹³ This explanation is correct but incomplete; in fact, reasons for the US policy of tilting towards India during the Kargil conflict were quite different.

First, the US believed that it was the Pakistani army and its militant allies that crossed the LoC first and “were on the wrong side of the LoC”¹⁴; as a result, it had to withdraw first. Second, there was evidence which showed that the Pakistani military was preparing to deploy nuclear missiles. So the US had to put pressure on Sharif to avoid the dangerous consequences resulting from any resort to a nuclear option. Third, the situation in Kargil developed in a direction favourable to the Indian side because of its conventional advantage. The US merely asked India to restrain itself as it was difficult to force New Delhi to withdraw first. Fourth, the US wanted to do India a favour. According to a senior US official, “[o]nce the withdrawal from Kargil was done, the US would have more credibility with India.”¹⁵

The Kargil conflict finally made the US publicly declare its new policy towards South Asia which involved: recognising the Simla Agreement;¹⁶ urging respect of the LoC; advocating resolution of the Kashmir issue through direct dialogue between India and Pakistan; and encouraging both sides to return to the Lahore process. Meanwhile, Sharif’s decision to withdraw aroused strong dissatisfaction in the Pakistani military and gave momentum to a bloodless military coup in which General Pervez Musharraf took office as President. As a result of that coup, the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan as it violated US democratic interests and goals in South Asia. That aside, the US reaction following the coup in Pakistan, however, was generally muted. While calling for an early return of democracy, the US went on to do business with Musharraf and assured a policy of constructive engagement; partly because Pakistan was important and could not be ignored, but also because the US viewed

Musharraf as a man who, despite deposing the elected government, generally held moderate political views. It was not in the interest of the US to see Pakistan collapse.¹⁷

The Clinton Visit (2000): In May 2000, Bill Clinton paid a historic visit to the subcontinent, marking the first US presidential visit to India in 22 years. He was also the first American President to visit Pakistan in over 30 years, not to mention the very first to address the people of Pakistan on television.

In New Delhi, Clinton's arrival caused an outbreak of 'Clintonmania' which led national newspapers to publish even the most trivial details of his visit on front pages and generated high expectations among Indians.¹⁸

In a communiqué issued by both sides entitled *Indo-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century*, the Indo-US relationship was deemed to have entered a new stage—continuous, constructive in the political area and beneficial in the economic arena. It was to form the basis for mutual strategic, economic, political and social benefit.¹⁹ Moreover, both sides agreed to institutionalise the bilateral dialogue through a range of high-level meetings and working groups on various areas of cooperation.

In his address to India's Parliament, Clinton comprehensively expounded US policy towards South Asia. First, on the non-proliferation issue, he asked both India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); to stop production of fissile material and join the Fissile Material Control Treaty negotiations; and to institute tight export controls on goods and equipment related to their nuclear programmes.

Second, on regional stability, Clinton told both countries that, while the United States would not mediate the Kashmir dispute, it would lend support wherever possible to help India and Pakistan return to the Lahore peace process. He urged both India and Pakistan to create the proper climate for peace and to adopt a policy of the four 'R's' in their bilateral relations: *restraint by both sides; respect for the Line of Control; renewal of dialogue; and rejection of violence.*

And third, Clinton expressed strong US opposition to terrorism throughout the region and pressed Pakistan to use its influence with the Taliban in Afghanistan to curb terrorist training camps and to put an end to their continued hosting of Osama bin Laden.

Throughout his five-day stay in India, Clinton repeatedly called India a great nation and welcomed its leadership in the region.²⁰ On the other hand, in his remarks during his five-hour stopover in Pakistan, Clinton reportedly urged General Musharraf to develop a timetable and a roadmap for restoring democracy at the top as well as the local level.²¹

Moreover, a senior US official pointed out what Pakistan needed: “It needs better governance. It needs to end its dangerous associations with extremist groups in the region. It needs to demonstrate restraint, practically on the ground in Kashmir. It needs to find ways to renew, broaden, and deepen dialogue with India. It needs to stay away from adventures like Kargil. It needs to use its influence with the Taliban in Afghanistan to end that war, to shut down terrorism camps and to bring terrorists to justice. It needs to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and demonstrate restraint in developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them.”²²

New US Interests and Challenges in South Asia after September 11

When George W. Bush became the newest resident of the White House in January 2001, his Republican Administration continued the Clinton policy of engagement in South Asia, with a special emphasis on US-India relations. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, however, changed US agenda in South Asia dramatically as the United States for the first time found itself in the unaccustomed position of having good relations with both India and Pakistan: India offered its ‘full support’ for US counter-terrorism efforts and Pakistan decided to align itself with the United States. The September 11 incident provided an infrequent opportunity for Washington to build a partnership with Islamabad and a strategic relationship with New Delhi on different bases.

The Bush Approach Prior to September 11

According to the US Ambassador to India, Robert D. Blackwill, when President Bush was the Governor of Texas in early 1999, he had ‘one big idea’, part of which was the ‘transformation’ of US-India relations because of India’s emergence as a rising world power, as an ever more influential leader of the community of democratic nations and because of its potential as a global market.²³ When Mr. Bush was ‘selected’ to be the forty-third President in late 2000, he began to turn his ‘big idea’ into reality.

Thus, the predominant emphasis of the new Republican Administration’s approach towards South Asia was improving and ‘transforming’ its ties with India. President Bush’s April 2001 decision to ‘drop by’ the visiting Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh’s meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice (which led to a cordial forty-minute talk in the Oval Office) was the beginning of a series of steps changing the nature of US-India relations.

The security field was the first beneficiary of transforming US-Indian relations. The Bush Administration de-emphasised non-proliferation as the sole determinant of US policy towards India and moved away from its demands for India’s signing of the CTBT to a discussion of President Bush’s proposed ‘new strategic framework.’ With

progress in the security field moving apace, India's reactions to President Bush's May 1, 2001 speech on his controversial missile defense proposals was far more positive than those of most US allies.

The second element of the transformation was the rebirth of defence cooperation with India. There have been numerous exchanges of high-level defence officials as well as meetings on peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, disaster relief, environmental security and even joint exercises. An important milestone was the late July 2001 visit of General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who became the highest ranking US military official to visit India since 1998 and the first chairman of the JCS to ever visit the nation. Of particular significance was the announcement about reviving the meetings of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), the key institution providing overall direction to defence cooperation between the two countries.

The third action aimed at transforming the relationship was the US decision to relax the sanctions imposed on India after its nuclear tests in 1998. In fact, "[t]he week of September 10, 2001, US officials were readying a briefing for congressional staff [indicating] that the Bush Administration was preparing to suspend all nuclear-related sanctions on India, while leaving in place many sanctions that limited US assistance to Pakistan."²⁴

At the time, in the remarks made to the US-India Business Council on June 19, 2001, Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, described the transformation in US-India relations as one of an evolution from "estranged democracies" to "engaged democracies."²⁵

While India was increasingly perceived as an opportunity, Pakistan came to be viewed as a real difficulty. Pakistan was economically vulnerable, politically unstable and internationally isolated; and it was widely viewed as a decaying and increasingly Islamic state.²⁶ Following the Kargil conflict and the resulting military coup in 1999, the United States gradually regarded Pakistan as a problematic and troublesome country, if not a failed state.

While sharing many common interests with India, the United States encountered many frictions in its relations with Pakistan. On the non-proliferation front, Pakistan refused to suspend its missile programme or sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CTBT unless India did so first. (Even worse, it was later discovered that Pakistan had a nuclear and missile exchange with North Korea before September 11) Moreover, Islamabad had close links with Islamic extremist groups and provided active support for the Kashmir insurgency, which was based and trained in Pakistan. Pakistan also backed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and was one of only three

countries that formally recognised the regime. And lastly, Musharraf's military rule posed further problems; the US asked Islamabad to restore civil government and return to democracy, but there was little progress made. As a result, before September 11, a marginalised Pakistan had a low priority on Bush's agenda.

Bush Policy After September 11

On September 11, 2001, the United States became the victim of a series of well-organised and highly coordinated terrorist attacks. Several thousand innocent citizens were killed suddenly after two hijacked civilian airliners slammed into the Twin Towers—the symbols of American economic and financial power—of the World Trade Center in New York and the west sections of the Pentagon in Washington DC.

It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the attacks on the US, their implications for the rest of the world and to predict what the differences before and after September 11 will be. Some have said that the new century began on September 11 rather than on January 1, 2001. Others argued that the end of the Cold War has ended and the world has entered the post-post-Cold War era. The most terse but profound formulation is that of President Bush: "9/11 changed America."

They have also transformed the dynamics of regional security in South Asia. "The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon turned US' South Asia policy temporarily upside down, bringing Pakistan to centerstage and putting parts of the US-India agenda on hold."²⁷ As South Asia scholar Stephen P. Cohen has said, no part of the world was more affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 than South Asia.²⁸

In the wake of September 11, it appears that the US has three main goals in South Asia:

- For the short term, it is trying to prevent an all-out war between India and Pakistan while concurrently maintaining Indian and Pakistani cooperation in the anti-terror campaign and keeping bilateral relations with the two nations on a positive course.
- For the medium term, the US is interested in preventing the Indo-Pakistani conflict from erupting into a nuclear exchange and ensuring that nuclear weapon-related material in South Asia is not obtained by terrorists or other organisations that would confound non-proliferation efforts.
- For the long term, the United States seeks a permanent solution to the Kashmir problem while at the same time attempting to avoid creating a sanctuary for extremist Islamic militants in the area.

In response to India's 'full support' and Pakistan's 'indispensable help' in the global war on terrorism, President Bush rapidly waived sanctions and provided assistance to them. On September 22, 2001, Bush issued a final determination removing all remaining nuclear test-related economic sanctions against Pakistan and India. On October 27, 2001, the President signed S.146 (P.L. 107-57) into law, officially waiving sanctions on Pakistan related to democracy and debt arrearage through 2003. In addition, the removal of sanctions allowed the United States to extend \$600 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Islamabad. In 2002, Pakistan received an estimated \$624.5 million in development assistance and ESF, while India received \$164.3 million in development aid, ESF and food aid grants.²⁹

In its *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, issued in September 2002, the White House indicated that it would "invest time and resources [into] building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan," adding that US-Pakistan relations had been "bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war against terror and move towards building a more open and tolerant society." At the same time, the US took note of "India's potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century," and added that it has "worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly."³⁰ The United States, thus, planned to build more balanced relationships in South Asia: a partnership with Islamabad and a strategic relationship with New Delhi.

Both relationships, however, face uncertainty. First, the so-called 'balanceable' relations are in fact asymmetrical. The US-Pakistan 'partnership' was driven in the short term by a single dimension which glossed over many of the divergences between the two nations. Even in the counter-terrorism campaign, Washington and Islamabad have different and sometimes conflicting goals. The US-India 'strategic relationship', however, was a goal the two nations set a few years ago and was based on broad common interests, even if the process was slower than expected.

Second, combating terrorism was the primary, if not sole, basis of the US-Pakistan 'partnership'. The US and Pakistan had workable collaborations in the operation of removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. When they moved the field to the western part of Pakistan to hunt down the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaida, however, the situation turned to be complicated. The partners began to disagree when a series of major terrorist incidents took place in Kashmir and it became apparent that the two nations had opposing viewpoints.

Third, in New Delhi, despite its longer-term rationale, "pessimism began to cloud public thinking on the future of US-India relations based on the feeling that post-September 11 developments had swept away more than a decade of political efforts to restructure the relationship with the United States."³¹ The Bush Administration

now has to “balance a new emphasis on terrorism with standing priorities such as the global economy and democracy.” This will be challenging, to say the least.

US and Pakistan: Re-engaging the Frontline State

The immediate consequences of the attacks of September 11, particularly for Pakistan, were clear and profound. The campaign, in the name of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, made Pakistan a frontline state in the US-led counter-terror campaign. Two factors contributed to Pakistan’s renewed significance in US eyes: first, Pakistan shared a border with Afghanistan and was among the few countries that had a formal diplomatic relationship with the Taliban regime. Second, Pakistan itself “combine[d] the two major security threats to the United States: Weapons of Mass Destruction and perceived links with terrorism.”³²

On the Pakistani side, General Pervez Musharraf correctly calculated that if Pakistan did not cooperate with the United States, his nation, at the very least, would be marginalised and isolated by the US and the international community; at worst, Pakistan itself could be targeted because of its support of, and close relationship with, the Taliban.

In a speech to the nation on September 19, 2001, Musharraf explained that his decision to support the US was based on four key Pakistani interests: the country’s security; its economic revival; the need to safeguard its “strategic nuclear and missile assets”; and the Kashmir cause. In another address to his people on January 12, 2002 he stated, “We decided to join the international coalition against terrorism... We took this decision on principles and in our national interest.” He added, “Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world.”³³ He also identified economic and social reform as critical priorities for his government.

The United States recognised Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in the global campaign against terrorism and expressed gratitude for Pakistan’s vital support in the international campaign.³⁴ On the occasion of Musharraf’s visit to the United States in February 2002, President Bush announced new bilateral programmes which included: debt relief; democracy assistance; strengthening education; expanded defence cooperation; and cooperation in law enforcement, science and technology.³⁵

This is the third time that the United States has allied itself with Pakistan—“the most allied ally in Asia” during the Cold War. History shows us many parallels. In 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower signed a mutual defence assistance agreement and sent \$1.7 billion to Pakistan in a bid to induce General Ayub Khan to confront the so-called ‘communist threat’. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan persuaded Congress to restore economic and military aid to Pakistan in exchange for General

Zia ul-Haq's agreement to help strengthen the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. And then, twenty years later, President George W. Bush asked Congress to lift sanctions in order to obtain President Musharraf's help in the counter-terrorism operations of USA in Afghanistan.

As an eminent American South Asia expert has pointed out, "US-Pakistan relations have been like a roller-coaster ride, marked by alliance ties and close partnership during the Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan Administrations and cool or tense relations when Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton occupied the White House."³⁶ Since September 11, however, Pakistan has once again clearly become important to the US as a critical frontline state in the war against terrorism. The United States and Pakistan launched a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism and Law Enforcement. Moreover, a Defence Consultation Group was re-established to revive military ties. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said America considered ties with Pakistan long, 'strategic' and 'mutually beneficial,' adding that he looked forward to, "strengthening it in a variety of different ways."³⁷

But, will the US-Pakistan partnership actually be 'long' and 'strategic' this time (and not just 'temporary' and 'tactical' as before)? All depends on whether Washington and Islamabad are willing and able to enlarge the basis of the partnership and harmonise their conflicting goals. Recently, the US and Pakistan had a workable cooperation in Afghanistan. The United States supported Musharraf's goal of rebuilding the nation and restoring Pakistan's external ties and in return, Pakistan supported the US goal of removing the Taliban from Afghanistan. When the counter-terror front moved westward in Pakistan, domestic unrest in Pakistan increased. Furthermore, the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 brought the Kashmir issue back to the front pages, putting the two partners on a collision course. The US saw the strike as terrorism and saw it as a major threat to US interests.

As Teresita C. Schaffer, former US Ambassador to Sri Lanka, has noted, "To avoid repeating history, US policy makers must depersonalise US policy towards Pakistan and establish two fundamental bases for engagement: a long-term democracy agenda designed to strengthen and legitimize Pakistan's institutions; and a sustained and realistic approach to working with both Pakistan and India to deal with and ideally resolve their enduring, dangerous dispute."³⁸ The Pakistani side, one feels, should also formulate a strategy of national construction. Two points are clear: Islamabad should make use of the support of the US and the international community to rebuild its international reputation and restart its internal democratisation process; and it should also seriously consider direct dialogue with India. This will, however, be both a challenge and an opportunity for Pakistan.

The US and India: Short-term Divergence, Long-term Convergence

The events of September 11, anti-terrorism in Afghanistan and the US re-engagement with Pakistan have complicated US-India relations in the short term and “have introduced a wild card into the US vision of India’s future and of future US and Indian priorities in Asia.”³⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, assured New Delhi that US policy towards South Asia, in renewing the relationship with Pakistan, would not overlook India’s interests.⁴⁰ India, however, has complained that the US has turned a blind eye to cross-border militants based in or supported by Pakistan. Moreover, India sees Pakistan as a central part of the terrorism problem, rather than part of the solution. India noted that the US, in assuring that Musharraf was on its side, had developed double standards on terrorism, “pursuing those terrorists threatening its own security and not those tormenting India.” Washington’s positive step of naming Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations still could not satisfy New Delhi as the US referred to the two as ‘stateless’ terrorist organisations aiming at both India and Pakistan. In addition, as the victim of a series of major terrorist attacks in India after September 11 (October 11, 2001 in Srinagar; December 13, 2001 at the Parliament House in New Delhi; and May 14, 2002 on an Indian Army camp at Kaluchak in Jammu and Kashmir), India threatened to go to war against Pakistan in the summer of 2002. The US, however, called for restraint, fearing that it would weaken and shift its global anti-terrorism strategy.

With respect to the Kashmir issue, which George Perkovich thought “more important than Al Qaida”⁴¹, the Indian government was cool to the idea of the US sending a special envoy to the region and has continued to resist US entreaties to hold talks with Pakistan. New Delhi has also increasingly feared that the US has focused more on terrorism issues worldwide and crisis management on the subcontinent since September 11 but less on the strategic partnership with India and ‘transforming’ bilateral relations. Bilateral defence cooperation was considerably enhanced because of the need to deal with terrorism, including Washington’s consideration of transferring weapons systems to India for the first time in decades. Stronger economic ties, (i.e., more foreign direct investment) and high-technology transfers, however, have unfortunately not been realised.

Nevertheless, the short-term divergence between the US and India over Pakistan, terrorism and Kashmir will not taint a long-term convergence stemming from common commercial interests, security cooperation and democratic values espoused by both Washington and New Delhi. In the words of Ambassador Blackwill: “It is difficult to think easily of countries other than India and the United States that currently face

to the same striking degree all three of these intense challenges simultaneously: advancing Asian stability based on democratic values; confronting daily the threat of international terror; and slowing the further proliferation of WMD.”⁴²

Though it may be overestimated, the US today does have more influence and leverage on the subcontinent than perhaps at any time previously because of the events of September 11. Washington’s support and assistance to Islamabad is giving new momentum to Pakistani reconstruction. And Washington’s cooperation is vital to India in fulfilling its economic, political, security and diplomatic goals.

The US is now reviewing its South Asia policy given the changed security environment on the subcontinent, especially as it pertains to two key issues:

- On Kashmir, the US successfully used a new and more proactive approach of crisis management to prevent escalation of the conflict during May and June 2002 between India and Pakistan. “At the heart of the US crisis-management strategy was the acquisition of a commitment from Pakistan to end cross-border infiltration permanently and a promise from India that it would engage in substantive dialogue on all bilateral issues, particularly the Kashmir dispute, when violence ceased.” India now seems to accept a behind-the-scenes, low-key US role in nudging the peace process along, and Pakistan also appears to agree with restraining its support for the militants.
- On non-proliferation, post-September 11 US non-proliferation policy has addressed three fundamental concerns: “preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction from falling into the wrong hands; preventing a nuclear confrontation in South Asia; and mitigating negative side-effects on countries outside South Asia that have flirted with developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.”⁴³

In this context, Washington must begin to combine the goal of non-proliferation with its goal of regional stability. As a former US diplomat has noted, “It took 10 years for India to get used to the end of the Cold War, but that has finally happened.”⁴⁴ Perhaps more important, Washington and Islamabad—and not just New Delhi—also need to learn to be used to the post-September 11 world, which many consider to be the ‘end of the end’ of the Cold War era.

The US-India-Pakistan Triangle: What Concerns China

From a Chinese perspective, September 11 and the subsequent global campaign on terror constitute a double-edged sword, presenting both opportunities and challenges. Most officials from the State Council and scholars from civilian Think Tanks hold an optimistic view and see the US war on terrorism as an opportunity,

noting that the US has shifted its attention away from East Asia to Central, South and South-East Asia. It would reduce pressure on China in many ways. Counter-terrorism provides a functional field in which China and the US can cooperate, thereby improving relations. And, China has gained more latitude in dealing with Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.

However, a number of officials from the defence and security fields hold more pessimistic views and see the US war in Afghanistan as a challenge rather than an opportunity. The most serious challenge, according to this view, is that the US military presence in Central, South and South-East Asia may undermine Chinese influence in these regions and make it more difficult for China to achieve its security, economic and energy objectives in the future.⁴⁵

Amid the great changes in relations between the US India and Pakistan after September 11, two points are highlighted in China. First, the United States for the first time has good relations with India and Pakistan at the same time. The unending rivalry between India and Pakistan, however, has turned out to be more complicated than expected for the US because of the mixture of territory disputes and the terrorist issue in Kashmir.

With respect to US' South Asia policy, several policy options have been advanced by many US scholars and recognised by policy makers in Washington:

- The United States should seek ways to strengthen bilateral ties with India and Pakistan based on shared political and economic values and interests, not merely on the basis of cooperation in dealing with an individual event such as the anti-Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the current counter-terrorism campaign in the same place.
- The United States should establish relationships with India and Pakistan based on their own merits in order to minimise zero-sum mentalities.
- The United States could play a more important role in crisis management by staying behind the scenes instead of mediating in a very public manner.

What are the implications of the changing US strategy towards South Asia for China? How does the transforming US-India-Pakistan triangle concern China? And what about the US-India-China, US-Pakistan-China and China-India-Pakistan triangles that also merit China's attention? Managing these triangles will certainly be a challenge for China's new leaders.

A US-India Alliance?

There are four major powers—two of them developed countries (the US and Japan), the other two rising and developing countries (China and India)—and two

strategic triangles in the Asia-Pacific region: the traditional Sino-US-Japan strategic triangle and the emerging US-China-India strategic triangle. While the former focuses on East Asian security, the latter concerns South Asian security.

Both triangles are asymmetrical. Given the formal US-Japan alliance relationship and the so-called ‘natural’ US-India alliance,⁴⁶ the United States has no fundamental conflict with either Japan or India. Considering the border disputes and historical distrust with both Japan and India—not to mention the conflict with US over the Taiwan issue (as well as over political ideals)—China clearly occupies a weak position in both triangles.

Some scholars have argued that US-China-India relations would influence the course of events within Asia in the 21st century.⁴⁷ Compared to the US-China-Japan triangle, which leaders in the three countries know and deal with, the emerging US-China-India strategic triangle is a new one which no leader has much experience in managing. Unlike the US, which worries about the rise of China and not the rise of India, what concerns China most is how to prevent US-Indian relations from becoming a formal alliance in South Asia similar to the US-Japan alliance in East Asia.

US-India defence engagement has scaled new heights with the announcement of a series of measures usually reserved for close US allies and friends, ranging from joint exercises in Alaska to sales of military hardware. According to Teresita C. Schaffer, a growing convergence of Indian and US interests in Asian security is likely to be the most dynamic element in the bilateral relationship in the next decade. Their differences over nuclear policy are known but their common interest in Indian Ocean security and in not having Asia dominated by a single power can be the basis for a significant expansion of their security cooperation.⁴⁸

As mentioned earlier, short-term points of Indo-US divergence over Pakistan, terrorism and Kashmir following 9/11, would not prevent long-term convergence based on common commercial interests, security cooperation and democratic values. Further both India and the US share the common view of China as a potential and major future threat; and, have common interests in circumscribing the rise of China. In the long term, there is the possibility of establishing strategic relations with each other to contain China by using the other as a core element for balancing Beijing, especially at a time when each has trouble with China.

That said, several factors will make it impossible for India and the US to establish an anti-China alliance in the short and middle term:

- “US and Chinese interests in their mutual relationship far outweigh the interests of each *vis-a-vis* India.”⁴⁹ That is to say, neither China nor the

United States will be willing to oppose each other for India. At best, aiming at China would be a by-product of US-India security cooperation.

- The US and China share many common interests in South Asia after September 11, such as maintaining regional stability in South Asia and helping in Pakistani national construction. This also includes trying to jointly keep the *status quo*, to persuade India and Pakistan to resume direct dialogue and to cooperate on counter-terrorism and social transformation in Pakistan.
- China and India have common interests in combating US unilateralism. China's perspective of great power politics in Asia is shared by India to some extent (as is its distrust of a too-prominent American role in the region).
- It is not rational for India to confront China before its rivalry with Pakistan is resolved. In addition, as Zhang Wenmu of the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations points out, "If India does not participate in the containment of China, China's development will lighten US strategic pressure on India... If India joins forces with the United States to contain China, the future years of the 21st century will not belong to India."⁵⁰

But, in the long term, the establishment of a solid Indo-US alliance may be possible *if*:

- Sino-US relations move to rivalry (over the Taiwan issue, for example). The United States might then conceivably align with India so as to encircle China (Japan would serve this purpose on the eastern front).
- India and China are involved in conflict because of the border issue or Pakistan-related affairs. India would then seek to align itself with the United States to balance China.
- Indian and Pakistani tensions escalate to an all-out or limited nuclear war, at which time Pakistan would seek help from China, politically and materially; India would then undoubtedly demand support from the US and Russia.

The worst-case scenario would involve the preceding three 'ifs' coinciding simultaneously, leading to chain reactions from South Asia (i.e., Pakistan-India and India-China) to the Asia-Pacific region (i.e., US-China).

An US-Pakistan-China Axis?

It is interesting that both China and the US, adversaries in the 1950s and 1960s, had close relations with Pakistan, even though their interests and goals in the country were admittedly quite dissimilar. Starting in the early 1970s, however, the US-China-Pakistan triangle became a reality in the face of the threat posed by their common enemy, the Soviet Union. Unlike the United States which has alienated Pakistan in

the post-Cold War era, China has maintained friendly relations with its 'all-weather friend' who has had some troubles after the end of the Cold War.

Islamabad may welcome warming security relations with both Washington and Beijing but there are different views among pro-US and pro-China factions over which is more important. China and the US, however, face a security dilemma in Pakistan because of two sensitive issues: the US military presence in Pakistan and Beijing's military relations with Islamabad.

On the first issue, at present, there are four US military bases in Pakistan in Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi. The US military in Pakistan needs a withdrawal time table and should limit itself to supporting the counter-terrorism campaign in accordance with its promise to the Pakistani government. Any prolonged presence and extended activity of US military forces in Pakistan will only add new unstable factors in South Asia and complicate US relations with China.

On the second issue, it must be noted that, China and Pakistan have kept close relations, regardless of the ever-changing international environment. In recent years, China has taken concrete steps to improve its non-proliferation policy through actively participating in the establishment of multilateral non-proliferation regimes at the international level and through promulgating a series of domestic regulations governing export controls. In fact, "China benefits from this regime and is firmly committed to this international non-proliferation."⁵¹ In the coming years, China will continue to develop and enhance its traditional friendly relations with Pakistan, including military cooperation, in accordance with China's grand strategy and non-proliferation policy.

The best way to change the security dilemma between the US and China in Pakistan is to jointly concentrate on Pakistani national construction instead of focusing on or limiting it to military aid and defence cooperation. As one of the poorest and weakest countries in the world, Pakistan needs not only hard currency but also good governance, including legal order, a market economy, democratic politics and a moderate civil society. The United States and China, two partners of Pakistan now, could offer their capitalist-style experience of micro-economic management (and technological development) and the socialist-style success in macro-political mobilisation and social stability, respectively.

In short, counter-terrorism and national construction in Pakistan are two common interests for Washington, Beijing and Islamabad in their triangular relationship. The decisive factor of a benign triangle depends on whether the United States and China could have a better understanding of each other's intentions and relations with Pakistan and could reinforce each other's actions there.

India vs Pakistan: Is Balance of Power Best for China?

In the late 1990s, there was a gradual shift in the regional balance of power in South Asia with the steady emergence of India and the gradual decline of Pakistan after a series of important events unfolded in the subcontinent, as made clear in the case studies introduced earlier in this paper. Kashmir, nuclear/missile proliferation and terrorism are the three major issues now confronting India and Pakistan today; they emerged from different days but are closely connected now. The international community should pay equal attention to these three issues though they have to be resolved one-by-one and in different ways. But as Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan has said, “The international community should encourage direct dialogue between India and Pakistan in a more balanced and fair manner, which is the most effective way to lead South Asia towards peace and stability.”

History shows that the Indo-Pakistan conflict cannot be resolved without the help of the United Nations and big powers such as the United States, Russia and China. Considering the dangers and possibility of conflict in Kashmir escalating to a nuclear war in South Asia, both India and Pakistan should take active and concrete steps to ease the tensions and seek ways to solve the long-standing conflict. But before a final resolution is reached, India and Pakistan should be asked to respect the Line of Control and not to change the *status quo* unilaterally.

Compared to East Asia, South Asia has often been a secondary priority in China’s traditional foreign policy. However, the emergence of India—coupled with the decline of Pakistan since the late 1990s and the sea changes after 9/11—launched South Asia into an important position on the agenda of the Chinese leadership. Regional balance and stability in South Asia and Pakistan’s healthy development are two major interests for China. Regional stability, whether in North-East or South-East Asia, the Middle East or South Asia, is increasingly in China’s national interests—not just because such stability is necessary for domestic economic modernisation but because China is becoming a more constructive and responsible player in international society.

The late 1990s saw increasing conflict in South Asia which turned a balance of power into an imbalance of power. It is in the US—as well as in China’s—interests to ensure that “the status of the Line of Control [is] not changed unilaterally” and that “the LoC [is]...not changed by violence.”⁵² These interests will not be served if one nation dominates the subcontinent. China is willing to see a healthy Pakistan that will be a constructive and stable factor in South Asia. As Mohan Malik, an analyst at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies has pointed out, neither an all-out India-Pakistan war nor Pakistan’s collapse would serve China’s grand strategic objectives.⁵³ It is the same for the US and the international community.

Conclusion

Post-September 11 South Asia has witnessed changing US-Pakistani and US-Indian relations but unchanged India-Pakistan tensions. These would undoubtedly influence China's interests and goals in South Asia.

The following are my key findings:-

- The US has developed good relations with India and Pakistan simultaneously after 9/11. It has rebuilt a partnership with Pakistan as a frontline country in the global war on terror while continuing to develop strategic relations with India which it has viewed as an emerging power for nearly a decade. The basis of these relations, however, is quite different. Whether the US-Pakistan partnership will be strategic and long-standing is still doubtful, especially if the two countries cannot enlarge the base to political, economic and cultural fields. The future of the US-India strategic relationship, however, is bright in the long term, even if it has slowed down since 9/11 because of differences over how to view relations with Pakistan, and how to deal with cross-border terrorism and the Kashmir issue.
- Counter-terrorism, Kashmir and non-proliferation are three major security issues facing India and Pakistan, as well as the US. The Kashmir issue is the core of the long-standing rivalry between New Delhi and Islamabad. Given the fact that India and Pakistan refuse to admit the legitimacy of each other's stake in Kashmir, the prospect of eventual peace between New Delhi and Islamabad is dim, especially if the former keeps its rigid position on the Kashmir issue and the latter fails to restrain its support for militant attacks in Kashmir in the coming years.
- US policy towards South Asia aims at balancing (i.e., maintaining cooperative ties with Pakistan in countering terrorism while transforming strategic relations with India) and linking (i.e., connecting non-proliferation with regional stability). The success of the policy in large part depends on whether Washington and Islamabad can find more common interests beyond counter-terrorism and whether New Delhi develops more open-minded and responsible policies in relation to Pakistan.
- Warming US-India defence cooperation and the profound US military presence in South and Central Asia, in conjunction with increasing US military influence in South-East Asia and long-held military bases in East Asia, make China more concerned about US intentions in these areas. Improving US-Pakistan relations, however, present a good chance for China to cooperate with the US in South Asia where Beijing shares many of the

same goals as Washington: preventing terrorism; promoting Indo-Pakistani dialogue and escalation control measures; and curbing proliferation throughout the region.

In light of the foregoing, the Chinese government must formulate a comprehensive South Asian strategy to meet the increasing security challenges in South-West China. China's principal interests and key goals in South Asia are regional stability and a balance of power. It is necessary—and possible—to carry out a 'constructive, balanced and independent' strategy towards South Asia. Chinese policy options include the following:-

- Developing constructive relations with India while improving traditional friendly relations with Pakistan. Considering India's increasing influence in regional affairs, China should pay more attention to New Delhi by taking more active steps to establish individual relations with Indian leaders and to promote negotiation of the border dispute. That said, it is also reasonable to invest more on Pakistan's economic reconstruction and social transformation. A healthy Pakistan is in China's interests.
- On the Kashmir issue, China should ask both India and Pakistan to resume direct dialogue and develop more flexible positions with an eye toward solving the issue. Before reaching the final resolution, however, both sides must respect the Line of Control.
- On the non-proliferation issue, it is in China's interest to ask India and Pakistan to sign the NPT and CTBT. In the meantime, China should help Pakistan to improve the safe management of its nuclear arsenal, and work with the US and the international community to prevent any possibility of nuclear conflict in South Asia.
- China should invite both India and Pakistan to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation which would provide an institutional framework to engender cooperation. It would also be helpful from the perspective of countering US military influence in South and Central Asia.

It is also in China's interests to enhance cooperation with the US in dealing with South Asian affairs. Here, China should:

- Welcome the US campaign to seek and destroy the Taliban and the Al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan as it would be helpful to eliminate the 'three forces' (terrorism, extremism and separatism) in Xinjiang. China should support the US endeavour of crisis management in South Asia as it would be beneficial to the security environment in southern China. And, China should also stand with the US to prevent an arms race on the subcontinent and to safeguard nuclear weapons.

- Make use of improving US-Pakistan relations to work with the US in aiding Pakistani national construction and to coordinate with the US on each other's interests in Pakistan, so as to promote a better understanding of their respective military relations with Islamabad. A constructive US-China-Pakistan triangle could be a decisive factor in regional stability and the balance of power in South Asia.
- Neutralise warming US-India defence cooperation by enhancing cooperation with the US in global and regional affairs and initiating a constructive dialogue with India. The United States could be a positive factor in Sino-Indian relations if it tries to promote regional stability in South Asia and to help China and India's economic modernisation. But it could also play a negative role, should it play the India 'card' in dealing with China (or play the China 'card' in developing its relations with India).

Lastly, in order to more effectively confront the challenges it will face in South Asia in the coming years, the Chinese government should consider establishing a new department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to deal with the longstanding conflict in the Middle East and an increasingly important South Asia. The Ministry, at present, has seven departments to deal with different regions.⁵⁴ It is necessary to adjust the organisation of these institutions, which were constructed in response to the realities of the Cold War. A more effective organisation would include departments of: East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Middle East and South Asian Affairs; African Affairs; Russian and Eastern European Affairs; West European Affairs; North American Affairs; and Latin American Affairs. There are two advantages to this reorganisation. First, China's main security concerns lie in the East (e.g., the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea) and the West (e.g., the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia), and this reorganisation would permit the Ministry to deal with these regions in a more effective and integrated manner. Equally important, this reorganisation would make it easier for the Ministry to deal with its US counterparts.

Acknowledgements

This paper is the product of the academic work undertaken as a Visiting Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center from October 2002 to January 2003. The Fellowship was funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, P.R.C. I greatly appreciate the following individuals who provided comments on the draft or helped me for my visit to Washington DC: Adam J. Hantman, Alan D. Romberg, Charles F. Hawkins, Dipankar Banerjee, Ellen Laipson, Feroz Hassan Khan, Kathleen A. Walsh, Khalid Hasan, Lawrence Scheinman, Leonard S. Spector, Linda J. Yarr, and Michael Krepon.

I also thank the two anonymous referees for their suggestions on the paper. The views expressed in this paper, however, are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any of the supporting organisations and individuals.

References/Endnotes

1. See Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991* 1992. National Defense University Press, Washington D.C; Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, *Ed., Engaged Democracies: India-US Relations in the 21st Century*. 2000. Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd.; New Delhi.
2. Lum, Thomas, US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, Congress Research Service Report for Congress, April 10, 2002.
3. Haass, Richard N., and Morton H. Halperin, After the Tests: US Policy Towards India and Pakistan. An independent Task Force Report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and The Brookings Institution, September 1998, p.13.
4. Interview with a former senior Congressional staff member responsible for South Asian affairs, November 19, 2002.
5. Biden, Joseph R. "A New Approach to South Asia," at www.ceip.org/program/npp/biden2.htm.
6. Raja Mohan, C., In Search of Political Convergence. In Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, no.1, p. 18.
7. Riedel, Bruce, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House", Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) Policy Paper Series, 2002, at www.sas.upenn.edu/casi.
8. The Declaration was signed on February 21, 1999.
9. Ganguly, Sumit, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. 2001. Columbia University Press New York; p. 117.
10. Sipress, Alan and Thomas E. Ricks, Report: India, Pakistan Were Near Nuclear War. *The Washington Post*. May 15, 2002.
11. Riedel, Bruce, no. 7, p. 13.
12. Boustany, Nora, From the Pakistani War Front to the Strategic Ivory Tower. *The Washington Post*. April 12, 2002. A22.
13. Ganguly, Sumit, no. 9, p. 119
14. Riedel, Bruce, no. 7, p. 10.
15. Ibid. p. 14.
16. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the Simla Agreement after the 1971 India-Pakistan War. Both sides stipulated that: "In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side"; "neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations"; and "both sides further undertake to refrain from threat to the use of force in violation of this Line."

17. Cohen, Stephen P., Still Another Last Chance For Pakistan. *Chicago Tribune*. October 24, 1999.
18. Chellaney, Brahma, Clinton's India Visit Has Mixed Result: Open New Ties, But No Change In Nuclear Stance. *The Washington Times*. March 25, 2000.
19. Bajpai, Kanti, India-US Foreign Policy Concerns: Cooperation and Conflict. In Bertsch, Gary K., Seema Gahlau, and Anupam Srivastava, *Eds.*, *Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy*. 1999. Routledge; New York. p. 194.
20. Remarks by the President to the Indian Joint Session of Parliament. US Department of State, Washington File, March 22, 2000.
21. Remarks by the President in Greeting the People of Pakistan. US Department of State, Washington File, March 25, 2000.
22. Riedel, Bruce, "New Opportunities in US-South Asia Relations: An Assessment of President Clinton's Visit to India" CASI Occasional Paper, No.12, May 9, 2000, at www.sas.upenn.edu/casi.
23. Blackwill, Robert D., The Future of US-India Relations. Remarks delivered in Mumbai on September 6, 2001; Transformation of US-India Relations 'Picking Up Speed'. Remarks delivered in New Delhi on February 26, 2002.
24. Feinstein, Lee, When Policy Priorities Converge: US Relations with India and Pakistan. In *A New Equation: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan After September 11*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper No. 27, May 2002, p. 7.
25. Boucher, Richard, "New Directions in US-India Relations", US Department of State Press Statement, June 19, 2001, at www.state.gov/p/sa/ci/in/3818pf.htm.
26. Tellis, Ashley J., C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella. 2001.RAND; Santa Monica. pp. ix-xii.
27. Schaffer, Teresita C., "The U.S. and South Asia: New Priorities, Familiar Interests", *Global Beat Issue Brief*, No.66 at www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib66.html.
28. Cohen, Stephen P., *India: Emerging Power*. 2002. The Brookings Institution Press; Washington, DC. p. xiii.
29. See *The Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002* (P.L. 107-115) and *The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Measure for Anti-Terrorism Efforts* (P.L. 107-38).
30. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House. September 2002, p. 10.
31. LaFranchi, Howard, Attacks Move Pakistan Up, India Down, on US Agenda. *The Christian Science Monitor*. September 24, 2001.
32. Cohen, Stephen P., and Sunil Dasgupta, "US-South Asia: Relations Under Bush". *Foreign Policy Studies*. 2001. The Brookings Institution, at www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/cohens/2001oa.htm.
33. "President General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation," January 12, 2002, at www.forisb.org/CE-019.html.
34. "Joint Statement for the Visit of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to New York". White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 10, 2001.

35. Fact Sheet: Official Working Visit of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to New York. White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 13, 2002.
36. Kux, Dennis, Pakistan: Flawed Not Failed State, Summer 2001, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, No.322, p. 76.
37. "US-Pak Relationship Strategic: Rumsfeld", Rediff.com News, February 14, 2002, at www.rediff.com/news/2002/feb/14uspak.htm.
38. Schaffer, Teresita C., US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities? *The Washington Quarterly*. Winter 2002-3, 170.
39. Schaffer, Teresita C., Rising India and U.S. Policy Options in Asia. Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), South Asia Program, January 2002.
40. Dugger, Celia W. , US and India Map Path to Military Cooperation; More Arms Sales Are Seen. *New York Times*. November 6, 2001, B2.
41. Perkovich, George, Kashmir Is More Important Than Al Qaeda. *The Asian Wall Street Journal*. May 27, 2002.
42. Blackwill, Robert D., The Quality and Durability of the US-India Relationship. Remarks delivered November 27, 2002 in Calcutta.
43. Feinstein, Lee, no. 25, p. 8.
44. Interview with a former senior US diplomat on December 4, 2002.
45. For a detailed analysis, see Nan Li, 11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges and War Fighting. Working Paper, No. 32, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, September 2002.
46. So-dubbed by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2000.
47. See, for instance, Venu Rajamony, India-China-US Triangle: A 'Soft' Balance of Power System in the Making. Working Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies March 2002, p. 3.
48. Schaffer, Teresita C., no. 41, p. 2.
49. Garver, John W., The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. *National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis*. October 2002, **13** (5)
50. Wenmu, Zhang, Global Geopolitics and India's Future Security. *Journal of Strategy and Management*. 2001.
51. Remarks by Liu Jieyi, Director-General of the Department of Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 14, 2002, at www.ceip.org.
52. Haass, Richard N., The United States and India: A Transformed Relationship. Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, Hyderabad, January 7, 2003.
53. Malik, Mohan, The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict. Occasional Paper, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. November 2002, p. 1
54. Namely, the departments of: Asian Affairs; West Asian and North African Affairs; African Affairs; Eastern European and Central Asian Affairs; West European Affairs; North American and Oceania Affairs; and Latin American Affairs.

Zhang Guihong is Associate Professor and Deputy Director at the Institute of International Studies, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, P.R.C. He specialises on US security strategy towards Asia-Pacific, especially the South Asia region.