

Religious Identity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Global-Local Interplay

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Abstract

This article covers the problems of religious identities in two Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – and analyses how globalisation and modernisation influenced them. International relations theories as well the sociology of religion presume that religious identity in contemporary Central Asia cannot be exclusively seen as a local product; it is of a two-dimensional character and reflects both local and broad external influences. The article argues that while external dimensions are noteworthy, local developments and modernisation need elaboration. The differences in local developments and modernisation during the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods are derived from the basic difference between Kazakh and Uzbek societies as nomadic and settled ones that had various degrees of religious beliefs; more profound among the Uzbeks and less among the Kazakhs.



Introduction

During the 2003 Russian-Kazakhstan Forum on bilateral cooperation in Moscow, Prof. Marat Tazhin, first Deputy Head of Administration for the President of Kazakhstan and former Security Council Secretary, said that economic pragmatism (dominant) pulls military-political cooperation among the CIS countries.¹ Elaborating on this idea, it can be said that there may be other factors (non-economic) promoting such cooperation.

Along with a common history and inter-linked economies, the CIS-countries share a common ideology and even a common religion (in certain regions). One should ask, therefore: can the religious factor become a driving force for intensive and close cooperation in the Central Asian region? In other words, can it become a basis for a unified regional response to the challenges of globalisation and international terrorism? To what extent is the growth of religious identity a product

of local development or/and mainstream external revivalism? These questions seem to be particularly important and urgent owing to the equivocal and complicated character of Islam.

These questions are a concrete manifestation of the broader problem of religion-society interaction and define a scholarly space to analyse the main theories of the sociology of religion and their applicability (or non-applicability) in Central Asia. Since one of the goals of this paper is to define the characteristics of the interaction among States in the region, the elements of the theory of international relations should be analysed as well.

In defining the methodological approach, the article studies the neo-realism and constructivism theories of international relations and the functionalism vs. conflict theories of the sociology of religion. Based on the common regularity (algorithm) among these theories, the article develops a combined integral approach towards religious identity highlighting its key elements. It argues that: 1) in the international system's unit-structure interaction, the structure influences units in a modern (to be precisely, post-modern) way while the units (not all of them, but a majority) have no capacity to meet these challenges and their answer comes in a traditional way, either alone or collectively; 2) the religious identity as one (but not the only) of the factors of the units' response in contemporary Central Asia should not be seen as a local product only; it is of a two-dimensional character and reflects both local and broad external environment.

The article further analyses the specific features of religious identity in two countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – and how modernisation and post-modern challenges influenced it. These States have been chosen due to several reasons. First, they represent two different types of societies (whose history and ideology were influenced greatly by the different ways of living - nomadic and settled). Second, today in the sense of a territory, population, and natural resources, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are leading countries in Central Asia and an analysis of the current situation in these two countries is important for an understanding of the dynamics in the whole region. And finally, the politico-religious interaction is also prominent in these countries – the role of the State is extremely significant when it comes to regulating religious and inter-confessional processes.

The article concludes that although the external factors of religious identity are the same for the region, however, the forms/degrees of religious identity in the countries are, and will be varied. Consequently, this can be exploited by the States in the political sphere of interaction.

Religious Identity and International Relations: Combined Integral Approach

Various theories explain continuity and change in the studied subjects. While the realism/neo-realism schools in international relations theory (H. Morgenthau, K. Waltz, R. Keohane)² explore the question of stability and continuity – of all that

keeps the system stable and predictable, the constructivists (A. Wendt, R. Cox, J. Ruggie, R. Ashley)³ stress the importance of ideas, perceptions, collective values, domestic changes, personal factors, i.e., all that can explain the local environment, changes and differences among various societies.

In the sociology of religious theory, the same meaning has the following approaches – the so-called functionalist approaches stressing the systemic, integral, stable function of religion (classical - E. Durkheim; all-embracing system functionalism - T. Parsons; average level functionalism - R. Merton; neo-evolutionism - R. Bellah)⁴ and approaches that consider religion as a factor of social change and not as a basis for stability (M. Weber) or as a factor of conflict and not of integration (K. Marx).⁵

Notwithstanding the differences, there is a common feature inherent in the approaches relating to these social disciplines. Both realism/neo-realism in international relations and functionalism in sociology of religion consider their subjects - international system, religion - as a factor of system/society's integration and stability and pay little attention towards the subjective role of other elements of the system. On the contrary, constructivism in international relations and the approach considering religion as a factor of change in the sociology of religion highlight the role of ideas, perceptions, values in forming new attitudes and causing change in general (according to M. Weber, not only material, but spiritual culture, person and his preferences, emotions, beliefs are important for social change).

Following only one approach/s (such as neo-realism-functionalism), it is difficult to explain the changes in the system or while following the other pair, to explain continuity. It is clear that the integration of both types can explain continuity as well as change in our understanding of the role of religion in contemporary society and international system. How can this be done?

The contemporary international system comprises of a structure and units⁶ (states, unions of states). Both structure and units interact between themselves, moreover units interact among each other as well (or react to each other's actions). Due to such specific features of the post-modern or post-industrial globalised world as a dissolution of space and time, the international structure imposes its own rules on the units and influences them more than previously. This causes units to react adequately, if not to gain, at least not to lose a balance. But since only few of them can do it, this leads other units either to simply accept new rules (thus losing their ability, partial or complete, for adequate performance) or to oppose them.

In unit-unit interaction, one unit can oppose another to solve its own problems (to strengthen the leader's power, to gain economic or political benefits, etc.). Thus, the unit's decisions are based on expediency and benefits, political, economic, and ideological or a combination of these and others. In the structure-unit interaction, two distinct patterns emerge. When one unit tries to counter the structure's challenges in order not to lose its ability for good national performance, it seeks interaction with the structure's international bodies, thus playing a bargaining game. In the opposite

case, when the unit does not accept the structure's challenges, it counters these influences by accumulating its resources and internationalising them. In the latter case, a unit considers the structure's challenges as a threat to its identity – as a nation, a country, member of a broader group or body, etc. In this case, the reply is given collectively.

In contemporary times, there are few States that try to oppose and challenge the structure. For the most part, States prefer to conduct a bargaining game. But there are groups of people constituting the units/States that are in opposition to a structure. The role of these people, their perceptions and constructed ideas and beliefs does matter in the understanding of the units' response to structural changes. This brings us to the constructivists' approach. On another level, the collective reply of the people opposing the structure's challenges impels us to highlight the integrative function of religion (since the objective of the paper is the study of the religious identity) aimed at integrating the group or body and maintaining and keeping its religious identity at whole (mainly untouched and unchanged).

Presumably, integration on a purely religious basis is the only way of development for those opposing the structure's post-modern influence. The existence of a pan-Islamic movement or activity of international extremist religious organisations (such as Moslem-Brothers, Al-Jihad, Al Qaida, etc.) prove this point. But reality suggests many examples of another approach in societies/units such as Turkey, India where religious identity co-exists with the secular one (deeply incorporated in the society). In this case, we can refer to the function of religion as a source of change explaining the variety and multiplicity of examples. This attribute of religion is interconnected with the process of modernisation taking place in all spheres.

Thus, there are two dimensions of religious identity in each unit/State. One, coming from the structure's influence and regarded by the followers of this approach as a globalisation, westernisation or Americanisation; the other, as a result of local development and modernisation. The structure's post-modern influence is more or less the same for any units/States and this can give a general idea of a framework and direction of development as a possible basis for units' religious response. Although it cannot explain the specific features of the religious identity in each case, it nevertheless can promote understanding of the variety of choices in general. In order to make the picture complete, analyses of the local environment, i.e., to explain the forms of religious identity in Central Asia from the point of view of the countries' development and modernisation, is essential.

Religious Identity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Specific Features and Modernisation's Challenges

Religious identity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan cannot be fully understood without considering the different ways of life – settled or nomadic – of the people inhabiting the territory of the States. The specific features of the ways of social and economic structures of settled and nomadic societies presumed and caused the

difference in the processes of Islamisation and modernisation. It is obvious that the scattered character of the nomadic people (moving constantly along natural geographic lines in search of different pastures) was reflected not only in the division of Kazakh people into three main hordes (Big, Middle, Small),⁷ but in the relatively late and poor spread of Islam and uneven convergence of people of different regions into this religion.

Islam was first introduced in what is now south-eastern Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as early as tenth century AD (by the founder of the Karakhanid dynasty, Karim Satuk Khan) and after the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, it became the official religion of the Golden Horde.⁸ Some scholars believe that the spread of Islam in Uzbekistan took place between the eighth and tenth centuries.⁹ The spread of Islam was not an even process – some khans (kings) such as Uzbek-khan in 1313 were stricter in following the faith while the others such as Abulhair-khan in the fifteenth century still used pagan magic ceremonies and rites (for example, to call forth/cause rain by using animal gall stones).¹⁰ According to historical written texts in 1509, Sheibanids' spiritual leaders wrote a fatwa on jihad against the Kazakhs since "they were apostates" and purposely violated Islamic law. Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, there were facts of new mass conversion into Islam.¹¹ Till the beginning of the twentieth century, Islam was intersected with pre-Islamic beliefs and "pagan" worship and thus was represented in the form of the so-called "people Islam". This paved the way for the spread of Sufism, a non-orthodox and non-strict tolerant version of Islam that was a dominant feature of the peoples' beliefs throughout the centuries.

Due to the nomadic character of living and a neighbourhood with enormous civilisational divide in the form of the Russian Empire in the north and Bukhara and Khiva Khaganate in the south, the degree of Islamisation among Kazakhs varied – from relatively loose in the northern parts to more intensive in the southern regions. This was reflected in many forms; in adherence to different forms of law, number of mosques, Muslim educational schools (mektebe and madrassas), and existence of 'small mosques'.

For example, the teachers (*ustads*) in mektebes and madrassas (religious primary and high schools) were mainly Tatars (in the north) or from Bukhara (in the south). Bukhara was regarded as a buttress of Islam and a source of pure Muslim knowledge. To achieve a high level education towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth century, Kazakhs preferred Bukhara and other Central Asian madrassas since the Kazakh madrassas were inferior by quality, organisation and curricula.¹² The nomadic nature of the Kazakhs was reflected in less mosques as compared to neighbouring Bukhara and Khiva khaganates and more in the south than in the north. The majority of mosques were therefore found in Turkestan to the south: 20 in 1864 and 41 in 1910.¹³ This can be explained by the proximity of the southern part to well-known religious centres in Central Asia.

Moreover, the relatively poor spread of Islam in Kazakhstan can be seen in the

existence of the so-called *adat* (ordinary, non-Islamic law) according to which the Kazakhs regulated their social and economic relations. This was despite the fact that the *shariat* (Islamic law) was known as well. In Kazakhstan, unlike in Bukhara, Khiva or Samarkand regions, the Russian colonial administration introduced three forms of law: ordinary law of nomadic people (*adat*), Islamic law (*shariat*) and Russian (empire criminal). On the contrary, in the neighbouring southern part with predominant Uzbek and Tajik populations, there were only two forms of law: the *shariat* and Russian criminal. The southern Kazakhs profoundly influenced by Islam and their neighbours, the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, asked the colonial administration to allow them to follow mainly the *shariat* and abolish the *adat*; for example, the 1907 request of the Kazakhs living in the Syrdarya region to Russian authorities.¹⁴

In contrast, the Uzbeks and the Tajiks as a settled people were influenced more significantly by Islam in general, and the *shariat* in particular. The Bukhara and Khiva khaganates were centres not only of political, but spiritual religious power as well. Such specific features of Islam as a non-division between political and religious power explain the mighty role of these Central Asian centres vis-à-vis the role of Islam among the local population. This contributed greatly towards the forming of a strong religious identity among these settled people. Their religious identity once formed was less influenced by external factors and historical events. Even the structural changes of society (during the Soviet regime) failed to get rid of their identity or change it (at least informally). It was this religious identity that translated into a huge resistance in the form of the *basmachi*/guerilla movements in the 1920s to the Bolsheviks' attempt to form and build a communist society. Although the civil war in Soviet Russia was declared to finished in 1920, nevertheless the opposition towards the regime in Soviet Central Asia lasted sporadically till 1932.¹⁵

Under Soviet rule for most part of the twentieth century, the processes of modernisation changed the way of living of both nomadic and settled people as well as their beliefs, although we cannot say that religious identity altogether disappeared. In spite of a very aggressive atheist policy (closure of madrassas and mosques, substitution of *shariat* and *adat* laws by secular ones, change of script from Arabic to Latin and then Cyrillic, and a ban on Muslim rites and processions), people continued to follow their beliefs at least in everyday life.¹⁶ This was made possible (in spite of strict anti-Muslim acts) because of several reasons.

S. Akimbekov stresses, any tough and strict “attempts of a cardinal structural rebuilding of the Muslim societies under the socialist slogans inevitably lead to the destruction and devaluation of the traditional values and pave the way for creating movements of the followers of ‘pure Islam’”.¹⁷ Hostility towards the new rulers as destroyers of the traditional system was a common feature among the Muslims of the USSR. These feelings did not altogether disappear during Soviet rule, although they were not broadly and openly represented and institutionalised in Soviet Central Asia. Under the socialist system, the State played an extremely high, suppressive and at the same time, flexible role while dealing with ideology and traditional beliefs in

order to balance secular and religious interests. The State recognised and supported (ideological, financial, administrative) official religious circles (the *Muftiyat* system) so as to effectively counter Islam's religious traditionalists.¹⁸

The dichotomy between 'official religious circles and pure Islam's traditionalists' in the Soviet period was not an exceptional feature. Before the socialist revolution of 1917, in the nineteenth century and later in the early twentieth century Tsarist Russia, two streams of thoughts represented the Muslims: the *djadidists* (modernists) and the *kadimists* (traditionalists). *Djadidists* supported the renovation of Islam – openness to new education, Europeanisation of science, adaptation to new times, i.e., upgrading Muslim standards of life and education. The processes of enlightenment and advancement of Islamic followers were basically the same as in other parts of the world, in particular, in 1880s in India (the ideas of Sayed Ahmad Khan). It is interesting to stress that *djadidists'* ideas were very popular amongst the Tatar and Bashkir Muslims of Volga and Crimea region. The *djadidists'* influence in Central Asia and Northern Caucasus was not so significant.¹⁹ The *Kadimists* stood for the spread of Islam as a unified and all-embracing ideology. They equated the terms 'nation' and Islam (Pan-Islamic) and conducted all their actions on the basis of the early Islam.²⁰ The debates between the followers of the modern and traditional Islam initiated in Tsarist Russia continued to take place in the Soviet times.²¹ Gradually, the spread of atheism and the resultant suppression of radical thoughts enabled the modernists to strengthen their position.

Another reason why Muslims continued to follow their faith in the Soviet times was the common socio-psychological beliefs of Islam and communism. As R. Landa puts it, in both Islam and communism there were such common directions as the priority of the collective over individual, subordination of man to a community, authoritarianism of State power as a norm of political culture, and the orientation of the people not towards economic effectiveness but towards social justice. That is why even the collectivisation of property was not opposed greatly by the Muslims. *Kolkhoz* was regarded as a form of State property or *avlod* (a form of family community).²²

The fact that Islam could survive in the Soviet Union is clear from the following: in Khrushchev's period, 80 per cent of the Muslims openly classified themselves as such.²³ Any modernisation undertaken by the Soviet regime was a kind of cover or shell while Muslim beliefs and traditions formed the essence. This was particularly true of the Uzbeks and the Tajiks but not of Kazakhs due to the different degree of religious identity these ethnic groups had maintained in pre-Soviet times.

Although the processes of modernisation undertaken in the Soviet times significantly influenced the religious identity of the people of Central Asia, it still did not undermine the basis of Islam in the region. Modernisation continued to play an important role in everyday life (varied from country to country but was more profound in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) and even within the country (for example, more in south Kazakhstan than in the north). At the same time, the Soviet approach

of balancing religious and secular interests in Central Asia impeded (temporarily) the development of a pure Islam revivalism and this combined with other factors, contributed to a formation of a volatile situation within the societies.

Religious Identity and Post-Modern Challenges

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the strengthening of the Islamic identity. Some of the important factors were: a) There was no more any external pressures on the internal form, essence or Muslim beliefs and traditions; b) Religious ideas were mainstreamed and given extensive support by many political actors pursuing their political interests; and c) The influence of good governance and post-modern development.

The first reason led to massive renaissance or revivalism of religious identity throughout Central Asia, reflected in the change of attitude towards Islam, building of mosques and madrassas, politicisation of Islam and the formation of political parties on religious basis (Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, *Adolat* in Uzbekistan, *Alash* in Kazakhstan).

As early as Gorbachev's *perestroika*, people began to consider Islam not as a roadblock for progress and development but as a faith having deep and profound humanistic and ethical values. The impact of liberal ideas towards Islam and other religions in Russia led to the growth of study on Islam, more frequent pilgrimages to holy places, establishment of contacts with Islamic countries and organisations like the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), OEC and education of clergymen abroad. Combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent states in Central Asia, the changing attitude towards Islam acquired new dimensions and soon became an important part of public debate. As a deliberate policy, Central Asian leaders maintained a high degree of Muslim faith. To gain public support, the newly elected presidents used religious symbols in justifying and legitimising their political decisions. For example, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan took their oath of office on both the Constitution and the Quran, while the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan after their formal appointment headed to Mecca for the Haj.²⁴ In Uzbekistan, the Muslim Kurban-bairam and Uraza-bairam festivals were given official status and declared State holidays.²⁵

The countries (Islamic and Islam influenced societies) in the immediate and extended neighbourhood of Central Asia tried to influence other States of Central Asia by stressing the religious identity factor (as well as cultural and linguistic) as a basis for cooperation and development. In this regard, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia were prominent actors, each pursuing their own interests. The financial and human resources coming from these countries were utilised mainly in the building of numerous big and small mosques and madrassas, Islamic centres and universities, as well as in the publication of theological literature. In Uzbekistan, for example, the number of mosques grew from 300 in 1989 to 6,000 by 1993.²⁶ In Tajikistan between

1989-1991, 2,000 mosques were opened. Meanwhile, in Kyrgyzstan there were 1,000 mosques by 1995²⁷ and in Kazakhstan 1,402 by the end of 1990s.²⁸ Judging from the above figures, the impact of Islamic revivalism was still significantly less in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as compared to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The intensification of religious feelings in the region was a result of the inevitable effects of globalisation and the continuing economic disparity between developed and developing countries. In the last few years, globalisation and its impact on religious identity have become more pronounced. The developing countries' failure to cope with the challenges of globalisation due to bad governance, weak political institutions, regionalism, client-patron relations at the decision-making level, corruption and lack of financial resources as well as other factors have resulted in uneven economic growth, as well as instability and social tension. The Central Asian countries are no exception.

Collective identity was historically justified and was an important part of the social structure. Even during the Soviet rule, religion as a part of collective identity had not altogether disappeared, rather it adapted to the existing conditions. But since any form of opposition was prohibited, it acquired the character of an underground political movement with all its specific features including financial, military, and manpower support from external forces. Underground politico-religious movements as a form of broad-based resentment are prevalent in countries where Muslim identity is most highlighted.

The forms of collective identity, however, vary for different societies in Central Asia. For the Kazakh society, which is a polyethnic and polyconfessional, religious identity, had limited impact except in the southern parts. In this case, maintaining polyethnic stability was more important. In Uzbekistan, on the contrary, religious identity was a major challenge for the authorities. The degree of Islam spreading in different parts of Uzbekistan (like in Kazakhstan) varied. There were three main regions: a) western and northwestern, b) central and eastern, and c) north-eastern (Ferghana valley). The western and north-western parts except Khorezm were profoundly influenced and assimilated by the nomadic tribes and culture. These tribes have accepted the 'nomadic' liberal version of Islam and its preservation in the form of traditions and rituals. Islam was integral to the central and eastern parts of the country with a highly developed urban Tajik-Persian culture. The relatively high educational level and the significance attached to religion has led to the moderate and stable position of the 'traditional', i.e., the *hanafi mazhab* version of Sunni Islam.

Historically, the Sufi version of Islam as a symbol of opposition was very popular. The Saudi Arabian missionaries following the *hanbali mazhab* version of Islam easily influenced the minds of the people in the Ferghana Valley, especially the youth. Economic backwardness, high population growth rate and limited access to resources for the people led to the relatively easy spread of *wahhabi* or *hanbali* sect of Islam in the Ferghana Valley.

It should be noted that one of the first religion-based political parties in Uzbekistan, the Adolat party, was formed in 1991 in Namangan. It was later banned because of its criticism of the government's policies, its demands for social justice, its efforts to give Islam the status of a state religion and its campaign against corruption. With its ability to mobilise people, the Adolat party was seen as a political rival and an aggressive competitor to the ruling party. This explains why President Islam Karimov has come down heavily on the party's activities and the party's efforts to spread religious fervour. The opposition movement in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s was based not only on religious lines, but on civil lines as well (for example, the activity of Erk Party whose leaders had to emigrate from the country). It could be argued that due to the repressive policies of President Karimov's regime, the civilian opposition soon transformed into a religious movement. In contrast, the civilian opposition in Kazakhstan faced the same fate although not to such an extent as to be totally dismissed from the political arena.²⁹

Conclusion

Although Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan faced the same challenges of globalisation, its impact varied. In Uzbekistan, the profound and increasing role of religious identity forced the government to take a tough stand. In Kazakhstan, the religious factor was not so politicised due to its weak religious identity. The opposition to the regime was and is still based on civil identity. The contrast explains, to a great extent, the differing problems in the internal polity that these two countries have to deal with today – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir movements in Uzbekistan, and the civil-political opposition in Kazakhstan. The uneven spread of religion as an identity factor severely limited the scope of those opposition movements that were purely based on religious lines.

It can be concluded that the increasing role of religious identity in the region was inevitable due to the structural changes within the societies (started during Gorbachev's *perestroika* and continued later at the time of gaining independence). The changes in the societies/units were accompanied by the structure's challenges in adjusting to globalisation and post-industrial development.

The factor of good/bad governance also contributed to the change of the political climate in the states. The suppressive approach towards any political resentment forced the opposition movements to exploit the religious factor and become a significant player in state politics with a strong religious identity.

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 5. M. Weber, *Protestantism i Capitalism* (Protestantism and Capitalism). Transl from English. in V. Garaja, Ye. Rutkevich, eds., note 4; Weber, M., *Religioznye idei i interesy* (Religious Ideas and Interests). Transl from English. in V. Garaja, Ye. Rutkevich, eds., Ibid.; Marx, K., *Religioznoye otchuzhdeniye* (Religious Alienation). Transl from English. in V. Garaja, Ye. Rutkevich, eds., Ibid.
 6. This is a basic idea of Kenneth Waltz's theory of international order. See Kenneth N. Waltz, note 2.
 7. The hierarchy of clans and tribes in the nomadic societies of Central Asia was a basic principle of public and state development. In the Middle Ages, tribes of each of the hordes were united by the joint route of seasonal migration, and common ethnic territory. See *Istoriya Kazakhstana* (The History of Kazakhstan). 2003. Ysh Kiyan: Almaty, pp. 71, 174.
 8. In the Early Middle Ages, Islam was not the only religion, although it became later a leading one. Apart from Islam, the local people believed in various faiths - firstly in pagan cults and shamanism, then in Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Manikheism, Christianity (of a nestorian type). See *Istoriya Kazakhstana* (The History of Kazakhstan), note 7, pp. 86-89, 111.
 9. Y. Abdullayev and L. Kolesnikov, *Islam i religiozniy faktor v Uzbekistane* (Islam and Religious Factor in Uzbekistan). in *Uzbekistan: Obreteniye Novogo Oblika* (Uzbekistan: Getting a New Look). 1998. RISS: Moscow, p. 249.
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 11. Ibid., pp. 144-145.
 12. R. Mustafina, *Islam v Kazakhstane* (Islam in Kazakhstan). In *Islam: Istoriya i Sovremennost'. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii* (Islam: History and Present Time. Materials of the International Conference). note 10, p. 129.
 13. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
 14. A. Nurmanova, *19 Gasyrdyn Sony 20 Gasyrdyn Basyndagy Kazak Zandylygy (Adat pen Sharihat)* (Kazakh Laws at the End of 19th century and Beginning of 20th century [Adat and Shariat]). in *Islam: Istoriya i Sovremennost'. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii* (Islam: History and Present Time. Materials of the International Conference), note 10, pp. 74-76.
 15. R.G. Landa, *Islam v Istorii Rossii* (Islam in the History of Russia). 1995. Vostochnaya Literatura: Moscow pp. 203-205.
 16. Prof. D. Kaushik describes the typical Central Asian as "Homo Islamicus in as much as the lifestyle and traditions followed by him were in many cases based on Islam." He argues that, "Islam persisted as a key element in every day life of the Central Asian people who adapted themselves to the new circumstances. Even party members did not completely disown their Muslim identity while celebrating the birth of a child, solemnizing weddings... religious festivals like *Id* were popularly celebrated. Inability to go to Mecca for *Haj* pilgrimage resulted in performance of little *Haj* in the form of visit to graves (*mazars*) of the Muslim divines." See D. Kaushik,

“Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia: An Appraisal”, *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*. July-December 2000, 4 (3-4), pp. 4-5.

17. S. Akimbekov, *Afganskiy Uzel i Problemy Bezopasnosti v Tsentral'noi Azii* (Afghan Knot and the Problems of Security in Central Asia). 2003. Continent: Almaty, p. 78.
18. S. Akimbekov points out the reason of ‘struggle’ between officially recognised religious circles and the followers of pure Islam religious modernisation. According to him, the difference between them was in the different approaches towards understanding Muslim society. While the officially recognised religious circles stood for the balance of secularism and religiosity in Islamic societies, the followers of pure Islam denied both this balance and the modern secular influence. See S. Akimbekov, note 17, pp. 71-77.
19. R.G. Landa, note 15, pp. 141-143.
20. Ibid., pp. 144-145.
21. It is important to call this debate a conventional one since during the 1930s, many *djadidists* (modernists) were subject to repression and were killed or imprisoned.
22. R.G. Landa, note 15, p. 232.
23. Ibid., p. 239.
24. D. Kaushik, note 16, p. 6.
25. Y. Abdullayev, and L. Kolesnikov, note 9, p. 249.
26. Ibid.
27. D. Kaushik, note 24.
28. Z. Djalilov, *Nekotorye Aspecty Modernizatsii Islama v Respublikah Tsentral'noi Azii* (Some Aspects of Islam Modernisation in Central Asian Republics). in *Izvestiya MON, NAN RK. Seriya Obshchestvennyh Nauk* (The Bulletin of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Social Sciences Series). 2002, (4) 57.
29. In this respect some leaders of the Opposition, such as RNPk (Republic People Party of Kazakhstan) party leader, A. Kazhegeldin was forced to leave the country due to a corruption scandal.

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