


Africa Trends

Volume 6, Issue 1

January-June 2017

ISSN: 2456-7329

A Biannual Newsletter on Africa



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE
STUDIES & ANALYSES

रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

Editor

Ruchita Beri

Associate Editor

Arpita Anant

<i>In This Issue</i>	<i>Page</i>
EDITOR'S NOTE	3
COVER STORY <i>South Africa's Naval Revival - Capability Enhancements face Capacity Constraints</i> <i>Sanjay Badri-Maharaj</i>	4-10
COMMENTARY <i>Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Towards a Shared Philosophy</i> <i>Ruchita Beri</i>	11-15
COMMENTARY <i>Botswana Spruces Air Defence</i> <i>Kishore Kumar Khera</i>	16-19
VIEWPOINT <i>Egypt's Stakes in Qatar's Predicament</i> <i>Lakshmi Priya</i>	20-24
BOOK REVIEW <i>Ali A. Mazrui and Francis Wiafe-Amoako, African Institutions</i> <i>Diya deep Singh</i>	25-27

Disclaimer

This newsletter does not reflect the views of IDSA. News reports have been abridged to provide clarity. IDSA is not responsible for the accuracy and authenticity of the news items.

Editor's Note

As *Africa Trends* enters the sixth year of its publication, we are pleased to inform our readers that it is now an ISSN accredited newsletter. There is however a change in its format. It will now be a biannual publication without a news track.

In this issue, the cover story by Sanjay Badri-Maharaj traces the evolution of the South African Navy from an Apartheid-era constrained force to a post-Apartheid resurgent force and highlights the budgetary and manpower constraints faced by it. A commentary by Ruchita Beri highlights the fortuitous coming together of a shared philosophy of development from Africa, India and Japan in the Asia Africa Growth Corridor project. A second commentary by Kishore Kumar Khera highlights the manner in which Botswana is sprucing up its air defence to deal with the probable threat of small insurgent groups and challenges due to proliferation of UAVs. The viewpoint by Lakshmi Priya explains Egypt's bandwagoning against Qatar in the GCC to diminish the Muslim Brotherhood within and to improve its standing in the GCC and against Iran. Diya deep Singh reviews the book titled *African Institutions* by Ali A Mazrui and Francis Wiafe-Amoako and finds that the problems of Africa's institutions are not merely related to their colonial descent; they are compounded by lack of change in mind-set and timely adjustments by policy makers.

We welcome your feedback.

Covery Story

SOUTH AFRICA'S NAVAL REVIVAL - CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENTS FACE CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

The SAN in the post-Apartheid era has been completely transformed from a "brown-water" force of missile craft and short-range submarines to one with considerable "blue-water" capability. However, serious allegations of corruption have marred its procurement processes. In addition, budgetary shortfalls and personnel problems have contributed to reducing the availability of surface and sub-surface assets.

Sanjay Badri-Maharaj *

In February 2017, the Republic of South Africa (RSA) announced the preferred bidders for two of the largest naval programs in Africa. Southern African Shipyards (SAS) were selected for the construction of a hydrographic survey vessel under *Project Hotel* and Damen Shipyards Cape Town – a joint venture between South Africa and the prolific Dutch ship builder Damen – were selected for the construction of three Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and three Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) under *Project Biro*. As a result, the South African Navy is set to receive a major boost to its surface fleet and its maritime patrol and surveillance capabilities.¹

Decline during the Apartheid-Era

Of all the arms of the Apartheid-era RSA armed forces, the South African Navy (SAN) underwent a period of sustained neglect and decline during the Apartheid era. The SAN was a very small force during the Second World War and post-war, it tried to create and subsequently sustain a veneer of "blue-water" capability with no fewer than three ex-Royal Navy frigates acquired between 1950 and 1952 and a further three frigates being purpose-built for it in the 1960s. The latter three vessels possessed significantly enhanced combat capability compared to the former. However, one of these ships – the *President Kruger* – sank in 1982 in a collision while the other two – *President Pretorius* and *President Steyn* – were unserviceable by the 1980s, the latter being cannibalized to provide spares in 1980 and the former decommissioned in 1990 after a prolonged period of inoperability.² Attempts to ac-

* Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj is a Trinidad-based Barrister and Attorney at Law.

quire two French corvettes were stymied by the arms embargo imposed upon the Apartheid regime in 1978. The embargo also halted efforts by the SAN to replace three ageing *Daphne-class* submarines with vessels of the *Agosta-class*.³ The *Daphne* class submarines served the SAN with some distinction and represented their most capable combat asset.

Attempts to acquire two French corvettes were stymied by the arms embargo imposed upon the Apartheid regime in 1978.

Despite these efforts, the Apartheid-era SAN was principally a navy of missile boats, bolstered by the three *Daphne-class* submarines. Nine vessels – built to a modification of the Israeli *Resheff Sa'ar 4* design (and known in the Apartheid-era as the *Minister-class*) – were inducted into the SAN between 1977 and 1986 with three being built in Israel and the remaining six in South Africa and so providing a substantial boost to domestic shipbuilding and ship maintenance..⁴ Despite being an efficient and effective combat force, the impact of the arms embargo combined with the high cost of maintaining large surface assets led to the decommissioning of 15 of the SAN's vessels in 1985 alone, effectively reducing the force to a "brown-water" navy.⁵

The SAN quickly established itself as a highly capable force. For example, during the period 1966 to 1989, the SAN saw extensive service against the South-West African People's Organization's (SWAPO) insurgents and against Cuban and MPLA forces in Angola. For these 23 years, the SAN had effective naval dominance of the seas around Southern Africa with even the potent force of four *Shershen* torpedo-boats and six *Osa-II* missile-boats operated by the Angolan navy being unable to contest the seas against the well-trained and highly-motivated SAN.⁶ The SAN conducted multiple raids in support of RSA special-forces teams and conducted extensive electronic surveillance and support activities in support of the RSA army during its counter-insurgency operations in erstwhile South-West Africa (now Namibia) and its conventional operations against Angola.⁷

For these 23 years, the SAN had effective naval dominance of the seas around Southern Africa...

Post-Apartheid Rejuvenation and Controversies

In 1999, in a decision that would prove to be highly controversial, the post-Apartheid government of President Nelson Mandela entered into a series of contracts aimed at restoring the SAN's "blue-water" capability through the purchase of four modern frigates and three new submarines.

...the post-Apartheid government of President Nelson Mandela entered into a series of contracts aimed at restoring the SAN's "blue-water" capability...

Between 2001 and 2007, four *Valour-class* light frigates/corvettes of the *MEKO A-200SAN* design were inducted into service. Built in Germany at a cost (at 2007 values) of R (Rand) 9.65billion, these vessels – capable of carrying helicopters and armed with surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles - represented a quantum leap in capability for the SAN.⁸ These vessels are easily the most powerful surface combatants in sub-

Saharan Africa and restored South African naval pre-eminence for the foreseeable future. These vessels lack anti-submarine weapons, which is not surprising considering that no Sub-Saharan navy operates submarines outside the RSA itself, thus making an anti-submarine capability unnecessary.

The SAN also acquired three *Heroine-class* submarines of the *Type-209 1400-Mod* SAN family between 2004 and 2008. These vessels, sub-types of which are in service with Argentina, India and the Republic of Korea, replaced the *Daphne-class* submarines of 1960s vintage. The SAN considered the *Type-209s* as the service's first "true submarines" as their underwater performance and endurance was considerably superior to the *Daphnes*.⁹ It is noteworthy that both the frigates and the submarines were acquired from Germany, rather than from France or Israel or the United Kingdom, which had hitherto been the major suppliers of equipment to the SAN. The German connection could be at least in part occasioned by the fact that Germany's exports of the Type 209 and the MEKO class have been very successful.

...allegations of extensive bribery and other corrupt practices were made against South African government officials at nearly all stages of the procurement process...

However, these two acquisitions (along with acquisitions for the RSA Air Force) came under intense scrutiny as allegations of extensive bribery and other corrupt practices were made against South African government officials at nearly all stages of the procurement process – from the selection of the items to be purchased to the negotiation of the financing packages.¹⁰ Andrew Feinstein, who resigned as an MP of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) when the government moved to curtail a probe into the deal believed that the corrupt practices in these arms purchases were when the ANC

lost its "moral compass".¹¹ To date, while much debate has been generated and even more circumstantial evidence unearthed, the probe has produced no definitive results but the rumour of corruption around these procurements refuses to go away.

Operational Problems – Expansion without capacity building

Had these procurements resulted in a sustainable restoration of the SAN's capability, it is possible that the controversies might have not continued to resurface. However, both the *Valour* and *Heroine-classes* have experienced severe operational problems which have called into question their suitability for a navy which is suffering (like the RSA armed forces in general) from chronic problems of retaining trained manpower. Indeed, it is questionable as to whether the RSA will ever be able to maintain sufficient trained crews to operate such sophisticated vessels especially when there is active "poaching of such personnel by the civilian-shipping sector."¹² The manpower problem is such that analysts have described the SAN as being "crippled" by manpower shortages – exacerbated by the fact that even personnel recruited are often unqualified.¹³ This is a challenge that is by no means unique to the SAN but the very rapid pace of its expansion, the sophistication of the

...analysts have described the SAN as being "crippled" by manpower shortages...

vessels acquired and the inevitable challenges any military faces in attracting and retaining personnel makes the operational problems faced by the SAN somewhat more difficult to resolve.

In addition, there have been constant reports of accidents and maintenance deficiencies severely reducing the operational availability of both the submarines and the frigates. While it is a major exaggeration to suggest that the vessels are “inoperable”, there is little doubt that ship availability is a major challenge.¹⁴ The submarines, in particular, have had chronic serviceability problems which led to all three vessels being dry-docked in 2012 following a major submerged mishap with the sole operational vessel.¹⁵ The frigates have also experienced serviceability problems caused in part by design shortcomings in the underwater exhaust valves which caused an ingress of water when the vessels rolled excessively.¹⁶ It is surprising that such a defect was not discovered either during the design phase or during sea trials and must perforce raise questions regarding the evaluation of the vessels.

In addition, one must question the logic of procuring, at considerable expense, these expensive vessels given the complete absence of a conventional naval threat to the RSA. This is evident from any study of regional navies, and even those in the rest of South Saharan Africa which have little by way of blue-water combat capability and modest brown-water capabilities.

Compounding the technical and manpower constraints is the paucity of funding for operations. In 2016, the SAN found its budget reduced by R147 million which made sustaining more than one or two frigates and submarines at operational level very problematic with attendant problems of development and maintaining proficiency among personnel.¹⁷ The SAN seems to be under no illusions about any increase in its operational budget in the foreseeable future. This, however, makes the SAN’s desire to increase its surface fleet with the addition of seven more vessels all the more puzzling.

Compounding the technical and manpower constraints is the paucity of funding for operations.

Projects *Hotel* and *Biro* – Necessary but still Questionable

The ageing *SAS Protea* is currently the SAN’s sole hydrographic survey vessel and as such the urgency of *Project Hotel*, which seeks the replacement of this vessel, is understandable. However, *Project Biro* is somewhat more complicated and in many ways less comprehensible.

With only four principal surface combatants, the SAN would clearly be acutely short of ships for patrol duties. To meet the demand for patrol assets, the SAN took the logical step of converting its three surviving *Reshef/Sa’ar 4-* class vessels (known since 1994 as the *Warrior-class*), into OPVs/ IPVs.¹⁸ For this task, the vessels had their missiles and one of their 76mm guns removed – reflecting the switch to a constabu-

With only four principal surface combatants, the SAN would clearly be acutely short of ships for patrol duties.

lary role. The vessels completed sea-trials in 2013 and are extensively used in the patrol role.¹⁹

Project Biro calls for the construction of three OPVs and three IPVs – presuming the latter will replace the aforementioned. Given the fact that the preferred bidder is Damen Shipyards Cape Town (affiliated to the Damen Shipyards Limited of the Netherlands), the specifications for the intended OPVs and IPVs suggest that the former will be based on the Damen 1800 Sea-Axe design of 85 metres length while the latter will be based on the FCS 5009 or SPa design which measures 50 metres in length with the possibility of a somewhat large vessel being suggested.²⁰

...the ability to manufacture the IPVs locally would mean that South African ship building would improve.

These vessels are being aggressively marketed by Damen in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and one vessel of the FCS 5009 class was built entirely in Cape Town in 2014-2015 to demonstrate the ability of a South African shipyard to build such vessels. Some have argued that the IPVs would be too small for meaningful off-shore work while being too large to be economical for inshore work which is best suited to smaller craft.²¹ One defence analyst, Helmoed Romer

Heitman, suggested that the SAN would be better served to increase the number of OPVs while cancelling the IPV order.²² However, it should be noted that OPVs are significantly more expensive than IPVs and the ability to manufacture the IPVs locally would mean that South African ship building would improve.

Yet, while appreciating the need for these vessels, it has to be asked whether the RSA has the budget to not only fund the construction of the ships but also to ensure sustainable operations.

...the crewing requirements for seven new vessels must be a factor which raises questions about the timing and sustainability of these purchases.

As late as October 2016, budgetary constraints put both *Projects Biro* and *Hotel* on hold.²³ It was reported that the bids submitted exceeded the earmarked funding for the projects leading to serious questions over the sustainability of such a large purchase – much less an increase in the number of OPVs.²⁴ However, given the chronic manpower shortages being experienced by the SAN, the crewing requirements for seven new vessels must be a factor which raises questions about the timing and sustainability of these purchases. The RSA may need to consider whether it is possible to continue operating

the four frigates and three submarines that form the nucleus of the fleet along with the vessels planned under *Project Biro*. It is suggested that the SAN may wish to consider a system of rotational storage of the vessels with a limited number operational with the others in storage. A similar system already exists in the South African Air Force where, at any given time, at least half of that service's *Gripen* fighters are in rotational storage.²⁵

Nonetheless, *Projects Hotel* and *Biro* will bring about one undeniable benefit – a boost to the South African shipbuilding industry. By partnering with the well-established Damen ship-

yards of the Netherlands, South Africa hopes to expand its ship building industry into a viable commercial undertaking. The projects will infuse new technology into a somewhat moribund sector of South African industry and will enhance local skills and supply chain development.²⁶

Conclusion

The SAN in the post-Apartheid era has been completely transformed from a “brown-water” force of missile craft and short-range submarines to one with considerable “blue-water” capability. However, serious allegations of corruption have marred its procurement processes. In addition, budgetary shortfalls and personnel problems have contributed to reducing the availability of surface and sub-surface assets.

Despite these problems, the SAN has ambitious expansion plans for its patrol assets with an emphasis on developing local shipbuilding capabilities. While undoubtedly necessary and adding much to the capabilities of the SAN, the inherent budgetary and manpower constraints currently plaguing the SAN show no signs of abating. In these circumstances, the RSA may be forced to make choices between either significantly increasing the budgetary allocations for the SAN or to adopting a rotational storage program to preserve capability while reducing operational costs. Whether the SAN makes this tough choice remains to be seen; but unless something drastic is done, the existing fleet and the planned new acquisitions will remain nothing more than status symbols with minimal effectiveness.

-
- ¹ Naval Today, “South Africa announces preferred bidders for new navy vessels”, February 23, 2017, at <http://navaltoday.com/2017/02/23/south-africa-announces-preferred-bidders-for-new-navy-vessels/> (Accessed February 25, 2017).
 - ² Robert Gardiner, Stephen Chumbley and Prezemyasaw Budzbon (eds.), *Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships: 1947-1995*, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1995, pp. 334-335.
 - ³ Ibid.
 - ⁴ Andre Wessels, “The South African Navy And Its Predecessors, 1910-2010”, *South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2010, p.118.
 - ⁵ Ibid, p.119.
 - ⁶ Robert Gardiner et al, n.2, p. 3.
 - ⁷ Andre Wessels, n.4, pp.118-119.
 - ⁸ L. Engelbrecht, “Fact file: Valour-class small guided missile frigates”, *Defence Web*, February 8, 2010, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6524:fact-file-valour-class-small-guided-missile-frigates-&catid=79:fact-files&Itemid=159 (Accessed February 25, 2017).
 - ⁹ L. Engelbrecht, “SA gets third submarine”, *Defence Web*, February 5, 2008, at http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3786&catid=96:defence-and-aerospace-technology (Accessed February 25, 2017).
 - ¹⁰ “The Arms Deal: What you Need to Know”, *Corruption Watch*, January 22, 2014, at <http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/> (Accessed February 25, 2017).
 - ¹¹ Ibid.

- ¹² H. Radebe, "Too few sailors for SA ships", *iAfrica.com*, August 28, 2013, at <http://business.iafrica.com/businessday/877131.html> (Accessed February 25, 2017).
- ¹³ G. Martin, "SA Navy crippled by lack of qualified personnel", *Defence Web*, August 1, 2013, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31410:sa-navy-crippled-by-lack-of-qualified-personnel&catid=108:maritime-security (Accessed February 25, 2017).
- ¹⁴ "Navy claims arms purchases were 'critical' for defence", *ENCA.com*, August 23, 2013, at <http://www.enca.com/south-africa/navy-claims-arms-purchases-were-critical-defense> (Accessed February 25, 2017).
- ¹⁵ B. Jordan, "Not one of the R8 billion arms deal submarines is operational", *Times Live*, August 12, 2012, at <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2012/08/12/Not-one-of-the-R8-billion-arms-deal-submarines-is-operational1> (Accessed February 25, 2017).
- ¹⁶ "Amatola to be repaired by March", *Defence Web*, August 15, 2011, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18056:amatola-to-be-repaired-by-march&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106 (Accessed February 25, 2017).
- ¹⁷ D. Wingrin, "Navy positive despite severe budget constraints" *Defence Web*, April 25, 2016, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43235:navy-positive-despite-severe-budget-constraints&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242 (Accessed February 25, 2017).
- ¹⁸ G. Martin, "Southern African Shipyards refurbishing Navy strike craft", *Defence Web*, October 30, 2012, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28304:southern-african-shipyards-refurbishing-navy-strike-craft&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242 (Accessed February 26, 2017).
- ¹⁹ G. Martin, "Upgraded strike craft nearly finished with sea trials", *Defence Web*, May 17, 2013, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30511:upgraded-strike-craft-nearly-finished-with-sea-trials&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106 (Accessed February 26, 2017).
- ²⁰ Naval Today, n.1.
- ²¹ G. Martin, "SA Navy needs more than three offshore and three inshore patrol vessels - expert", *Defence Web*, June 19, 2015, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39577:sa-navy-needs-more-than-three-offshore-and-three-inshore-patrol-vessels-expert&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106 (Accessed February 26, 2017).
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ K. Helfrich, "Projects Biro and Hotel on hold for budget review", *Defence Web*, October 14, 2016, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45557&catid=74&Itemid=30 (Accessed February 26, 2017).
- ²⁴ Ibid. Also see G. Martin, n.21.
- ²⁵ "13 of 26 SAAF Gripen are active; the rest are in rotational storage", *Defence Web*, June 9, 2016 at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43839&catid=74&Itemid=30 (Accessed February 26, 2017).
- ²⁶ B. Jordan, "SA shipyards secures R10bn naval procurement package", *Business Day*, February 22, 2017, at <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/business-and-economy/2017-02-22-sa-shipyards-secures-r10bn-naval-procurement-package/> (Accessed February 26, 2017).

Commentary

ASIA AFRICA GROWTH CORRIDOR: TOWARDS A SHARED PHILOSOPHY

The Asia Africa Growth Corridor provides a transparent and inclusive alternate to the countries of Africa. It builds on the Japanese ethos of working with quality and India's long and historic people-centric partnership with African countries.

Ruchita Beri *

Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), a fresh initiative led by India and Japan to enhance connectivity between the two continents, was unveiled by Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi during the African Development Bank annual meeting in Gandhi Nagar, Gujarat on May 16, 2017. According to the AAGC Vision Document, the corridor will focus on four areas:

- Development Cooperation Projects
- Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity
- Enhancing Skills
- People-to-People Partnership.¹

This venture reflects the shared philosophy and priorities of countries in Asia, particularly India and Japan on one hand and Africa on the other.

India: Development and Security for All

The AAGC echoes India's current development agenda based on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth. This is reflected in Prime Minister Modi's philosophy of *Sab ka Saath, Sab ka Vikas* (in Hindi) – together with all, development for all. At the same time, India's proposed long term development strategy, the India 2031-32 Vision by National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) calls for "transformation of India into a prosperous, highly educated, healthy, secure, corruption free, energy abundant, environmentally clean

* Ms. Ruchita Beri is Senior Research Associate and Coordinator, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.

The policy emphasises India's determination to support local initiatives to promote economic development and security in the Indian Ocean region.

region that delivers...prosperity.”³ The policy emphasises India's determination to support local initiatives to promote economic development and security in the Indian Ocean region.

and globally influential nation”.² It foresees India's positive role in shaping the global agenda on sustainable development and international cooperation based on principles of solidarity, equity and sharing. At the same time AAGC acknowledges the symbiotic relationship between security and growth endorsed through Prime Minister Modi's policy of SAGAR- Security and Growth for All. This was announced during his visit to Mauritius in 2016 where he spoke of ensuring “a safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean

The AAGC also calls for maritime connectivity across the Indian Ocean region through India's *Sagarmala* policy.⁴ This initiative was initially launched to promote port modernisation, connectivity improvement, industrial and port led community development in the coastal regions in India. So far it involves 73 projects with a total value of \$ 60 billion. However, India has also extended this policy to all Indian Ocean littoral countries. The idea is to “fuel their economic growth and bring sustainability to the IOR.”⁵

Japan: Free and Open Indo- Pacific and Building Quality Infrastructure

The Asia Africa Growth Corridor highlights Japan's policy of promoting Free and Open Indo- Pacific. Some elements of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Free and Open Indo- Pacific Strategy can be traced back to his first stint as a Prime Minister, to a speech titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” delivered to the Indian parliament in August 2007. Abe advocated that Japan and India being like-minded maritime democracies, should promote freedom and prosperity in “broader Asia”, at the confluence of two seas- the Indian and Pacific Ocean. He also proposed an “arch of freedom and prosperity”.⁶ However the strategy of Free and Open Indo-Pacific was officially announced in a speech at the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in 2016. He said, “Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous...Let us make this stretch that is from Asia to Africa a main artery for growth and prosperity.”⁷ This strategy aims at combining the dynamics of Asia and Africa and envisions a greater regional integration along the coastlines of the Indian Ocean / Pacific Ocean. The aim is to improve connectivity, growth and stability in the region.

The AAGC seeks to reiterate Japan's focus on promoting quality infrastructure in diverse areas such as power, transport, port development etc.

Like India, Japan too, has called for connecting Asia and Africa through development of infrastructure. This approach is clearly visible in Abe's Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI). The initiative was launched in 2015 and was later upgraded as Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) in 2016.⁸ Under this policy Japan has pledged \$200 billion for development of infrastructure projects across the world. The AAGC seeks to

reiterate Japan's focus on promoting quality infrastructure in diverse areas such as power, transport, port development etc.

Tokyo's promotion of values of freedom in the maritime context and rule of law have been echoed by New Delhi. Indian leadership has reiterated that "respecting freedom of navigation and adhering to international norms is essential to peace and economic growth ... in the Indo-Pacific."⁹

Africa: Fulfilling the Aspirations of All

Over the years African countries have developed several plans to accelerate growth in continent. They include, Lagos Plan of Action, the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Program for Infrastructure Development of Africa (PIDA) and the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy). Here it is important to mention that like the EPQI promoted by Japan, PIDA aims to accelerate infrastructure development, though it is limited to the African region. The PIDA features large-scale development programmes in enhancing infrastructure in the energy, transport, information and communication technology, and water sectors.¹⁰ Similarly the 2050 AIM Strategy proposes to enhance the security and development of blue economy in the Atlantic or the Indian Ocean littoral countries in Africa.¹¹ This maritime vision is quite similar to that projected by India.

The AAGC also reflects the current African plan for the transformation of the continent in the next 50 years- the Agenda 2063. This plan seeks to accelerate the implementation of past and existing continental policies for growth and sustainable development. Agenda 2063 calls for achieving seven African aspirations over the fifty year period:

The AAGC also reflects the current African plan for the transformation of the continent in the next 50 years...

- A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development
- An integrated continent politically united based on the ideals of pan Africanism and the vision of African Renaissance
- An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and rule of law
- A peaceful and secure Africa
- Africa with strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics
- An Africa whose development is people driven
- An Africa as a united, resilient and influential global player.¹²

These aspirations reflect the norms and values that are similar to those championed by India and Japan. The Agenda 2063 also highlights African countries' aim to partner with

like-minded external partners for promoting African growth and development. Over the years, African countries have acknowledged the role played by India and Japan in Africa's development. India has a historic relationship with African countries that is hinged on skills enhancement, capacity building and mutual development. The India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation released at the end of the Third India Africa Forum Summit held in 2015 notes the importance of Agenda 2063.¹³ Similarly the AAGC dovetails African priorities with those of India and Japan.

AAGC: Transparent and Inclusive

The foregoing discussion makes it clear that AAGC projects a shared vision of development and growth across Africa and Asia. At the same time, although denied by Japan, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy as enshrined in the AAGC also provides a counter narrative to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI like the AAGC, seeks to connect Asia and Africa through large scale infrastructure projects. Japan with its emphasis on freedom and openness is attempting to differentiate from China's opaque and hegemonic strategy. Similarly, there is no doubt that India's hesitation to join the Belt and Road project is primarily due to transparency and sovereignty issues. India has often rebuked China for its blatant violation of India's sovereignty in the context of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Asia Africa Growth Corridor provides a transparent and inclusive alternate to the countries of Africa. It builds on Japanese ethos of working with quality and India's long and historic people-centric partnership with African countries.

¹ African Development Bank Meeting, *Asian Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC): Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A Vision Document*, Ahmedabad, India, May 22-26, 2017, at <http://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Vision-Document.pdf> (Accessed June 2, 2017).

² Arvind Panagariya, *India 2031-32: Vision, Strategy and Action Agenda*, NITI Aayog, April 23, 2017, at http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/new_initiatives/Revised_Presentation.pdf (Accessed June 2, 2017).

³ Ibid.

⁴ "Sagarmala: Concept and implementation towards Blue Revolution", March 25, 2015, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=117691> (Accessed May 25, 2017).

⁵ "Text of Shri Nitin Gadkari's Address at the Indian Ocean Conference in Singapore Today", September 1, 2016, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=149454> (Accessed May 21, 2017).

⁶ "Confluence of two Seas" Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22, 2007, at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html> (Accessed May 19, 2017).

⁷ Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the opening session of the 6th Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD VI), August 27, 2016, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html Accessed May 22, 2017).

⁸ "The "Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure" initiative directed toward the G7 Ise-Shima Summit Meeting Announced", May 23, 2016, at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/0523_01.html (Accessed May 20, 2017).

- ⁹ Inaugural Address by Prime Minister at Second Raisina Dialogue, New Delhi, January 17, 2017, at http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-statements.htm?dtl/27948/Inaugural_Address_by_Prime_Minister_at_Second_Raisina_Dialogue_New_Delhi_January_17_2017 (Accessed 22 May 2017) .
- ¹⁰ Africa Union, *Program Infrastructure Development for Africa (PIDA)*, 2012 at <https://au.int/en/ie/pida> (Accessed May 24, 2017).
- ¹¹ Africa Union, *2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy)*, 2012, at https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/11151/2050_aims_strategy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed May 24, 2017).
- ¹² African Union Commission, *Agenda 2063: Africa We Want*, 2015, at <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063.pdf> (Accessed May 24, 2017).
- ¹³ Third India-Africa Forum Summit, *India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation*, October 29, 2015, at http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/25981_framework.pdf (Accessed May 22, 2017).

Commentary

BOTSWANA SPRUCES AIR DEFENCE

While combat aircraft acquisition for self-defence capability is a long drawn and expensive process, Botswana has moved systematically to enhance its low-cost variation - by improving ground-based air defence system.

Kishore Kumar Khera *

A Government of France, Parliamentary Report on Weapon Exports for 2017 indicated that Botswana is a recipient of MBDA air defence systems and missiles.¹ France delivered 14 missile launchers in 2016 and the total value of French defence exports to Botswana is estimated at •304.2 million including MICA-VL and Mistral missiles.

Landlocked Botswana, located in the heart of Southern Africa, shares her borders with Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. A stable democratic set up since independence in 1966 has allowed Botswana to grow systematically to be one of the most affluent countries in the region. Botswana has had no major military threat to its borders. In past, during the apartheid era, the country had often got caught in the crossfire between two regional military powerhouses - South Africa and Angola. However relations between South Africa and Angola are peaceful at the moment. A real and practical threat is from small insurgent groups that may disrupt the economic and development activities. To safeguard national borders, Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was established in 1977. The BDF is small, with only 9,000 personnel.² Operationally, its outlook is primarily defensive, aimed at protecting the country from infiltration. Its doctrine appears to be heavily influenced by its officers who have been trained in the USA.³

A real and practical threat is from small insurgent groups that may disrupt the economic and development activities.

Past

The BDF Air Wing is very small but efficient as a contingent of only 500 personnel manages 63 aircraft including 14 F5, five O-2 aircraft along with 19 transport aircraft, five training

* Kishore Kumar Khera is with the Military Affairs Centre, IDSA.

aircraft, 16 helicopters⁴ and four Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)⁵. With the induction of Gripen (in South Africa)⁶ and Su30 (in Angola)⁷ in the region, BDF F5 will have limited capability to stop airspace violations. To ensure that the sovereignty of airspace is not infringed, Botswana is boosting its air defence network. Creation of a comprehensive air picture in real time is a first step in air defence activity. This is also essential to employ combat power effectively through combat aircraft or surface-based weapons because of the enhanced situational awareness. To achieve this, the BDF, in Phase I, in 2005, tasked Indra of Spain to develop and implement a full air defence command and control system for an amount of 7.1 million euros within a period of two years.⁸ The system planned for entire Botswana airspace was with one operational control centre, nine air traffic tracking and control posts to process the information from air surveillance radars. Such airspace transparency allows for active monitoring and is a key element for initiation of action against any hostile intent.

Creation of a comprehensive air picture in real time is a first step in air defence activity.

BDF ground-based air defence system is equipped with Javelin⁹, Igla-1 (SA-16), Strela-2 (SA-7) and 20mm Vulcan towed guns.¹⁰ These air defence weapons have severe limitations in terms of range and environmental conditions. In the next phase, to bolster the air defence, better surface to air missiles were contracted for. In 2012, Botswana bought 100 Strela-3/SA-14 surface-to-air missiles from Ukraine.¹¹ This system can engage targets up to 4.1 km range and over 7000 feet altitude. But most importantly, its seeker head is more sensitive than SA-7 and gives the missile an all-aspect engagement envelope. Its modified warhead with additional secondary charge enhances the probability of damaging the target.

Present

The most recent acquisition from France of MICA-VL air defence system with 50 MICA missiles and 50 Mistral portable air defence systems, on induction, will further strengthen the air defence.¹² It is a short range, ground-based air defence system using MICA missile, capable of being fitted with either an infra-red homing head or with an active radar seeker head. With an active seeker, major environmental limitations are overcome and a higher Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP) achieved. MICA-VL's interception range of 20 km gives BDF a ground-based area defence weapon for the first time. With such a large engagement envelope covering 1,242 square kilometre, a large number of short-range air defence weapons, earlier deployed to protect the vital areas, can be redeployed to cover a larger number of vital points. Its Vertical launch (VL) capability gives it 360-degree coverage without any restriction on the grazing angle and allows it to be deployed in constricted spaces. On the other hand, Mistral man-portable air defence system (MANPADS) is a short range weapon with infra-red seeker head and an effective range of 6 km. This range is also greater than the range of earlier held SA-7 and SA-16 systems. Overall, Botswana's area under active air defence has increased substantially with these acquisitions.

MICA-VL's interception range of 20 km gives BDF a ground-based area defence weapon for the first time.

While operationally, this is good for BDF as it is difficult to maintain and operate ageing F5 especially for air defence duties. To enhance the self-defence capability, the Air Wing of BDF is looking to replace its F-5 fighter aircraft, with the Swedish Gripen or South Korean FA-50.¹³ As a precursor, reportedly, in January 2017, Botswana and South Korea signed a military-cooperation umbrella agreement and simultaneously negotiations are on for eight to 12 Gripen at an estimated price of \$1.7 billion.¹⁴

Future

Boosting ground-based air defence capabilities may also help in instances of use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) by other states and non-state actors. With the proliferation of UAV technology and the relatively low cost of its acquisition, coupled with minimal training required for its operation, it has become a prime threat to defence establishments

...availability of UAVs to groups with hostile intent is highly probable.

worldwide. UAVs can be used as a terror tool. These can be fitted with cameras to give bird's eye view of the intended target to the terrorists. In desperate situations, these low-cost flying machines can be fitted with explosives to create havoc at key locations or public places. A number of ready-to-make kits for UAVs are commercially available and within Africa, a number of agencies are already manufacturing UAVs. Therefore, availability of UAVs to groups with hostile intent is highly

probable. To protect against UAV attacks, a number of methodologies are being employed like jamming or blinding the UAV. However, shooting it down remains the most effective method. Fighter aircraft have a low probability of intercepting low-speed UAVs because of the large speed differential. Small arms have severe limitations against UAVs flying above 1000m and in such a scenario, air defence systems with larger engagement envelope play a pivotal role. This is where the new acquisitions of BDF will be able to provide an effective cover against UAV threat.

Conclusion

While combat aircraft acquisition for self-defence capability is a long drawn and expensive process, Botswana has moved systematically to enhance its low-cost variation - by improving ground-based air defence system. Many debates are on about usefulness or otherwise of spending such a large amount by a developing country on building a military capability that may never have to be used. But military capability building is a time-consuming process. It is better to gradually build the national capability to face likely threats so that the nation is ready when the need arises.

¹ Government of France, *Rapport au Parlement 2017 sur les exportations d'armement de la France, Annexe IX*, at <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/.../2016-FranceControlArmTrade.pdf> (Accessed May 10, 2017).

² International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Military Balance 2017*, London: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 2017, pp 497-498.

- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ IHS, *Jane's World Air Forces*, Edition 44, 2016, pp 71-73.
- ⁶ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), n. 2. p. 498.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Press Release, "Indra is Awarded Botswana's Air Defence Control System", *Defence Aerospace*, January 2, 2005, at <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/51663/indra-wins-botswana-air-defense-contract-%28jan.-18%29.html> (Accessed May 10, 2017).
- ⁹ IHS, *Jane's World Armies*, Edition 40, 2016, pp. 81-82.
- ¹⁰ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), n.2.
- ¹¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Arms Transfers Database*, at http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php (Accessed May 10, 2017).
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), n.2.
- ¹⁴ "Botswana, South Korea agree to collaborate on defence", *Defence Web*, January 19, 2017, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46504:botswana-south-korea-agree-to-collaborate-on-defence&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111 (Accessed on May 10, 2017).

Viewpoint

EGYPT'S STAKES IN QATAR'S PREDICAMENT

Egypt understood that to be relevant globally and to re-emerge as a regional leader, it has to re-build its relations with the GCC countries that supported it during the Arab Spring. Egypt achieved more than one goal by supporting Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain in isolating Qatar. It gained global relevance, clarified its position in opposition to terrorism, gained regional eminence by taking a stand against terrorism and is able to bonhomie with other GCC states. Apart from that, by taking a firm stand against Qatar, it sent a strong message to Muslim brotherhood leaders at home.

Lakshmi Priya *

Introduction

Egypt, like many other Arab African countries, has been a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and has therefore been engaged with the geopolitics of the Gulf region. So when a fault line developed in the GCC on June 5, 2017, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain cut ties with Qatar accusing it of sponsoring terrorism, Egypt was among the first countries from outside the region to respond. All other North African Arab countries took a neutral stand on the issue. Egypt's response on this issue is based on high stakes, both domestic and external.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain cut ties with Qatar accusing it of sponsoring terrorism...

Africa and the Crisis relating to Qatar

On June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain cut ties with Qatar accusing it of sponsoring terrorism, Egypt announced the withdrawal of its envoy from Doha and gave a margin of 48 hours to Qatari ambassador in Cairo to leave the country. Egypt's foreign ministry announced suspension of air and sea links to Qatar citing threat to national security. Egypt's ministry of civil aviation notified that Egypt's airspace will be inaccessible for Qatari flights from next day. As part of the quartet, Egypt has supported Saudi Arabia's stance on Qatar and the President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el Sisi appreciated US President Donald Trump who echoed the quartet's stand on Qatar.

* Dr. Lakshmi Priya is Research Assistant, West Asia Centre, IDSA.

Apart from Egypt, all other North African Arab countries including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya maintained a neutral stand on the issue. Qatar has considerable influence in Arab Africa. Algeria advocated that the crisis regarding Qatar must be resolved through dialogue, though its Islamist Members of Parliament formed a parliamentary committee in solidarity with Qatar. Morocco, though an ally of Saudi Arabia, has more recently received investments from Qatar. So while remaining neutral, it sent planes loaded with food for Qataris despite accusations of ignoring demands of its own people protesting at Al Hoceina. Tunisia too maintained a neutral stand on the issue even though Qatar is its biggest Arab investor. Qatar is a major player in western Libya; whereas eastern Libyan leaders and Tobruk based House of Representatives supported the blockade by the quartet isolating Qatar.

Apart from Egypt, all other North African Arab countries...maintained a neutral stand on the issue.

Among other countries of Africa, Eritrea, Mauritania, Senegal, Chad and Gabon sided with Saudi Arabia; Ethiopia and Somalia advocated for dialogue between the concerned parties. Ghana on the other hand announced to open its embassy in Doha, throwing its weight behind Qatar. Head of African Union, President of Republic of Guinea, Alpha Conde, emphasised on constructive dialogue and diplomatic efforts as effective tool in resolving the crisis. African Union applauded the mediatory role played by Kuwait through Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah. Chief of African Union, Mr Mahamat Moussa Faki stated that if the rift is not addressed speedily, it could have adverse political, security and humanitarian implications for the Gulf States, the African continent and for international peace and stability.¹

Africa and the GCC

Africa's relations with GCC go back to antiquity and the two regions are tied with shared bonds of Islam and Arab culture. African languages like Swahili and Hausa share words and phrases with Arabic language. The east African island of Zanzibar was the Headquarter of the Sultanate of Oman. African human resource was used in date plantations and pearl diving industry of GCC countries. The leaders from both the regions shared common experience in their struggle against colonialism.

Africa's relations with GCC go back to antiquity and the two regions are tied with shared bonds of Islam and Arab culture.

The economy of a number of African countries benefits from the remittances sent by their citizens residing in GCC countries. African people are 28 per cent of the population of UAE, 25 per cent of the population of Muscat and 22 per cent of Qatari population.² Currently, GCC nations are investing in African tourism sector for instance Dubai World has invested in Victoria and Albert complex in Cape Town. Similarly, GCC countries have invested in African land for food production since 2007-2008 food price crisis.³ Availability of unused cultivable land in Africa is an attraction for the oil rich but arable land-deficient GCC countries.

Egypt and the GCC

As an Arab country situated in North Africa, Egypt has significant linkages with the GCC.

As per ministry of foreign affairs of Egypt, seventy percent of Egypt's 6 million total emigrants live in the Gulf.

Before Arab Spring, Egypt and Gulf countries shared warm relations reflected in its support to Kuwait when Saddam Hussain invaded it in 1991. Egypt provided third largest contingent after US and UK comprising of 35,000 troops during the gulf war. In return Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Qatar waived the debt of \$6 billion on Egypt. As per ministry of foreign affairs of Egypt, seventy percent of Egypt's 6 million total emigrants live in the Gulf. In 2009-2010, Egypt received \$1.5 billion from Kuwait and \$ 1 billion from Saudi Arabia.⁴

Gulf business men have invested in Egypt in tourism, industry, and agriculture and service sector.

During the Arab spring, among the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait backed the incumbent Hosni Mubarak; while Qatar supported the extremist elements of Muslim Brotherhood with material and immaterial sources. It provided financial support

Qatar supported the extremist elements of Muslim Brotherhood with material and immaterial sources.

to the rebels while propagating their cause through Al Jazeera channel. As Muslim Brotherhood led by Mohamed Morsi came to power, Qatar maintained good relations with Egypt. However as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait supported the coup against Muslim Brotherhood and Abdel Fattah el Sisi came to power, Qatar virtually came in Egypt's line of fire.

After the Arab Spring, Egypt aimed to portray an image of a globally relevant, moderate state interested in rebuilding the Egypt-GCC coalition. When internally Egypt was witnessing the rise of Muslim Brotherhood and revival of its extremist tendencies, it gave priority to fighting terrorism outside its own borders and at international forums. As it supported cohesion of state in the face of extremist groups, bandwagoning with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE against Qatar came naturally to it.

Egypt's Stakes

Egypt understood that to be relevant globally and to re-emerge as a regional leader, it has to re-build its relations with the GCC countries that supported it during the Arab Spring. Egypt achieved more than one goal by supporting Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain in isolating Qatar. It gained global relevance, clarified its position in opposition to terrorism, gained regional eminence by taking a stand against terrorism and is able to bonhomie with other GCC states. Apart from that, by taking a firm stand against Qatar, it sent a strong message to Muslim brotherhood leaders at home.

Egypt is aware that if it has to maintain good relations with GCC, it cannot incline towards Iran. Going against Qatar which is also accused of being soft on Iran, is an opportunity to prove Egypt's repulsion from Iran. Secondly, since Iran and Egypt both intend to lead the

region in terms of resources and capabilities, standing against Qatar gives Iran a strong message. Thirdly, by opposing Qatar, Egypt has tried to fit in the image created by other Arab countries who see it as the only country able to match Israel's capabilities. Iran's support to Hezbollah and Hamas worries Egypt and gives it another reason to go against Iran.

Egypt is aware that if it has to maintain good relations with GCC, it cannot incline towards Iran.

Egypt believes in diplomatic methods to resolve the Arab-Israel issue, whereas Iran believes in direct and violent methods. Egypt is the first Arab country to publically sign a peace treaty with Israel while Iran finances Hezbollah and Hamas and promotes violence. It is an irritant for Egypt as Hamas gets soft support from Muslim Brotherhood.⁵ As Egypt engages in the ongoing crisis, Qatar has sidelined it in a subtle but firm manner. Qatar and Al-Jazeera have been addressing to this crisis as the gulf crisis, signifying its lack of concern towards Egyptian demands and fostering GCC unity while excluding Egypt.

A final Egyptian tussle with Qatar is due to its closeness with Sheikh Yousef al Qardawi, an influential Egyptian theologian based in Doha, Qatar. Sheikh Yousef al Qardawi who was born and brought up in Egypt, was banished due to his radical views and sought refuge in Qatar from where he engaged in preaching his ideology. He has used social media to propagate his views and is the president of World Union of Muslim scholars. Qardawi also has a following among Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which is an irritant for Egypt. During the Egyptian crisis, he preached and gave moral support to the Muslim Brotherhood through al Jazeera channel. When Morsi was in power, he visited the Tahrir square and gave motivational speeches. He even issued a *fatwa* against those who rebelled against Morsi. He has financial backing from Qatar and is close to Emir of Qatar.⁶

Qardawi also has a following among Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which is an irritant for Egypt.

Conclusion

Egypt's stake in the current predicament of Qatar within the GCC, thus, is very high. The ongoing crisis gives an opportunity to Egypt to not only slight the Muslim Brotherhood in its own backyard, but also to reposition itself as a religious leader in the region that can stand up to Iran. Improved relations with other countries of the GCC will also enable Egypt to regain its place in the regional comity of nations.

¹ Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, "Qatar-Gulf Crisis: AU urges speedy resolution through dialogue", *Africa News*, June 17, 2017, at <http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/17/qatar-gulf-crisis-au-urges-speedy-resolution-through-dialogue/> (Accessed August 16, 2017).

² Yaw Nyarko and Silvana Melitsko, "Africa and the Arab Gulf: A new economic and political alliance?", *Journal of African Development*, Spring 2010, 12 (1), pp. 10-18, at http://yawnyarko.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Africa-and-the-Gulf-JAD_vol12_ch11.pdf (Accessed on July 2, 2017).

- ³ The Report: Qatar 2015, "Qatar among GCC countries investing in Africa", *Oxford Business Group*, at <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/qatar-among-gcc-countries-investing-africa> (Accessed July 3, 2017).
- ⁴ Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi, "Gulf states must repay Egypt favour", *Al Jazeera*, February 17, 2011, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011214151229281695.html> (Accessed April 27, 2017).
- ⁵ Gawdat Bahgat, "Egypt and Iran: The 30-year Estrangement", *Middle East Policy Council*, Winter, XVI (4), at <http://www.mepec.org/journal/egypt-and-iran-30-year-estrangement> (Accessed April 27, 2017).
- ⁶ Staff Writer, "Qardawi: The top advocate of suicide bombings", *Al Jazeera*, June 09, 2017, at <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/06/09/The-reasons-Qaradawi-on-the-top-of-Egypt-s-most-wanted-list.html> (Accessed April 27, 2017).

Book Review

Ali A. Mazrui and Francis Wiafe-Amoako, *African Institutions*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, USA, 2016
ISBN 978-1-4422-3952-4 (Cloth: alk paper)
ISBN 978-1-4422-3953-1 (pbk: alk paper)
ISBN 978-1-4422-3954-8 (electronic)

Diya deep Singh *

The title of the book itself speaks of its significance; a state's stability, security and development are dependent on its past, present and future institutions. The book provides vital insights into the political, social and economic institutions which form the foundations of Africa's development. While the distinguished first author Ali A. Mazrui passed away in October 2014, the book is a collection of some of his work on Africa. Further the book has been enriched by chapters written by Francis Wiafe-Amoako, the current editor for "Africa" in the *World Today* series, an annual publication of historical and contemporary issues on Africa.

The book emphasises the fact that no progress on Africa's development could be achieved without addressing institutional challenges. Institutions form behavior patterns and once they are adopted, the challenge is how to ensure that these institutions meet people's expectations. It also identifies institutional challenges that need utmost attention. The authors classify these areas into chapters, each targeting a different institutional challenge and critical issues such as ethnicity and constitutional development, instability despite abundance of resources, international economic regimes and Africa's economy, political ideologies of Africa and the role of gender in Africa. These chapters feature case studies of South Africa, Tanzania, Morocco, DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Rwanda.

The book also asserts that underdevelopment in Africa is due to hindrances in democratic consolidation in contemporary African politics, society and economy. Chapter 2 of the book entitled "Democracide" examines critical institutional elements that may have destroyed or continue to threaten democracy in Africa. It forms a strong base for further discussion in the book on gender roles, political ideologies and ethnicity in Africa. A few chapters in the book have been written in a storytelling format with reference to Agatha Christy's famous novel *Murder on the Orient Express*. The Author states that there are a number of villains who killed

* Diya deep Singh is Research Intern, Centre for Defence Economics and Industry, IDSA.

democracy in Africa. Firstly, the models of governance put in place by the western powers, which led to the sustenance of colonialism; secondly the military's role in African politics, especially the manner in which African political elites exploited that institution; thirdly, western powers in Africa during the cold war era who permitted African favourites to be corrupt and repressive; and lastly widely held beliefs of curses the ancestors can unleash if the indigenous traditions are violated. The book also predicts a new villain that continues to challenge democracy in Africa - counterterrorism. It also addresses fundamental challenges faced by states in developing institutions. These challenges are not limited to the adoption of foreign institutions, but also include the lack of change in mind-set and timely adjustments. Policy makers in Africa need to make adjustments for the institutions to functions properly

The importance of institutions in the larger context of international arena has been explained by citing instances of United Nations as an instrumental institution. While the relevance of the UN in the 21st century has also been questioned, the need for institutions to evolve over-time has been amply underscored. Extensive literature has been covered which explains why the balance between power consolidation and nation building is vital to Africa, it is because the interaction between political elites (institution drafters) in Africa and the general people of Africa is very complex. The question which needs to be addressed is, till what extent institutions should balance between societal needs and preferences of elites. This balance leads us to question the morality of institutions made by the political elites. The flexibility of institutions also impact their durability and lifespan.

Every chapter in the book raises vital questions-

- Is Africa undeveloped because it is undemocratic or is it undemocratic because it is undeveloped? (p:20)
- How to keep democratic goals constant while looking for democratic means more appropriate for Africa?(p:20)
- How important is planning for women empowerment in political process?

Although the book does not aim to answer the questions stated above, they render the study thought provoking. The book follows a case study approach while discussing the challenges faced in its economic political and social foundations. It could have done more in discussing about Africa's economic development post 1990's with empirical evidence. Another critical issue which has not been discussed elaborately in the book is how Apartheid affected the democratisation process.

Two books by another author, George Ayittey, dwell on the subject of Africa's institutions. *Indigenous African Institutions* (1991) presents a picture of pre-colonial and post-colonial Africa, its cultures, traditions, and indigenous institutions; *Africa Unchained: The Blue Print for Africa's Future* (2005) presents some daring suggestions on how Africa could modernise and built its institutions. But both the books were written more than a decade ago. Meanwhile a lot of things have changed within Africa and substantial amount of development has taken

place between early 2000's and now. During the decade, books were written targeting specific institutions and their impact for instance *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa* (2005), *Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence* (2008) and *Healthcare Policy in Africa: Institutions and Politics from Colonialism to the Present* (2016). However, Mazurai and Amoake's book gives a holistic overview of political, social and economic institutions in Africa.

The book does not have a conclusion, but provides a forward looking perspective on Africa's development issues by overcoming institutional challenges. The analytical and argumentative manner in which the book has been written makes it a fascinating and an informative text; it is organised in a fashion with interesting chapter headings to increase the interest of readers. This book is an important frame of reference for understanding Africa's future political path and how the continent can play its role in the world. The book will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in African Studies, comparative politics and other related fields.

Call for Contributions

IDSIA invites articles, commentaries and book reviews for publication in *Africa Trends*, a biannual magazine on Africa. Submissions can focus on security, political and economic issues relating to African countries. Articles may focus on analysing bilateral, regional and multilateral developments of strategic significance to India's engagement with African countries.

Articles could be of approximately 2000 words. Commentaries can range between 1,000-1,500 words (excluding footnotes) and book reviews between 600-1,000 words. Guidelines for contributors may be found at: <http://www.idsa.in/africatrends>. Submissions may be emailed to the Editor at idsa.africatrends@gmail.com.

About Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN Centre IDSA

The Centre's research focus includes understanding developments in the African region and analysing various hotspots like Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and the Indian Ocean Region. It also focuses on bilateral, regional as well as multilateral engagements between India and the countries of Africa. The Centre also endeavours to analyse India's engagement with Latin American countries, particularly in forums such as the IBSA and BRICS.

In addition, the Centre carries out research on the broader theme of India and the United Nations. It deals with important topics that come up in the Security Council and those that have relevance and significance for India's foreign policy.

Cover page courtesy: Dr Saurabh Mishra & Ms Geeta



Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,

Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010

Tel.: (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax: (91-11) 2615 4191

Website: <http://www.idsa.in>

E-mail: contactus@idsa.in