

The menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency, has been categorised as the single biggest challenge to India's internal security by the Prime Minister. He urged the Centre as well as States, to urgently employ all available resources to cripple the virus of Naxalism.

The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs has adopted a multi-prong strategy to deal with the Naxal menace, including an effective security response to curb rebel violence. Due to socio-economic roots of the problem, emphasis is being laid on employing the State Police Forces to tackle the Naxal violence. However, the Government's security response, have been ineffective in most of the States except a few. Inadequate combat capability of police forces in Naxalism-affected States is considered a prime factor for failing security response. The police forces in most of the States are tremendously capacity-deficient in terms of manpower, resources, training and infrastructure.

This occasional paper attempts to assess and analyse the impact of the MPF scheme on building police combat capability in affected States. In order to realistically assess the impact of the MPF scheme, the paper focuses on the ongoing MPF scheme in various affected States in general, and the States of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa in particular, which are worst hit and generally considered to be having the least developed police capability.



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## Impact of Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme on Combat Capability of the Police Forces in Naxal-Affected States:

### A Critical Evaluation

Om Shankar Jha

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**IMPACT OF MODERNISATION OF POLICE  
FORCES SCHEME ON COMBAT  
CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE FORCES IN  
NAXAL-AFFECTED STATES :  
A CRITICAL EVALUATION**

**OM SHANKAR JHA**



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# INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

*In any moment of decision the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing.” -Theodore Roosevelt*

The menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency, has been a major challenge to India’s internal security for the last few years.<sup>2</sup> It has been categorised as the single biggest challenge to India’s internal security by the Prime Minister. Recently, the Prime Minister reiterated that, from being an ideologically-driven movement it has transformed into one, in which military ethos have become predominant.<sup>3</sup>

As part of its multi-pronged strategy to deal with the menace, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has taken special steps on the security front. Due to socio-economic roots of Naxalism, emphasis is being laid on employing the local State Police Forces (SPF) with assistance from Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) for ensuring appropriate security. However, the security response of various States has not been so effective, barring limited success in a few States. Of late, Maoist insurgents have specifically targeted the SPF involved in anti-Naxal operations and inflicted heavy casualties upon them. While the number of Maoist casualties has declined in recent years, the casualty figures of SPF have increased. Security experts generally attribute this to the combat capability deficiency of SPF.

In order to address the long felt need of police capability building, the Centre as well as State Governments have initiated numerous measures to enhance the combat capability of SPFs in naxalism-affected States, like raising of special anti-Naxal forces, specialised training to SPFs in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare, providing better arms, ammunitions, equipments, communication gadgets, bullet proof vehicles, land-mine proof

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on a field visit to Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh during December 2008 and June 2009, besides the author’s personal experience of working with police forces in various States. Interactions with State police leadership and Ministry of Home affairs officials monitoring/dealing with the implementation of the scheme have gone a long way in the writing of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> The terms Naxalism, Left Wing Extremism and Maoist Insurgency are used inter-changeably in this paper.

<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister’s opening remarks at the Chief Minister’s Conference on Internal Security, January 6, 2009; accessible at <http://www.pmindia.nic.in>.

vehicles, intelligence support, improved infrastructural and resource supports etc. The Centre has been implementing the presently ongoing modernisation of police forces scheme (MPF) since 2000-01, with an annual budgetary allocation of Rs.1000 Crores for ten years, with assistance of States. The MHA claims that, this scheme provides the much needed assistance and impetus to police organisation in States. However, on ground, things appear different. Almost eight financial years have passed since this scheme was launched. The SPFs in most of the affected States are still combat capability deficient and unable to take the Naxals head on. The Naxal violence and casualty figures of SPF are still on the rise. There has been no decline in Naxal violence in year 2008.<sup>4</sup> The number of incidents of violence by Naxalites and police/civilian casualties in 2008 was 1591 and 721 respectively, as compared to 1565 and 696 for 2007. Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa have been the worst affected recording maximum number of incidents<sup>5</sup>. These four States have jointly accounted for 610 out of 699, i.e. 87% of casualties and 1371 out of 1591 i.e. 86% of incidents related to LWE. The following table indicates the ever growing Naxal violence since 1999 onwards.<sup>6</sup>

**Table 1: All-India Trends of Naxal Violence, 1999-2008**

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
No of incidents	1246	1179	1208	1465	1597	1533	1608	1509	1565	1591
SF killed	96	98	125	100	105	100	153	157	236	231
Civilians killed	502	452	439	382	410	466	524	521	460	490
Naxalites killed	261	254	182	141	211	87	225	274	141	199
Total Killed	859	804	746	623	726	653	902	952	837	920

*Source:* Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>7</sup>


<sup>4</sup> Please see “Year End Review on Internal Security”, a press release of the MHA, December 31, 2008; accessible at <http://www.pib.nic.in>.

<sup>5</sup> Please see Annexure- I.

<sup>6</sup> *Status Paper on Internal Security*, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, September 30, 2008 p 25. Also see, Statement of Minister of State Home Affairs in the Rajya Sabha, PIB press release, February 18, 2009; accessible at <http://www.pib.nic.in>.


<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

**Chart 1**



Source: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>8</sup>

**Chart 2: Fatalities in Naxal Violence: 1999-2008**



Source: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>9</sup>

While the number of Naxal casualties has declined in recent years, SF personnel have suffered more casualties. The following table indicates that, the Naxals have specifically targeted the SFs and inflicted heavy casualties on them.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

**Table 2: Naxal/SF killed Ratio (1999-2008)**

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
<i>Naxal/SF killed Rratio</i>	2.71	2.59	1.45	1.41	2.0	0.87	1.47	1.74	0.59	0.86

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>10</sup>

**Chart 3**

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>11</sup>

The militarization and lethal capabilities of Naxalites is on the rise.<sup>12</sup> Naxalites have recently attacked CPMF camps and fought pitched battle for hours. They had recently inflicted heavy casualties on SFs during the parliamentary elections in April-May 2009, despite heavy deployment of SFs. The Naxals' targeted attack against SFs still continues and almost 200 SF personal have lost their precious lives in less than six months of current year ie 2009.<sup>13</sup> Hence, a vital question arises: whether the ongoing MPF scheme launched in FY 2000-01 has helped in building desired police capability in affected States? Is there any difficulty in the implementation and execution of the scheme? This paper seeks to answer the following questions:-

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008 and Bihar, Patna and Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 3-11, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> See "Major Naxal Strikes this Year", *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, June 23, 2009.

- What has been the essence of the ongoing MPF scheme and its impact on police capability building since 2000 onwards in Naxal-affected States?
- What difficulties are being faced while implementing this scheme?
- Has the provisions/allocation under the scheme been adequate to address all the aspects of police combat capacity deficiency, so as to make them capable enough to counter Naxalism effectively? If not, what are the deficiencies in the existing scheme, including in implementation?
- What measures could be undertaken to make the scheme more effective?

This paper attempts to assess and analyse the impact of the MPF scheme on building police combat capability in affected States. In order to realistically assess the impact of MPF scheme, the paper focuses on the ongoing MPF scheme in various affected States in general and the States of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa in particular, which are worst hit and generally considered to be having the least developed police capability.

# MPF SCHEME: AN OVERVIEW

## Evolution of the Ongoing MPF Scheme

Police is the strong arm of the Government. Its strength and efficiency are essential for the credibility of any Government, especially a democratic one. As per the VII Schedule to the Constitution of India, “Police” and “law and order” is a “State Subject” and, as such, it is the responsibility of the State Governments to modernize and adequately equip their police forces for meeting challenges to law and order and internal security. The concerned State Governments take necessary action to deal with law and order problems, terrorism, Naxal activities and other related issues etc. The Central Government supplements their efforts and resources by various measures, which include deployment of CPMF to assist the SPFs, sanctioning India Reserve Battalions (IRB) to the States, assistance for strengthening State Police and Intelligence agencies through Modernization scheme, reimbursement of security-related expenditure under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme, assistance in training State police forces through the Army, CPMF and BPR&D, sharing of intelligence, bringing about inter-State coordination and assistance in development works through myriad schemes of different Ministries.

Traditionally policing has been a neglected area in most of the States. The State Governments have overlooked the requirement and need of developing basic policing infrastructure, as policing is a service function and not a revenue earning department. Police budget has been traditionally limited to mere payment of pay and allowances in most of the States and no effort has been made to build even basic minimum facilities for policing duties.<sup>14</sup> A senior police officer expressed that, Indian police have inherited Colonial legacy in its present system. The British gave adequate powers to police personnel in India with little administrative facilities. They deliberately left the police personnel on their own for managing their basic amenities and administrative requirements. Hence police personnel misused the immense power vested in them and exploited the public, which was overlooked by the colonial bosses. This practice cannot continue in a

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<sup>14</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008 and Bihar, Patna and Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 3-11, 2009.

democratic set up. The basic needs of Police personnel including administrative infrastructural and welfare measures remained neglected in post colonial period also.<sup>15</sup> Increased public awareness, political interference, media watch, Right to Information Act, etc, have now made the police more accountable and exposed them to public scrutiny. Hence, policing has earned a negative image in the society. The total police budget in India has been a meagre 1% of the GDP.<sup>16</sup> In 2008, the total budget of Police in all the States put together is Rs 22,700 Crores and the Union Police budget is Rs 22,300 Crores. Thus, the total budget in 2008 has been Rs 45,000 Crores. The total strength of police force in India was 23,79,529 with 16,32,651 State police personnel and 7,46,878, CPMF personnel by the end of September 2008. Policing is a round-the-clock (24x7x365) function and therefore needs adequate and recurring investment, especially for such a large body of personnel.<sup>17</sup> The police budget in Naxalism-affected States has been further meagre as can be noticed in Table-3.

**Table 3: State-Wise Total Expenditure on Police Budget in Naxal-affected States (Rupee in Crore)**

State	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07
Andhra Pradesh	1,159.49	1,150.32	1,115.97	1,115.97
Bihar	897.80	897.80	897.80	897.80
Chhattisgarh	247.00	269.00	336.00	377.00
Jharkhand	299.35	468.59	725.64	722.13
Maharashtra	1,357.68	2,118.22	1,858.00	1,858.00
Orissa	378.00	393.00	429.58	488.87
West Bengal	731.12	715.76	794.28	889.93
Uttar Pradesh	2,372.24	2372.24	2,761.25	3210.70
Madhya Pradesh	796.36	935.14	907.99	866.28

<sup>15</sup> Views of senior police officers in Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, expressed to the author during field visits in December 2008 and June 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Please see the *98th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Demands for Grants, 2003-04*, New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2004; evidence of the Union Home Secretary to the Standing Committee.

<sup>17</sup> *Status Paper on Internal Security*, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, September 30, 2008, p. 81, p.83.

*Source:* Status Paper on Naxal Activities as on September 30, 2008, Ministry of Home Affairs.

To supplement the efforts of State Governments in modernizing their police forces, the MHA has been implementing a Non-Plan Scheme for Modernization of State Police Forces since 1969-70 on Centre-State cost sharing (50:50) basis. Initially, Rs. 50 lakh was allocated annually for the Scheme. In 1978-79 the allocation was raised from Rs. 50 Lakh to Rs. 7 Crores per annum. Further, from 1999-2000, allocation was further enhanced to Rs.100 Crores. During the period 1969-70 to 1999-2000, a total amount of Rs.536.74 Crores was released to various State Governments on account of this scheme, which, in real terms, is a meagre sum for such a vast project. The MPF scheme therefore, could not have the desired impact on policing in the States, thus far.

BPR&D conducted the base survey in 2000 to assess the deficiency in various areas of police administration in the States. The survey indicated that a sum of minimum Rs. 25,000 Crores would be required to meet the current deficiencies in the State Police Forces in the country in the areas of mobility, police building, police housing, weaponry, forensic set-up, training, etc. Consequently, in January 2001, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) decided to enhance the annual Central allocation under MPF scheme to Rs.1000 Crores from 2000-01 for 10 years.<sup>18</sup> The summary of BPR&D cost projection is given as under:

Building	1583 (Rupees in Crores)
Housing	24608 Cr
Mobility	2922 Cr
Equipment	855 Cr
Training	260 Cr
Total	30,230 Cr

The Government had however put a ceiling of maximum Rs 20,000 Crores. Hence, BPR&D had recommended 70% satisfaction level for lower

<sup>18</sup> Please see the *98th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Demands for Grants, 2003-04*, New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2004.

subordinate and 80% satisfaction level for upper subordinate in housing. The total cost for housing was therefore projected at Rs 17677.49 Crores. Also, some elements of mobility were curtailed especially in repair and replacement aspects etc. to restrict the cost. With these restrictions, the total cost projection came down to Rs 20,108 Crores. The need for manpower was not taken into account in the above analysis. Also special requirements like BP vehicles, MPVs, etc were not included in this. *Hence, the overall projection of BPR&D stood approximately at Rs 25,000 Crores.*

### **Objective of the MPF Scheme**

- To meet the identified deficiencies in the various aspects of police administration worked out by the BPR&D.
- To reduce the dependence of the State Governments on the Army and CPMF.
- To control internal security and Law and Order situation by way of equipping the State Police Forces adequately and imparting the required training.
- Balanced development of the State Police Forces.

### **Focus of the MPF Scheme**

The focus of the scheme is on strengthening the police infrastructure at the cutting-edge level through constructing secure police stations, equipping police stations with required mobility, modern weaponry, communication equipment, forensic set-up and housing, etc.

### **Major Items Covered Under the Scheme**

- Ensuring Mobility
- Provision of modern weaponry
- Communication system
- Upgradation of training infrastructural facilities
- Construction secure Police Stations and Outposts
- Construction of Police Lines and residential buildings for lower level police personnel
- Security equipment
- Strengthening of Intelligence Branches and Surveillance

- Forensic science facilities and equipments
- Police Housing
- Computerisation, etc

**Note:—** These items only indicate the broad areas for which assistance is admissible under the Scheme. The Annual Action Plans covering these broad areas are prepared by the State Governments, and submitted to the MHA for consideration and approval. Based on the approved Annual Action Plans, Central funds are released to the States, as per the items of the Scheme. Some special provision was made in this scheme for Naxal-affected States.

### **Review and Implementation Mechanism**

The Scheme provides for reviewing implementation every two years. Accordingly, a Review Committee was constituted under the Special Secretary, MHA in 2002. The Committee visited a few major States and studied the implementation of the Scheme. The views of the State Governments were also obtained on various aspects of the Scheme. Most State Governments had expressed their inability to contribute matching share, as required by the Scheme, due to financial constraints. The Committee submitted its report. It had *inter alia* recommended that the funding pattern of the Scheme needed to be changed, whereby Central Government share should be increased to 75% out of which 50% should be in the form of grant-in-aid and 25% as loan.<sup>19</sup> Also, difficulty was faced in full utilisation of budget. During 2000-01 and 2001-02, Central share of Rs.1,000 Crores was released to the State Governments. However, only 71% of the funds allocated for 2000-01 and 43% for 2001-02 were utilised by the States. During 2002-03, release of further funds was done only on the basis of utilisation reports received from the States, with respect to the approved plans of 2000-01 and 2001-02. Subsequently, the Central allocation was enhanced to Rs.1,400 Crores per annum in 2003-04.

### **Revision of MPF Scheme in 2005-06**

Review of the scheme continued, subsequently, from time to time in the light of the capacity of States to utilize these funds, inability of several States in contributing their matching share, level of insurgent/terrorist/

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

cross-border activities, Naxalism and internal security scenario in NE States and J&K. The scheme was last reviewed in 2005 and in view of the changed security scenario, the States were re-categorised into two groups, namely 'A' and 'B' involving Central assistance at 100% and 75%, respectively w.e.f. 2005-06.

- The State of J&K and all 8 NE States, namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim (2007-08 onwards) have been classified as 'A' category States entitling them to 100% Central assistance.
- The remaining 19 States fall in category 'B' allowing 75% Central assistance with a provision of 25% of State share.

Only J&K and NE States have been given priority and accorded 100% assistance, while Naxal-affected States have been given only 75% assistance. Generally, these States are considered to be economically and infrastructurally backward, ill-developed and lacking in basic policing facilities. These States are also considered to be having suffered due to prolonged poor governance. They needed to be supported on priority. Many States find it difficult to allocate, on time, the matching grant, i.e. State's share of 25%. These States should have been given 100% assistance.

In FY 2003-04 and 2005-06 onwards, while revising the scheme, all police related items covered under the Scheme for SRE being implemented in respect of North East, J&K, etc. were merged with the MPF scheme and the proposed central allocation of the States from FY 2005-06 was worked out accordingly as per the direction of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Also from 2005-06 onwards the CCS had set an annual allocation ceiling of Rs 1645.00 Crores under the MPF Scheme. Five per cent of the annual allocation is earmarked as "Home Secretary/ Home Minister contingency reserve."

### **Fund Allocation Formula**

The Central allocation to the States under the MPF scheme was determined in the year 2001 on the following basis:—

- Population (35 % weightage).
- Sanctioned Strength of Police Force (25% weightage).

- Number of police stations (15% weightage).
- Incidence of crime per lakh of population (25% weightage).

*No weightage was given to economic backwardness, lack of basic policing infrastructure, etc. Hence, States which are traditionally capacity deficient with least policing resources and infrastructure did not get any special attention. Poor performing States have lesser crime registration due to lack of public awareness and poor police credibility. Hence, fund allocation formula went against Naxal-affected States.*

### **Fund Release Procedure**

After allocation of budget by MHA, Action Plan is prepared by the concerned States and submitted for approval. On approval, the fund is released to the States. But, the all-India total amount marked under the 'arms and ammunition' head for all the affected States put together is sent directly to the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), and a list mentioning the requirement of each State is also given to the OFB. 60 per cent of this total amount is paid in advance and the remaining after the States collect their stores. Once the stores are ready, the concerned States collect these directly from the OFB. In case any ordnance item is not being produced indigenously, the States are permitted to procure/import them.

Separately, the State Government releases the fund for infrastructure directly to the concerned agencies like States Police Housing Corporation, etc and the fund for provisioning and other miscellaneous stores to the police department.

Even though the plan size is fixed, poor performing States suffer, as their fund is re-allocated to other States. The fund is pooled up and released to States that require more funds than their normal allocation on account of specific requirements, and also released to better performing States with no pending overdue utilization certificates.

- However, deductions/ additional allocations are relevant only for the particular FY and do not affect the State-wise normal allocations in subsequent years.
- The State-wise, inter-se, ceiling fixed earlier at the time of the approval of the CCS in 2005-06 is 'indicative' and the actual allocation could vary in the light of the above.

### Year-Wise Release of Central MPF Fund

The year-wise total funds released from 2000-01 to 2007-08 to various States under the MPF Scheme are as under:—

**Table 4: (Amount:-Rs in Crore)**

Year	Funds Released	Amount Spent	Unspent Balance
2000-01	1000	1000	0
2001-02	1000	999.98	0.02
2002-03	695.00	695.00	0
2003-04	705.27	703.95	1.32
2004-05	960.00	959.80	0.20
2005-06	1025.00	1017.61	7.39
2006-07	1065.00	975.28	89.94
2007-08	1248.70	281.70	967.00
2008-09	1157.64		
2009-10	779.00*		
Total	9635.61		

\* Interim Allocation

*Source:-* Ministry of Home Affairs

During the period 2002-03 to 2006-07, the total Central assistance given to Naxal-affected States for modernization of the Police was Rs.2,140.70 Crores. In 2007-08, a provision of Rs 437.53 Crores was made.<sup>20</sup> The State-wise break-up of MPF allocation is given in Table-4 below. Till December 31, 2008, out of an allocation of Rs. 501.53 Crores for Naxal affected States for 2008-09, over Rs.279 Crores was released to the States. This is indicative of the slow implementation process of this scheme.

<sup>20</sup> Please see “Year End Review on Internal Security”, a press release of the Ministry of Home Affairs, December 31, 2008; accessible at <http://www.pib.nic.in>.

**Table-5: Support by Central Government to Naxal-Affected States Under MPF Scheme**

State	2002-03 to 2006-07			2007-08	2008-09
	Central Share	Utilisation upto 2006-07	Unspent balance	Central Share	Central Share
Andhra Pradesh	420.24	412.48	7.76	87.34	67.00
Bihar	148.67	99.68	48.99	16.24	40.00
Chattisgarh	164.68	103.63	61.05	41.72	25.00
Jharkhand	131.30	114.92	16.38	50.95	38.00
Madhya Pradesh	216.52	210.20	6.32	57.68	43.00
Maharashtra	395.66	315.32	80.34	78.87	75.00
Orrisa	138.80	132.05	6.75	45.80	26.53
Uttar Pradesh	426.36	426.36	0	115.44	90.00
West Bengal	98.47	76.00	22.74	44.45	33.00
Total	2140.70	1890.64	250.06	538.49	437.53
All India	4450.27			1248.0	963.83

*Source:-* Status Paper on Naxal Activities as on September 01, 2008, Ministry of Home Affairs.

### **Prioritising Under the MPF Scheme**

Since FY 2005-06, within the fund allocated under the MPF Scheme, priority is being given to NE States, Naxal-affected districts, districts along Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan border and the State of Jammu and Kashmir owing to their specific needs, and the balance funds are released thereafter among other States. The funds under the Scheme are sanctioned to the States by the High Power Committee (HPC) chaired by Additional Secretary (Centre-State Relations) MHA, as per the annual plans received from the States. Also, as mentioned earlier, in order to meet any emergent demands from any State, a 'Reserved Fund' of 5% of the annual allocation is kept aside, as contingency reserve, to be allocated with the approval of the union Home Minister.

## **Special Provisions for Naxal-Affected States through MPF**

### ***Strengthening of Special Branches***

Well-equipped intelligence set-up plays crucial role in ensuring internal security and the success of counter-insurgency operations. To begin with, 5% of MPF allocation has been earmarked for strengthening of Special Branches (SB) and equipping them with modern security and communication gadgetry in four Naxalite affected States, *viz.*, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. States have been requested to enhance SB manpower from their own resources. All States have been advised to earmark 5% of MPF allocation for strengthening the intelligence set-up in their States. Rs.40.00 Crores was sanctioned in 2008-09 for this purpose.<sup>21</sup>

### ***Strengthening of the Police Infrastructure in 76 Severely Naxal Affected Districts***

The MPF scheme has a special component for strengthening the police infrastructure in 76 highly Naxal affected districts at the rate of Rs. 2.00 Crores per district per year initially for a period of five years. Naxal-affected districts are provided 100% Central funds. On the advice of the Naxalite Management Division in the MHA, Rs.64.00 Crores has been allocated to 32 affected districts in FY 2008-09 for fortification of police stations.<sup>22</sup>

## **Other Measures for Improving Police Capability in Naxal-Affected States**

### ***Improving Police Training Capability***

With a view to building the capacity of Police personnel in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency operations, 20 special Counter Insurgency & Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) training centres will be set up in Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa (4 Centres in each State) with an outlay of Rs.52 Crores during the 11th Five Year Plan. Central funds have been released for at least one such school in each State during FY 2007-08. BPR&D has been tasked to set-up a Central Academy for Police Training at Bhopal during the 11th Five Year Plan for providing training to the

<sup>21</sup> Please see *Annual Report 2007-08*, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs.

<sup>22</sup> Please see "Year End Review on Internal Security", a press release of the Ministry of Home Affairs, December 31, 2008; accessible at <http://www.pib.nic.in>.

Police Trainers across the country and to direct recruit Dy SPs, as well as in-service and specialized training to Dy SP/Addl SP of these States.<sup>23</sup>

***Deployment of CPMF, Raising of IRBs and Sanctioning of Commando Company in each of 44 IRBs***

The Government has decided to provide additional assistance of Rs.264 Crores @ Rs.3 Crores per Company (Coy) for two Coys to be raised as a Commando Coy in each of the 44 IRBs. A total 29 IRBs have been sanctioned, of which 15 battalions (Bns) have been raised. 38 CPMF battalions are deployed in Naxal-Affected States.<sup>24</sup>

***Engagement of SPOs to Augment Policing***

Chhattisgarh has been permitted to engage 3,500 SPOs for payment of honoraria. Jharkhand also has been permitted to engage 3,400 SPOs.

***Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme***

A non-plan scheme, namely Security Related Expenditure Scheme (SRE) scheme is under implementation since April 1, 1996 to supplement the efforts of the States to deal with the Naxalite problem effectively. The Scheme was revised comprehensively in February 2005, thereby, increasing the rate of reimbursement from 50% to 100% and also covering more districts and more items for reimbursement. The revised scheme also permits advance release of funds to the States. In order to provide additional support to the States, the ceiling on re-imburement of infrastructure cost has been enhanced from Rs.8 Crores to Rs.15 Crores.

Under the revised scheme, 76 districts in nine States (Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) are covered and the MHA reimburses 100% expenditure incurred on security related items such as, ex-gratia paid to families of victims of Naxalite violence, providing logistic and camp facilities to the CPMFs, amount spent on special training given to State Police personnel, provision of insurance for State Police personnel involved in anti-Naxalite operations (ANO), a lump sum grant to Village Defence Committees (VDCs)/Nagrik Surakasha Samitis (NSSs) for security

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Please see Annexure II

related expenditure, lump sum amount per surrendered Naxalite, expenditure incurred on publicity material, advance releases under the SRE scheme, hiring of vehicles including helicopters, weapons or communication equipment not covered under the MPF Scheme, etc.

### ***Pilot Project for Development of Infrastructure in Naxal-Affected States***

A new scheme named “Special Infrastructure Scheme in LWE Affected States” has been launched with an outlay of Rs 500 Crores in the XI Plan, with a view to filling gaps in infrastructure not covered under any other Government scheme to provide accessibility to SFs in such areas.<sup>25</sup>

Based upon a detailed analysis of the spread and trends of Naxalite violence, 33 affected Districts in eight States have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of development schemes. 69 Schemes of 20 development Ministries/Departments have been identified. The Planning Commission has constituted eight Inter-Ministerial Groups to assist and guide the District Administration to formulate their respective District Plans.<sup>26</sup>

### **Other Components of MPF Scheme Applicable Beyond Naxalism-Affected States**

Besides the above measures, the MHA has also made special provision for police capacity building in seven mega cities, as well as improvement in desert policing in Gujarat and Rajasthan under the MPF scheme.<sup>27</sup>

### **Modernisation and Augmentation of CPMFs having Bearing on Anti-Naxal Operations**

Modernisation of all CPMFs is also in progress in a planned manner with a well formulated perspective plan. These schemes have a direct bearing on the maintenance of internal security, including tackling LWE violence.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Status Paper on Naxal Activities as on September 1, 2008*, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, September 30, 2008 p. 24.

<sup>26</sup> This was stated by Shri Sripakash Jaisawal, Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, in a written reply to a question in the Lok Sabha on February 24, 2009; please see <http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=47899&kwd=>, February 24, 2009.

<sup>27</sup> Please see Annexure III

<sup>28</sup> Please see Annexure IV

## EVALUATION OF ONGOING MPF SCHEME

The scheme has faced teething problems in the initial stage of implementation. The Central Government has been regularly reminding the States at Chief Ministers' Conferences and through letters to Chief Secretaries, to send perspective action plans for modernisation of their Police Forces.<sup>29</sup> However, the States have been found wanting in utilising the allotted funds. The lack of initiative on the part of a majority of States in the early stage of the MPF scheme was apparently due to their inability to spare requisite matching funds. This had led to a situation where the Union Government was keen to modernise the SPFs but the States were unable to implement the scheme owing to paucity of financial resources at their disposal.

This peculiar situation emanates, to a large extent, from the federal structure of our polity. According to our constitutional framework, the subjects of 'Police' and 'Public order' fall within the jurisdiction of State Governments, whereas the overall responsibility for maintenance of internal security has been vested in the Union Government under Article 355. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs in its report in 2003-04 had this to say:<sup>30</sup>

“When it comes to the control and superintendence of police forces, the States do not want to yield even an inch of their jurisdiction. But at the same time when it comes to improve and strengthen their police forces, they simply raise their hands expressing their inability to do so because of financial constraints.”

In order to overcome this problem, the Committee recommended that the Union Government must make earnest efforts to ensure the active participation of State Governments in modernising their police forces.<sup>31</sup> However, the Committee, while analysing the Demands for Grants, 2003-04, remarked that the Union Government should not have a feeling of

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<sup>29</sup> Please see the *98th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Demands for Grants, 2003-04*, New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Please see the *98th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Demands for Grants, 2003-04*, New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2004.

helplessness in convincing the State Governments to focus their attention on this issue as Article 355 places the responsibility of protecting the States from internal disturbances on the shoulders of the Union Government. Therefore, the Union Government will be well within its right if it issues necessary instructions to the State Governments to come forward and join it in modernising their police forces in the larger interest of maintaining internal security.

The Committee, keeping in view, the poor financial position of the States had also proposed a new funding pattern based on 75:25 ratio and recommended that the Centre may further consider stopping the release of funds in respect of States that are found wanting vis-à-vis the implementation of the scheme. The Committee also felt that a specialised Central agency should be entrusted with the task to oversee the implementation of this scheme. The Committee was also of the view that, under the MPF scheme, only a part of the Central share of the funds should be allotted to the States in cash, to meet their requirements for improving physical infrastructure such as police stations, etc. In so far as weaponry, gadgetry, equipment, vehicles, etc., the Central assistance should always be in kind. *This practice was followed initially, but discontinued latter. As already mentioned, presently only ordnance items are ordered centrally as per States' demands and the remaining fund is released to States only.*

### **Delay in Release of Fund to the States**

There has been an undue delay in allocation and release of funds to States by MHA. After receiving the funds from the MHA, the States have to release matching share as per Plan, but the States' home and finance departments take considerable time in issuing the allocation to the police department.<sup>32</sup> This is due to the States' inability to provide matching State share. Consequently, the fund is generally released at the end of the financial year. Hence, the tender formalities can not be completed in time and budget is not utilised in the same financial year. The revalidation sanction is sought from the respective State home department, which once again takes considerable time.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Please see Annexure V.

<sup>33</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008 and Bihar, Patna and Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 3-11, 2009.

A new system has been adopted for release of funds from 2008-09. A High Power Committee of the MHA considered the Action Plan in February-March 2008, and the first instalment of funds for 2008-09 was released to the States in April 2008.<sup>34</sup>

### **Adequacy of Funds under MPF Scheme**

The BPR&D in the year 2000 had projected a requirement of RS 25,000 Crores. However, initial allocation was made for Rs 1000 Crores per year for 10 years, which has been further raised to Rs 14,000 Crores and, finally, the maximum ceiling was raised to Rs 1,645.00 Crores by CCS. However, so far only a total of Rs 9,653.60 Crores has been released to the States by the Centre, including interim allocation for FY 2009-10. The maximum allocation ceiling set by CCS has never been met so far. Hence, the Centre's allocation has been inadequate in view of the initial estimate of Rs 25,000 Crores. So far, less than 40% of the estimated modernisation budget has been released. Cost escalation of items and inflation over the years will make the projected requirement of Rs 25,000 Crores itself meagre, let alone the amounts actually allocated.

Keeping in view the recommendation of the National Police commission that 100% housing should be provided to all police personnel, BPR&D while making the initial projection, estimated that police housing would require Rs 24,608.92 Crores, in order to achieve 100 % satisfaction level. However, owing to paucity of funds, allocation for housing was drastically cut, thereby, making it impossible to achieve 100 % satisfaction level for this requirement. As already mentioned, some elements of mobility requirements were also curtailed initially due to allocation ceiling. Hence, it is amply clear that, the allocation of fund under the scheme is inadequate since the beginning.

Senior Police officers of Chhattisgarh expressed that, on an average, the State is allocated Rs 50 Crores annually under the MPF scheme, which is far less than the actual requirement. There is a huge gap in basic policing requirements in this State. For example, during 2008-09, Rs 15 Crores only has been allocated for up-gradation of police communication equipment, against a minimum requirement of Rs 200 Crores. This State requires a minimum of Rs 300 Crores for vehicles for basic policing alone,

<sup>34</sup> Please see the "Year End Review on Internal Security", a press release of the Ministry of Home Affairs, December 31, 2008; accessible at <http://www.pib.nic.in>.

as per BPR&D norms. An additional Rs 150 Crores are required for BP and mine proof vehicles etc. Being the worst Naxal-hit State, they wish to have 100% housing for men in certain areas. Even as per BPR&D's recommended norms of providing 70% and 80% housing respectively for Constables and Inspectors, Chhattisgarh requires an additional Rs 2,100 Crores. With the present average annual allocation of Rs 10 Crores for housing under the MPF scheme this State will be able to achieve 80% housing satisfaction level after 200 years!!! The budget allocation for training is meagre and accorded least priority. During the year 2004-05, the State police spent Rs 77 lakh on training out of a total allocation of Rs 22 Crores under MPF scheme, accounting for 0.35% of the total budget. Likewise, in 2006-07, only Rs 25 lakh was expended on training out of a total Rs 76 Crores under MPF scheme, which accounts for 0.0328% of the total budget.<sup>35</sup> The Orissa Chief Minister had recently urged the Centre during the Chief Minister's conference to increase allocation under the MPF scheme for the State from Rs. 27 Crores to Rs. 60 Crores annually.<sup>36</sup>

*Many police officers feel that, although the total allocation under MPF is insufficient, it is a praise-worthy initiative for police capacity building, as policing has been neglected for since long the in States' budget. Generally, States' funding to police has been limited to merely pay and allowances, etc. No adequate effort to build-up policing infrastructure, buildings, housing training and mobility etc was made in the past. There is a huge gap between demand and what is made available. A huge amount is required to be allocated for infrastructure and mobility. Residential buildings for police men and family accommodation need to be constructed on priority to maintain the morale of police men. Mobility is another aspect which needs immediate attention. The present scheme has not been able to achieve the desired level of satisfaction in the above aspects as the allocation has been inadequate so far.<sup>37</sup>*

## **Problems of Implementation**

### ***Problems Faced by the MHA***

- Under the scheme, the States are required to submit an Action Plan well in advance preferably by January ahead of the next financial year.

<sup>35</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008.

<sup>36</sup> Please see "Naveen Patnaik seeks Centre's help to curb growing Naxal menace", *The Hindu*, Chennai, March 1, 2008.

<sup>37</sup> Interaction with Director General of Police and other senior police officers in Bihar, Patna, June 3-08, 2009.

These action plans are, thereafter, examined by the MHA and release is made accordingly. However, the States do not send the Action Plan in time. Also, they submit unrealistic Plans with highly inflated demands which are beyond the scope of the scheme due to budget limitation. For example, Punjab has been allocated Rs 22.80 Crores, but the State has submitted the Action Plan demanding Rs 100 Crores, with a demand for including Ludhiana under 'Mega City Policing' Scheme. Maharashtra, which submitted its Action Plan for the current FY 2009-10 four months late in May has been allocated Rs 65.4 Crores, but its demand was for Rs 450 Crores. Hence, unrealistic Action Plans beyond the scope of the MPF scheme lead to undue delay in finalisation and approval, thus resulting in delay in release of fund to States.<sup>38</sup>

- States do not utilise the budget in time and do not furnish the utilisation certificate, which results in delay in release of the subsequent year's allocation. In many cases utilisation certificates have been pending for more than five years. Chhattisgarh and Bihar are major defaulters.
- Funds allotted in a particular financial year get carried forward to the subsequent financial years for 4-5 years due to non-utilisation. Hence, allocation schedule gets disturbed.
- There is also delay in collection of stores from the designated depot of the OFB. Hence, realisation of final payment to OFB is delayed.

#### ***Problems Faced by the States***

- MHA releases the budget to the States in the middle or at the end of the financial year. Hence, States are unable to utilise the fund in time during same financial year.
- MHA releases the funds to the respective State Government (Home department). Sometimes, the State Government is unable to provide matching State share (25%) in time due to funds crunch. The power of approval for spending lies with a high power committee within the State Government headed by the Chief Secretary. Hence, the Home department takes considerable time in processing and issuing sanction order. As a result, the Police HQ is intimated to act in the end of the financial year. Hence, tender formalities can not be completed in time and the budget gets lapsed. The revalidation sanction is re-sought

<sup>38</sup> Interaction with MHA officials dealing with MPF scheme, New Delhi June 2, 2009.

which again takes months to mature, and results in delay in procurement/implementation.

- Presently the State DGPs have little financial sanction power. They are highly dependent on the State's Home department for financial sanctions. Hence, all the procurement cases require sanction of the State's Home department. Items to be procured through DGS&D Rate Contract (RC) need payment to be made in advance. State DGPs does not have the authority to draw the advance for such purpose. Hence, cases are sent to the State Home department and, thereby, create undue delay/lapse of budget. The process needs to be simplified.
- The MHA releases the budget to better performing States in order to ensure better utility of the total annual allocation. Hence, poor performing States are devoid of the much needed benefits of this scheme.

Almost all senior police officers in Bihar equivocally stated that, the MPF scheme is a noble scheme and is of immense benefit to the police, but its objective can be achieved if implemented properly. They feel that although the total allocation is meagre, they are unable to spend even this meagre amount as the scheme in its present form is trapped in bureaucratic and secretarial process and valuable time is lost. They suggest that the fund needs to be made available directly to the State's Police department with full financial power vested in the DGsP. Simple implementation formula on lines of already existing practice of the "Command Area Concept" can be introduced in MPF scheme in affected areas for smooth implementation. The existing mind set of control in States need to be shed away on issues of priority nature.<sup>39</sup> A veteran security analyst and retired police officer

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<sup>39</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Bihar, Patna, June 3-8, 2009. A senior police officer involved in MPF implementation says: "At every stage we have to approach Home department for sanction. Hence, it causes delay and money is not utilized in time. Therefore, we can not furnish utilisation certificate in time. Hence subsequent year's fund is also not released by MHA in time. Presently considerable time is lost in secretarial process and generally 1-2 years is wasted. Till money is not given to DGP directly with adequate financial powers in policing matters, this will continue to be trapped in bureaucratic red-tapism. The present financial power of DGP is abysmal and even less than any administrative service officer like a BDO or a Circle officer in many cases. This needs to be re-looked. The Home Department is hindrance in all financial matters related to Police. It is difficult and time consuming to approach State's Home department at each and every stage of procurement. It is felt that if the Government can entrust immense responsibility of maintaining law and order in the State to DGPs, then they must be believed for financial responsibilities also."

feels that such specific schemes like MPF, which is intended for early impact on police capacity building, especially in Naxalism-affected States, need to be given some degree of freedom from unnecessary or duplicity of bureaucratic/secretarial procedures to ensure timely implementation. However, adequate monitoring must be ensured to prevent misuse of funds. Hence, it would be advisable to allocate direct fund to States' DGsP in specific cases.<sup>40</sup>

Adequate allocation was made for the construction of 1,000 residential quarters for Lower Subordinates and Upper Subordinates in Bihar at the beginning of the scheme. However, because of the above mentioned reasons it could not be implemented in time. Meanwhile, due to price escalation the revised estimate could cover only 330 quarters. Hence, 670 quarters could not be built, which could have been of immense use to the police. A Similar problem can be noticed in the other aspects of the scheme, too. The budget of Rs 1.5 Crores for commissioning a temporary CIAT Centre within FY 2008-09 was released to Bihar Home department but the same has not been released to the State's police department despite a lot of correspondence between the two. The Police department has identified the location and land is available, but the Centre can not be commissioned until the budget is released. Meanwhile, the MHA is asking for compliance and utilisation certificate from Bihar Police which is not feasible. Under Special Infrastructure Scheme in Naxal-affected districts, Rs 15 Crores was allocated to Bihar for two districts, i.e. Gaya and Aurangabad to be utilised in the last financial year. The money was released to the District Magistrates quite late, and, hence, could not be utilised.<sup>41</sup>

Police officers also feel that the MHA needs to re-visit its allocation formula. A retired police officer and security analyst suggests that, there is certainly a need for change in system and delivery mechanism, rules and procedures etc need to be simplified. Even the allocation formula is grossly against Naxalism-affected States. The allocation of MPF fund should be made as per the State's assessed need. The backward and relatively less developed States are already lagging behind and, therefore, need more allocation in comparison to economically well-off States.<sup>42</sup> Presently, the MHA decides the priority and items to be procured under the MPF scheme; this should

<sup>40</sup> Shri J N Roy, IPS (Retd) expressed such views to author. New Delhi, June 26, 2009.

<sup>41</sup> Interaction with senior police officers Bihar, Patna, June 3-8, 2009.

<sup>42</sup> Shri Kalyan K Mitra, IPS (Retd) expressed such views to author. New Delhi, June 26, 2009.

not be thrust upon the States. Backward States give more priority to develop their police infrastructure rather than procuring sophisticated equipment, gadgets, etc. First, a secure facility to store these items needs to be created. Only then, these items can be kept safely and used properly. Development of infrastructure like buildings and mobility involve high cost. Therefore, the State Police should be given adequate scope and liberty to set their own priority as per their local needs. Economically and infrastructurally weak backward States need to be given 100% Central assistance<sup>43</sup>. For a State like Bihar or Chhattisgarh where the State police budget is just limited to the pay and allowances, the MPF scheme is of immense utility.<sup>44</sup>

Senior Police officers however modestly accept that the onus lies also on the police department, as some officers have the tendency to avoid responsibility involving financial implications and pass time in order to avoid future blame. This results in avoidable delay in completion/execution of works/procurement formalities. Even some field officers avoid expenditure of SRE fund which is of immediate use for enhancing security in districts. Hence, Bihar's record of spending SRE is also very poor. For example district SP were reluctant to utilise the money given to them for 'Model Police Stations'. The DGP had to, therefore, insist upon the implementation of this project.<sup>45</sup> They feel that police officers need to be adequately trained in handling administrative duties in the third phase of their career training. The DGP of Bihar warns that the Naxal challenge is very severe and we need to immediately tighten our belts, else we shall invite peril.<sup>46</sup>

It also came to the notice of the author that, there are instances where substandard equipments have been procured under MPF scheme in few States. A veteran security expert who is closely watching the Naxalism issues opines that, it is the moral responsibility of implementing officers to ensure that, best available equipments are procured and provided to the men fighting with the Naxals. He further advises that, this is the right time for police officers also to carry out introspection on such issues.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008 and Bihar, Patna and Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 3-11, 2009.

<sup>44</sup> Please see Annexure, Budget of Naxalism-affected States.

<sup>45</sup> Shri D N S Gautam, IPS, DGP, Bihar says: *Paisa Nabin bota to Kaam nabin bota ha; per paisa bota hai to keharch nabin bota hai.*

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. He says, *agar samay rahate nabin jaagte ho to bad me badi maar paregi.*

<sup>47</sup> Shri Kalyan K Mitra, I P S (Retd) expressed such views to author. New Delhi, June 26, 2009.

The senior police officers of Jharkhand are of the view that, since police falls under the State's Home department, fund crunch is inherited. The State's Home department is traditionally budget-deficit being a non-revenue earning department. The same is reflected in the police budget also. However, there has been a positive shift in the approach of the Government in Jharkhand, and the State police budget, has been raised considerably over the past few years. They also do not face unprecedented delay in sanction from the Home department. For this reason, Jharkhand has been one of the best performing States in the utilisation of MPF and SRE funds. Jharkhand Police has also set an example by formulating their own 10 year perspective plan for systemic strengthening and modernisation of the State Police.<sup>48</sup>

However, senior officers of Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh Police have equivocally opined that red-tapism and secretarial procedure needs to be reduced in implementing MPF scheme for achieving timely and desired results.<sup>49</sup> Police officers of Chhattisgarh were of the view that remotely located States face problems in the finalisation of tender and quotations, etc involving procurement/import of sophisticated technical equipment. They feel that, MHA should prepare a consolidated demand of such items from all concerned States and evolve a transparent mechanism of Central procurement for all States to avoid duplicity of tender formalities and other efforts. Adequate quotation is not received for piecemeal items and tenders are, thereby, cancelled. Central procurement in bulk may result in competitive pricing, too.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 8-11, 2009.

<sup>49</sup> Interaction with police officers, men and personal observations during field visit to Chhattisgarh, December 2008 and Bihar and Jharkhand, June 2009.

<sup>50</sup> Interaction with police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-08, 2008.

## IMPACT OF THE MPF SCHEME: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The MHA claims that the MPF Scheme *has made perceptible impact in all the States and provided* much needed assistance and impetus to policing in the country. It has provided proper building for police station/out posts. Construction of houses for police personnel has boosted their morale. Availability of vehicles has improved police mobility and reduced response time. Modern weapons have boosted police fire power and morale, particularly in Naxal-affected areas, thereby, enhancing performance and satisfaction level of the SPFs.<sup>51</sup>

### **Impact on Arms/ Ammunition/Equipment/ Communication, etc**

Bullet proof jackets and helmets etc have been procured and provided to troops which led to an increase in their confidence level. However, there is still acute deficiency in these items as per the recent MHA guidelines issued after Mumbai's 26/11 terror attacks. GPS and other gadgets have been provided. CGRL and UBGL etc have been procured. Old armaments have been gradually phased out and replaced with latest INSAS weapons and ammunition. Jharkhand aims to achieve 90% of satisfaction level by the end of the 2009-10 Action Plan.<sup>52</sup> Orissa has procured 7,000 AK-47 rifles and more than 100,000 live bullets under the MPF scheme. These weapons will reportedly be given to the Special Operation Group and various police battalions and to some Police Stations in affected areas. The State is expecting to receive more INSAS rifles, bullet proof jackets and helmets shortly. Orissa has nearly a 28,000-strong police force, but wireless equipment at their disposal stands at a mere 4,140. With around 53,000 police strength in Karnataka, wireless equipment is around 42,000. In Orissa, three per cent of the total funds are earmarked for wireless equipment and forensic requirements.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> "Year End Review on Internal Security", a press release of the Ministry of Home Affairs, December 31, 2008; accessible at <http://www.pib.nic.in> and "Development Schemes"; accessible at <http://www.mha.nic.in>.

<sup>52</sup> Interaction with police officers, men and personal observations during field visit to Chhattisgarh, December 2008, and Bihar, Jharkhand, June 2009.

<sup>53</sup> Please see Sanjeev Kumar Patro, "ORISSA: What ails police modernisation?" <http://www.naxalwatch.blogspot.com/2009/01/orissa-what-ails-police-modernisation.html>; accessed on June 17, 2009.

### Impact on Police Mobility

Jharkhand has shown considerable improvement in police mobility. Especially, the mobility of troops in police stations has witnessed a visible impact. Bihar and Chhattisgarh have, however, not shown much improvement, except in the highly-affected districts, which have been allotted vehicles on priority. Bullet proof vehicles, mine protected vehicles, bomb detection equipment, etc have been made available to vulnerable police stations and STF teams, etc.<sup>54</sup> By the end of year 2008 this State has achieved only 10%, 25% and 15% satisfaction level in Heavy, Medium and Light vehicles respectively. As in December 2008, Chhattisgarh police had 32 heavy vehicles, 56 medium vehicles and 169 light vehicles ready for condemnation. Police officers hold that police vehicles need to run 24 hours X 365 days, resulting in more wear and tear. They need additional BP and mine proof vehicles, etc. However most of the vehicles in Bihar also need condemnation and replacement. Policing is adversely suffering due to such deficiency. This aspect needs to be addressed on priority.

### Impact on Police Intelligence Set-up

Lack of intelligence and intelligence failure has been synonymous with incident of terrorism, insurgency and Naxalism in India. The State Governments had been advised from time to time to strengthen their special branches (SB). The “GoM on Reforming the National Security System” had laid special emphasis on reforming the SBs of the States with the help of the MHA and IB. The GoM had further recommended that this should be a component of the MPF Scheme.<sup>55</sup> Things have improved after special priority is being accorded to strengthening SBs under the MPF scheme. The SB personnel are now independent in mobility. They have been provided with mobile phones with camera and intelligence penetration has increased.<sup>56</sup> However they still suffer from inadequacy of manpower and lack of proper training. Lack of actionable intelligence is still considered a main reason for the limitation of SFs in anti-Naxal

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<sup>54</sup> Interaction with police officers, men and personal observations during field visit to Chhattisgarh, December 2008 and Bihar and Jharkhand, June 2009.

<sup>55</sup> Please see paragraph 28.1.2 of the *98th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Demands for Grants, 2003-04*, New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2004.

<sup>56</sup> Interaction with personnel of Special Branch (SB) in Bihar and Jharkhand.

operations.<sup>57</sup> Officers leading the STF revealed that they are still relying on their own internal intelligence set-up rather than on the SBs.<sup>58</sup> The SIB, which has specifically been raised in Chhattisgarh for anti-Naxal operations, suffers from lack of manpower, **and is yet to perform at its optimum.**<sup>59</sup> Bihar and Jharkhand have not set-up their dedicated anti-Naxal intelligence set-up like the SIB of Andhra Pradesh (AP), Orissa and Chhattisgarh. It is pertinent to mention that, the success of AP police in anti-Naxal operations is largely attributed to excellent synergy between district police and SIB and the elite anti-Naxalite Greyhounds force. In Orissa only Rs 1 Crores has been earmarked for security/intelligence equipment and only Rs 40 lakh has been earmarked for CID infrastructure.

### Impact on Police Stations

Police Stations are the most visible face of the Government and security system all over the country. Considering the challenges thrown by various divisive forces, it is more essential to have a close coordination between the citizens and police stations. A common man approaching a police station needs to repose trust and confidence in the system that it would deliver. Hence, one of the central foci of the MPF Scheme was on police station buildings. The State Governments were advised to build proper and secure police stations with all facilities, including facilities for women police personnel. Emphasis is also being laid on computerisation of police stations with the aim to enable the public to register their FIRs through Internet. Funds have been provided to States in this regard. Once the POLNET system is implemented, the speed and flow of information from and to the police stations would increase vastly. Police Stations have been categorized under three 'A', 'B' and 'C' categories as per threat assessment. A 'Model police Station' having all facilities has been approved taking example of a Karnataka Police Station. Also, well fortified police stations are being built-up in vulnerable areas.<sup>60</sup> Presently, under a special scheme, many vulnerable police stations in affected have been converted

<sup>57</sup> Interaction with senior SF officers and Junior SB staff in Chhattisgarh, December 2008 and Bihar and Jharkhand, June 2009.

<sup>58</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008 and Bihar, Patna and Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 3-11, 2009.

<sup>59</sup> Mukesh S Singh, "State Intelligence Bureau working in sorry state." *Hitavda*, Raipur, December 2, 2008.

<sup>60</sup> Please see paragraph 28.1.2 of *98th Report* of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, *Demands for Grants, 2003-04*, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi.

into a well fortified building with residential, office and adequate defence potential. Such police stations have increased the morale of troops and enhanced their capability. However, there is a requirement for construction of a large number of similar police stations. Mathematical distribution of Rs 2 Crores is not justified. Each district has its own deficiency in police station buildings, which needs to be addressed accordingly. A recent security audit conducted by Bihar Police reveals that there is a huge deficiency of infrastructure and basic amenities in police stations.<sup>61</sup> Orissa has taken the initiative in modernization of Police Stations in Naxalism-affected areas, but still 400 Police Stations remain to be modernized.

### **Impact on Police Training**

In June 1995 a survey of 100 out of 145 Police training institutions in the country conducted by the BPR&D had revealed that police training is highly neglected.<sup>62</sup> The BPR&D study had further found that, only 1,105 Head Constables and 9,861 constables were given refresher training out of 13 lakh police personnel in the country. The sanctioned police strength has gradually increased as more forces are being raised and strength of police is being augmented.<sup>63</sup> The study had projected that it was feasible to give training to a police personnel once in 20 years with existing training infrastructure in States. Not much has changed since then, except for more recruitment and increase in police strength by further three lakh. Police strength is expected to increase rapidly in near future due to ever increasing internal security requirements of the country.

The MHA has recognised that lack of specialised training to State police personnel is severely affecting their anti-Naxal operations. As per a BPR&D study, and subsequent projection on modernisation and up-gradation of police infrastructure, training of police was the single area which needed to be supported in a big way. A research study on this issue undertaken by the author in November–December 2008 has found that huge deficiency in police training infrastructure, resources and personal commitments still exists in Naxalism-affected States.

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<sup>61</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Bihar, Patna, June 3-8, 2009.

<sup>62</sup> Please see “Police Organisation in India”, *Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative*, 2008.

<sup>63</sup> The total sanctioned strength of law and order police, country-wide as on August 31, 2008 is 16,32,651.

Presently, there are 162 police training institutions in the country, 105 belonging to the States and 57 to the Centre which are inadequate for police training, especially in combat training.<sup>64</sup> The MHA has released adequate funds @ Rs 1.5 Crores for commissioning at least one CIAT Centre in each State in FY 2008-09.<sup>65</sup> However, things are quite different on the ground. During field visits to Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh it has been noticed that such schools are still in the conceptual stage and have not yet been commissioned.

### **Impact on Forensic Facilities and Computerisation**

FSLs have to be modernised for giving scientific aid to criminal justice delivery system. Necessary funds have been provided to the States for upgradation and modernisation of Forensic Science Laboratories (FSLs). Till 2002, 24 States had State Forensic Science Laboratories, whereas 12 States had set up facilities of regional forensic laboratories and only 11 States had district mobile forensic units. Wherever the facility of FSLs did not exist, the Directorate of Forensic Science in the Ministry of Home Affairs was providing the facilities to the concerned States.<sup>66</sup> With new equipment, the State FSLs have improved in their functioning. However many State laboratories were not able to utilize the services of modern equipment for want of trained manpower. The State Governments have not been recruiting the required manpower on the ground due to austerity measures. They still lack in critical forensic abilities. In Jharkhand the building for Forensic laboratory is under construction. A total of Rs 9 Crores has been spent on improving forensic capability in Jharkhand, so far. In Orissa the computerisation amount has been fixed at Rs 1.1 Crores, in 2007-08. As a result, only 45 police stations, out of a total 465, are computerised. The allocation for forensic science has been only at Rs 2.6 lakh.

### **Impact on Police Housing**

Police housing and buildings have been the most neglected aspect of policing in almost all the States. Naxalism has led to increased demand on police housing, as police personnel posted in Naxal-affected area need to

<sup>64</sup> Please see "Police Organisation in India", *Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative*, 2008.

<sup>65</sup> "Year End Review on Internal Security", a press release of the Ministry of Home Affairs, December 31, 2008; accessible at <http://www.pib.nic.in>".

<sup>66</sup> Please see paragraph 28.1.1 of the *98th Report* of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, *Demands for Grants, 2003-04*, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi.

keep their family in secured camps or at a safer place for stress-free working. States like Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are acutely deficient in this aspect. Naxal-affected States require 70% to 100% housing in districts for safety and security reasons.<sup>67</sup> Jharkhand has achieved only 5% of satisfaction level till 2007-08. They hope to achieve 70% satisfaction level in the years ahead. The situation in Bihar is further worse, where police housing has been the most neglected. They have not been able to use the allocated MPF budget. The State could not utilise the initial MPF allocations, because the Bihar State Police Building Construction Corporation was defunct as no Chairman was posted for years. Hence, the budget remained unutilised for many years.

Bihar Government has, however, recently sanctioned Rs 19.93 Crores under MPF scheme for construction of buildings for police in about half-a-dozen Naxal-hit districts to accommodate around 300 police officials posted in Nawada, Jamui, Jehanabad, Arwal, Aurangabad and Bhabua. The amount was released after the Naxalites attacked Mahuliatand village on February 9, 2009 in Nawada district, killing 10 policemen and looting their firearms. As per the plan, 184 and 108 lower grade and upper subordinate quarters under the separate family accommodation scheme would be constructed by the Bihar State Police Building Construction Corporation. It may be recalled that Bihar Police Association (BPA) and Bihar Policemen Association (BPMA) had drawn the attention of the Government on umpteen occasions to the lack of quarters for policemen posted in the Naxalite-affected districts.<sup>68</sup>

Chhattisgarh has a peculiar problem as no development work can be undertaken in the virtually Naxal-dominated Bastar region. Hence, budget remains unutilized. Many police officers recommend that, due to the huge costs involved, the permanent infrastructure element of MPF may be separated from the present MPF scheme and may be initiated as a separate pilot project taking consideration of the specific needs of economically backward States.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008.

<sup>68</sup> See "Naxal-affected districts in Bihar to have buildings for cops." *Press Trust of India, Patna*, February 18, 2009.

<sup>69</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008 and Bihar, Patna and Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 3-11, 2009.

An abnormal situation is prevailing in Naxal-affected areas, where the money given to construction agencies invariably remains unspent for years. Because of lack of infrastructure the police operations suffer. Therefore, dedicated police construction agencies need to be set in all the Naxal-affected States. Presently few of the States have such arrangements.

In order to improve the combat capability of policemen, their family should have secure places to stay. At present the living conditions of the family are abysmally low with no security. Therefore, MPF should encourage setting up of large police housing colonies at relatively secured places in Naxal belt, so that police men can fight without having to bother for security of their families. For example, the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh have 100% housing and exhibit a better combat capability.

### **Assessment of Overall Impact/Additional Lacunae**

Police officers in general are of the opinion that the MPF scheme is providing quality equipment, gadgets, computers, GPS, etc which is commendable. But, the real problem lies in the quality of manpower recruited. The end-user of these gadgets i.e., police constabulary should be capable of using them. For example, the remote sensing (RS) satellite data, even if provided to a police Station, can not be of any use to an almost illiterate constable. In Bihar and Jharkhand police constables are recruited with VII class education-level. Despite the BPR&D's suggestive guideline (which is not a compulsion to States), no corrective measure have been taken, thus far. Even the Jharkhand High Court has directed the State Government to recruit matriculate constabulary, but the State's political leadership overruled the court's directive by passing legislation in State Assembly. This has been subsequently challenged in the court but *status quo remains*.<sup>70</sup> *Police authorities have still not been able to convince the legislature on this issue. Therefore, it will take many years of persistent effort to build real police capability. Strong political resolve, unambiguous anti-Naxal policy with no political interference are required for police capacity building and achieving a realistic anti-Naxal capability by SPF.*

A positive training culture has to be developed in the State Police which is acutely lacking. Very few police personnel are willing to undergo strenuous

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

physical training, which is inescapable for professional competence in insurgency environment. Also men need to be tech-savvy to use electronic gizmos procured for them. The district police personnel are reluctant to work in STF despite of 50% extra allowance. Sophisticated weapons are, therefore, of little use to them.<sup>71</sup>

Police leadership possessing strong operational orientation is required to be deputed to fight the Naxals, alongside unwavering modernisation efforts. The police at grass-roots level need to be adequately motivated and sensitised. Unless they are operationally oriented, they will continue to suffer casualties. MPV and BP vehicles are only secured if used tactically; else, these are sitting ducks. The police suffer large numbers of casualties due to IED blasts and ambushes owing to tactical ignorance, careless approach, and not strictly adhering to Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs). Operations are generally planned and executed at Police station-level in association with CPMF Companies. It needs more professional planning and execution by an effective higher-level leadership. Hence, adequately trained and motivated leadership is required to lead anti-Naxal operations.<sup>72</sup> A senior police officer opines that the MPF has brought visible changes in resources, but *Police Work Culture* has not yet changed. He further says; *“We have not even taken first step firmly! How can we achieve the goal?”*<sup>73</sup> Shri Kalyan K. Mitra opines that, the police leadership training needs to be re-looked as well as the overall policing needs a transformation to derive the real benefit of modernisation process.<sup>74</sup> Shri J N Roy feels that the Modernisation of police forces initially had a different direction and it was meant for a general uplifting of police capacity in overall policing aspects. However, gradually some specific elements suited to Naxalism-affected States have been added to this, which is apparently inadequate. He advises that, the Government should consider, for bringing up a separate and specific modernisation scheme, especially for Naxalism-affected States. These States can't compete with other States in implementation because of inherent disadvantages. There requirements are altogether different and unique. He further feels that naxalism-affected States need 100% Central

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Interaction of the Author with senior police officers of Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 8-11, 2009.

<sup>74</sup> Interaction of the Author with Shri Kalyan K Mitra on June 26, 2009

assistance in MPF allocation. He questions; if Jammu and Kashmir and North East States can be given 100% Central assistance, then, why not the Naxalism-affected States also? <sup>75</sup>

Another renowned counter-insurgency expert who also closely follows the Naxalism issues opines that, police organisation are not structured and trained to fight insurgency. The officer to men ratio is not conducive to dedicated anti-Naxal operations. At the most, they are expected to tackle maximum violence level of terrorism nature besides routine law and order duties. Hence, the MPF should not aim to paramilitaries the SPF. Otherwise, in future the police work culture will also be militarised, and the very much desired community policing concept will be defeated. Hence, he advises that, only a limited element of SPF in each State, should be trained like a special anti-Naxal forces, so that, they can conduct team-based operations on specific intelligence. Anything beyond their capability should be tackled by CPMF or army's paramilitary units like Rashtriya Rifles. He cautions that increase Naxal violence is worrying and little time is left for appropriate response on all the fronts. If it is not tackled effectively, within few years, it may open a third front within our heartland, which would be more difficult to handle then. Hence, MPF scheme must cover immediate requirements of Naxalism-affected States on priority to build up the minimum desired capacity within SPFs.<sup>76</sup>

Many senior police officers feel that, in order to achieve a better impact of noble schemes like the MPF, policing system in India needs to be given more autonomy with due accountability. The Government should implement the much awaited and much required 'Police Reforms' and new 'Model Police Act'. The modern-day police have to be community-oriented, rather than being a tool in the hands of the administration.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Shri J N Roy, IPS (Retd) expressed such views to author. New Delhi, June 26, 2009.

<sup>76</sup> Major General (Retd) G D Bakshi expressed such views to author. New Delhi, June 26, 2009

<sup>77</sup> Interaction with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008 and Bihar, Patna and Jharkhand, Ranchi, June 3-11, 2009.

## CONCLUSION

The “Police” and “law and order” are State subjects as per VII Schedule to the Constitution of India and is the prime responsibility of the State Governments to improve the functioning of their police force and to equip them adequately with the latest technology for meeting the emerging challenges to public order and internal security. The Central Government is supplementing the efforts of the States/Union Territories in this regard. The MPF scheme is a significant initiative towards capacity building of SPFs which has been widely welcomed by police officers and men in all the States in general and in the Naxal-affected States in particular. Especially it is proving as resuscitation to deficient policing machinery in economically backward Naxal-affected States, where the regular police budget has been insufficient due to fiscal crunch.<sup>78</sup>

In spite of the various problems, the MPF scheme has been able to bring some positive impact on policing, but, it has not been able to fill up the huge gap, between what is existing and what is optimally desired in almost all the Naxal-affected States. Still much needs to be done. Its implementation needs to be more users oriented, than thrust upon the States. It should meet State Police’s aspirations based on their specific needs. Undue secretarial procedure is proving as a hurdle to the smooth and time bound implementation, hence, needs to be simplified. Hence, the scheme needs to be re-looked.

The nature of ongoing modernisation is materialistic and aims to achieve physical infrastructure. Besides materialistic modernisation, improvement of manpower for quality handling of resources need to be given due emphasis. The overall policing machinery needs to be transformed in a holistic manner. Proper recruitment followed by realistic training, equipping, incentives, leadership and clear-cut directives will lead to motivation for work and transform the policing system in a holistic manner. Thereafter, the result is bound to be satisfying.

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

The following policy recommendations may help in achieving better output from the ongoing MPF scheme:-

### **Recommendations**

- Naxalism-affected States should have overall priority for allocation (as per their need) over the other States.
- Economically and infrastructurally backward Naxalism-affected States need to be given 100% Central assistance.
- MPF in Naxalism-affected areas may be separated from routine modernisation process covering all States in general and a separate MPF Scheme; need-specific to such States may be initiated, with simplified implementation procedures like in command area schemes.
- Improvement of police training facilities needs to be given more priorities in all the States in general and Naxalism-affected States in particular.
- The present practice of giving sanction by high powered committee of States is time consuming and need to be re-looked.
- MPF funds should be directly given to Police department with adequate financial sanction power to DGP of States.
- Each State should be asked to form a central purchase committee under financial competence of DGP for smooth implementation of MPF scheme.
- Procurement of import items as well as items of high technical specifications may be done centrally as per consolidated demand of all States.
- Budget should be directly given to Police Housing Corporation for Police housing and building construction.
- MHA should release money in time in the beginning of financial year.
- Time bound monitoring mechanism need to be introduced.
- State Police should be given adequate scope and liberty to set its own priority as per local need basis.
- Housing, building and mobility need to be given priority in economically backward States after arms, ammunitions and communications equipment.

- Dedicated police construction agencies need to be set in all the Naxal-affected States where-ever not existing,
- MPF should encourage setting up of large police housing colonies at relatively secured places in Naxal belt,
- The overall annual MPF allocation should be increased for achieving desired satisfaction level in policing infrastructure and resources.
- Since the MPF allocation is limited, it needs to be prioritised as per specific need. Resources needed most urgently may be procured on priority basis.
- MHA should re-look its allocation formula. The backward and relatively less developed States need more allocation in comparison to economically developed States, as they are acutely deficient and lagging behind.
- The MPF should be more flexible so that the States customise to the local requirements and needs. The needs should be framed on the actual field requirements.
- Due to huge cost involvement, the permanent infrastructure element of MPF may be separated from the present MPF scheme and may be initiated as a separate pilot project taking into consideration the specific needs of economic backward States.
- The Scheme should continue till desired level of satisfaction set by BPR&D is achieved in all the States.

*“The combat capability of SPFs can’t improve unless police development is undertaken in a holistic manner. A materialistic development scheme will only have short term impact” ..... The Author*

### Incidents and Fatalities of Civilians and SFs in Naxal Violence: 2003 To 2008

State	2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	
	Inc	Cas										
A P	577	140	310	74	535	208	183	47	138	45	92	46
Bihar	250	128	323	171	186	96	107	45	135	67	164	73
Chhattisgarh	256	74	352	83	385	168	715	388	582	369	620	142
Jharkhand	342	117	379	169	312	119	310	124	482	157	484	207
M. Pradesh	13	1	13	4	20	3	6	1	9	2	7	-
Maharashtra	75	31	84	15	94	53	98	42	94	25	68	22
Orissa	49	15	35	8	42	14	44	9	67	17	103	101
Uttar Pradesh	13	8	15	26	10	1	11	5	9	3	4	-
West Bengal	6	1	11	15	14	7	23	17	32	6	35	26
Kerala	12	-	5	-	-	-	2	-	8	-	2	-
Karnataka	4	-	6	1	8	8	10	-	7	5	8	4
Haryana	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	2	-
Tamil Nadu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-
Total	1597	515	1533	566	1608	677	1509	678	1565	696	1591	721

Source:- Ministry of Home Affairs. Note: Inc.= Incidents, Cas.= Casualty.

Annexure I

***Annexure II*****Deployment of CPMF and Sanction of IR Battalions for Naxal-Affected States**

Deployment of CPMFs	States	IR Battalions	
		Sanctioned	Raised
4	Andhra Pradesh	8	6
4	Bihar	3	2
16 & 1*	Chhattisgarh	6	4
6	Jharkhand	3	1
0	Maharashtra	2	0
4	Orissa	5	1
1	West Bengal	2	1
38		29	15

\* State Armed Police on Inter-State Deputation

***Annexure III*****Other Components of MPF Scheme Applicable Beyond Naxalism-Affected States*****Mega City Policing***

The MHA has introduced a new concept of Mega City Policing as a sub-Plan under the MPF Scheme from the year 2005-06 onwards.

- It covers seven cities, namely, Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata and Ahmadabad.
- Its aim is to address special problems being faced by police in large urban areas in crime investigation, traffic management, etc.
- Funds are provided to mega cities to procure modern and innovative equipment. Financial assistance is given to mega cities for procurement of modern and innovative equipment like Night Vision Devices, GPS/GIS for dial 100 system and patrol cars, surveillance camera systems,

CCTV systems, security equipments like portable x-ray machines, vehicle scanner, vehicle number plate identification system, cyber patrol and communication monitoring system, integrated GIS based automated vehicle tracking and management system, etc. Adequate fund has been released during the period 2005-06 to 2008-09 to the concerned States for police modernization under this scheme.

**Central Fund Released for Mega City Policing Scheme of MPF (Rs in Crore)**

Mega City	Year			
	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09
Ahmedabad	3.00	8.01	8.99	—
Bangalore	3.00	12.99	9.94	—
Chennai	4.00	20.90	15.00	—
Hyderabad	3.00	12.85	2.19	—
Kolkatta	4.00	14.68	13.70	—
Mumbai	5.00	27.00	20.00	—
Total	22.00	96.43	69.82	68.00

**Desert Policing**

- Desert policing is also a new concept, which has been started in the Police Modernization Scheme from 2005-06.
- It covers the States of Gujarat and Rajasthan.
- The problems regarding policing in the large and scattered desert area, especially with regard to problems in investigation, mobility, communication and requirement of special equipments are given emphasis under the Desert Policing initiative.
- Expenditure for this component is also met out of the funds allocated under the MPF Scheme for these States. During the last three years adequate fund has been released for desert policing.

**Central Fund Released under Desert Policing Scheme of MPF  
(Rs in Crore)**

State	Year		
	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
Gujarat	2.00	2.00	1.50
Rajasthan	3.00	12.00	9.00
Total	5.00	14.00	10.50

***Annexure IV***

**Modernisation and Augmentation of CPMFs**

***CPMF Modernisation***

With a view to enhance their striking capabilities in terms of better firepower and a fully equipped manpower, the modernisation plans of CPMFs, namely, BSF, CRPF, NSG, CISF, ITBP and Assam Rifles is under progress. The notable feature of this modernisation exercise is that it is being carried out as per a comprehensive perspective plan with concrete budgetary allocations spread over a set time frame of five years. Out of total outlay of Rs. 4185 Crores, an amount of Rs. 2664 Crores have been spent till December 2008 on modernisation of CPMFs and rest of the amount will be spent by 31.03.10. The CPMFs have been equipped with latest weapons, surveillance and communication equipment, vehicles, Body protection equipments etc so that they can carry out their job of guarding the borders and ensuring internal security more effectively. The modernization of Sashashtra Seema Bal (SSB) at an estimated cost of Rs.444.43 Crores is in progress and the same will come to an end on 31.3.2010.

***Procurement of Interceptor Boats for Coastal Security***

An order for procurement of 84 Nos of 5 Ton boats each costing Rs. 105 lakhs and 110 Nos of 12 Ton boats each costing Rs. 215.00 lakhs at a total cost of Rs. 324.70 Crores has been placed. Supply of boats is likely to be completed by 1.4.2011. These Boats will help the Marine Police Stations of various State Governments in patrolling the coastal areas more effectively which will further reduce incidents of infiltration and smuggling through the coastal route.

***Strengthening of Air Wing of BSF***

Procurement of one 100 seater Large Transport Aircraft and two 50 Seater Medium Transport Aircraft are under procurement through Ministry of Defence. The Cabinet Committee on Security has also approved procurement of 8 Dhruv Helicopters. The procurement of these helicopters and aircrafts will help the CPMFs to carry out their operation of guarding the borders as well as ensuring internal security of the Country in a more effective manner. The helicopters will also be used for fighting the Naxalite elements as well as for casualty evacuation.

***Raising of 10 Commando Battalions***

The Government has approved raising of 10 Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA), well trained in guerilla tactics and jungle warfare to tackle Naxal threat and militancy.

***Annexure V***

**Date wise Allocation of MPF Fund by State Home Department to Police Dept in Bihar**

2000-01	Voucher no. 7137 dtd 8.7.01
2001-02	Voucher no. 2269 dtd 5.3.2002
2002-03	Voucher no.2526 dtd 4.3.2003
2003-04	————
2004-05	————
2005-06	Voucher no.1757 dtd 16.2.2006 and revised dtd 9.1.2007
2006-07	Voucher no.12973 dtd 29.11.06 for main and Voucher no. 9652 dtd 8.10.2007 supplementary
2007-08	————
2008-09	Voucher no. 1450 dtd 20.3.2009. ( <i>Sent by MHA to State Home Deptt on 4.8.2008.</i> )

*Source :-* Figures received from Bihar Police Headquarter, Patna.