

IDSA Occasional Paper No. 20

Measures To Deal With Left-Wing Extremism/Naxalism

P V Ramana



Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

The Prime Minister has said more than once, and for the first time in October 2004, that the Maoist problem is the most serious internal security challenge that the country is faced with. Indeed, the seriousness of this challenge has been increasing every year.

There has been steady rise in the spatial spread of the rebels, over the years. Even as they have been making fervent attempts to retain, consolidate and extend their spread and influence in some areas, including urban centres, they have also been constantly working to regain lost territories. Also, the increased belligerence of the Maoists and their sinister design to impede and roll-back development can be gauged by the numerous attacks they have launched on the infrastructure in the past few years causing large-scale destruction.

The achievement of the state (government) in dealing with the Maoist challenge has been a mixed-bag. Andhra Pradesh is the one State that has displayed the best result in almost near totally wiping out rebel presence from the State, except in North Coastal Andhra.

The assertions by the Ministry of Home Affairs that the Maoist challenge could be dealt with in three years seems to be ambitious, given present-day the ground realities. If coordinated action is taken, perhaps, their challenge could be defeated in approximately seven to 10 years. A welcome development is that the various state governments and the Union Government have begun to evince willingness to deal with the issue. Also, The Union government has initiated efforts to build a consensus among the affected states. At the same time, capacities of state police forces need to be built up, among other things, which cannot be accomplished within a short period.

Besides weakening the Maoists' lethal capacities and reducing violence, it is also essential to ensure that governance is improved; development schemes and programmes are implemented effectively; and their implementation is monitored rigorously, so that those prone to sympathising with, or supporting, the Maoists would, in the long run, realize the needlessness and futility of doing so.

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Cover Illustration: The cover shows the Dantewada Jail, *circa* December 2010. On December 16, 2007, 299 inmates, including 110 Maoists, fled the jail under the leadership of a detained Maoist “Commander”. Cover Photograph courtesy the author.

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Introduction

The proscribed Communist Party of India (Maoist), Maoists in short, also known in India as the Naxalites, was founded on September 21, 2004, following the amalgamation of two of India's most lethal extreme-Left outfits — Communist Party of India—Marxist-Leninist (People's War), PW in short and popularly known as the People's War Group (PWG), and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI).

According to the Union Cabinet Secretary, the estimated armed-underground strength of the rebel outfit is 11,500 men and women, but there are other estimates, as well¹. Their ultimate objective is the armed seizure/capture of political/state power. There are different views regarding the extent of the Maoists' influence in the country. According to the Union Home Minister, the guerrillas have a presence with varying degrees of influence — intense, moderate or negligible — in 20 States spread across 223 districts. Another estimate held that the Maoists have a presence in 192 districts.

According to a 2010-estimate of the Indian Army's Central Command, the Maoists have a presence in 237 districts. However, Lt Gen KM Seth, a former Governor of Chhattisgarh — presently, the fiercest battleground, especially the Bastar region in the south of the State — told a website that 256 districts are Maoist-affected.

This contradiction in the state's estimates of the spatial spread of the rebels has been a continuing feature since the past few years. Perhaps, this lack of unanimity on — and the lack of a near-realistic comprehension of — the intensity of the challenge, has contributed to inadequate state response.

¹ Please see the succeeding paragraph.

Ideology²

The CPI (Maoist) describes India as backward, semi-colonial and semi-feudal. It is committed to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Its objective is to wage protracted people's war (PPW) on the lines propounded by Mao, seize/capture state/political power and herald a New Democratic Revolution (NDR), under the leadership of the agrarian class. This NDR would be conducted through guerrilla warfare by establishing base areas in the villages and then encircling the towns and cities, before the final Long March to capture political power.

In the perception of the CPI (Maoist), the comprador bureaucratic capitalist classes of India are 'tools' in the hands of the imperialists, and the comprador big bourgeoisie (CBB) classes tailor the policies of the country to suit the interests of the imperialists. It contends that this has become more brazen and visible after 1990 with the introduction of liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation (LPG). The CPI (Maoist) considers that neither the Congress (I) nor the BJP is better than the other. Moreover, it contends: "The ... support of the so-called Left parties to the present Congress government with the fake posture of opposing its economic policies is a new fraud (on) the Indian people". It argues that the imperialist dictated LPG policies followed by both the Union and various State governments "have not only greatly deteriorated the overall Indian economy but also the living conditions of the Indian people..., particularly the peasantry".

In the opinion of the CPI (Maoist), "The overall crises are so deep that the ruling classes are no longer in the position of providing even the minimum relief by accepting the mostly minimum just demands". In these circumstances, "only under the leadership of the Maoist party, [the] working class will be more forcefully able to mobilise and channelize all the struggles of the various sections of the people, particularly the

² This section draws significantly from an internal document of the CPI (Maoist), prepared at the time of its founding, read during a field visit to Andhra Pradesh, February 2007.

struggles of the peasantry against imperialism and feudalism and leading towards establishing a new democratic India by smashing old India, and thereby advancing towards building socialism and communism on a world scale. That is, by advancing, strengthening and expanding the flames of the already going on protracted people's war in various parts of the country under the leadership of the Maoist party."

The CPI (Maoist) considers the Indian caste system as "obnoxious" and holds that the dalits are "victims of untouchability, caste discrimination and upper caste chauvinism". The CPI (Maoist) argues that "Dalit question is essentially a class question. Hence, the Maoist forces should carry on the struggle against caste oppression as a part of the NDR and also fight for their equal place in the society in all spheres by abolishing the caste system. They should also fight for equal rights and special privileges, including reservations for Dalits and other backward castes, while exposing the hollowness of the ruling class politics in this regard. The struggle against casteism and untouchability should also be carried on in the ideological, political and cultural spheres".

In order to advance the already ongoing revolution, the CPI (Maoist) has identified the principal and immediate tasks before the party. These include:

- Intensification and advancing of people's war to establish people's political power;
- Building a mighty mass movement against the imperialist the policies of LPG inspired by them;
- Exposing, isolating and defeating Hindu fascist forces, besides exposing all other fundamentalist forces;
- Resisting and defeating state repression and demanding the repeal of all black laws; and
- Fighting US and Indian expansionism and hegemony.

Evolution³

The Naxalite movement in India has a long history and should be understood in two phases.

Phase One: Splits Overshadow Mergers

This period was dominated by the fragmentation of Naxalite groups, though several mergers did occur as well. Some of the notable developments from the period include the following:

- In 1966, Kanhai Chatterjee (KC), a member of the CPI (Marxist) group, forms a group known as *Dakshin Desh*, also within the CPI (Marxist).
- In 1968-69, extreme left-wing elements within the CPI (Marxist) organize themselves under the banner of All India Coordination Committee for Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR).
- On April 22, 1969 — International Lenin Day — the AICCCR group within the CPI (Marxist) splits. CPI (Marxist-Leninist or ML) is formed under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar. Meanwhile, Tarimela Nagi Reddy splits from the AICCCR and forms the Committee of Revolutionary Communists. This eventually becomes a part of CPI (ML).
- On October 20, 1969, the Dakshin Desh group of KC splits from CPI (Marxist) because of disagreements over whether to embrace the ideology of Mao Tse Tung or Karl Marx, and renames itself the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC).
- In October 1971, Tarimela Nagi Reddy, Asit Sen, and Satyanarayan Singh part ways with CPI (ML) and Charu Mazumdar.

³ This section draws significantly from my earlier publication entitled “India’s Maoist Insurgency: Evolution, Current Trends and Responses”, in Michael Kugelman, ed., *India’s Contemporary Security Challenges*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011, pp. 29-45.

- On July 28, 1972, Charu Mazumdar passes away due to ill health while in prison. CPI (ML) splits into various factions led separately by Vinod Mishra, Mahadev Mukherjee, Santosh Rana, Chandra Pulla Reddy, Tarimela Nagi Reddy, Appalsuri, and others.
- In 1972, the Central Organizing Committee CPI (ML) [COC CPI (ML)] is formed as a breakaway faction of the CPI (ML). Various factions emerge within the COC CPI (ML)
- In 1974, Chandra Pulla Reddy's group merges with the groups of Tarimela Nagi Reddy and Satyanarayan Singh.
- In 1976, Central Organizing Committee (Party Unity), a splinter group of the CPI (ML), regroups as CPI (ML) Party Unity led by Dr. Viniyan and Jung Bahadur. In 1982, Appalsuri's COC (CPI ML) merges with Party Unity. Over time, Narayan Sanyal (alias Naveen Prasad, alias Niranjana Prasad) assumes mantle as general secretary of Party Unity.
- In January 1978, parting ways with the Chandra Pulla Reddy faction, another COC CPI (ML) faction is formed under the leadership of Jagjit Singh Sohal (alias Sharma), Kondapalli Settharamaiah, and Suniti Ghosh.
- On International Lenin Day 1980, Kondapalli Seetharamaiah splits from the COC CPI (ML) and founds the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (People's War Group, PWG), in the Karimangar district of Andhra Pradesh.
- In 1992, Mupppala Lakshmana Rao (alias Ganapathy) ousts Kondapalli Seetharamaiah and assumes the post of general secretary of the PWG. Ganapathy is also the incumbent general secretary of the CPI (Maoist)⁴. A majority of the Central Committee members of the CPI (Maoist) are erstwhile members of the Central Committee of the PWG.

⁴ The CPI (Maoist) is an amalgam of the PWG and MCCL.

As a former chief of the Intelligence Bureau noted about this first phase:

Firstly, the leadership and the middle-level activists were all thoroughly ideologically motivated. Secondly, the movement drew into its vortex not only the political elements on the extreme fringe but also a large number of students. Indeed, several extremely brilliant students of Delhi University went all the way to the jungles of Bihar to hone their revolutionary skills! Thirdly, almost 200 revolutionary journals and publications of different shapes and sizes were brought out in English and vernacular languages. The level of ideological content and enthusiasm was, thus, high. At that point in time, the movement received the complete backing of China. The Communist Party of China extended guidance, financial support and training to the leadership. The *Peking Review* consistently devoted several column lengths to the movement, extolling it and the leadership provided by its founder, Charu Mazumdar⁵.

Phase Two: Merger and Consolidation

The second phase of the movement—which continues to the present day—is dominated by mergers. There have been some splits, though they are largely insignificant and have had no impact on the lethal capabilities and influence on the chief rebel factions.

- In 1997, the Maoist Unity Centre (MUC) is formed as an amalgam of Naxalites from the Kerala Communist Party and Maharashtra Communist Party.
- In 1998, after years of negotiations, Party Unity merges with PWG, and PWG is renamed the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (People's War, or PW), heralding the first major and significant merger among competing and rival Naxalite groups.
- In 1999, the Naxalbari branch of CPI-ML merges with MUC. Later, a faction of Red Flag merges with CPI-ML (Naxalbari).
- In January 2003, the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) merges with the MCC, and the resultant group is named the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI).

⁵ KP Singh, "The Trajectory of the Movement," in PV Ramana, ed., *The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages and Policy Options*, New Delhi: Pearson-Longman, 2007, pp.11-12.

- In May 2003, CPI (ML) 2nd CC merges with MCCI.
- CPI-ML (Naxalbari), CPI-ML Red Flag, and MUC merge.
- On September 21, 2004, PW and MCCI merge, resulting in the formation of the largest and most lethal Naxalite outfit in India — the CPI (Maoist)—with a then-estimated strength of 9,500 underground armed men and women.
- In 2008, CPI-ML (Naxalbari) and the Kerala unit of a group known as the CPI (ML) Janasakthi merge with CPI (Maoist).

In the months ahead, a strong possibility exists that other state units of the Janasakthi party will merge with the CPI (Maoist).

With these mergers, there has been a consolidation of forces. The mergers should also be seen in the context of security operations against the rebels, turf wars leading to internecine clashes, and the proscription imposed on the rebels from time to time by the central government and the affected states. In a manner of speaking, the rebels seem to have realized that strength lies in unity. The effect the merger was explained by Narayan Sanyal in a 1998 interview with the news website *rediff.com*, soon after his Party Unity merged with the PWG: “This is the most significant incident in the CPI-ML history after the martyrdom of Charu Mazumdar... It was the desire of the rank and file that there should be a unified leadership so that the revolution can be quickened⁶.”

On the other hand, CPI (Maoist) general secretary Muppala Lakshmana Rao, alias Ganapathy, had this to say about the significance of the merger: “In our agenda for a new democratic revolution, there are two aspects—the agrarian revolution and [the] fight for nationality. For the development of a new democratic revolution, the unification of the two is needed. Our merger is a cue for such unification⁷.”

⁶ See Chindu Sreedharan, “PWG Hopes Merger with Party Unity Will Boost Cadre Morale,” *rediff.com*, October 5, 1998, available at <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/05nxl.htm>.

⁷ See “The Rediff Interview/Ganapathy: ‘Unification is the Only Way to Advance the Cause of the Indian Revolution,’” *rediff.com*, October 7, 1998, available at <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/07gana.htm>.

Strength

According to one estimate, the armed underground strength of the CPI (Maoist) is 9,500 men and women. The apex Central Committee presently consists of 22 members, the Polit Bureau has nine members, while the Central Military Commission (CMC) consists of eight members. Muppall Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy is the general secretary of the outfit. The second most important leader in the rebel pecking order is Prashant Bose alias Kishan alias Kishan da, the general secretary of the erstwhile MCCI. The third most important person in the rebel outfit is Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishan ji, who presently operates in the Lal Garh area in West Bengal. The CMC is technically headed by Ganapathy, but the de facto head and “lynchpin” of the CMC is Nambala Kesava Rao alias Basavaraju, who holds an M Tech degree.

Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution

According to the CPI (Maoist), “The strategy and tactics of the Indian Revolution should be formulated by creatively applying the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism Maoism to the concrete conditions prevailing in our country. This means that the strategy and tactics should be evolved by basing on an objective class analysis of the Indian society; the character of the Indian State; the fundamental contradictions and the principal contradiction; and by taking into account the specific characteristics, the special features as well as the peculiarities of the Indian situation.”

Political Strategy

To build their movement, the Maoists aim to develop progressive forces, win over fence-sitters, and isolate staunch opponents, in order to defeat the state. Thus, the political strategy of the Indian Democratic Revolution is to unite, under the leadership of the proletariat, all the above motive forces which constitute the vast majority - almost nine-tenths - of the Indian population to overthrow the three heavy mountains that are weighing down the backs of the Indian people and keeping the country in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal state.

As part of their political strategy, the Maoists hold that “it is the contradiction between feudalism and broad masses of the people at present that is the principal contradiction. Agrarian revolutionary programme and area-wise seizure of power remain primary during the entire period. But if the principal contradiction changes to that between imperialism and the Indian people, accordingly a specific programme to unite all the anti-imperialist forces will have to be drawn up as part of the general programme of the New Democratic Revolution.”

Military Strategy

According to the Maoists, “The military strategy has to be formulated basing on the specific characteristics of the revolutionary war in India. These characteristics determine the military strategy to be one of protracted people’s war, as enunciated by comrade Mao—of establishing revolutionary base areas first in the countryside where the enemy is

relatively weak and then to gradually encircle and capture the cities which are the bastions of the enemy forces.”

The Maoists also hold that the strategy and tactics of the revolution in any country cannot be worked out in isolation from the overall international situation. One has to take into account the actual situation both in the world at large and in the given country prevailing at a given point of time in order to formulate the strategy and tactics correctly. This is because in the imperialist epoch the revolution in every country is an integral part of the world proletarian revolution.

In a comprehensive document entitled “Strategy and Tactics” that was adopted in 2004 at the founding of the CPI (Maoist), the Maoists have identified the major contradictions in the Indian society. They contend that these contradictions are a result of India being a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country, under neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control. The major contradictions identified by the Maoists are:

1. The contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people;
2. The contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses;
3. The contradiction between capital and labour; and
4. The internal contradictions among the ruling classes.

They further contend that the Maoist movement “in India has to pass through more than one phase and in any of the phases, one of these fundamental contradictions becomes the principal contradiction. However, the principal contradiction cannot remain unchanged throughout the entire process of the New Democratic Revolution; rather the principal contradiction and the non-principal one among the two fundamental contradictions are bound to change their positions with the changes in the phases of the revolution.”

For the Maoists, the “central task of the Indian Revolution is the seizure of political power. To accomplish this, the Indian people will have to be organised in the People’s Army and will have to wipe out the Armed Forces of the counter-revolutionary Indian State and establish in its place their own state.”

According to the CPI (Maoist), the principle characteristics of the Indian revolutionary war are:

1. India is a vast semi-colonial and semi-feudal country with uneven political, economic and social development, with favourable terrain for guerrilla warfare that has witnessed a long period of armed struggle by the peasantry and also now witnessing the ongoing agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle in which the peasantry is playing a heroic role.
2. Our enemy is big and powerful having centralized state machinery and a well-equipped modern army.
3. The Communist Party, the guerrilla army and the agrarian revolutionary movement in India are still weak.
4. Our country is a prison-house of nationalities where some nationalities are engaged in bitter struggles against the Indian state to achieve their right to self-determination.

Some other salient aspects of the document (Strategy and Tactics) include:

- The strength of the Armed Forces of the reactionaries is quite inadequate in the vast country, and communication system makes it quite inconvenient for the quick movement of the enemy forces.
- A large part of the remote countryside, most advantageous for the establishment of Red liberated areas from the geographical and military point of view, is inhabited by the discontented and agitated nationalities and tribes who are engaged in bitter armed confrontation with the Indian state.
- It becomes imperative for the enemy's armed forces to be deployed in large numbers in even wider areas to contain the armed struggle waged by the various nationalities. Lakhs of enemy armed forces have been deployed since long in Kashmir and the North Eastern states.
- As a considerable part of the enemy's armed forces will inevitably be engaged against the growing tide of struggles by various nationalities, it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes to mobilize all their armed forces against our revolutionary war.

- We are presently in the phase of Strategic Self Defence. At present, the revolutionary movement is advancing in a vast belt of people's war encompassing the extensive areas of Dandakaranya, Jharkhand, Andhra, Bihar-Orissa border, North Telangana and Koel-Kaimur. We will be able to build these areas into contiguous areas of armed struggle with each area influencing the other.
- The revolutionary situation can become even more favourable for the rapid advance of the peoples war due to several factors such as a war with the neighbouring countries.
- The exploiting ruling classes will never relinquish or give up power voluntarily. Without smashing the present state machinery and the main constituents of state power, the mercenary armed forces, the instruments of the suppression of the people by ruling classes... the Indian people can not establish political power. Hence, in order to completely smash the state machinery, the building up of the People's Army as the organised armed force of the masses is indispensable.
- When there is a serious enemy offensive in the form of encirclement and suppression campaign, we should not make futile attempts to hold territory. We should disperse in mobile squads and at the same time should carry on attacks from exterior lines, simultaneously with attacks from within the area of encirclement. The tactical counter offensive against the enemy should be carried out in the form of small and big military actions. A 'meal is eaten mouthful by mouthful'. By following the tactics of sudden attack and annihilation it is absolutely possible to defeat the enemy and achieve victory for the people in single battles.

Serious Challenge: Spatial Spread and Increasing Militarisation

The Prime Minister has said more than once, and for the first time in October 2004, that the Maoist problem is the most serious internal security challenge that the country is faced with. Indeed, the seriousness of this challenge has been increasing every year.

There has been steady rise in the spatial spread of the rebels ever since the then PW conducted its 3rd Congress in March 2001, in the Abuj Maad forests in Bastar. Thus, the rebels began to acquire a presence in 131 districts in 2001; 159 in 2004; 165 by November 2006; 185 in April 2007; and 223 districts as admitted by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs in September 2009.

Even as they have been making fervent attempts to retain, consolidate and extend their spread and influence in some areas, they have also been constantly working to regain lost territories — for instance West Medinipur, Purullia and Bankura in West Bengal. More importantly, the Maoists are now targeting ‘virgin territories’, some of which have never even witnessed any noteworthy Communist presence. Thus, Maoist activities have been detected up-North in Uttarakhand in Nainital, Almora, Pitoragarh, Champawat and Udham Singh Nagar; and down-South in Tamil Nadu in Dharmapuri, Salem, Coimbatore, Madurai, Theni, and Kodaikanal; as well as Bellary, Shimoga, Udupi, Chikmagalur, Dakshin Kannada and Kolar in Karnataka.

Thus, one could easily plot on a map of India a near contiguous Maoist presence from North to South — i.e. the so-called North-South Corridor. At the same time, the Maoists are also developing an East-West Corridor, both below and above the Tropic of Cancer. In fact, perhaps as if commenting on the eventuality of such multiple corridors emerging, a former Chief of the Indian Army, Gen (Retd) Shankar Roy Chaudhary said on December 15, 2004, while speaking in the Rajya Sabha, that “if this movement ever catches on, it will be difficult to travel from Kolkata to Mumbai and Delhi to Chennai”.

Indeed, commenting on the dangers of the emerging North-South Corridor, Ranjit Kumar Gupta, former Police Commissioner of Kolkata who fought the Naxalites in West Bengal in the 1970s, wrote: “...the

north-south corridor can virtually drive a wedge through the vital areas of the country, cutting off the rich north-eastern part of India from the rest of the country. This very large zone will have control over huge deposits of minerals, oils and industrialised territory”, and give the Maoists “a powerful bargaining chip.”

On the other hand, if the Maoists were to ever launch coordinated, simultaneous attacks along the east-west corridor, they would be able to near totally cut off peninsular India from the rest of the country.

Indeed, it is not merely a question of body-count and the sophistication of weapons, but the sheer loss of physical territory which is the more alarming feature and is, perhaps, a chilling reminder that the State has simply failed to govern in nearly 223 districts.

Besides, the Maoist arsenal has acquired tremendous sophistication. At the time the rebels first struck in 1967, in Naxalbari, they had used farm implements such as sickles and sticks, while they now field a wide array of weapons. These include the home-made *tapancha*, the older .302, SBBL and, DBBDL rifles, SLRs, LMGs, AK series assault rifles, INSAS rifles, mortar and lethal IEDS such as claymore and directional mines.

With such weapons at their disposal, the rebels have been striking deadly blows, and committing chilling massacres, on the security forces, as well as murdering unarmed civilians in cold blood, whom they brand as class enemies (police informers). Thus, the number of fatalities in Maoist-related violence has been fairly and near consistently high since the past few years, as the following tables illustrate.

Table 1: All-India Maoist Violence Profile, 2005-2008

S. No		2005	2006	2007	2008
1	Incidents	1608	1509	1565	1435
2	Civilians Killed	524	521	460	441
3	SF Killed	153	157	236	217
4	Naxals Killed	225	274	141	181
5	Naxals Arrested	1950	1270	1456	1536

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi

Table 2: All-India Maoist Violence Profile, 2009-2011

	2009	2010	2011
Incidents	2016	2210	610
Civilians Killed	591	713	140
SFs Killed	317	285	20
Naxals Killed	217	171	n.a.
Naxals Arrested	1619	2908	n.a.

Note: Data till March 7, 2011

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi

Table 3: State-wise Civilians and SFs Killed in Maoist Violence, 2008-10

State	2008			2009			2010		
	Incidents	Civilians	Security	Incidents	Civilians	Security	Incidents	Civilians	Security
Andhra Pradesh	92	45	1	66	18	0	100	24	0
Bihar	164	52	21	232	47	25	307	72	25
Chhattisgarh	620	157	85	529	163	127	625	171	172
Jharkhand	484	169	38	742	140	68	501	132	25
Maharashtra	68	17	5	154	41	52	94	35	10
Madhya Pradesh	7	0	0	1	0	0	7	0	1
Orissa	103	28	73	266	36	31	218	62	17
Uttar Pradesh	4	0	0	8	2	0	6	1	0
West Bengal	35	19	7	255	144	14	350	221	35
Others	14	3	1	5	0	0	4	0	0
Total	1591	490	231	2258	591	317	2212	718	285

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi

Table 4: State-wise Fatalities in Maoist Violence, 2008-2010

State	2008				2009				2010			
	Incidents	Civ	SF	Naxal	Incidents	Civ	SF	Naxal	Incidents	Civ	SF	Naxal
AP	92	45	1	37	66	18	0	18	100	24	0	16
BH	164	52	21	15	232	47	25	16	307	72	25	20
CG	620	157	85	66	529	163	127	137	625	171	172	102
JH	484	169	38	50	752	140	68	76	501	132	25	49
MH	68	17	5	7	154	41	52	23	94	35	10	3
MP	7	0	0	-	1	0	0	-	7	0	1	-
OR	103	28	73	32	266	36	31	13	218	62	17	25
UP	4	0	0	2	8	2	0	2	6	1	0	-
WB	35	19	7	1	255	144	14	9	350	221	35	61
Others	14	3	1	3	5	0	0	-	4	0	0	-
Total	1591	490	231	213	2258	591	317	294	2212	718	285	276

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, for figures other than Naxal killed.

Table 5: State-wise Total Fatalities in Maoist Violence, 2008-2010

State	2008	2009	2010	Total
AP	83	36	40	159
BH	88	83	117	283
CG	308	437	445	1190
JH	257	284	206	747
MH	29	116	48	193
MP	0	0	1	1
OR	133	80	104	317
UP	2	4	1	7
WB	27	127	317	471

Source: Computed from Table 4 above

From Table 5 above, it is evident that Chhattisgarh is the most troubled state, followed by Jharkhand. Orissa, West Bengal and Bihar — in that order — have recorded the highest number of fatalities in the past three years. Thus, these four states could be termed as the most-affected states, where as Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh have recorded considerable number of fatalities, and could be ranked next in intensity. Thus, in all, the Maoist problem is spread across these seven states — Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, while in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Kamataka and Kerala the movement is in the organizational phase. Available reports also indicate that some rudimentary Maoist activity has also been detected in Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, where the Maoists are said to have investigated if the ground conditions are favourable to launch the movement there.

The increased belligerence of the Maoists and their sinister design to impede and roll-back development can be gauged by the numerous attacks they have launched on the infrastructure in the past few years causing large-scale destruction, as the following Table illustrates:

Table 6: Infrastructure Attacks, 2008-2010

		2008		2009		2010	
			Total		Total		Total
Economic targets	Andhra Pradesh	Uranium Mines	0	0	0	0	0
		Essar steel	1	0	0	0	
	Chhattisgarh	NMDC	0	2	11	11	
		Essar pipe lines	BRO	3	1	1	
			BRO	0	0	0	
	Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana		1	4	3		
	Orissa	Essar pipe lines	0	5	1	1	
		Gramin Sadak	0	2	4	4	
	Maharashtra	BRO	0	0	1	1	
	Madhya Pradesh	Gramin Sadak	0	0	1	1	
		Nirman Yojana	0	05	17	24	
	Bihar	Cement Plant	0	0	0	0	
		Solar Plate	0	2	0	0	
		Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana	0	1	1	1	
	Jharkhand	Gramin Sadak	0	0	1	1	
		Nirmal Yojana					

Railway	Andhra Pradesh		2		0		1	
	Bihar		11		8		16	
	Chhattisgarh		6		5		8	
	Jharkhand		7		17		13	
	Maharashtra		0		0		0	
	Orissa		0		10		7	
	West Bengal		1		6		7	
	Uttar Pradesh		0	27	0	46	2	54
Telephone exchange/tower	Andhra Pradesh		1		0		4	
	Bihar		14		24		14	
	Maharashtra		2		1		1	
	Chhattisgarh		15		10		2	
	Jharkhand		10		14		6	
	Orissa		4		18		17	
	West Bengal		0	46	0	67	1	45
Power plant	Andhra Pradesh		0		0		1	
	Chhattisgarh		0		0		0	
	West Bengal		0		0		1	
	Maharashtra		1	01	2	2	1	3
Mining	Orissa		0		1		1	
	Jharkhand		4		2		6	
	Chhattisgarh		2		0		0	
	AP		0		0		0	
	Maharashtra		0		0		1	
	W.B.		0	06	0	3	1	9
Pole/transmission	Chhattisgarh		23		7		1	
	Orissa		01		0		0	
	Jharkhand		0	24	0	7	1	2
Panchayat Bhawan	Chhattisgarh		2		0		3	
	Jharkhand		0		7		4	
	Andhra Pradesh		0		0		0	
	Maharashtra		5		8		6	
	Bihar		0		3		0	
	Orissa		0		3		11	
	West Bengal		0	7	2	23	7	31

School Building	Chhattisgarh		19		7		13	
	Andhra Pradesh		0		0		1	
	Jharkhand		4		37		7	
	Bihar		0		21		10	
	Maharashtra		2		1		0	
	Orissa		0	25	5	71	8	39
Forest road, cul-verts etc.			41	41	126	126	158	158
	TOTAL		182	182	362	362	365	365

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi

Current Trends in the Maoist Movement

The following trends can be noticed in the Maoist movement since the past few years:

Increasing spatial spread

Increasing militarization

- Synchronised large-scale attacks on multiple targets

- Chilling massacres of security forces

- Looting weapons and ammunition, at times in large numbers

- Qualitative increase in armed struggle

Infrastructure attacks

Mobilisation and propaganda

- Urban penetration

- Penetration of working class movement

- Founding various front organizations/ United Front activities

- Mobilisation of masses against land acquisition and tribal land alienation, and against SEZs

- Use of technology, including the Internet

Revolutionary and Counter- Revolutionary Strategy⁸

An accurate assessment of the ground situation, employing area-specific strategies and application of correct tactics have ensured the resilience of the Maoist movement, and its spatial spread. The government's response is, on the other hand, marked by either one of inaction, ostrich-like attitude, or remaining content with scoring military successes.

Thus, during the organizational phase of the movement, when the rebels seek to build a popular support base, they do not indulge in any violence. The nature of their activities is peaceful, and essentially political (strategic defensive). In this phase, they issue threats to who may be termed as 'class-enemies', sometimes commit actions against them, build front organizations to rally various segments of the society such as women, labourers, youth, etc, to mobilize, organize and indoctrinate them. They take-up issues that are specific to the area such as failure of governance, acts of omission and commission by political parties/ leaders, anti-mining agitations, land acquisition, etc. Since, there is no violence and the State has failed to comprehend the evolving situation, the authorities fail to respond and the police make no attempt to curb the activities of the Maoists. When they do, they either lack adequate evidence to book and get the rebels punished, or respond with a disproportionate (excessive) use of force. All the more, when they apprehend sympathisers and supporters, and sometimes completely unconnected people, it gives a fillip to the revolutionary movement; this is what the Maoists wait for and desire.

After the rebels gain firm foot-hold in their areas of operation during the organizational phase, the movement enters the guerrilla warfare phase. In this phase, the guerrilla and the state are said to be on an equal footing (strategic stalemate). In this phase, they target police patrols and police

⁸ In the preparation of this section, I have depended largely upon, and have borrowed from, K Srinivas Reddy, "Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary Strategies of the Naxalites and the State", in P V Ramana, ed., *The Naxal Challenge*, New Delhi: Pearson-Longman, 2008, pp. 90-100.

stations, target kill specific individuals who they brand as police informants. Especially, they seek to create political vacuum by asking political leaders to resign from their posts and would not hesitate to kill those who do not fall in line. As a result, fearing for their lives, leaders at various levels move away from countryside to towns and cities, or lie low in their own villages. The political space vacated by these people is filled-in by the rebels through forming *gram rajya* committees and *gram raksha* committees, thus forming a parallel administration. The civil administration remains a mute spectator during these developments and the rebels gain total control over these areas, and their writ alone runs. The police adopt a shot-gun approach and do not mind causing collateral damage while targeting Maoist squads. This causes further alienation from the people and the rebels become stronger. While development efforts take a back-seat, in the wake of the threat of reprisal attacks and destruction by the rebels, what ever little development activities are undertaken are left to the police to handle. Further, in this state of affairs the Maoists would not miss the opportunity to criticize the police of ‘usurping’ the role of the civil administration.

In the next stage of the movement — mobile warfare phase (strategic defensive), which is now being witnessed in Bastar, in the central Indian State of Chhattisgarh, the focus is almost singularly on militarily dealing with the rebels, in order to re-establish the authority of the state. All agencies of the state are totally absent in the villages, and are nominally present in, and confined to, taluk/district headquarters. It is during this stage that casualties mount and reach a peak as the state now begins to wrest control over these areas. Numbers, motivation, training, capabilities and logistics, and more importantly ground-level intelligence, besides tactical blunders (not following SOPs) are aspects that would need to be addressed by the state to thwart out the guerrillas and re-establish the authority of the state. At all stages, and including in this stage, it is quite essential for the security forces to steadfastly avoid reprisal killings of sympathisers, burning down villages that support the Maoists and killing innocent civilians. Else, it would be impossible to win the crucial support of the people, which is very necessary to defeat the rebels.

There is no gainsaying that this is the toughest phase to deal with for the state. Indeed, the state’s resilience is put to severe test and requires immense patience and coordinated, sustained efforts on all fronts — security,

development, public perception management (Winning Hearts and Minds, WHAM, in short), in spite of facing several set-backs to comprehensively defeat the Maoists.

On the whole, at any stage the state should first have a thorough and correct understanding of the problem at hand. Then, there should be the political will to face the Maoist challenge. There can be no room for confusion and vacillation. Only then, it would be possible to devise correct strategies to face the challenge. A policy would emerge from such strategies, which needs to be translated into action at the ground level in order to show tangible results. For this the policies and programmes need to be implemented by committed officers in a comprehensive and well-coordinated manner. It is all the more important to make available adequate funds and strictly monitor their use.

It is possible to defeat the Maoist challenge and re-establish the authority of the state in all areas currently under the Maoist control and or influence through patience, silent and sustained work.

Political Opinion

Absence of consensus and consistency mark the approach of the various political leaders towards to the Maoist challenge. “On the one extreme the Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, Mr Raman Singh of the BJP, has repeatedly called for a national policy to address the Naxalite issue, while, at the other extreme, the CPI-M leader, Mr Sitaram Yechury said in Hyderabad, on August 21, 2005 that ‘it is not possible to have a national policy.’”⁹ For a State like Madhya Pradesh or Uttar Pradesh, the limited pockets on the periphery have some Maoist presence and report violence at infrequent intervals. Therefore, the political parties in those states do not see any urgency in dealing with the Maoists.

On the other hand, in Andhra Pradesh the approach varied for a very long time depending upon who was the chief minister. When NT Rama Rao of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) swept to power for the first time, he hailed the Naxalites as patriots. For quite some years the TDP-led government was soft towards the rebels. Later, he proscribed the Naxalites, but the real and intense crackdown during the TDP regime started only after Chandra Babu Naidu assumed office as chief minister. In 1989, when the Congress-I was swept to power in a landslide victory, Chenna Reddy adopted a liberal approach towards the rebels. He allowed them to freely and openly propagate their ideology and accepted several surrenders. His successor, N Janardhan Reddy reversed the policy and ordered a crackdown.

Years later, when the Congress-I strode to power in 2004, the then chief minister allowed the ban on the Naxalites to lapse, held a dialogue with Naxalite representatives and conducted a failed peace process and, subsequently proscribed the rebel outfit after a ruling party MLA was murdered by the Maoists on August 15, 2005. At the same time the Congress-I in Karnataka vacillated and eventually did not ban the Maoists.

⁹ See P V Ramana, “National Approach to Naxal Issue Needed”, *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, September 14, 2005.

On the other hand, at the Centre, even as the Congress-I led Government permitted the Congress-I led Andhra Pradesh Government to hold negotiations with the rebels in October 2005, its then Union Home Minister declared on March 13, 2006, “There will be no peace dialogue by the affected states with the naxal groups unless the latter agree to give up violence and arms.” Barely six months earlier, the then Union Home Minister had said on September 20, 2005: “If they drop arms, it is good. But if they want to carry arms and still talk ... we don’t have any difficulty. We are not afraid to do so”.¹⁰

¹⁰ See a report entitled “Joint Task Force formed to combat Naxals”, *Times of India*, New Delhi, September 20, 2005.

Wide-Ranging Opinion

A wide range of opinion exists on dealing with the Maoist challenge. Mr Prakash Singh, former Director General of Police, supports Salwa Judum and holds that every possible method should be adopted to fight the rebels¹¹. He further argues that if the government could be prepared to hold negotiations with a plethora of rebel groups it might as well hold negotiations with the Maoists. Renowned journalist and authority on the Naxalites, K Srinivas Reddy suggests a judicious mix of K-NKO (kinetic and non-kinetic operations), i.e. security measures and development efforts, and cautions that mindless, excessive dumping of forces would only be counterproductive¹².

On the other hand, well-known security authority, Dr Ajai Sahni argues in many of his writings in the weekly, *South Asia Intelligence Review* that the state has neither displayed its comprehension of the enormity of the problem, nor shown the willingness to deal with it. He also opines that the people-police ratio is far below accepted international standards, and that prescribed by the United Nations. He further contends that there can be no development without security and calls for intense operations against the rebels.

According to Mr Giridhari Nayak, Additional Director General of Police (Special Intelligence Branch), Chhattisgarh:¹³

The real challenge lies in developing correct specific strategies with unity of purpose, and in executing the counter-[Maoist] strategies. Now it is high time for the decision makers to fight the strategies and tactics of

¹¹ See P V Ramana, "Red Storm Rising: India's Intractable Maoist Insurgency", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 2008. He has argued in favour of negotiations at many of his public speeches and presentations, which this author has had the privilege to attend.

¹² K Srinivas Reddy, "Maoists in North Telengana", presentation made at a one-day conference on *Extremist Challenge in Tribal Areas*, Tribal Research and Development Institute, Bhopal, January 11, 2007.

¹³ Giridhari Nayak, "Strategy and Tactics in Countering Left Wing Extremists in India", *Strategic Analysis*, New Delhi, Vol. 34, No. 4, July 2010, pp. 504-513.

[Maoists] rather than merely fighting effectiveness of [Maoist movement]. With prudent strategies and brilliant tactics it is possible to counter the strategies and tactics of [Maoists]; it can better be achieved by strategic planning, strategic coordination of forces and resources... To counter the [Maoists'] growing menace, a significant change in attitude, approach and orientation of the political, administrative and police machinery at various levels is much desired. It is for this reason that many tactical and operational aspects of counter-measures against [Maoists] have no strategic foundations.

At the other extreme, sociologist and activist Nandini Sundar, and a few of her colleagues, have strongly criticized the Salwa Judum and also filed a PIL in the Supreme Court pleading for winding it up. Besides, Civil Rights groups such as the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC) have never lost an opportunity to allege that the state is repressive, that all police encounters are staged, and that the security forces behave in a high-handed manner.

State Response

Evolution

Addressing the annual conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security in December 2007, the Prime Minister said: “In many ways, development and internal security are two sides of the same coin. Each is critically dependent on the other... Often, the lack of development and the lack of any prospects for improving one’s lot provide a fertile ground for extremist ideologies to flourish... A large proportion of the recruits to extremist groups come from deprived or marginalized backgrounds or from regions which somehow seem disaffected by the vibrant growth in many other parts of the country. At the same time, development cannot take place in the absence of a secure and stable environment.”

In its Annual Report for 1997-98, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) noted that “the Government attaches high priority to containing the menace of Left Wing Extremist violence by a double pronged strategy of strict law enforcement, along with special development initiatives in the affected States. The Central government has asked the State governments to take purposive, well-coordinated and integrated action, which would include, among other measures, intensification of development activities, rapid improvement of roads and communications, implementation of land reforms, etc.”

In fact, the Union Home Minister held a meeting of the chief ministers of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa in Hyderabad, on June 15, 1998, to review the action being taken by these states to tackle the problem. At the meeting, it was decided that:¹⁴

- a) The existing laws such as the National Security Act would continue to be invoked by the concerned state governments. Simultaneously, the state governments could examine enactment of a separate law to deal with Left-wing extremism.

¹⁴ *Annual Report, 1998-1999*, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs.

- b) A comprehensive plan of action encompassing developmental activities as well as stepped-up security measures would have to be prepared by the states. Andhra Pradesh Government had already prepared such a plan which had been referred to the Planning Commission. Other State Governments should also prepare similar plans which would be taken up with the Planning Commission for allocation of funds.
- c) A Coordination Centre would be set up at Hyderabad for reviewing the progress of the Action Plan and coordinating the efforts of the state governments.

Also in 1998, the Centre had asked the affected States to prepare 'holistic' security and development plans to address the issue in a comprehensive manner. This process was, finally, completed in December 2006 and, thereafter, the Centre had asked the affected States to fine-tune their plans.

Thereafter, the MHA constituted the Coordination Centre on June 26, 1998. This met for the first time on July 19, 1998. Initially, the Coordination Centre consisted of the police chiefs of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. Later, Bihar was included in the Coordination Centre. Over the years, as more number of states witnessed heightened Maoist activity each of them found representation on the Committee. The membership of the Coordination Centre was, thus, expanded to include 13 Naxalite-affected States.

Subsequently, in its Annual Report, 1999-2000, the MHA noted: "The Left-wing extremist violence in the country remained almost at the same level during the period January-September 1999, as compared to the corresponding period of 1998. However, the number of killings in extremist violence registered a slight increase."

In its Annual Report for the next year, 2000-2001, the MHA said, "Keeping in view the over all dimension which [Naxalism] has assumed in some States, it has become equally a matter of concern for the Central Government. The Central Government has, therefore, set up in consultation with the State Governments a high-level Coordination Centre, headed by Union Home Secretary..."

At the annual conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security, the Prime Minister noted with concern: "In the initial days of the movement,

many of the of the best and the brightest had been attracted towards the movement. Almost 40 years later, the Naxalite movement has lost much of its intellectual élan, but it has gained in strength and has now spread to over 150 districts all over the country.”¹⁵

He further said: “This phenomenon is a function of underdevelopment. It is not a coincidence that it is the tribal areas that are the main battleground of left wing extremism to day. Large swathes of tribal territory from Andhra Pradesh in the south to the borders of UP and Bengal in the North and East have become the hunting ground of left wing extremists, which has the potential to pose an even graver threat than militancy in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East.”¹⁶

Besides, the MHA Annual Report for 2004-2005, deals with the issue of Naxalism very extensively and quite exhaustively, for the first time, devoting full 10 pages for the subject.

The Annual Report notes: “...Naxal violence during 2004 continued to be a cause of serious concern. Despite serious efforts at the Central and State levels to contain naxal violence and initiation of peace process between the ... CPML- PW and the government in Andhra Pradesh, the over all quantum of Naxal violence remained more or less at the same level as during the preceding year. The problem, however, has affected a larger area, in varying degrees.”

The Annual Report also describes the extent of violence in various States and makes a systematic assessment of the problem, State-wise, thus indicating that it has acquired an all-India dimension. It also lists out major incidents and identifies the then existing (current) trends. It also mentions in good detail the measures being taken by the Central Government to tackle Naxalism. It notes: “Since the problem of Naxalism is not merely a law and order problem, it is being tackled on political, social, economic and security fronts by way of a multi-pronged strategy...”

¹⁵ Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, in his address at the Annual Conference of DGPs/IGPs on November 4, 2004, at New Delhi.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

In its Annual Report, 2005-2006, the MHA reiterates its concern at the rising trend of Naxalism and for the first time acknowledges that:

It is not merely a law and order problem but has deep socio-economic dimensions. Therefore, a multi-pronged strategy essentially of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development of naxal affected areas is being pursued to effectively tackle this menace.

Further, a Task Force was constituted on October 7, 2004, headed by the Special Secretary, Internal Security. Besides, following a meeting of Chief Ministers on Internal Security, the Union Government, on April 15, 2005, also constituted Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxalite Affected States, headed by the Union Home Minister, which met for the first time on September 19, 2005. 13 States are presently represented on this Committee.

In its Annual Report, 2007-2008, the MHA noted that:

The view and the policy of the Government is that, for dealing effectively with the naxal problem, an entirely police and security oriented approach is not enough. While it is necessary to conduct proactive and sustained operations against the extremists, and put in place all measures required for this, it is also necessary to simultaneously give focussed attention to development and governance issues, particularly at the cutting edge level.

Addressing the Chief Minister's Conference on Internal Security, on December 20, 2007, the Prime Minister reiterated that Naxalism poses the single largest threat to the country's internal security. He said:

- In many ways, development and internal security are two sides of the same coin. Each is critically dependent on the other.
- Often, the lack of development and the lack of any prospects for improving one's lot provide a fertile ground for extremist ideologies to flourish.
- A large proportion of the recruits to extremist groups come from deprived or marginalized backgrounds or from regions which somehow seem disaffected by the vibrant growth in many other parts of the country. At the same time, development cannot take place in the absence of a secure and stable environment.

He also said at the meeting: "... we need to devise both protection mechanisms as well as incentives for ensuring that the Naxal groups do not succeed in their attempts to derail the process of development. We also need to wean away the youth from naxal ideologies", and went on to note that "... a coordinated effort has begun in eight districts in four states. This is only a beginning. We need such a response across the entire affected area."

Thus, "a detailed analysis of the spread and trends in respect of Left Wing Extremis[t] violence [has] been made and 33 affected districts in eight States have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of development schemes. Within these 33 districts, eight most affected districts in four States, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa have been taken up for implementation of integrated security and development action plans, an approach that can be replicated in other affected districts also."¹⁷

As an extension of the above initiative, and as noted by the Prime Minister in his December 20, 2007-speech, the Planning Commission has developed an Integrated Action Plan (sometimes also known as Unified Action Plan) targeting 60 districts in all, in nine states.

At the same time, on the other hand, the Union Government, as noted in the MHA Annual Report, 2008-2009, is of the opinion that "The primary responsibility for tackling the naxalite situation rests with the State Governments, and they have to take coordinated measures for this purpose". The MHA further reiterated this in its Annual Report, 2010-2011.

¹⁷ *Annual Report, 2009-2010*, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.

14-Point Policy

In an apparent indication of the Union Government's recognition of the gravity of the Maoist challenge, and its inclination to deal with the challenge head along, the then Union Home Minister unveiled in the Lok Sabha, on March 13, 2006, the 14-point policy of the Union Government to deal with Naxalism. The policy stated *inter alia* that:¹⁸

- (i) The Government will deal sternly with the naxalites indulging in violence.
- (ii) Keeping in view that naxalism is not merely a law and order problem, the policy of the government is to address this menace simultaneously on political security, development and public perception management fronts in a holistic manner.
- (iii) Naxalism being an inter-state problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it.
- (iv) The states will need to further improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action against naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly.
- (v) There will be no peace dialogue by the affected states with the naxal groups unless the latter agree to give up violence and arms.
- (vi) Political parties must strengthen their cadre base in the naxal-affected areas so that the potential youth there can be weaned away from the path of naxal ideology.
- (vii) The states from where naxal activity/influence, and not naxal violence, is reported should have a different approach with special focus on accelerated socio-economic development of the

¹⁸ Status Paper on the Naxal Problem, Internal Security Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, March 13, 2006.

backward areas and regular inter action with the NGOs, intelligentsia, and the civil liberties groups to minimize over ground support for the naxalite ideology and activity.

- (viii) Efforts will continue to be made to promote local resistance groups against naxalites but in a manner that the villagers are provided adequate security cover and the area is effectively dominated by the security forces.
- (ix) Mass media should also be extensively used to highlight the futility of naxal violence and loss of life and property caused by it and developmental schemes of the government in the affected areas so as to restore people's faith and confidence in the government machinery.
- (x) The states should announce a suitable transfer policy for the naxal-affected districts. Willing, committed and competent officers will need to be posted with a stable tenure in the naxal-affected districts. These officers will also need to be given greater delegation and flexibility to deliver better and step-up government presence in these areas.
- (xi) The Government of Andhra Pradesh has an effective surrender and rehabilitation policy for naxalites and has produced good results over the years. The other states should adopt a similar policy.
- (xii) The state governments will need to accord a higher priority in their annual plans to ensure faster socio- economic development of the naxal-affected areas. The focus areas should be to distribute land to the landless poor as part of the speedy implementation of the land reforms, ensure development of physical infrastructure like roads, communication, power etc. and provide employment opportunities to the youth in these areas.
- (xiii) Another related issue is that development activities are not undertaken in some of the naxalite affected areas mainly due to extortion, threat or fear from the naxalite cadres. In these areas, even contractors are not coming forward to take up developmental work. Adequate security and other measures would need to be taken to facilitate uninterrupted developmental activities in the naxal-affected areas.

- (xiv) The Central Government will continue to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and development fronts and bring greater coordination between the states to successfully tackle the problem.

Mechanism, Approach and Measures

Besides, the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected States and an Empowered Group of Ministers — headed by the Union Home Minister — there exists an **institutional mechanism** to address the Maoist challenge. Thus, the MHA has set-up¹⁹

- A Task Force on inter-State coordination headed by Special Secretary, Internal Security. (now Secretary, Internal Security)
- An Inter Ministerial Group in the Ministry of Home Affairs – headed by Secretary, Naxal Management Division – to review the implementation of development programmes in the naxalite-affected areas.
- A high-level Task Force under Cabinet Secretary has been formed for promoting coordinated efforts across a range of development and security measures. (This has now been renamed as Review Committee)
- A Coordination Centre headed by the Union Home Secretary.

Thus, in order to address the challenge of Naxalism the Union Government has initiated various measures and has adopted an **integrated approach**. There are four key elements in the Union Government's approach to dealing with the Maoists/ Naxalites. These are security, development, public perception management and surrender and rehabilitation. The plethora of measures being adopted by the Union Government and being suggested to the various affected States, thus, fall under these four broad heads.

¹⁹ http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=540, and *Annual Report, 2010-2011*, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.

The **measures** initiated by the Union Government include:

- a) Deployment of CPMF
- b) Sanctioning of IR Battalions
- c) Setting-up of COBRA battalions
- d) Setting-up of CIAT Schools
- e) MPF scheme
- f) SRE scheme
- g) Training for state police through CPOs and Army
- h) Intelligence sharing
- i) Inter-state coordination
- j) Assistance in development works
- k) Various development programmes and schemes such as BRGF (earlier, BDI), Integrated Action Plan, PMGSY, MGNREGP, Sarva Siksha Abhiyan, Indira Awas Yojana, 100 per cent assistance for setting-up Ashram Schools in Tribal Sub Plan areas and for ST students, etc.
- l) No dialogue with Naxalites unless they abjure violence

Suggestions/Guidelines to the Affected States

Besides, undertaking various initiatives on its part, the Union Government has also been making various suggestions to the affected States to deal with the Maoist challenge. These are summarized below.

- a) Strengthen intelligence network
- b) Expeditiously fill vacancies in police and increase police-population ratio

- c) Fortify police stations and improve the fighting capabilities of police through provisioning for equipment, communication, mobility and develop infrastructure (police buildings and housing)
- d) Impart training to police forces and raise specialized units
- e) Strong police response individually and collectively
- f) Undertake comprehensive development of affected regions
- g) Effective revenue/ land administration
- h) Have an effective grievance redressal mechanism

Assessment of State Response

The achievement of the state (government) in dealing with the Maoist challenge has been a mixed-bag. Andhra Pradesh is the one State that has displayed the best result in almost near totally wiping out rebel presence from the State, except in North Coastal Andhra.

Noticeably, fatalities in Maoist violence witnessed a spurt in Chhattisgarh, Bihar and West Bengal. Together, 66 per cent of all Maoist violence in the country was reported from these three states, in 2010. The year past also recorded the highest number of fatalities, thus far, in Maoist violence in the country — 1001 civilians, SFs and rebels, killed in various states. This indicates increased belligerence on the part of the Maoists.

At the same time, the rebels have increased their front-organisation activities, especially in the national capital, Delhi. The rebels are yet to make disconcerting head-way in the targeted areas of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab and Uttarakhand. But, there has been noticeable rebel activity in these areas.

In part, the inadequacy of the government's response to the Maoist challenge can be attributed to a lack of unanimity in the perception of the various affected states on the Naxalite issue. Thus, while States such as Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu have proscribed the CPI (Maoist), West Bengal has refused to do the same. Orissa has lately proscribed the CPI (Maoist), while Karnataka issued contradictory statements and finally chose not to ban the CPI (Maoist).

On its part, Andhra Pradesh allowed the ban to lapse, initiated a peace process and re-imposed proscription in August 2005, in the wake of the assassination of serving MLA in August 2005. It is pertinent to also point here that except for the CPI (Maoist) no other Naxalite group in the country has been proscribed in any of the states or by the Centre, even though some of them are committed to protracted armed struggle.

Besides, fluid coalitions and lack of maturity on the part of the political leadership have also contributed to inadequate response. The political leadership in some of the affected states fails to recognize that what

seems to be a peripheral problem today would eventually turn out into a major challenge, a few years down the line. Moreover, a few political leaders — cutting across party lines — have had opportunistic linkages with the Maoists for narrow political gains. As one highly respected Marxist leader, late Koratala Satyanarayana, once a Polit Bureau member of the CPI (Marxist), noted:²⁰

In our experience, the political parties that have been in power in the State for the last three or four decades have been trying to utilise or use services of these extremist groups, either to come to power or to perpetuate their power... We have been ... pleading [with] the Government to take all political parties into confidence and try to solve this problem of extremism in totality.

Further, coordination between the police/intelligence agencies of various affected states has improved, but is yet to reach the desired levels. In recent times, initial indications of improvement in coordination has been witnessed, as was evidenced by the seizure of 875 empty rocket shells in September 2006, the unearthing of an R&D-cum-arms making unit in Bhopal on January 10, 2007, the unearthing of another arms making unit in Rourkela a few days later, and the arrests of a number of Central Committee/Polit Bureau members and State Committee members in different states. Besides, joint-commands have just about been formed in some of the affected states.

As Parliament was informed in April 2008, nearly five years after the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojna (RSVY) scheme was launched, of the total Rs 6615 crore earmarked, at the time it was “subsumed into the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) Programme in August 2006, the districts concerned had claimed only Rs 2850 crore.”²¹ In other words, the districts concerned could utilise a mere 43 per cent of the allocated funds.

²⁰ Statement before the Advocates Committee on Naxalite Terrorism, constituted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 1997.

²¹ See the reply by Minister for Panchayati Raj to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2240, “Review of Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana”, answered on April 23, 2008. The Minister further informed that of the 147 districts under the RSVY, as on that date, a mere 70 districts claimed their full entitlement of Rs 45 cr; 39 districts had to claim the last instalment; 30 districts two more instalments; and eight districts had to claim three or more instalments.

The implementation of these development schemes has been rather tardy, and its monitoring was weak. In its 126th report tabled in the Lok Sabha on April 26, 2007, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs noted:

The Committee however, feels that there is no perceptible change on the socio-economic front. Though the socio-economic development cannot be quantified, it can be perceived and if such a perceptible change is there, undoubtedly it will have a lasting impact. The Committee . . . recommends that various schemes under the Ministries of Rural Development and other Ministries may also be implemented for the socio-economic development in the naxal affected areas. There needs to be an effective monitoring mechanism on the implementation of these schemes with the involvement of all the concerned Ministries and agencies.

Besides, according to a media report, “The Home Minister has desired to review the scheme [Integrated Action Plan] himself,” following approval of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs. He said he would talk to all the DMs on its implementation.²² According to yet another media report, “The Planning Commission, which has been monitoring the work under IAP, has decided to ask CAG to conduct a special audit of the scheme launched from January 2011 to remove development deficit in the worst naxal affected zones in India.”²³

The reasons for deficient delivery are not far to seek. What a Steering Group of the Planning Commission noted in 2001 is equally true today, too. It said:²⁴

The Working Groups strongly felt that though the programmes for poverty alleviation were well designed, poor delivery was a major hurdle in eradicating poverty. It was felt that the Government machinery at the

²² See <http://www.hindustantimes.com/Chidambaram-to-take-stock-of-Integrated-Action-Plan-via-video-conferencing/Article1-662367.aspx#>.

²³ See <http://www.hindustantimes.com/CAG-to-audit-schemes-in-Naxal-areas/Article1-701996.aspx>.

²⁴ Planning Commission of India, *Report of the Steering Group on Rural Poverty Alleviation, Watershed Development, Decentralised Planning and Panchayati Raj Institutions*, for the Tenth Five Year Plan, 2002-2007, TYFP SC Report No.8/2001, November 2001, New Delhi, p. 36. The Members of the Group included Secretary, Union Ministry of Rural Development, Rural Development Secretaries of various States, well-known economists such as Prof Hanuamtha Rao, Prof Indira Hiraway, Prof Gopal Chadha, and Ms Renana Jhabwala of SEWA, etc.

cutting edge level was too thinly spread, poorly trained and ill equipped to implement programmes, which require not only commitment to poor but also certain amount of technical expertise. The groups felt that given the outreach of the Government, the administrative machinery has to be strengthened by reforming it from within, by providing support through networking with other institutions and by subjecting it to greater supervision and control by the Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) and other Community Based Organisations (CBOs).

Besides, siphoning-off funds/leakages is a significant contributing factor in the benefits not reaching the targeted groups²⁵. The situation, indeed, reminds one of what former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said. During a visit to Kalahandi, Orissa, in 1985, he said: “Of every rupee spent by the government, only 17 paise reached the intended beneficiary”²⁶. Speaking from Bundelkhand, Uttar Pradesh, about the implementation of, and rampant misappropriation in, the NREGS, Member of Parliament Rahul Gandhi reportedly said, “Now the situation is even worse”²⁷. He went to add that he had seen job cards of 50 people “with the same serial number, and not even one card had the entry of work”²⁸.

On the other hand, the government has achieved several successes in arresting a number of Maoist leaders and neutralizing a few more. Notable among the Central Committee/Polit Bureau members arrested in the past few years include Narayan Sanyal, Patitpaban Haldar, Susheel Roy, Tapan Das, Sumanand, ideologue and international department head

²⁵ Personal communication from a Superintendent of Police (SP) of a district in the south Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, March 2008. Under the NREGS about Rs 200 cr has been allotted to each district. In this particular district not much money has been spent, on the ground that wheeler-dealers would siphon-off funds. Thus, a huge amount has been left unspent. The approximate amount of misappropriation is over 50 lakh per mandal (taluk); and there are 66 mandals in that district. Besides, there is total mayhem in the villages at the meetings of social audit parties, with the wheeler-dealers (local legislator’s henchmen) creating disorder. There have also been instances when members of the social audit parties were threatened and manhandled.

²⁶ See Santosh K Joy, “Rahul Echoes Rajiv Gandhi’s Comments on Public Funds”, accessed at the Rediff News section on January 17, 2008, available at www.rediff.com.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

Kobad Ghandy, Sridhar Krishnan Srinivasan, Balraj, Chintan, Varanasi Sunbrahmanyam, Jhantu Mukerjee and Vijay Kumar Arya. Some of the important leaders neutralized include Sande Rajamouli, Wadkapur Chandramouli, military intelligence head Patel Sudhakar Reddy and Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Zad, the spokesperson of the CPI (Maoist), while the most powerful Maoist leader to surrender to the authorities was Lanka Papi Reddy alias Lachhanna, who was once the head of the Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee.

At the same time, it should also be noted that for the past many years, thus far, the response by the various states has either been one of inaction, or focused in significant measure, if not excessively, on militarily fighting the Naxalites, rather than addressing the issue on a socio-economic plane.

Suggested Additional Measures

Besides the various initiatives currently being undertaken by the Union Government and the various affected States, it might be useful to consider a few more measures that could be initiated to squarely and successfully deal with the Maoist challenge.

Political Parties

Mao Tse Tung once said: “If we attend to these problems, solve them and satisfy the needs of the masses, we shall really become organizers of the well-being of the masses, and they will truly rally round us and give us their warm support... The women want to learn ploughing and harrowing. Whom can we get to teach them? The children want to go to school. Have we set up primary schools? The wooden bridge over there is too narrow and people may fall off. Should we not repair it? Many people suffer from boils and other ailments. What are we going to do about it? All such problems concerning the well-being of the masses should be placed on our agenda. Discussions should be held, decisions reached, actions taken and results checked up.”

Being the largest organized group with a presence in every village, each political party can play a significant role in being responsive to people’s needs and problems. Moreover, the political parties have a direct stake in the democratic system. Therefore, setting-aside political rivalries the government should advise and encourage all political parties to play a pro-active role and be responsive to people’s problems. This shall strengthen the support base of each of the political party and, additionally, deny political space to the Naxalites.

Administration

1. The Union Government has constituted various committees and commissioned studies/ reports to make recommendations on how to address the Naxal challenge. It might be useful to constitute a task-force to work on a mission-mode to examine which of these recommendations have not been implemented, inquire why they were not implemented, and consider if they could be implemented

2. Within the Naxal Management Division of the MHA, only those officers who have proven record of having handled the Naxalite challenge should be appointed
3. Meet out exemplary punishment to any person proved to be having a nexus with the Naxalites
4. Encourage surrender and rehabilitation by having in place an attractive rehabilitation package
5. Involvement of the local population while drawing-up development plans in order to address the felt needs of the people
6. Posting dedicated officers as heads of the various departments and necessarily granting them security of tenure
7. Effective implementation of development schemes and programmes
8. Rigorous monitoring of the implementation of development schemes and programmes
9. Saturate the moderately affected and targeted areas with rapid development
10. Civil and police officials should be made to compulsorily visit affected villages at frequent intervals and strike rapport with the people
11. Speedy delivery of justice
12. Encourage and promote NGOs in affected areas
13. Encourage universities to undertake studies that would help deal with the Maoists

Police

1. Sensitisation and training of all ranks of the police force across the entire affected state on activities of Naxalites
2. Posting of young and enthusiastic S.H.Os in affected or potential regions

3. Giving additional extra perks to policemen working in affected areas
4. Assiduously and consciously adopt an entirely people-centric policing and actively participate in community development activities
5. Frequently visit Welfare Hostels run by the government
6. Victim reassurance

Public Perception Management

- 1) Massive use of graffiti in all the villages
- 2) Extensive use of short documentaries in cinemas across the affected district
- 3) Form cultural troupes
- 4) Government officials at various levels, and in all departments, should consciously cultivate stringers and moffusil journalists
- 5) Organise people to undertake rallies, protests and sit-ins against Naxalite activities and accord massive publicity to any anti-people action of the Naxalites

Big Businesses / Industries

In the Naxalite-affected areas, industries, especially paper and mining industry, belonging to both the public and private sectors, has been under constant threat of attacks and destruction — leading to loss of lives and property — from the Naxalites. At the same time, in order to win over the people and wean them away from the Naxalites the industry could meaningfully and sincerely fulfil its corporate social responsibility (CSR). The government should closely work with the industry and help them devise schemes and programmes. It would be most prudent to commence CSR activities the day an industry signs a MoU with the government, rather than wait for a later date when production would commence, or profits start pouring-in. The money to be spent on CSR could be included in the project cost itself. Some of the CSR activities that could be undertaken include:

- 1) Free educational facilities for local adivasi children in the project schools.
- 2) Construction of new school buildings and additional class rooms, besides undertaking repair and renovation of a number of school buildings of the state government in the area, including electrification work.
- 3) Supply of school uniforms, text books and other stationery items to adivasi children, besides suitable cash awards to meritorious students of various classes to inculcate the positive attitude towards education.
- 4) Establish ITI/ Polytechnic College exclusively for tribal youth providing entire infrastructure facilities, including residential quarters and hostel buildings for students, to develop local talent suiting to the needs of the industry.
- 5) Undertake “Skill Development Programme”, which includes in-house training, aimed at equipping tribal youth to acquire necessary knowledge, skill and proficiency in the operation of Mine/Plant to help them in seeking employment. Pay appropriate stipend during the period of programme and offer free/subsidised breakfast, lunch, uniform, tool kits, etc.
- 6) Free medical treatment in project hospitals and frequent camps for eye, dental, cancer, orthopaedic, family planning and other health camps.
- 7) Frequent visits of project doctors to neighbouring villages for providing medical assistance to the needy and help the District Administration in extending medical assistance through making available ambulances, donation of medical equipment, etc in interior villages.
- 8) Lay open well/tube wells, hand pumps and water tanks for supplying drinking water to nearby villages.
- 9) Construct all weather roads connecting neighbouring villages, besides providing street lighting and electrification in the areas

Conclusion

The assertions by the Ministry of Home Affairs that the Maoist challenge could be dealt with in three years seems to be ambitious, given present-day the ground realities. If coordinated action is taken, perhaps, their challenge could be defeated in approximately seven to 10 years. A welcome development is that the various state governments and the Union Government have begun to evince willingness to deal with the issue. Also, The Union government has initiated efforts to build a consensus among the affected states. At the same time, capacities of state police forces need to be built up, among other things, which cannot be accomplished within a short period.

The Maoist challenge can certainly be defeated. Besides weakening the Maoists' lethal capacities and reducing violence, it is also essential to ensure that governance is improved; development schemes and programmes are implemented effectively; and their implementation is monitored rigorously, so that those prone to sympathising with, or supporting, the Maoists would, in the long run, realize the needlessness and futility of doing so.

Annexures

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Annexure – 1

PRESS STATEMENT:

CPI (ML) (PW) and MCCI - Merged Communist Party of India (Maoist) Emerged

On Sept. 21, 2004, amidst the thick forests in some part of India, the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) was declared at a public meeting before an assembly of peoples' guerrilla fighters, party activists and activists of mass organisations. The two parties, the Maoist Communist Centre of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)[People's War] were merged to form the new unified Party, the CPI(Maoist). However, this merger declaration has been withheld from the media for security reasons and is now being released to the entire people of our country and the world. The formation of this new Party has fulfilled the desires and aspirations of the oppressed masses of the country for a genuine proletarian party that can lead them to revolutionary change for the establishment of a new democratic society, advancing towards socialism and communism.

This unified party has been formed after thoroughgoing discussions held between the high level delegations of the two parties initially and then finalized by the Joint Central Committee meeting of both the parties. Through these thorough-going and constructive discussions, held on an equal footing, five documents have been drafted and finalized. These documents are: Hold High the Bright Red Banner of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, the Party Programme, Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution, the Political Resolution on the International and Domestic Situation and the Party Constitution.

In addition to these documents it has also been decided that our beloved leaders and teachers of the respective parties, the late Com. Charu Mazumdar and Com. Kanai Chatterjee, will be recognized and highlighted

as the founding leaders of the unified party. It was also decided that both these parties, stemming from the turbulent period of the decade of the 60's, particularly from the great Naxalbari uprising, livingly inherited all that was revolutionary in the long history of the Indian communist movement. The peculiarity of the situation is that both these parties continued to flow as two separate streams of the revolutionary communist movement, wedded to the same cause of carrying forward the Indian revolution over the past 35 years. All these steps taken together clearly disclosed a unified understanding on almost all ideological and political questions of line. The line established provided a principled basis for the unity achieved by both the parties.

Basing on this unity the Joint Central Committee meeting finally resolved to unite the two parties into a single unified party, which will henceforth be called as the Communist party of India (Maoist). Com. Ganapati was unanimously elected as the general secretary of the new party.

The formation of the unified Communist Party of India (Maoist) will certainly prove to be a new milestone in the history of the communist movement of India. A unified Maoist party based on MLM continued to be a long and highly cherished need of the revolutionary minded and oppressed people of the country including all our ranks, and also all Maoist forces of South Asia and internationally. Today this long-cherished desire and dream has been transformed into a reality.

The new Communist Party of India (Maoist) will continue to act as a consolidated political vanguard of the Indian proletariat. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism will be the ideological basis guiding its thinking in all the spheres of its activities. It will continue its struggle against right and left deviations, particularly against revisionism, by taking this as the main danger for the communist movement as a whole. It will still seek to unite all genuine Maoist groups that remain outside this unified Party.

The immediate aim and programme of the Maoist party is to carry on and complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution in India as a part of the world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under the neo-colonial

form of indirect rule, exploitation and control. This revolution will remain directed against imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism. This revolution will be carried out and completed through armed agrarian revolutionary war, i.e. protracted people's war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and principal task, encircling the cities from the countryside and thereby finally capturing them. Hence the countryside as well as the PPW (Protracted People's War) will remain as the "center of gravity" of the party's work, while urban work will be complimentary to it.

Since armed struggle will remain as the highest and main form of struggle and the army as the main form of organization of this revolution, hence it will continue to play a decisive role, whereas the UF will be built in the course of armed struggle and for the seizure of power through armed struggle. Mass organizations and mass struggles are necessary and indispensable but their purpose is to serve the war.

We also hereby declare that the two guerilla armies of the CPI(ML)[PW] and MCCI—the PGA and the PLGA—have been merged into the unified PLGA (Peoples' Liberation Guerrilla Army). Hereafter, the most urgent task i.e. principal task of the party is to develop the unified PLGA into a full-fledged People's Liberation Army (PLA) and transforming the existing Guerrilla Zones into Base Areas, thereby advancing wave upon wave towards completing the New Democratic Revolution. The formation day of the PLGA is to be December 2, the day when a people's army was formed for the first time ever in our country in 2000, on the first anniversary of the martyrdom of the three CCMs, com. Shyam, Mahesh and Murali.

Apart from this the unified party will continue to pay added attention to building a new wave of revolutionary mass movements on various political and other issues of the people. It will involve all the vast sections of the masses in these struggle directed against imperialism, feudalism and the comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The vicious imperialist offensive on our country has resulted in mass destitution of an already impoverished people, particularly in the countryside, which has even witnessed thousands of suicides. The CPI(Maoist) will mobilize vast sections of the masses

against the growing onslaught of the imperialists on the country, against state repression together with mobilizing support for all the movements directed against imperialism and feudalism.

The new party will also continue to support the struggle of the nationalities for self-determination including their right to secession and condemn the brutal state repression on these movements. It will pay special attention in mobilizing and organizing the women masses as a mighty force of the revolution, and will fight against all other forms of social oppression, particularly untouchability and casteism. It will continue to expose, isolate and defeat the more dangerous Hindu fascist forces, while exposing all other fundamentalist forces. It will continue to do so while keeping the edge of the people's struggles directed against the new Congress rulers in Delhi along with the CPI/CPM and their imperialist chieftains.

It will continue to expose and resist the expansionist designs of the Indian ruling classes along with their imperialist chieftains, particularly the US imperialists. It will more actively stand by the side of the Nepali people led by the CPN(Maoist), and vehemently oppose the Indian expansionists and US imperialists from intervening in Nepal with their military might. It will also continue to support the people's war led by the Maoist parties in Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and elsewhere. It will continue to support all people's struggles directed against imperialism and reaction. It will also support the working class movement and other people's movements the world over. It will continue to stand by the side of the Iraqi and Afghan people in their mighty struggle against the US imperialist-led aggression and occupation.

The Unified Party will continue to hold high the banner of proletarian internationalism and will continue to contribute more forcefully in uniting the genuine Maoist forces at the international level. Besides, it will also establish unity with the oppressed people and nations of the whole world and continue to fight shoulder to shoulder with them in advancing the world proletarian revolution against imperialism and their lackeys, thereby paving the way towards realizing socialism and then Communism on a world scale.

Thousands of our martyrs have laid down their valuable lives for these lofty aims. The Central Committee (Provisional) of the unified Party-CPI

(Maoist) — pledges that it will continue to advance along the path illuminated by them and thereby mobilize all its existing and latent energies in transforming the dreams of the martyrs into a reality.

With revolutionary greetings,

(Kishan)

General Secretary

Central Committee

Maoist Communist Centre of India

(Ganapathy)

General Secretary


Central Committee

CPI (M-L)[People's War]

Date: 14-10-2004

Source: People's March, Ernakulam, Volume 5, No. 11-12, November-December 2004.

Annexure – 2



Annexure – 3

Central Committee, Polit Bureau and Central Military Commission of the CPI (Maoist)

Central Committee

1. Muppala Laxmana Rao @ Ganapathi
2. Mallojula Koteswara Rao @ Kishanji
3. Nambala Keshava Rao @ Basava Raju.
4. Katakam Sudershan @ Anand.
5. Thippiri Tirupathi @ Deoji.
6. D. Kuppu Devraj @ Ramesh.
7. Jinugu Narasimha Reddy @ Jampanna.
8. Mallojula Venugopal @ Sonu.
9. Akkiraju Haragopal @ Ramakrishna.
10. Kadari Satyanarayana Reddy @ Kosa.
11. Pulluri Prasad Rao @ Chandranna. Alternate CC Member.
12. Modem Balakrishna @ Bhaskar. Alternate CC Member
13. Prasanth Bose @ Kishanda.
14. Rajnand da @ Paresh.
15. Mahesh @ Mohan.
16. Prayog @ Vivek.
17. Ranjith Bose @ Kanchan.

18. Ramachandra Reedy Pratap Reddy @ Chalaparthi. Alternate CC Member.
19. Misir besra @ Sunirmal.
20. Malla Rajireddy @ Sattenna.

Polit Bureau

1. Muppala Laxman Rao @ Ganapathi.
2. Prashant Bose @ Kishanda.
3. Nambala Keshava Rao @ Basava Raju.
4. Mallojula Koteshwara Rao @ Kishanji.
5. Mallojula Venugopal @ Sonu.
6. Katakam Sudershan @ Anand.
7. Malla Raji Reddy @ Sattenna.
8. Misir Besra @ Sunirmal.

Central Military Commission

1. Nambala Keshava Rao @ Basava Raju.
2. Thippiri Tirupathi @ Deoji.
3. Prashant Bose @ Kishanda.
4. Muppala Laxman Rao @ Ganapathi.
5. Jinugu Narasimha Reddy @ Jampanna.
6. MallaRaji Reddy@ Sattenna.
7. Misir Besra @ Sunirmal.

Annexure – 4

Districts Included Under Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme

<p>Andhra Pradesh</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anantapur 2. Adilabad 3. East Godavari 4. Guntur 5. Karimpagar 6. Khammam 7. Kurnool 8. Medak 9. Mehboobnagar 10. Nalgonda 11. Prakasam 12. Srikakulam 13. Visakhapatnam 14. Vizianagaram 15. Warangal <p>Bihar</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Arwal 17. Aurangabad 18. Bhojpur 19. East Champaran 20. Gaya 21. Jamui 22. Jehanabad 23. Kaimur 24. Munger 25. Nalanda 26. Nawada 27. Patna 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 28. Rohtas 29. Sitamarhi 30. West Champaran <p>Chhattisgarh</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 31. Bastar 32. Bijapur 33. Dantewada 34. Jashpur 35. Kanker 36. Korea (Baikunthpur) 37. Narayanpur 38. Rajnandgaon 39. Sarguja <p>Jharkhand</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 40. Bokaro 41. Chatra 42. Dhanbad 43. East Singhbhum 44. Garhwa 45. Giridih 46. Gumla 47. Hazaribagh 48. Koderma 49. Latehar 50. Lohardagga 51. Palamu 52. Ranchi 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 53. Simdega 54. Saraikela Kharaswan 55. West Singhbhum <p>Madhya Pradesh</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 56. Balaghat <p>Maharashtra</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 57. Chandrapur 58. Gadchiroli 59. Gondia <p>Orissa</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 60. Gajapati 61. Ganjam 62. Keonjhar 63. Koraput 64. Malkangiri 65. Mayurbhanj 66. Navrangpur 67. Rayagada 68. Sambhalpur 69. Sundargarh <p>Uttar Pradesh</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 70. Chandauli 71. Mirzapur 72. Sonbhadra <p>West Bengal</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 73. Bankura 74. Midnapore 75. Purulia
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