Unless an integrated view of Teesta basin management is adopted, the water and power needs of Sikkim and Bengal cannot be attended to in juxtaposition to the needs of Bangladesh.
Given an already upset population and the presence of anti-establishment factions, the unequal distribution of the benefits of CPEC is likely to ignite protests and cause a setback to the initiative as well to the Pakistan establishment.
It has become usual pattern for any political interaction between Bangladesh and India at the highest political level to be preceded, and followed, by an endless stream of analysis and curiosity on both sides of the border, but more so in Bangladesh. The just concluded official visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India from 7 to 10 April has been no exception, nor was it expected to be.
Sheikh Hasina’s visit should not be seen through the narrow prism of an agreement on defence cooperation or Teesta but through the broader perspective of the unexplored potential in India-Bangladesh relations.
China has created a constituency within the Nepal Army during the last few years. Some senior officers of the NA favour deeper military cooperation with China to reap more benefits.
Will the Pakistani civilian leadership cease to placate the Islamist forces for their own electoral gain? Will the Army rein in the jihadis it has been using to retain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan?
Regulated borders with greater emphasis on developing people-to-people contact and cross-border trade initiatives are likely to yield greater security benefits as against a closed border.
The many imponderables in sharing the Teesta waters
Unless an integrated view of Teesta basin management is adopted, the water and power needs of Sikkim and Bengal cannot be attended to in juxtaposition to the needs of Bangladesh.