

NATO Enlargement and Security Perceptions in Europe

Prasad P Rane

Abstract

The post-Cold War period saw North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) being expanded not once but twice. In foreseeing the security threats of the 21st century, NATO is seeking to recast its strategic response. The EU and the US are united in their opinion about the need for a stronger and cohesive NATO, and a wider out-of-area role for the alliance. If both the sides start working together and address future challenges, it may bring about a 'symbiosis' in the Atlantic Relationship. In a globalised world where interdependency is a norm, it is pertinent for the policy-making and academic communities to take cognisance of the developments within NATO.

Introduction

The September 11, 2001 Al Qaida attacks in the US saw terrorism emerge as a vital international security threat. These events also forced NATO to conduct its first out-of-area operation in Afghanistan and in a different form in Iraq. Indeed, NATO had begun to seek a new *raison d'être* soon after the end of the Cold War. By 1997 NATO had expanded its membership to include Central and East European countries. Certain differences emerged within NATO with this transformation. These differences can broadly be brought under two areas: (a) lack of commitment of the allies to send forces outside Europe, and (b) lack of political consensus on cases fit for intervention by NATO. Many States are concerned about the transformation of NATO into a Global Policeman to guard Western interests. Even some of the West European members in NATO are sceptical and concerned. In the light of this, building up of consensus amongst its members in particular and with regional powers in general about the role NATO desires to play through its expansion and Out-of-Area Operations are crucial for the success of the new NATO.

Strategic Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 3, Jul-Sep 2005
© Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

With the end of the Cold War, Western Europe was left without any major threat to its security. It also brought to an end the era of ideological and military rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs and most security analysts expected peace to prevail. However, the 1997 Madrid Summit sparked off a new debate when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to join NATO. Even while some were questioning the rationale behind NATO's continued existence, the Madrid Summit triggered the process of an eastward enlargement of NATO. Seven years later, NATO was enlarged again when Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania were inducted as members.¹

Throughout the Cold War, the Europeans faced the threat of a nuclear conflict. Security thinking in that period was deeply influenced by the ideological conflict between the two power blocks – East and West – with nuclear weapons making the threat imminent. The Europeans saw the alliance system as an arrangement to consolidate their security.² Therefore, the alliance system was designed accordingly to meet the security needs of that period.³ The disintegration of Soviet Union had already initiated a process of the restructuring of 'New Europe' – a Europe without any East-West divide or a power vacuum in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)⁴. However, this power vacuum was vulnerable to politico-military and economic challenges. Also, a series of new non-state threats particularly terrorism were on the ascendancy. To address these challenges a security arrangement was necessary. 'Cohesiveness' in decision-making and a 'multi-facet' approach were the pre-requisites for such an arrangement. Both the European Economic Community (EEC) which already proved its inability in building a consensus among its 12-members on vital issues during the Persian Gulf War and the Yugoslav crises⁵ and the 53-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) also lacked that 'cohesiveness'. The choice fell on NATO.

But the security arrangements during the Cold War had a state-centric character.⁶ Some neorealists even argued that in the years to come NATO may lose its cohesion due to the absence of a common external threat.⁷ If one goes by the logic that NATO came into existence due to a credible threat posed by the Soviet Union⁸ then by the same logic NATO renders itself useless after the latter's break-up. However, constructivists and institutional theorist argued in favour of its continued existence. David G. Haglund candidly observes:

...alliances can withstand the loss of their great foe if they can continue to be useful by 'reinventing' themselves in the security realm, which is what the 'new' NATO managed to accomplish through its 1990s focus upon 'cooperative security' and 'conflict management in Balkans'.⁹

In the Cold War strategic-security discourse, 'threat' had an external dimension. Threats in the post-Cold War period are largely non-strategic in nature,¹⁰ of which terrorism has become the most dangerous. NATO attempted to expand its strategic horizons realising the need of addressing the present day security challenges. The summits in London and Rome in 1990 and 1991 respectively redefined the new political and military goals for NATO.¹¹ It adopted the policy of transformation and change through expansion.

As a part of the process of enlargement, NATO re-defined its role through 'Out-of-Area' operations and reviewed its geographical limitations under Article 6 of the NATO Treaty.¹² Subsequently, NATO has undertaken operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, knocking the doors of Southern Asia.

Enlargement of NATO

The Process

NATO's decision to enlarge membership after the demise of the Soviet Union was based on a set of new threat perceptions and a redefined role:¹³

- First, US-led NATO did not regard the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a complete disappearance of threat, and was wary of Russia. Collective defence remains an essential function of NATO.¹⁴
- After the Kosovo and Afghan wars, NATO finally found a new mission of carrying out 'humanitarian intervention' and keeping peace after the wars. NATO has now deployed peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia.
- NATO has taken anti-terrorism and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a new global mission for itself. To complete this new mission, NATO has expanded its defence area.
- NATO is an indispensable link between the US and Europe.¹⁵ Without NATO, European defence would head for complete

independence. Are the Europeans capable of holding together as a strong cohesive unit?¹⁶

Observing the nature of the new security threats in the post-Cold War period, NATO had to shift its emphasis from defending common territory to defending common interests. Harmonising the interests of the Alliance partners became pivotal for the effectiveness of the Alliance.

The second enlargement took place on March 29, 2004, when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia formally became members of NATO. This enlargement dramatically changed the geopolitics of Europe. The enlargement highlighted NATO's alertness against the resurgence of Russia and likewise Russia saw it as a threat to its security.¹⁷ Some security analysts were worried about the Russian reaction but scholars like Ivo H Daalder regarded the Russian opposition as one influenced by the history of NATO during the Cold War.¹⁸

The Purpose

The primary objective of the Alliance has always been one of providing security to its members, defending their common interests and consolidating peace and stability in the continent¹⁹ and Post-Cold War it ensured that it did not drift away from this fundamental security task.²⁰ The rising concerns from non-strategic security threats provided a secondary purpose for NATO. In order to respond to these new threats, it was necessary for NATO to adopt a multi-focal approach – conceptually, strategically and tactically. In this context, during the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO allies approved a strategy to meet the security challenges of the 21st century and to guide its future political and military development. This was called the 'strategic concept of the Alliance'. The first clause of Part III of the concept brings out the Alliance approach to security. It states:

the Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognise the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in

which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.²¹

The operations in Afghanistan, NATO's first out-of-area operation, and Iraq demarcated a new tactical role for NATO. In these two countries, NATO is offering the role of an arrangement to build institutions of peace, stability and democracy. Secondly, as NATO's primary objective at the formation stage was to consolidate security of Europe, it will be of great importance to look at the developments in NATO-European Union (EU) relations. This relationship is strategic as well as provides a holistic framework for addressing a whole range of security threats in the post-Cold War period.

Security Perceptions in Europe

The member-states of EU are now coming to terms with the changed strategic scenario as evident from the key security threats outlined in the European Security Strategy, 2003. The threats identified are terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.²²

Subsequently there is a fresh thinking on the use of coercive power.²³ While the Europeans are striving hard to reconfigure threats and reshape and consolidate security accordingly, the US has been demanding a stronger 'European Pillar' in the Atlantic Alliance since the NATO operations in Bosnia, which underlined the EU member-states limitations. The Europeans were initially convinced that the American presence even after the end of the Cold War is essential for the security and stability of Europe. Gradually, the Europeans started worrying about the size and the composition of the US troops in Europe.²⁴ Some serious contestations were raised within Western Europe over the leadership role of the US in NATO.

While the Europeans were worried about the US dominance in NATO and its unilateral agenda, the Russians were worried about the NATO's expansion. As NATO expanded eastward, the Russian worries increased. The Russian Military Doctrine published in November 1993 has the

underpinning that any expansion of military bloc in Western or Eastern Europe will be considered detrimental to the security of Russian Federation. The Russian military thinkers considered this expansion as bringing the world's most powerful military alliance to the very borders of Russia and creating a strategically untenable position for Russia.²⁵ NATO-Russia relations took a big step forward by signing a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security with Russia on May 27, 1997 in Paris. The Act expressed the common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic region, and providing a true basis for the development of a strong and durable partnership.²⁶ The Founding Act also envisaged the setting up of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC).²⁷ The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) later replaced the PJC in the year 2002.²⁸ These developments in the NATO-Russia relations were also seen as recognising the status and role of Russia in the region.²⁹

Transatlantic Relations: Concerns Ahead

The rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries was a distinctive feature of the Cold War. However, NATO outlived the Warsaw Pact and by 1997 had suitably enlarged and restructured itself by giving membership to former Soviet bloc countries. However, sceptics started questioning the very existence and the excessive enlargement of NATO. Robert Kagan described this in the following words:

...in gathering of peoples who had been forcibly excluded from the West and wanted to be part of it again, they saw NATO as not only or even primarily (as) a security organisation but simply as the one and only institution that embodied the transatlantic West.³⁰

The proposal by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at the mini-summit in April 2003 to establish a separate EU operational planning headquarters sent strong signals of moving away from the "Berlin Plus" formula.³¹ Washington viewed it as a first step towards creating an independent European military capability which could pose a threat to NATO.³² These developments raised doubts over the cohesiveness of the Alliance. NATO's decision to conduct out of area operations lead to clash of interests between the Europeans and the Americans within the Alliance. Scholars like Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro believe that:

...ever since the end of the Cold War removed the common enemy,

American and European strategic perspectives have diverged. During the 1990s, Europeans turned increasingly inward, focusing on the historic and difficult efforts to create a common currency and to complete the political integration of Europe. Accustomed to interdependence and acutely aware of the limits of their power, they sought to develop a rules-based international order built upon multilateral agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Americans, by contrast, confident in their power, began to focus on new types of threats, particularly weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and 'rogue states'.³³

The synergic reaction of invoking Article 5³⁴ by NATO in the aftermath of 9/11 can be seen as a united step towards addressing the issue of terrorism. But the US' unilateral decision of invading Iraq and necessitating regime change once again sparked off differences in the Atlantic Alliance. Europeans accepted Iraq as a problem but disagreed with the pre-emptive British-American solution. The strategic understanding led to serious differences, jeopardising the cohesiveness of the Alliance. The expansion process has to be analysed considering these facts. A comparison between the US and European perceptions of security may be done to evaluate whether it augments the cohesiveness of the Alliance. The rationale behind NATO enlargement and its utility in the post-Cold War period can be determined after understanding the complex matrix of the Atlantic Alliance.

The restructuring of NATO highlights its efforts to cope with the changing security dynamics. Clearly NATO's existence depends on a harmonisation of interests and objectives within the alliance. Since the end of the Cold War, Transatlantic differences over the rogue states or states of concern have come out openly.³⁵ Also, there is a strong belief of a permanent rift in the Atlantic Alliance due to US' unilateral policies. In fact, some contemporary literature on US-Europe relations points to a departure in the behavioural patterns of the two.³⁶

The US strongly believes in the policy of containment, while their European counterparts prefer negotiations.³⁷ The French and Germans have been pressing for a separate European Security Force as a purely independent one without the North American partners.³⁸ A further deepening of the rift was due to US' war in Iraq. Such differences reflect the clash between the two different approaches towards security.³⁹

The shift in US foreign policy from engagement to intervention and the difference in its strategic priorities are hampering the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. Much of it depends on how NATO-EU relations evolve in the years to come.

NATO-EU Relations

NATO and EU share common strategic interests and cooperate in a spirit of complementarities and partnerships. However, the US has always shown scepticism over European burden sharing in NATO. The recent developments also indicate a change in US priorities. Europe no longer remains a high security priority. The US strategic focus has shifted from Europe to the Koreas, Taiwan, the Caspian Sea basin, the Middle East and South America. The Europeans have already realised the need for a Common European Security and Defence Policy to complement with the economic and political integration⁴⁰. With significant changes in the international system, EU crafted its own post-Cold War security responses to emerging threats. Discussions were renewed on how foreign policy should be shaped. Defence dimension was incorporated in the later stages at Maastricht in February 1992.⁴¹ This effort resulted in the formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In the post-Cold War period, the US always demanded for a powerful European pillar in the Atlantic Alliance hence it supported the European endeavour in establishing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 1993 treaty of the European Union signed in Maastricht.⁴² A European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) – now called by the EU as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – was established.⁴³ These initiatives were based on the goals set up by the EU treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997)⁴⁴ and were supported by NATO.⁴⁵ Basically the West Europeans were driven by three elite worries for hastening the process of the formation of CFSP. These worries can be enlisted as follows:

- To constrain the strength and power of the newly unified Germany. The main worry was that a unified Germany may dominate the political and economic centrestage of Europe. So, to prevent Germany from 'Germanising Europe' and instead 'Europeanise Germany' there was a need for Europe to stand as a cohesive unite.⁴⁶

- There was a need for Europe to stand on its own as the US was more attentive towards other regions with the end of the Cold War.
- Lastly, the Europeans were aware that if the US is out of the European theatre, there is a large possibility that the Europe may revert back to its 'warring' past which was influenced by 'destructive nationalism'.⁴⁷

The real debate was over the relationship between the ESDI and NATO. This debate ended up with a "grand bargain"⁴⁸ that was to prevent both organisations finding themselves at loggerheads over the roles and missions for post Cold War security in Europe. The WEU states were determined to acquire a capacity to take military action independent of NATO, i.e., without the US. On its part, the US was more concerned about the weakening of NATO's capacity due to the promotion of an independent WEU. Thus, emerged the "grand bargain", which essentially talked about the help NATO would offer to facilitate the creation of ESDI. The bargain was that the ESDI would not be a completely independent entity, but be built within the NATO structure. Finally the agreements in Berlin and Brussels created a scope for designing an effective military arrangement.⁴⁹ This meant that ESDI would act as a European pillar in the Atlantic Alliance. For two years no controversy surfaced with regard to NATO-EU relations but the debate re-emerged with the Anglo-French Summit at St. Mâlo on December 4, 1998, where Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac issued a joint statement discussing the ESDI's capacity to conduct autonomous actions.⁵⁰

The 'duplication' of NATO in the Atlantic Alliance was discussed, with the US expressing concerns. At the semi-annual NATO Foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on December 8, 1998, the then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright talked about US support for an ESDI "within the Alliance" and referred to the enthusiastic support US would extend to enhance European capability.⁵¹ She went further to chalk out three sets of standards for judgement which soon became famous as the 'three Ds':

The key to a successful initiative is to focus on practical military capabilities. Any initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-making by *de-linking* ESDI from NATO, avoid *duplicating* existing efforts, and avoid *discriminating* against non-EU members.⁵²

On January 24, 2001, the NATO Secretary-General and EU Presidency

exchanged letters defining the scope of cooperation and the modalities of consultation between the two organisations, including on security issues.⁵³ This cooperation accelerated with the institutionalisation of NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on December 16, 2002. This Declaration not only reaffirmed assured access to NATO's planning capabilities for the EU's own military operations, but also reiterated the following political principles of the strategic partnership:

- effective mutual consultation;
- equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO;
- respect for the interests of the EU and NATO member-states;
- respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.⁵⁴

The Declaration paved the way for the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements in the area of crisis management, which was adopted on March 17, 2003, by the EU and NATO and provided the basis for the NATO-EU cooperation by allowing EU access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged. It consists of the following major elements:

- a NATO-EU security agreement (covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules);
- assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;
- presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations;
- procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- terms of reference for NATO's Deputy SACEUR – who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements (and who is always a European) – and European command options for NATO;

- NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
- incorporation within NATO's long-established defence planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.⁵⁵

NATO Out-of-Area Operations: A Tactical Change

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the US, NATO members, for the first time, invoked the treaty's mutual defence guarantee, i.e., Article 5. A role reversal was witnessed – the Europeans coming to aid of the Americans.⁵⁶ Subsequently, NATO undertook two operations, Afghanistan and Iraq, as a tactical change in its process of adopting a multi-focal approach.

NATO in Afghanistan

The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)⁵⁷ was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001 after the ousting of the Taliban regime. Afghan opposition leaders who attended the conference chalked the process of reconstruction. A new structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority was formulated. To create a secure environment in and around Kabul and to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan, an UN-mandated international force was established to assist the transitional authority.⁵⁸

NATO took command and coordination of the ISAF in August 2003. The ISAF became the first out-of-area operation for NATO with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) providing the political direction and coordination. The NAC works in close consultation with non-NATO nations taking part in ISAF. The joint Force Commander (JFC) based at the Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands, is responsible at the operational level for manning, training, deploying and sustaining ISAF. According to the update as of November 23, 2004, ISAF had 8,000 troops from 47 NATO and non-NATO countries.⁵⁹

NATO in Iraq

The US started the campaign against Iraq in 2003 with coalition forces from different countries. NATO had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or its conduct.⁶⁰ In response to a request by Turkey in February 2003 for assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance undertook a number of precautionary defensive measures to ensure its security in the event of a potential threat to its territory or population. On May 21, 2003, the Alliance also agreed to support Poland, a member of NATO, in its leadership of a sector in the multinational stabilisation force in Iraq.⁶¹

Initially, the Iraq campaign sent tremors in the transatlantic relations resulting in a rift between the traditional allies. The French and the Germans opposed the idea of NATO's involvement in what was clearly a US endeavour of ousting Saddam Hussain. This rift was at two levels. At one level, it was between the US on the one side and Franco-German alliance on the other. And at the other level, it was between the old members and new members of NATO. The rift between the European members of the alliance was interesting. It was heavily influenced by the past experiences as well as the strategic cultural predispositions of these countries.⁶²

However, at the Istanbul Summit on June 28, 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to assist Iraq with the training of its security forces in response to a letter sent to the NATO Secretary-General on June 22, 2004, by the then interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi. In his letter, Allawi requested NATO to extend support to his government, which was established on July 30, 2004, through training and other forms of technical assistance.⁶³

On September 22, 2004, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand NATO's assistance, including establishing a NATO-supported Iraqi Training, Education and Doctrine Centre in Iraq. On December 9, 2004, as a continuation of the policy of expanding the mission, the NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels authorised the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to start the next stage of the mission, which would increase the number of training personnel to 300. This stage also saw a change in the name of the mission from 'NATO Training Implementation Mission' to 'NATO Training Mission-Iraq'.⁶⁴

Following the successful conduct of elections in Iraq on January 30, 2005, all NATO members agreed to provide planning support to Poland, which has taken a leading role in south-central Iraq. Thus, the elections in Iraq may lead to a significant shift in NATO's mindset at both the strategic and conceptual levels. Earlier, the Europeans were only concerned about the legitimacy of the US invasion of Iraq. But now it seems that their main strategic concern may become how the alliance assists the Iraqis in developing a stable country.

For India NATO's Out-of-Area operations are much more relevant than any other country as India has been facing the bane of terrorism since the last couple of decades. But the cooperation between India and NATO on the counter-terrorist operations will not be easy or smooth. The US, by designating Pakistan as a Most Favoured Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), created intellectual and political ferment in India regarding NATO's counter-terrorism operations. India has always put forth its concerns over Pakistan sponsored terrorism in India. Making Pakistan a frontline state in NATO's Out-of-Area Operations sends out wrong signals.

As far as India's relationship with NATO goes, it is seen in the light of EU-India Relations and the commitments between the two to examine the security related issues. Besides, Indian attempts to intensify its relations with the US are taken by NATO in a right sense.⁶⁵

Conclusion

The post-Cold War period has seen a paradigm shift from geopolitics to geo-economics in the international system. In the European context the need was to have a Europe without any East-West divide.

The non-strategic nature of the threats and challenges in the post-Cold War period made the international system highly complex. Perhaps these challenges influenced the decisions of enlargement of EU and NATO with the intention of restructuring a Europe that is stable and militarily secure – a shift from protecting common values to protecting common interests.

NATO has outlasted the Cold War and transformed itself to meet the goal of restructuring a 'New Europe'. It has not only expanded its membership but has also started undertaking operations outside its transatlantic area. These Out-of-Area Operations have taken NATO to

Afghanistan and in a different form to Iraq. An organisation meant for 'collective defence' of the transatlantic area is thus working towards a mandate covering a larger collective and common security in the international arena.

The Europeans have also felt an urgent need to address their security needs independently of the US. ESDP was seen as an arrangement and not a duplication of NATO, through which the Europeans could tackle security challenges without US involvement. However, differences in the strategic perspectives of France and Germany on the one hand, and the US on the other, and the institutional overlap of ESDP and NATO at times strained transatlantic relations.

The US has tended to view EU as a 'political dwarf' on issues like security. The Europeans saw the American 'coercive' techniques of addressing new security challenges as unilateral, particularly during the American intervention in Iraq. Despite all these differences, the European Security Strategy (ESS)⁶⁶ of 2003 as well as NATO's Strategic Concept of 1999⁶⁷ recognised terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and 'failed states' as principle security challenges. Furthermore, both proposed a need for non-military policy dimensions in addressing insecurity. For the accomplishment of a 'New Europe' a stronger Atlantic Alliance is a prerequisite. Likewise for a stronger Atlantic Alliance, a strong NATO-EU relationship is equally important. Stronger ties between these two organisations will determine the future of the Alliance.

With the enlargement and out-of-area tasks, NATO has shed its Cold War character. With eastward expansion it has already reached the borders of Russia. Russia raised its grievances when NATO took a decision to expand in 1997. However, this opposition was overcome when President Boris Yeltsin grudgingly accepted the NATO-Russia Founding Act⁶⁸ on May 27, 1997 in Paris. NATO has made some efforts by establishing NRC, but still the irritants in this relationship exist. Basically the irritants remain due to the Russian apprehensions regarding the US approach towards security in the CEEC and Central Asia.

As NATO plays a wider security role in the post-Cold War period it needs to develop stronger ties and understanding with major regional powers outside Europe. It is necessary for NATO to have consultations with regional powers. NATO would also have to arrive at a common

understanding on certain key security issues, especially terrorism. Building political consensus within the alliance is a key to the success in these exercises. However, given the diversity in the approaches, a convergence of interests over issues seems difficult. Short of consensus, the worry of NATO being labelled as a 'Global Police Force' will loom large and its 'Out-of-Area' Operations will remain controversial.

References/End Notes

- ¹ Details on the accession ceremony of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia on March 29, 2004, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/04-april/e0402a.htm>
- ² For the argument on these lines, see D. Scott Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," *American Journal of Political Science*, 41 (3), 1997, pp. 846-78.
- ³ The US and Canada along with the West European States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Soviet Union and other East European States formed the Warsaw Pact.
- ⁴ The "Central and Eastern European Countries" (CEEC) are those European successor states of the former Soviet Union and other formerly communist states in Europe.
- ⁵ The original members of the European Economic Community (EEC) were Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986; the former East Germany was admitted as part of reunified Germany in 1990. Extracted from the information on European Union available at <http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/blokit/eu.htm#History>
- ⁶ The understanding of security still lingered in the Cold War as the emergence of Security Studies as an identifiable sub-field of International Relations was closely related to the Cold War. Even the scholars like Bull (1968), Martin (1980), Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988) in their works, identified Security Studies as a study of threat, use and control of military force and a conflict between states and societies. During the Cold War Military threat was treated as the only threat to Security. To study the debates on these issues in detail, refer; (i) David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies*, 23, 1997, pp.5-26; (ii) David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies And the End of the Cold War", *World Politics*, 48, 1995, pp.117-141; (iii) Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, 1991, pp. 211-239.
- ⁷ See Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987,

pp.26-27 cited in Robert W. Rauchhaus, "Marching NATO Eastward: Can International Relations Theory Keep Pace?" in Robert W. Rauchhaus (Ed), *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2001, p.6.

- ⁸ See discussion by David G. Haglund in "The Case of the Missing Democratic Alliance: France, the 'Anglo-Saxons' and NATO's Deep Origins", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 25 (2), August 2004, p. 226.
- ⁹ Ibid., p. 225. The pessimistic case is stated in Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security*, 25 (1), Summer 2000, pp. 5-41. Contrast this with the optimism of Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War", *International Organisation*, 54 (4), Autumn 2000, pp. 705-35; Lars Skalmes, "From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory", *Security Studies*, 7 (4) Summer 1998, pp. 44-87; and Rebecca R. Moore, "NATO's Mission for the New Millennium: A Value-Based Approach to Building Security", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 23 (1), April 2002, pp. 1-34.
- ¹⁰ The spectrum of these non-strategic security threats ranges from terrorism to environmental hazards on one side and energy security to rights of the unborn on the other. Economics in particular can be called as a strategic parameter of security.
- ¹¹ The Alliance Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of States and Government participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 8, 1991 is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>
- ¹² Refer the NATO Treaty at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>
- ¹³ For details regarding the process of accession post-Madrid Summit, 1997, refer to NATO-OTAN, NATO Hand book, 2001, pp. 61-64.
- ¹⁴ It seems that to counter the threat from revivalist Russia, NATO signed a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security with Russia in May 1997. On details regarding this, see Cooperation between NATO and Russia, Ibid., p. 80.
- ¹⁵ Ivo H. Daalder has argued over the indispensability of NATO in US-Europe relations. See Ivo H. Daalder, "NATO at 50: The Summit & Beyond", Brookings Institution, *Policy Brief* # 48, 1999.
- ¹⁶ See "Why NATO expands further eastward: commentary", at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200404/01/eng20040401_139179.shtml
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ NATO can adopt the goal of extending to the rest of Europe the security and stability its members have been enjoying. In doing so, the Alliance can always try and fulfil George Marshall's vision of a Europe "united in peace, freedom and prosperity", a Europe in which democratic forms of government would be the

norm, individual liberty and minority rights would be protected and upheld, and open market economies would provide an expanding basis for the welfare of all its citizens. For details, see Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

- ²⁰ According to the Alliance's Strategic Concept issued at the Washington Summit Meeting in April 1999, to achieve its essential purpose, as an alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter. The other details of the Alliance's Strategic Concept can be found in NATO-OTAN, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, no.13, pp. 31-32 or from the NATO Strategic Concept from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>
- ²¹ For details regarding the Alliance Strategic Concept, see no. 13, pp.42-47; or visit <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>
- ²² For details regarding the key security threats, see European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 12 2003, at <http://ue.eu.int/solana/index.asp>
- ²³ Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the use of Force", *European Security*, 13(1), 2001, p.339
- ²⁴ Dr. Willem F. van Eekelen, *The Changing Environment of Transatlantic Relations*, (A Report from the European Strategy Group, IFRI, 1991), p.71
- ²⁵ The November 1993 Military Doctrine of Russia was not published as such but one can always visit <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/russia/russia189.html> for the Russian position on NATO expansion.
- ²⁶ Refer Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed May 27, 1997 in Paris available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm>
- ²⁷ The Permanent Joint Council was set up with Russia according to the Part II of the NATO-Russia Founding Act which can be accessed at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm>
- ²⁸ Ibid. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was created on May 28, 2002 under the Rome Declaration. Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation titled "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b020528e.htm>
- ²⁹ See the quotations by Zbigniew Brzezinski in *Financial Times*, May 27, 1997, p.20 as cited in Vinod K. Agarwal, "Analysing NATO Expansion: An Institutional Bargaining Approach" in Robert W. Rauchhaus, no.7, p. 77
- ³⁰ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the World Order*, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, p. 80.
- ³¹ The Berlin Plus arrangement was agreed upon in June 1996. At their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers decided that the European Security and Defence Identity should be built within NATO, as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the Alliance. This would enable

all European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance. It would allow them to act themselves as required and would simultaneously reinforce the transatlantic partnership. But its implementation was prevented by differences between Greece and Turkey. These differences were finally overcome at the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002.

- ³² F. Stephan Larrabee, "ESDP and NATO: Assuring Complementarity", *The International Spectator*, 39 (1), January-March 2004, pp. 57-58. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) raised some serious concerns for the US. See Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?* RAND, 2002.
- ³³ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, "A European Front", *San Jose Mercury News*, June 20 2004, p. 2. One may also refer to the comparison of strategic priorities of US and Europe through the respective strategic papers compiled by Alyson J. K. Bailes, "EU and US Strategic Concepts: A Mirror for Partnership and Difference?" *The International Spectator*, Ibid, p. 22.
- ³⁴ Refer Article 5 in The North Atlantic Treaty Document at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>
- ³⁵ Here 'rogue states or states of concern' is in reference to Iraq. There was a major point of difference between Americans and Europeans over the US unilateralist approach towards Iraq which culminated in to the differences over the Iraq war.
- ³⁶ To see the argument by Robert Kagan on the differences in the strategic culture of the US and Europe, see Robert Kagan, *no. 30*, p. 1.
- ³⁷ For a detailed study of the Atlantic Partnership, see Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership*, 2004.
- ³⁸ The Franco-German Declaration on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, on January 22 2003, in which both countries agreed to harmonise policies in a strategic partnership. As a direct consequence of this Franco-German cooperation, new initiatives were taken for a closer European Defence Cooperation. On April 29, 2003, the heads of state of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg gathered for a summit in Brussels in an attempt to form a defence core group. See Rob de Wijk, The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation, *The International Spectator*, no. 32, p. 78.
- ³⁹ Ibid, p. 77.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 72.
- ⁴¹ See Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, February 7, 1992, especially "Title 1: Common Provisions, Article B": The Union shall set itself the following objectives:...-to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through

the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, which is also there in Article J.4. Cited in Robert E. Hunter, no. 32, pp. 2-3. For further details regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), visit http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm; http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/

⁴² See NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, M-NAC-2(93)70, Brussels, December 2, 1993, paragraph 2 for its support to the emerging ESDI, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c931202a.htm>

⁴³ To go through the steps taken in Europe to fulfil the larger European dream, see Robert E. Hunter, no.32, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁴ *Title V: Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy*. Maastricht (*The Single European Act of 1992*) laid out the framework for CFSP and set as a goal “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (Article J.4.1). The Amsterdam Treaty went beyond Maastricht, referring to the “progressive framing of a common defence policy...which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide” (paragraph 17.1, Title V of the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union*). Cited in Robert E. Hunter, no. 32, p. 10.

⁴⁵ See NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, no. 42,

⁴⁶ Germany after unification played a central role in the European Economic Integration. The French and the British were aware of the German power. So, they were worried about the integration process which may possess a German character. For good amount of analytical reasoning on this issue please refer Robert J. Art, Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO, *Political Science Quarterly*, 111: 1, Spring 1996.

⁴⁷ The European History has been a vibrant history with wars and conflict breaking out between European countries. That phase was dominated by the nationalistic feelings for supremacy. During the Cold War, the US presence through NATO in Europe brought peace amongst the European powers. But the post Cold War period saw the US taking interest in areas other than Europe. The West Europeans expected sooner or later a US withdrawal from Europe. From this emerged the fear of again going back to the past. This was detrimental to the process of integration as the multilateral approaches will be taken over again by nationalistic approaches. For good amount of analytical reasoning on this issue please refer Robert J. Art.

⁴⁸ For details of the ‘grand bargain’, see Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Berlin, NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, June 3, 1996, paragraph 5, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>; and Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers’ Session, *Final Communiqué*, Brussels, NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC(DM)-2(96)89, June 13, 1996, paragraph 3, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-089e.htm>

- ⁴⁹ The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crises management. See European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 12, 2003, at <http://ue.eu.int/solana/index.asp>
- ⁵⁰ See, *Text of a Joint Statement by the British and French Governments*, Franco-British Summit, St. Mâlo, France, December 4, 1998, paragraph 2. The text is available in the chapter 6 of the Document on European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) of the Basic Research Report "A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO", at <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/1999riskreduction7.htm>
- ⁵¹ Refer to the text of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's remarks to the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting at Brussels on December 8, 1998.
- ⁵² Ibid. For a detailed discussion on the "three Ds", refer Robert E. Hunter, no. 32, pp. 34-44. The Helsinki Summit on December 10-11, 1999, which set the formal target for the ESDI backbone 60,000 troop force, concluded in its formal communiqué: 'NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members and will continue to have an important role in crisis management.' For Helsinki Summit, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/chrono.htm
- ⁵³ NATO-EU Strategic Partnership, at <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html>
- ⁵⁴ <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/policy.html>
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival*, 43 (4), Winter 2001-02, p. 89.
- ⁵⁷ ISAF is not a UN force, but it is a coalition of the willing deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council (four UNSC Resolutions – 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510 – relate to ISAF). A detailed Military Technical Agreement between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan transitional Authority provides additional guidance for ISAF operations. For the ISAF structure and other details visit; <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm> <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/command.htm>
- ⁵⁸ <http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/evolution.htm>
- ⁵⁹ <http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm>.
- ⁶⁰ NATO policy on Iraq on the record, as pledged by the NATO Heads of State and Government in November 2002 at the Prague Summit, is full support for the efforts of the United Nations to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UN Security Council Resolution 1441. At that time, however, there were no discussions of any specific NATO involvement. See, <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/evolution.htm>
- ⁶¹ Poland formally assumed command of the Multinational Division (MND) Central

South in Iraq on September 3, 2003. NATO does not have any permanent presence in Iraq, but aids Poland in a variety of supporting roles. This includes help with force generation, communication, logistics and movements. See <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/index.html>

- ⁶² To see the argument on these lines, refer Kerry Longhurst and Margin Zaborowski, "The Future of European Security", *European Security*, 13 (4), 2004, p. 383. For a detailed study on EU-US relations on the aftermath of Iraq operations, Gustav Lindstrom (Ed.), *Shift or rift? Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq*, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, 2003, at <http://www.iss-eu.org/chailot/bk2003.pdf>
- ⁶³ <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/decision.html>
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ⁶⁵ These things emerged during the discussion between the visiting NATO delegation headed by NATO spokesperson James Appathurai and the Indian think-tanks. The delegation visited India during January 12-14, 2005.
- ⁶⁶ See European Security Strategy (ESS) at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>
- ⁶⁷ *NATO Handbook*, no.13.
- ⁶⁸ For the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/fndact-a.htm>

Prasad P Rane is an Associate Fellow at IDSA.