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DECEMBER

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United Nations

FCCC/CP/2015/L.9



Framework Convention on
Climate Change

Distr.: Limited
12 December 2015

Original: English

Conference of the Parties

Twenty-first session

Paris, 30 November to 11 December 2015

Agenda item 4(b)

Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (decision 1/CP.17)

**Adoption of a protocol, another legal instrument, or an
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention
applicable to all Parties**

ADOPTION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

Proposal by the President

Draft decision -/CP.21

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decision 1/CP.17 on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,

Also recalling Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention,

Further recalling relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including decisions 1/CP.16, 2/CP.18, 1/CP.19 and 1/CP.20,

Welcoming the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/1, “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, in particular its goal 13, and the adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the third International Conference on Financing for Development and the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,

Recognizing that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires the widest possible cooperation by all countries, and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions,

Also recognizing that deep reductions in global emissions will be required in order to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and emphasizing the need for urgency in addressing climate change,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples,

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local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Also acknowledging the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the impact of the implementation of response measures and, in this regard, decisions 5/CP.7, 1/CP.10, 1/CP.16 and 8/CP.17,

Emphasizing with serious concern the urgent need to address the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties' mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C,

Also emphasizing that enhanced pre-2020 ambition can lay a solid foundation for enhanced post-2020 ambition,

Stressing the urgency of accelerating the implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol in order to enhance pre-2020 ambition,

Recognizing the urgent need to enhance the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country Parties, in a predictable manner, to enable enhanced pre-2020 action by developing country Parties,

Emphasizing the enduring benefits of ambitious and early action, including major reductions in the cost of future mitigation and adaptation efforts,

Acknowledging the need to promote universal access to sustainable energy in developing countries, in particular in Africa, through the enhanced deployment of renewable energy,

Agreeing to uphold and promote regional and international cooperation in order to mobilize stronger and more ambitious climate action by all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples,

I. ADOPTION

1. *Decides* to adopt the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement") as contained in the annex;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be the Depositary of the Agreement and to have it open for signature in New York, United States of America, from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017;
3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to convene a high-level signature ceremony for the Agreement on 22 April 2016;
4. *Also invites* all Parties to the Convention to sign the Agreement at the ceremony to be convened by the Secretary-General, or at their earliest opportunity, and to deposit their respective instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, where appropriate, as soon as possible;
5. *Recognizes* that Parties to the Convention may provisionally apply all of the provisions of the Agreement pending its entry into force, and *requests* Parties to provide notification of any such provisional application to the Depositary;
6. *Notes* that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, in accordance with decision 1/CP.17, paragraph 4, has been completed;

7. *Decides* to establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement under the same arrangement, mutatis mutandis, as those concerning the election of officers to the Bureau of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action;¹
8. *Also decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement shall prepare for the entry into force of the Agreement and for the convening of the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
9. *Further decides* to oversee the implementation of the work programme resulting from the relevant requests contained in this decision;
10. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on the progress of its work and to complete its work by the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
11. *Decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement shall hold its sessions starting in 2016 in conjunction with the sessions of the Convention subsidiary bodies and shall prepare draft decisions to be recommended through the Conference of the Parties to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session;

II. INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS

12. *Welcomes* the intended nationally determined contributions that have been communicated by Parties in accordance with decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 2(b);
13. *Reiterates* its invitation to all Parties that have not yet done so to communicate to the secretariat their intended nationally determined contributions towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2 as soon as possible and well in advance of the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties (November 2016) and in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended nationally determined contributions;
14. *Requests* the secretariat to continue to publish the intended nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties on the UNFCCC website;
15. *Reiterates* its call to developed country Parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and any other organizations in a position to do so to provide support for the preparation and communication of the intended nationally determined contributions of Parties that may need such support;
16. *Takes note* of the synthesis report on the aggregate effect of intended nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties by 1 October 2015, contained in document FCCC/CP/2015/7;
17. *Notes* with concern that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions do not fall within least-cost 2 °C scenarios but rather lead to a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030, and *also notes* that much greater emission reduction efforts will be required than those associated with the intended nationally determined contributions in order to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels by reducing emissions to 40 gigatonnes or to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels by reducing to a level to be identified in the special report referred to in paragraph 21 below;

¹ Endorsed by decision 2/CP.18, paragraph 2.

18. *Also notes, in this context*, the adaptation needs expressed by many developing country Parties in their intended nationally determined contributions;
19. *Requests* the secretariat to update the synthesis report referred to in paragraph 16 above so as to cover all the information in the intended nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 by 4 April 2016 and to make it available by 2 May 2016;
20. *Decides* to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement;
21. *Invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways;

III. DECISIONS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE AGREEMENT

MITIGATION

22. *Invites* Parties to communicate their first nationally determined contribution no later than when the Party submits its respective instrument of ratification, accession, or approval of the Paris Agreement. If a Party has communicated an intended nationally determined contribution prior to joining the Agreement, that Party shall be considered to have satisfied this provision unless that Party decides otherwise;
23. *Urges* those Parties whose intended nationally determined contribution pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2025 to communicate by 2020 a new nationally determined contribution and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Agreement;
24. *Requests* those Parties whose intended nationally determined contribution pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame up to 2030 to communicate or update by 2020 these contributions and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Agreement;
25. *Decides* that Parties shall submit to the secretariat their nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4 of the Agreement at least 9 to 12 months in advance of the relevant meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement with a view to facilitating the clarity, transparency and understanding of these contributions, including through a synthesis report prepared by the secretariat;
26. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop further guidance on features of the nationally determined contributions for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;
27. *Agrees* that the information to be provided by Parties communicating their nationally determined contributions, in order to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding, may include, as appropriate, inter alia, quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals, and how the Party considers that its nationally determined contribution is fair and ambitious, in the light of its national circumstances, and

how it contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2;

28. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop further guidance for the information to be provided by Parties in order to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally determined contributions for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

29. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to develop modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Agreement, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

30. *Further requests* the secretariat to make available an interim public registry in the first half of 2016 for the recording of nationally determined contributions submitted in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement, pending the adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement of the modalities and procedures referred to in paragraph 29 above;

31. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to elaborate, drawing from approaches established under the Convention and its related legal instruments as appropriate, guidance for accounting for Parties' nationally determined contributions, as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 13, of the Agreement, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session, which ensures that:

(a) Parties account for anthropogenic emissions and removals in accordance with common methodologies and metrics assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

(b) Parties ensure methodological consistency, including on baselines, between the communication and implementation of nationally determined contributions;

(c) Parties strive to include all categories of anthropogenic emissions or removals in their nationally determined contributions and, once a source, sink or activity is included, continue to include it;

(d) Parties shall provide an explanation of why any categories of anthropogenic emissions or removals are excluded;

32. *Decides* that Parties shall apply the guidance mentioned in paragraph 31 above to the second and subsequent nationally determined contributions and that Parties may elect to apply such guidance to their first nationally determined contribution;

33. *Also decides* that the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of response measures, under the subsidiary bodies, shall continue, and shall serve the Agreement;

34. *Further decides* that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation shall recommend, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session, the modalities, work programme and functions of the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of response measures to address the effects of the implementation of response measures under the Agreement by enhancing cooperation amongst Parties on understanding the impacts of mitigation actions under the Agreement and the exchange of information, experiences, and best practices amongst Parties to raise their resilience to these impacts;

35. *Decides* that the guidance under paragraph 31 above shall ensure that double counting is avoided on the basis of a corresponding adjustment by both Parties for anthropogenic emissions by sources and/or removals by sinks covered by their nationally determined contributions under the Agreement;

36. *Invites* Parties to communicate, by 2020, to the secretariat mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Agreement, and *requests* the secretariat to publish on the UNFCCC website Parties' low greenhouse gas emission development strategies as communicated;

37. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop and recommend the guidance referred to under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Agreement for adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session, including guidance to ensure that double counting is avoided on the basis of a corresponding adjustment by Parties for both anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered by their nationally determined contributions under the Agreement;

38. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Agreement on the basis of:

- (a) Voluntary participation authorized by each Party involved;
- (b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change;
- (c) Specific scopes of activities;
- (d) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would otherwise occur;
- (e) Verification and certification of emission reductions resulting from mitigation activities by designated operational entities;
- (f) Experience gained with and lessons learned from existing mechanisms and approaches adopted under the Convention and its related legal instruments;

39. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop and recommend rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in paragraph 38 above for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

40. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to undertake a work programme under the framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Agreement, with the objective of considering how to enhance linkages and create synergy between, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, and how to facilitate the implementation and coordination of non-market approaches;

41. *Further requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to recommend a draft decision on the work programme referred to in paragraph 40 above, taking into account the views of Parties, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

ADAPTATION

42. *Requests* the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to jointly develop modalities to recognize the adaptation efforts of developing

country Parties, as referred to in Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Agreement, and make recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

43. *Also requests* the Adaptation Committee, taking into account its mandate and its second three-year workplan, and with a view to preparing recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session:

(a) To review, in 2017, the work of adaptation-related institutional arrangements under the Convention, with a view to identifying ways to enhance the coherence of their work, as appropriate, in order to respond adequately to the needs of Parties;

(b) To consider methodologies for assessing adaptation needs with a view to assisting developing countries, without placing an undue burden on them;

44. *Invites* all relevant United Nations agencies and international, regional and national financial institutions to provide information to Parties through the secretariat on how their development assistance and climate finance programmes incorporate climate-proofing and climate resilience measures;

45. *Requests* Parties to strengthen regional cooperation on adaptation where appropriate and, where necessary, establish regional centres and networks, in particular in developing countries, taking into account decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 13;

46. *Also requests* the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Finance and other relevant institutions, to develop methodologies, and make recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session on:

(a) Taking the necessary steps to facilitate the mobilization of support for adaptation in developing countries in the context of the limit to global average temperature increase referred to in Article 2 of the Agreement;

(b) Reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support referred to in Article 7, paragraph 14(c), of the Agreement;

47. *Further requests* the Green Climate Fund to expedite support for the least developed countries and other developing country Parties for the formulation of national adaptation plans, consistent with decisions 1/CP.16 and 5/CP.17, and for the subsequent implementation of policies, projects and programmes identified by them;

LOSS AND DAMAGE

48. *Decides* on the continuation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, following the review in 2016;

49. *Requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish a clearinghouse for risk transfer that serves as a repository for information on insurance and risk transfer, in order to facilitate the efforts of Parties to develop and implement comprehensive risk management strategies;

50. *Also requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force to complement, draw upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;

51. *Further requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to initiate its work, at its next meeting, to operationalize the provisions referred to in paragraphs 49 and 50 above, and to report on progress thereon in its annual report;

52. *Agrees* that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation;

FINANCE

53. *Decides* that, in the implementation of the Agreement, financial resources provided to developing countries should enhance the implementation of their policies, strategies, regulations and action plans and their climate change actions with respect to both mitigation and adaptation to contribute to the achievement of the purpose of the Agreement as defined in Article 2;

54. *Further decides* that, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Agreement, developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries;

55. *Recognizes* the importance of adequate and predictable financial resources, including for results-based payments, as appropriate, for the implementation of policy approaches and positive incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks; as well as alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests; while reaffirming the importance of non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches; encouraging the coordination of support from, inter alia, public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources, such as the Green Climate Fund, and alternative sources in accordance with relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties;

56. *Decides* to initiate, at its twenty-second session, a process to identify the information to be provided by Parties, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Agreement with the view to providing a recommendation for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

57. *Also decides* to ensure that the provision of information in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Agreement shall be undertaken in accordance with modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 96 below;

58. *Requests* Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session (November 2018), with the view to making a recommendation for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

59. *Decides* that the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility, the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, as well as the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, administered by the Global Environment Facility, shall serve the Agreement;

60. *Recognizes* that the Adaptation Fund may serve the Agreement, subject to relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto

Protocol and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

61. *Invites* the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to consider the issue referred to in paragraph 60 above and make a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

62. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall provide guidance to the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the Agreement for transmission by the Conference of the Parties;

63. *Decides* that the guidance to the entities entrusted with the operations of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including those agreed before adoption of the Agreement, shall apply *mutatis mutandis*;

64. *Also decides* that the Standing Committee on Finance shall serve the Agreement in line with its functions and responsibilities established under the Conference of the Parties;

65. *Urges* the institutions serving the Agreement to enhance the coordination and delivery of resources to support country-driven strategies through simplified and efficient application and approval procedures, and through continued readiness support to developing country Parties, including the least developed countries and small island developing States, as appropriate;

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER

66. *Takes note of* the interim report of the Technology Executive Committee on guidance on enhanced implementation of the results of technology needs assessments as referred to in document FCCC/SB/2015/INF.3;

67. *Decides* to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and requests the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, in supporting the implementation of the Agreement, to undertake further work relating to, *inter alia*:

(a) Technology research, development and demonstration;

(b) The development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies;

68. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to initiate, at its forty-fourth session (May 2016), the elaboration of the technology framework established under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Agreement and to report on its findings to the Conference of the Parties, with a view to the Conference of the Parties making a recommendation on the framework to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session, taking into consideration that the framework should facilitate, *inter alia*:

(a) The undertaking and updating of technology needs assessments, as well as the *enhanced* implementation of their results, particularly technology action plans and project ideas, through the preparation of bankable projects;

(b) The provision of enhanced financial and technical support for the implementation of the results of the technology needs assessments;

(c) The assessment of technologies that are ready for transfer;

(d) The enhancement of enabling environments for and the addressing of barriers to the development and transfer of socially and environmentally sound technologies;

69. *Decides* that the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network shall report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, through the subsidiary bodies, on their activities to support the implementation of the Agreement;

70. *Also decides* to undertake a periodic assessment of the effectiveness of and the adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Agreement on matters relating to technology development and transfer;

71. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to initiate, at its forty-fourth session, the elaboration of the scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 70 above, taking into account the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network as referred to in decision 2/CP.17, annex VII, paragraph 20 and the modalities for the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement, for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (November 2019);

CAPACITY-BUILDING

72. *Decides* to establish the Paris Committee on Capacity-building whose aim will be to address gaps and needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities under the Convention;

73. *Also decides* that the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will manage and oversee the work plan mentioned in paragraph 74 below;

74. *Further decides* to launch a work plan for the period 2016–2020 with the following activities:

(a) Assessing how to increase synergies through cooperation and avoid duplication among existing bodies established under the Convention that implement capacity-building activities, including through collaborating with institutions under and outside the Convention;

(b) Identifying capacity gaps and needs and recommending ways to address them;

(c) Promoting the development and dissemination of tools and methodologies for the implementation of capacity-building;

(d) Fostering global, regional, national and subnational cooperation;

(e) Identifying and collecting good practices, challenges, experiences, and lessons learned from work on capacity-building by bodies established under the Convention;

(f) Exploring how developing country Parties can take ownership of building and maintaining capacity over time and space;

(g) Identifying opportunities to strengthen capacity at the national, regional, and subnational level;

(h) Fostering dialogue, coordination, collaboration and coherence among relevant processes and initiatives under the Convention, including through exchanging information on capacity-building activities and strategies of bodies established under the Convention;

(i) Providing guidance to the secretariat on the maintenance and further development of the web-based capacity-building portal;

75. *Decides* that the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will annually focus on an area or theme related to enhanced technical exchange on capacity-building, with the purpose of maintaining up-to-date knowledge on the successes and challenges in building capacity effectively in a particular area;

76. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to organize annual in-session meetings of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building;

77. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to develop the terms of reference for the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, in the context of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework, also taking into account paragraphs 75, 76, 77 and 78 above and paragraphs 82 and 83 below, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session;

78. *Invites* Parties to submit their views on the membership of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building by 9 March 2016;²

79. *Requests* the secretariat to compile the submissions referred to in paragraph 78 above into a miscellaneous document for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-fourth session;

80. *Decides* that the inputs to the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will include, inter alia, submissions, the outcome of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework, the secretariat's annual synthesis report on the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries, the secretariat's compilation and synthesis report on capacity-building work of bodies established under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, and reports on the Durban Forum and the capacity-building portal;

81. *Requests* the Paris Committee on Capacity-building to prepare annual technical progress reports on its work, and to make these reports available at the sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation coinciding with the sessions of the Conference of the Parties;

82. *Also requests* the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (November 2019), to review the progress, need for extension, the effectiveness and enhancement of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building and to take any action it considers appropriate, with a view to making recommendations to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session on enhancing institutional arrangements for capacity-building consistent with Article 11, paragraph 5, of the Agreement;

83. *Calls upon* all Parties to ensure that education, training and public awareness, as reflected in Article 6 of the Convention and in Article 12 of the Agreement are adequately considered in their contribution to capacity-building;

84. *Invites* the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session to explore ways of enhancing the implementation of training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under the Agreement;

² Parties should submit their views via the submissions portal at <<http://www.unfccc.int/5900>>.

TRANSPARENCY OF ACTION AND SUPPORT

85. *Decides* to establish a Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency in order to build institutional and technical capacity, both pre- and post-2020. This initiative will support developing country Parties, upon request, in meeting enhanced transparency requirements as defined in Article 13 of the Agreement in a timely manner;

86. *Also decides* that the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency will aim:

(a) To strengthen national institutions for transparency-related activities in line with national priorities;

(b) To provide relevant tools, training and assistance for meeting the provisions stipulated in Article 13 of the Agreement;

(c) To assist in the improvement of transparency over time;

87. *Urges and requests* the Global Environment Facility to make arrangements to support the establishment and operation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency as a priority reporting-related need, including through voluntary contributions to support developing countries in the sixth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility and future replenishment cycles, to complement existing support under the Global Environment Facility;

88. *Decides* to assess the implementation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency in the context of the seventh review of the financial mechanism;

89. *Requests* that the Global Environment Facility, as an operating entity of the financial mechanism include in its annual report to the Conference of the Parties the progress of work in the design, development and implementation of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency referred to in paragraph 85 above starting in 2016;

90. *Decides* that, in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Agreement, developing countries shall be provided flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of that Article, including in the scope, frequency and level of detail of reporting, and in the scope of review, and that the scope of review could provide for in-country reviews to be optional, while such flexibilities shall be reflected in the development of modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 92 below;

91. *Also decides* that all Parties, except for the least developed country Parties and small island developing States, shall submit the information referred to in Article 13, paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10, as appropriate, no less frequently than on a biennial basis, and that the least developed country Parties and small island developing States may submit this information at their discretion;

92. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop recommendations for modalities, procedures and guidelines in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 13, of the Agreement, and to define the year of their first and subsequent review and update, as appropriate, at regular intervals, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties, at its twenty-fourth session, with a view to forwarding them to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for adoption at its first session;

93. *Also requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement in developing the recommendations for the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 92 above to take into account, inter alia:

(a) The importance of facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time;

- (b) The need to provide flexibility to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities;
- (c) The need to promote transparency, accuracy, completeness, consistency, and comparability;
- (d) The need to avoid duplication as well as undue burden on Parties and the secretariat;
- (e) The need to ensure that Parties maintain at least the frequency and quality of reporting in accordance with their respective obligations under the Convention;
- (f) The need to ensure that double counting is avoided;
- (g) The need to ensure environmental integrity;

94. *Further requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, when developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 92 above, to draw on the experiences from and take into account other on-going relevant processes under the Convention;

95. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, when developing modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 92 above, to consider, inter alia:

- (a) The types of flexibility available to those developing countries that need it on the basis of their capacities;
- (b) The consistency between the methodology communicated in the nationally determined contribution and the methodology for reporting on progress made towards achieving individual Parties' respective nationally determined contribution;
- (c) That Parties report information on adaptation action and planning including, if appropriate, their national adaptation plans, with a view to collectively exchanging information and sharing lessons learned;
- (d) Support provided, enhancing delivery of support for both adaptation and mitigation through, inter alia, the common tabular formats for reporting support, and taking into account issues considered by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on methodologies for reporting on financial information, and enhancing the reporting by developing countries on support received, including the use, impact and estimated results thereof;
- (e) Information in the biennial assessments and other reports of the Standing Committee on Finance and other relevant bodies under the Convention;
- (f) Information on the social and economic impact of response measures;

96. *Also requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, when developing recommendations for modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 92 above, to enhance the transparency of support provided in accordance with Article 9 of the Agreement;

97. *Further requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to report on the progress of work on the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 92 above to future sessions of the Conference of the Parties, and that this work be concluded no later than 2018;

98. *Decides* that the modalities, procedures and guidelines developed under paragraph 92 above, shall be applied upon the entry into force of the Paris Agreement;

99. *Also decides* that the modalities, procedures and guidelines of this transparency framework shall build upon and eventually supercede the measurement, reporting and verification system established by paragraphs 40 to 47 and 60 to 64 of decision 1/CP.16 and paragraph 12 to 62 of decision 2/CP.17 immediately following the submission of the final biennial reports and biennial update reports;

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

100. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to identify the sources of input for the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement and to report to the Conference of the Parties, with a view to the Conference of the Parties making a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session, including, but not limited to:

- (a) Information on:
 - (i) The overall effect of the nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties;
 - (ii) The state of adaptation efforts, support, experiences and priorities from the communications referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Agreement, and reports referred to in Article 13, paragraph 7, of the Agreement;
 - (iii) The mobilization and provision of support;
- (b) The latest reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;
- (c) Reports of the subsidiary bodies;

101. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to provide advice on how the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change can inform the global stocktake of the implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its Article 14 of the Agreement and to report on this matter to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement at its second session;

102. *Further requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop modalities for the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement and to report to the Conference of the Parties, with a view to making a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session;

FACILITATING IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

103. *Decides* that the committee referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Agreement shall consist of 12 members with recognized competence in relevant scientific, technical, socio-economic or legal fields, to be elected by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the basis of equitable geographical representation, with two members each from the five regional groups of the United Nations and one member each from the small island developing States and the least developed countries, while taking into account the goal of gender balance;

104. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop the modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Agreement, with a view to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement completing its work on such modalities and procedures for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session;

FINAL CLAUSES

105. *Also requests* the secretariat, solely for the purposes of Article 21 of the Agreement, to make available on its website on the date of adoption of the Agreement as well as in the report of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, information on the most up-to-date total and per cent of greenhouse gas emissions communicated by Parties to the Convention in their national communications, greenhouse gas inventory reports, biennial reports or biennial update reports;

IV. ENHANCED ACTION PRIOR TO 2020

106. *Resolves* to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts in the pre-2020 period, including by:

(a) Urging all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that have not already done so to ratify and implement the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;

(b) Urging all Parties that have not already done so to make and implement a mitigation pledge under the Cancun Agreements;

(c) Reiterating its resolve, as set out in decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, to accelerate the full implementation of the decisions constituting the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 and enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention by all Parties;

(d) Inviting developing country Parties that have not submitted their first biennial update reports to do so as soon as possible;

(e) Urging all Parties to participate in the existing measurement, reporting and verification processes under the Cancun Agreements, in a timely manner, with a view to demonstrating progress made in the implementation of their mitigation pledges;

107. *Encourages* Parties to promote the voluntary cancellation by Party and non-Party stakeholders, without double counting of units issued under the Kyoto Protocol, including certified emission reductions that are valid for the second commitment period;

108. *Urges* host and purchasing Parties to report transparently on internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, including outcomes used to meet international pledges, and emission units issued under the Kyoto Protocol with a view to promoting environmental integrity and avoiding double counting;

109. *Recognizes* the social, economic and environmental value of voluntary mitigation actions and their co-benefits for adaptation, health and sustainable development;

110. *Resolves* to strengthen, in the period 2016–2020, the existing technical examination process on mitigation as defined in decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 5(a), and decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 19, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge, including by:

(a) Encouraging Parties, Convention bodies and international organizations to engage in this process, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with relevant non-Party stakeholders, to share their experiences and suggestions, including from regional events, and to cooperate in facilitating the implementation of policies, practices and actions identified during this process in accordance with national sustainable development priorities;

(b) Striving to improve, in consultation with Parties, access to and participation in this process by developing country Party and non-Party experts;

(c) Requesting the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network in accordance with their respective mandates:

- (i) To engage in the technical expert meetings and enhance their efforts to facilitate and support Parties in scaling up the implementation of policies, practices and actions identified during this process;
- (ii) To provide regular updates during the technical expert meetings on the progress made in facilitating the implementation of policies, practices and actions previously identified during this process;
- (iii) To include information on their activities under this process in their joint annual report to the Conference of the Parties;

(d) Encouraging Parties to make effective use of the Climate Technology Centre and Network to obtain assistance to develop economically, environmentally and socially viable project proposals in the high mitigation potential areas identified in this process;

111. *Encourages* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention to engage in the technical expert meetings and to inform participants of their contribution to facilitating progress in the implementation of policies, practices and actions identified during the technical examination process;

112. *Requests* the secretariat to organize the process referred to in paragraph 110 above and disseminate its results, including by:

(a) Organizing, in consultation with the Technology Executive Committee and relevant expert organizations, regular technical expert meetings focusing on specific policies, practices and actions representing best practices and with the potential to be scalable and replicable;

(b) Updating, on an annual basis, following the meetings referred to in paragraph 112(a) above and in time to serve as input to the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 112(c) below, a technical paper on the mitigation benefits and co-benefits of policies, practices and actions for enhancing mitigation ambition, as well as on options for supporting their implementation, information on which should be made available in a user-friendly online format;

(c) Preparing, in consultation with the champions referred to in paragraph 122 below, a summary for policymakers, with information on specific policies, practices and actions representing best practices and with the potential to be scalable and replicable, and on options to support their implementation, as well as on relevant collaborative initiatives, and publishing the summary at least two months in advance of each session of the Conference of the Parties as input for the high-level event referred to in paragraph 121 below;

113. *Decides* that the process referred to in paragraph 110 above should be organized jointly by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and should take place on an ongoing basis until 2020;

114. *Also decides* to conduct in 2017 an assessment of the process referred to in paragraph 110 above so as to improve its effectiveness;

115. *Resolves* to enhance the provision of urgent and adequate finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country Parties in order to enhance the level of ambition of pre-2020 action by Parties, and in this regard *strongly urges* developed country Parties to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete roadmap to achieve the goal of jointly providing USD 100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation while significantly increasing adaptation finance from current levels and to further provide appropriate technology and capacity-building support;

116. *Decides* to conduct a facilitative dialogue in conjunction with the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties to assess the progress in implementing decision 1/CP.19, paragraphs 3 and 4, and identify relevant opportunities to enhance the provision of financial resources, including for technology development and transfer and capacity-building support, with a view to identifying ways to enhance the ambition of mitigation efforts by all Parties, including identifying relevant opportunities to enhance the provision and mobilization of support and enabling environments;

117. *Acknowledges* with appreciation the results of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, which build on the climate summit convened on 23 September 2014 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

118. *Welcomes* the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions, and *encourages* the registration of those actions in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform;³

119. *Encourages* Parties to work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to strengthen mitigation and adaptation action;

120. *Also encourages* non-Party stakeholders to increase their engagement in the processes referred to in paragraph 110 above and paragraph 125 below;

121. *Agrees* to convene, pursuant to decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 21, building on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda and in conjunction with each session of the Conference of the Parties during the period 2016–2020, a high-level event that:

(a) Further strengthens high-level engagement on the implementation of policy options and actions arising from the processes referred to in paragraph 110 above and paragraph below, drawing on the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 112(c) above;

(b) Provides an opportunity for announcing new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions, including the implementation of policies, practices and actions arising from the processes referred to in paragraph 110 above and paragraph 125 below and presented in the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 112(c) above;

(c) Takes stock of related progress and recognizes new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions;

(d) Provides meaningful and regular opportunities for the effective high-level engagement of dignitaries of Parties, international organizations, international cooperative initiatives and non-Party stakeholders;

122. *Decides* that two high-level champions shall be appointed to act on behalf of the President of the Conference of the Parties to facilitate through strengthened high-level engagement in the period 2016–2020 the successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions, including by:

(a) Working with the Executive Secretary and the current and incoming Presidents of the Conference of the Parties to coordinate the annual high-level event referred to in paragraph 121 above;

(b) Engaging with interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including to further the voluntary initiatives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda;

³ <<http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>>.

(c) Providing guidance to the secretariat on the organization of technical expert meetings referred to in paragraph 112(a) above and paragraph 130(a) below;

123. *Also decides* that the high-level champions referred to in paragraph 122 above should normally serve for a term of two years, with their terms overlapping for a full year to ensure continuity, such that:

(a) The President of the Conference of the Parties of the twenty-first session should appoint one champion, who should serve for one year from the date of the appointment until the last day of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session;

(b) The President of the Conference of the Parties of the twenty-second session should appoint one champion who should serve for two years from the date of the appointment until the last day of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session (November 2017);

(c) Thereafter, each subsequent President of the Conference of the Parties should appoint one champion who should serve for two years and succeed the previously appointed champion whose term has ended;

124. *Invites* all interested Parties and relevant organizations to provide support for the work of the champions referred to in paragraph 122 above;

125. *Decides* to launch, in the period 2016–2020, a technical examination process on adaptation;

126. *Also decides* that the technical examination process on adaptation referred to in paragraph 125 above will endeavour to identify concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing vulnerabilities and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions;

127. *Further decides* that the technical examination process referred to in paragraph 125 above should be organized jointly by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, and conducted by the Adaptation Committee;

128. *Decides* that the process referred to in paragraph 125 above will be pursued by:

(a) Facilitating the sharing of good practices, experiences and lessons learned;

(b) Identifying actions that could significantly enhance the implementation of adaptation actions, including actions that could enhance economic diversification and have mitigation co-benefits;

(c) Promoting cooperative action on adaptation;

(d) Identifying opportunities to strengthen enabling environments and enhance the provision of support for adaptation in the context of specific policies, practices and actions;

129. *Also decides* that the technical examination process on adaptation referred to in paragraph 125 above will take into account the process, modalities, outputs, outcomes and lessons learned from the technical examination process on mitigation referred to in paragraph 110 above;

130. *Requests* the secretariat to support the technical examination process referred to in paragraph 125 above by:

(a) Organizing regular technical expert meetings focusing on specific policies, strategies and actions;

(b) Preparing annually, on the basis of the meetings referred to in paragraph 130(a) above and in time to serve as an input to the summary for policymakers referred to in paragraph 112(c) above, a technical paper on opportunities to enhance adaptation action, as well as options to support their implementation, information on which should be made available in a user-friendly online format;

131. *Decides* that in conducting the process referred to in paragraph 125 above, the Adaptation Committee will engage with and explore ways to take into account, synergize with and build on the existing arrangements for adaptation-related work programmes, bodies and institutions under the Convention so as to ensure coherence and maximum value;

132. *Also decides* to conduct, in conjunction with the assessment referred to in paragraph 120 above, an assessment of the process referred to in paragraph 125 above, so as to improve its effectiveness;

133. *Invites* Parties and observer organizations to submit information on the opportunities referred to in paragraph 126 above by 3 February 2016;

V. NON-PARTY STAKEHOLDERS

134. *Welcomes* the efforts of all non-Party stakeholders to address and respond to climate change, including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities;

135. *Invites* the non-Party stakeholders referred to in paragraph 134 above to scale up their efforts and support actions to reduce emissions and/or to build resilience and decrease vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change and demonstrate these efforts via the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform⁴ referred to in paragraph 118 above;

136. *Recognizes* the need to strengthen knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples related to addressing and responding to climate change, and *establishes* a platform for the exchange of experiences and sharing of best practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner;

137. *Also recognizes* the important role of providing incentives for emission reduction activities, including tools such as domestic policies and carbon pricing;

VI. ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY MATTERS

138. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision and requests that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources;

139. *Emphasizes* the urgency of making additional resources available for the implementation of the relevant actions, including actions referred to in this decision, and the implementation of the work programme referred to in paragraph 9 above;

140. *Urges* Parties to make voluntary contributions for the timely implementation of this decision.

⁴ <<http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>>.

Annex

PARIS AGREEMENT

The Parties to this Agreement,

Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,

Pursuant to the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action established by decision 1/CP.17 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its seventeenth session,

In pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being guided by its principles, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances,

Recognizing the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge,

Also recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the Convention,

Taking full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries with regard to funding and transfer of technology,

Recognizing that Parties may be affected not only by climate change, but also by the impacts of the measures taken in response to it,

Emphasizing the intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable development and eradication of poverty,

Recognizing the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change,

Taking into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Recognizing the importance of the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of the greenhouse gases referred to in the Convention,

Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and noting the importance for some of the concept of “climate justice”, when taking action to address climate change,

Affirming the importance of education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and cooperation at all levels on the matters addressed in this Agreement,

Recognizing the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in addressing climate change,

Also recognizing that sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, with developed country Parties taking the lead, play an important role in addressing climate change,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purpose of this Agreement, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the Convention shall apply. In addition:

1. “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992.
2. “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the Convention.
3. “Party” means a Party to this Agreement.

Article 2

1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:
 - (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
 - (b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;
 - (c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.
2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Article 3

As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement.

Article 4

1. In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.
2. Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.
3. Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.
4. Developed country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances.
5. Support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions.

6. The least developed countries and small island developing States may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emissions development reflecting their special circumstances.
7. Mitigation co-benefits resulting from Parties' adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans can contribute to mitigation outcomes under this Article.
8. In communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
9. Each Party shall communicate a nationally determined contribution every five years in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14.
10. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall consider common time frames for nationally determined contributions at its first session.
11. A Party may at any time adjust its existing nationally determined contribution with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
12. Nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.
13. Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions. In accounting for anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined contributions, Parties shall promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double counting, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
14. In the context of their nationally determined contributions, when recognizing and implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and removals, Parties should take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance under the Convention, in the light of the provisions of paragraph 13 of this Article.
15. Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties.
16. Parties, including regional economic integration organizations and their member States, that have reached an agreement to act jointly under paragraph 2 of this Article shall notify the secretariat of the terms of that agreement, including the emission level allocated to each Party within the relevant time period, when they communicate their nationally determined contributions. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of that agreement.
17. Each party to such an agreement shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement referred to in paragraph 16 above in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.
18. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Agreement, each member State of that regional economic integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic integration organization, shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement communicated under paragraph 16 of this Article in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.
19. All Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Article 5

1. Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the Convention, including forests.
2. Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon

stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.

Article 6

1. Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.
2. Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
3. The use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by participating Parties.
4. A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, and shall aim:
 - (a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development;
 - (b) To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party;
 - (c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and
 - (d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.
5. Emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement of the host Party's nationally determined contribution if used by another Party to demonstrate achievement of its nationally determined contribution.
6. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from activities under the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.
7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article at its first session.
8. Parties recognize the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches being available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, as appropriate. These approaches shall aim to:
 - (a) Promote mitigation and adaptation ambition;
 - (b) Enhance public and private participation in the implementation of nationally determined contributions; and
 - (c) Enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements.
9. A framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development is hereby defined to promote the non-market approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article.

Article 7

1. Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.
2. Parties recognize that adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions, and that it is a key component of and makes a contribution to the long-term global response to climate change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
3. The adaptation efforts of developing country Parties shall be recognized, in accordance with the modalities to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session.
4. Parties recognize that the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs.
5. Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate.
6. Parties recognize the importance of support for and international cooperation on adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account the needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
7. Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework, including with regard to:
 - (a) Sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned, including, as appropriate, as these relate to science, planning, policies and implementation in relation to adaptation actions;
 - (b) Strengthening institutional arrangements, including those under the Convention that serve this Agreement, to support the synthesis of relevant information and knowledge, and the provision of technical support and guidance to Parties;
 - (c) Strengthening scientific knowledge on climate, including research, systematic observation of the climate system and early warning systems, in a manner that informs climate services and supports decision-making;
 - (d) Assisting developing country Parties in identifying effective adaptation practices, adaptation needs, priorities, support provided and received for adaptation actions and efforts, and challenges and gaps, in a manner consistent with encouraging good practices;
 - (e) Improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions.
8. United Nations specialized organizations and agencies are encouraged to support the efforts of Parties to implement the actions referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article.
9. Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions, which may include:
 - (a) The implementation of adaptation actions, undertakings and/or efforts;
 - (b) The process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;
 - (c) The assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability, with a view to formulating nationally determined prioritized actions, taking into account vulnerable people, places and ecosystems;
 - (d) Monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions; and
 - (e) Building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources.

10. Each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country Parties.
11. The adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2, and/or a national communication.
12. The adaptation communications referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.
13. Continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of this Article, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 11.
14. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall, inter alia:
 - (a) Recognize adaptation efforts of developing country Parties;
 - (b) Enhance the implementation of adaptation action taking into account the adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article;
 - (c) Review the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support provided for adaptation; and
 - (d) Review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 8

1. Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.
2. The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
3. Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.
4. Accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support may include:
 - (a) Early warning systems;
 - (b) Emergency preparedness;
 - (c) Slow onset events;
 - (d) Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;
 - (e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management;
 - (f) Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;
 - (g) Non-economic losses;
 - (h) Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.
5. The Warsaw International Mechanism shall collaborate with existing bodies and expert groups under the Agreement, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Agreement.

Article 9

1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.
2. Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.
3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds,

through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.

4. The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.
5. Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.
6. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account the relevant information provided by developed country Parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance.
7. Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, at its first session, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other Parties are encouraged to do so.
8. The Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including its operating entities, shall serve as the financial mechanism of this Agreement.
9. The institutions serving this Agreement, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans.

Article 10

1. Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
2. Parties, noting the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions under this Agreement and recognizing existing technology deployment and dissemination efforts, shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer.
3. The Technology Mechanism established under the Convention shall serve this Agreement.
4. A technology framework is hereby established to provide overarching guidance for the work of the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology development and transfer in order to support the implementation of this Agreement, in pursuit of the long-term vision referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
5. Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable development. Such effort shall be, as appropriate, supported, including by the Technology Mechanism and, through financial means, by the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, for collaborative approaches to research and development, and facilitating access to technology, in particular for early stages of the technology cycle, to developing country Parties.
6. Support, including financial support, shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, including for strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, with a view to achieving a balance between support for mitigation and adaptation. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account available information on efforts related to support on technology development and transfer for developing country Parties.

Article 11

1. Capacity-building under this Agreement should enhance the capacity and ability of developing country Parties, in particular countries with the least capacity, such as the least developed countries, and those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, such as small island developing States, to take

effective climate change action, including, inter alia, to implement adaptation and mitigation actions, and should facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness, and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information.

2. Capacity-building should be country-driven, based on and responsive to national needs, and foster country ownership of Parties, in particular, for developing country Parties, including at the national, subnational and local levels. Capacity-building should be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive.
3. All Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this Agreement. Developed country Parties should enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing country Parties.
4. All Parties enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this Agreement, including through regional, bilateral and multilateral approaches, shall regularly communicate on these actions or measures on capacity-building. Developing country Parties should regularly communicate progress made on implementing capacity-building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement this Agreement.
5. Capacity-building activities shall be enhanced through appropriate institutional arrangements to support the implementation of this Agreement, including the appropriate institutional arrangements established under the Convention that serve this Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall, at its first session, consider and adopt a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity-building.

Article 12

Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.

Article 13

1. In order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties' different capacities and builds upon collective experience is hereby established.
2. The transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reflect such flexibility.
3. The transparency framework shall build on and enhance the transparency arrangements under the Convention, recognizing the special circumstances of the least developed countries and small island developing States, and be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties.
4. The transparency arrangements under the Convention, including national communications, biennial reports and biennial update reports, international assessment and review and international consultation and analysis, shall form part of the experience drawn upon for the development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines under paragraph 13 of this Article.
5. The purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide a clear understanding of climate change action in the light of the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving Parties' individual nationally determined contributions under Article 4, and Parties' adaptation actions under Article 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.
6. The purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.
7. Each Party shall regularly provide the following information:

- (a) A national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, prepared using good practice methodologies accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
 - (b) Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its nationally determined contribution under Article 4.
8. Each Party should also provide information related to climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 7, as appropriate.
9. Developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support should, provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country Parties under Article 9, 10 and 11.
10. Developing country Parties should provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11.
11. Information submitted by each Party under paragraphs 7 and 9 of this Article shall undergo a technical expert review, in accordance with decision 1/CP.21. For those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities, the review process shall include assistance in identifying capacity-building needs. In addition, each Party shall participate in a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress with respect to efforts under Article 9, and its respective implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution.
12. The technical expert review under this paragraph shall consist of a consideration of the Party's support provided, as relevant, and its implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution. The review shall also identify areas of improvement for the Party, and include a review of the consistency of the information with the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article, taking into account the flexibility accorded to the Party under paragraph 2 of this Article. The review shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of developing country Parties.
13. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall, at its first session, building on experience from the arrangements related to transparency under the Convention, and elaborating on the provisions in this Article, adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of action and support.
14. Support shall be provided to developing countries for the implementation of this Article.
15. Support shall also be provided for the building of transparency-related capacity of developing country Parties on a continuous basis.

Article 14

1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the "global stocktake"). It shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science.
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall undertake its first global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
3. The outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.

Article 15

1. A mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement is hereby established.
2. The mechanism referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The committee shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties.

3. The committee shall operate under the modalities and procedures adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session and report annually to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

Article 16

1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, decisions under this Agreement shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Agreement.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Agreement and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Agreement and shall:
 - (a) Establish such subsidiary bodies as deemed necessary for the implementation of this Agreement; and
 - (b) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of this Agreement.
5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and the financial procedures applied under the Convention shall be applied *mutatis mutandis* under this Agreement, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall be held in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.
8. The United Nations and its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Agreement and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article.

Article 17

1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the secretariat of this Agreement.
2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention, on the arrangements made for the functioning of the secretariat, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement. The secretariat shall, in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Agreement and by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

Article 18

1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement. The provisions of the Convention relating to the functioning of these two bodies shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement. Sessions of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the Convention.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Agreement, decisions under this Agreement shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.
3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Agreement, any member of the bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Agreement.

Article 19

1. Subsidiary bodies or other institutional arrangements established by or under the Convention, other than those referred to in this Agreement, shall serve this Agreement upon a decision of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall specify the functions to be exercised by such subsidiary bodies or arrangements.
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement may provide further guidance to such subsidiary bodies and institutional arrangements.

Article 20

1. This Agreement shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States and regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017. Thereafter, this Agreement shall be open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.
2. Any regional economic integration organization that becomes a Party to this Agreement without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Agreement. In the case of regional economic integration organizations with one or more member States that are Parties to this Agreement, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this Agreement. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Agreement concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Agreement. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.

Article 21

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 percent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
2. Solely for the limited purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article, “total global greenhouse gas emissions” means the most up-to-date amount communicated on or before the date of adoption of this Agreement by the Parties to the Convention.
3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or approves this Agreement or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article for entry into force have been fulfilled,

this Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit by such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

4. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by its member States.

Article 22

The provisions of Article 15 of the Convention on the adoption of amendments to the Convention shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.

Article 23

1. The provisions of Article 16 of the Convention on the adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.
2. Annexes to this Agreement shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise expressly provided for, a reference to this Agreement constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character.

Article 24

The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.

Article 25

1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for paragraph 2 of this Article.
2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Agreement. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.

Article 26

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Agreement.

Article 27

No reservations may be made to this Agreement.

Article 28

1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Agreement.

Article 29

The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

DONE at Paris this twelfth day of December two thousand and fifteen.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Agreement.

BILATERAL

Speech by Prime Minister at the Parliament of Afghanistan

December 25, 2015

Your Excellency President Ghani

Your Excellency, Chief Executive Dr. Abdulla

Honorable Speaker of Wolesi Jirga and the Chairman of Meshraon Jirga,

Distinguished Members of both Houses

Eight centuries ago, a famous son of Balkh Province, one of the greatest poets in human history, Jalaluddin Rumi, wrote, "Raise your words, not your voice. It is rain that gives flowers, not thunder".

This is the wisdom of this magnificent land and a great nation.

A land where legends are born – of poetry and beauty, of valour and honour, of pride and generosity, of the warmest embrace of friendship and the strongest resistance for freedom.

And, in this century, the great Afghan people have waged an epic struggle of courage and resolve to shape their future with vote and debate, not gun and violence.

A country with an abiding faith in the tradition of Jirga has chosen the path of democracy. And, it has done it against challenges that would have defeated a lesser people.

It is a tribute to the countless, nameless Afghans who laid down their lives and sacrificed their future.

To the leadership of former President Hamid Karzai Saheb,

who led the nation with wisdom and determination from the dark days of despair to a future of hope.

To President Ghani and CEO Dr. Abdullah for their vision and statesmanship that can only come from great patriots.

To you, Members of Parliament, for braving violence to take your seat in this House in trust of your people.

Honourable Members,

So, I stand here, on behalf of 1.25 billion friends in India, in admiration for your achievements, in gratitude for your friendship and in solidarity for your future.

And, today, I am humbled and honoured to join President Ghani and all the Members of the Afghan Parliament to dedicate this new abode of democracy to the Afghan nation.

We could not have chosen a more special day than the birthday of one of the tallest leaders of our time, former Prime Minister and Bharat Ratna Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayeeji. Eleven years ago, he dreamt of this project in partnership with Karzai Saheb.

And, we are deeply touched that you have chosen to name one of the wings in this building the Atal Block.

This Parliament House brings together our two nations through the vision of our leaders, the labour of our people and the stones of our lands.

And, the Atal Block unites us in spirit, because Atal means hero in Pashto and in Hindi it means to be firm. It captures the spirit of Afghanistan and of our friendship.

This Parliament Complex is a small tribute to your progress as a nation and a democracy. And, it will stand as an enduring symbol of the ties of emotions and values, of affection and aspirations that bind us in a special relationship.

Honourable Members,

Our ties are as ancient as history.

Over the mighty Hindu Kush and through the forbidding Khyber Pass, monks, merchants and monarchs have linked us through knowledge, culture, religion, commerce and kingdoms.

In the shifting contours of history, there were times we have been one. There were times we saw wars. But, through the ages, we have always enriched one another.

In the timeless Buddhist symbols of Aynak and Bamian and in the majestic monuments of Delhi, in our culture and art, in language and literature, food and festivals, we see the imprint of our timeless relations.

We owe to ancient Afghanistan the gift of one of the great characters of Mahabharata, Gandhari.

In the achievements of Mauryan Empire or Shershah Suri, we see connectivity that we now aspire to rebuild.

The words of poet Ahmed Shah Durrani may have expressed the longing of an Afghan King in Delhi, I forget the throne of Delhi, when I remember the mountain tops of my Afghan land.

But, in the heart of every Indian and Afghan, there is boundless love for each other. We love each other's culture and cinema, music and poetry, food and festivals. And, now we admire each other's cricket.

We are delighted that the Afghan National Cricket Team has found its home ground near Delhi and is practicing for next year's World Cup. And, I congratulate the Afghan Under 19 team that just beat Zimbabwe in its first home series.

We are just as proud that Afghans see India as a natural destination for education, health or a family home.

Indians remember the support of Afghans for our freedom struggle; the contribution of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, revered as Frontier Gandhi; and, the important footnote of that history, when, exactly hundred years ago, the first Indian Government-in-Exile was formed in Kabul by Maharaja Mahendra Pratap and Maulana Barkatullah.

King Amanullah once told the Maharaja that so long as India was not free, Afghanistan was not

free in the right sense.

Honourable Members,

This is the spirit of brotherhood between us.

And, when you began a new journey in a new century, we were proud to stand with you and walk with you.

Our partnership has helped rural communities get schools, minor irrigation, health centres, welfare for children and opportunities for women.

Together, we have built roads that have brought regions closer;

power transmission lines and power stations that light up Afghan homes;

satellite links that bring education, medical advice and communication to Afghan people.

And, we are helping the security forces become more mobile.

The institutions we are establishing together are helping rebuild agriculture and mining in Afghanistan, and make advanced medical care available in Kabul.

Nothing is more important for a nation than its human resources. So, we are pleased that our scholarships and training programmes are empowering Afghan youth with modern education and professional skills; Afghan government with resources to develop their country; and, the Afghan Security Forces with the capacity to secure their nation.

Power and water will flow out of Salma Dam soon. The Stor Palace will again stand as a symbol of your priceless heritage. Our scheme of 1000 scholarships every year for Afghan students in India will continue. We are pleased with the response to our special scholarship scheme in agriculture science.

Today, I announce 500 scholarships for the children of the martyrs of Afghan security forces.

As we have stood with you in our efforts to rebuild your country, you have guarded and protected our people as your own. We have faced daily threats, but we feel secure in your midst.

To every Afghan, who has risked or lost his life so that his Indian guest is safe, I convey the eternal gratefulness of India.

To Indian diplomats, officers, engineers and doctors, who serve here with pride, to the families of our Indian martyrs, I express the gratitude of Indians and Afghans.

There are some who did not want us to be here. There were those who saw sinister designs in our presence here. There are others who were uneasy at the strength of our partnership. Some even tried to discourage us.

But, we are here because you have faith in us. You never doubted the sincerity of our commitment and the strength of our friendship. And, you have seen the fruits of our partnership.

You have judged us by what you see, not what others tell you, including about the mysterious Indian consulates.

You know that India is here to contribute not to compete; to lay the foundations of future, not light the flame of conflict; to rebuild lives, not destroy a nation.

You know, as we do, that Indians and Afghans have always stood for each other, never against another.

You have been at the crossroads of history. And, your history tells us that you will never let yourself become a theatre of competition; or serve the designs of others.

For you live by the creed extolled by poet Kushal Khan Khattak that Nation's honor and nation's fame on life they have a prior claim.

So, with your faith and at your pace, India will continue to build Afghan capacity for governance, security and development, so that you can build a future that Afghans so richly deserve.

We will do this from the responsibility that comes from our friendship. But, we also do this with a commitment to peace and stability in our region.

We know that Afghanistan's success will require the cooperation and support of each of its neighbours. And, all of us in the region - India, Pakistan, Iran and others - must unite, in trust and cooperation, behind this common purpose and in recognition of our common destiny.

When Afghanistan becomes a haven of peace and a hub for the flow of ideas, commerce, energy and investments in the region, we will all prosper together.

That is why we are working to improve your connectivity by land and sea, including through Chahbahar in Iran.

That is why I hope that Pakistan will become a bridge between South Asia and Afghanistan and beyond.

I hope that the day will come soon when energy from Central Asia will power prosperity in our region; when a Kabuliwala can once again come across easily to win Indian hearts; when we in India can relish the wonderful fruits of Afghanistan; when Afghans do not have to pay an enormous price to buy their favourite products from India.

For this has always been the course of this region's history. And, it must be the path to its future.

But, brave and tireless as the Afghans are in defending their nations, Afghanistan will succeed only when terrorism no longer flows across the border; when nurseries and sanctuaries of terrorism are shut; and, their patrons are no longer in business.

Terror and violence cannot be the instrument to shape Afghanistan's future or dictate the choices Afghans make..

For, the fire that is lit in Afghanistan, can never be contained, within these boundaries.

Afghans have the wisdom to seek peace with neighbours, but also the courage to defend their freedom.

And, Afghans of all persuasions must have the right to seek peace among themselves.

Too much blood has flown down Kabul River. Too many tragedies have darkened the mountain slopes. Too many dreams have burnt in the fire of a senseless conflict.

You can be Pushtoons, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras. You can be Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs.

But, you are proud Afghans who can come together as one nation and one people.

You may have fought in the name of religion; or in the cause of identity.

But, it is now time for Afghans to come together in peace.

As a wise Afghan said, A tree with a bitter seed, Fed with butter and sugar, Will still bear a bitter fruit.

You have a glorious tradition of pluralism and respect for diversity and beliefs.

Those waging war from outside must seek a path to this building and this hall. Those seeking territory through gun must seek power through ballot. Those who have destroyed homes must now rebuild their nation. For, this is your land and these are your people.

And, it must be on your terms, on your genius, through your own process and your own spirit of brotherhood.

Not driven by the calculations or ambitions of others.

And, the future you build in peace and through dialogue must preserve the hard-won progress of the last decade and half. It must have a place for every Afghan. It must have space for everyone's aspiration. And, it must be a nation, where every citizen is secure of her rights and confident about her future.

And, as Afghans take responsibility for their future, the world must stand with them in solidarity and support.

We must do that for the soldier from a foreign land who laid down his life in an Afghan village that he had never heard of and for a people he had never known; and, for the enormous sacrifices that Afghans have made for a life that others take for granted.

We must support Afghanistan without time lines because the new clouds of extremism and terrorism are rising, even as the old ones continue to darken our skies; and, because Afghans are not only fighting for their future, but are standing up for all of us and a safer world.

The world will be a better place when we can experience the real wealth of Afghan people in their diversity and rich heritage.

It is time for all Afghans, everyone in the region and the rest of the world to come together.

The sacrifices must not go in vain.

The flame of hope should not die.

No girl that steps into the world should slip into darkness of denied opportunities.

No son should face the choice of gun or refuge in a distant land.

No mother should fear bringing a child into this world.

No leader should lose a brother because he spoke for Afghan freedom to choose friends.

No one kneeling in prayer in a mosque should be killed in the name of religion.

No elder should look back on his youth wasted in conflict, and see the same future for his grandchild.

Every youth in Afghanistan should see a future in which IT stands for information technology, not international terrorism.

For, the promise and the opportunities of the 21st century belong to Afghan youth as much as anyone else in the world.

For India, this is a deeply held commitment.

Your suffering is our pain.

Your dreams are our duty.

Your strength is our belief.

Your courage is our inspiration.

Above all, your friendship is our honour.

And, as Hindi cinema's most famous Pathan character, Sher Khan in Zanjeer sang,

Yaari hai iman mera, Yaar meri zindangi. Friendship is my faith, the friend is my life.

This is the creed of Afghans and Indians.

I am confident that

Hope will return to your homes,

Laughter in your schools,

Life in your streets

Prosperity in your cities

unity in your society

and, peace in your nation.

And, at every step of your journey, India will be with you.

Thank you. Thank you again for this great honour and privilege.

Media Statement by PM during his visit to Russia

December 24, 2015

Your Excellency President Vladimir Putin,
Members the Media,

Let me begin by expressing my deepest condolences on the loss of lives in the terrorist attack on a civilian Russian aircraft and in the unfortunate downing of the military jet in Syria. In this moment of grief and challenge, we stand in solidarity with the people of Russia.

Mr. President, thank you for generous and warm hospitality. You are the architect of the India-Russia strategic partnership. And, in a changing world, your leadership has kept our relations on a steady course of progress and growth.

Mr. President, I have always had great respect and appreciation for our strategic partnership. It has been a source of strength and success for India in defence, development and diplomacy. And, there is genuine goodwill and mutual respect between our people.

As I look to the future, I see Russia as a significant partner in India's economic transformation and in shaping a balanced, stable, inclusive and a multi-polar world.

We have had excellent conversations over the past two days and very productive outcomes.

It has deepened my conviction that this relationship truly meets the test of a special and privileged strategic partnership.

We have laid the foundation of the future character of this strategic partnership.

The Inter-Governmental Agreement on manufacture of Kamov 226 helicopter in India is the first project for a major defence platform under the Make in India mission. It is rightly with our most important defence partner.

We have made progress on a number of other defence proposals. These would boost defence manufacturing in India and India's defence readiness with next generation equipment.

The pace of our cooperation in nuclear energy is increasing. We are making progress on our plans for twelve Russian nuclear reactors at two sites. The agreement today will increase Indian manufacturing content in these reactors. It supports my mission of Make in India. I thank President Putin for his support.

With one of the world's largest reserves of hydrocarbons, Russia can be a critical source of energy security for India, especially because of our strategic partnership. With President Putin's support, we are enlarging Indian investments in Russian hydrocarbon sector.

President Putin and I are moving creatively in expanding our economic relations. Following our last Summit, India has created a special notified zone to facilitate direct trade between the world's largest uncut diamond exporter, Russia, and India, which processes 90% of the world's uncut diamond.

Second, we are working on logistics. Our Green Corridor project has taken off. The International North South Transit Corridor through Iran will significantly reduce transportation time and cost.

Third, we are moving forward on the India-Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement. This will also benefit us in Central Asia.

Fourth, we are encouraging our private sector to connect with each other more. We have just had an excellent meeting of CEO Forum. The agreements and the announcements today give me confidence that we will see huge increase in investments and trade in both directions.

President Putin and I have a high degree of convergence in our positions on global issues and a strong commitment to deepen our international cooperation.

We have strong collaboration in the United Nations. Our membership of BRICS, East Asia Summit, G20 and now Shanghai Cooperation Organisation gives our partnership a global character. It is particularly important in the arc from Eurasia to Asia Pacific, including in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

We are one in our belief that the world must unite and take concerted action on combating terrorism, without distinction and discrimination between terrorist groups and target countries.

We agree that an early political settlement through dialogue in West Asia is essential for restoring stability and containing extremism in the region.

Indeed, all nations must come together, with sensitivity to each other, to address the challenges of our times.

I am very pleased to have deepened my association with President Putin. Together, we have also given new direction and added more momentum and content to our strategic partnership.

Just as I have had the pleasure of visiting Russia twice this year, I look forward to welcoming President Putin in India next year for the BRICS Summit as well as the Annual Summit.

Thank you.

18th India-Iran Joint Commission Meeting

December 28, 2015

The 18th session of the India-Iran Joint Commission was held in New Delhi on December 28, 2015. The session was co-chaired by External Affairs Minister of India (EAM) and H.E. Mr. Ali Tayebnia, Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

H.E Mr. Ali Taiebnia called on the Prime Minister of India, who warmly recalled his meeting with the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Ufa earlier this year and reiterated the keen desire of India to expand its economic cooperation with Iran.

In the Joint Commission Meeting (JCM), EAM mentioned that India considers Iran as an important partner and expressed satisfaction at the growing bilateral interaction in diverse area. She underlined the efforts underway to enhance bilateral economic cooperation in energy, infrastructure – including shipping, ports and railways - and trade and commerce. She stressed that connectivity afforded by Indian participation in Chahbahar Port will facilitate linking

Afghanistan and Central Asia with India. The Iranian side suggested participation of India's public and private sectors in development of Chahbahar Port and Chahbahar Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and in setting up industrial units in the FTZ.

EAM emphasized the need for early completion of all necessary procedures for India's participation in Farzad-B field and pointed out India's desire to participate in other oil and gas explorations in Iran as well.

The two Ministers reviewed the progress in trade and economic cooperation and a number of related matters, and discussed the possibilities in cooperation in railways, including by supply of rails, rolling stock, signalling and other works and India's participation in Chahbahar – Zahedan -Mashhad railway line.

The JCM was preceded by meetings of the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Trade & Commerce (18th-19th November 2015), Joint Working Group on Energy (26th December 2015) and Joint Working Group on Infrastructure

Media Statement by Prime Ministers of India and Japan

New Delhi, December 12, 2015

Your Excellency, Prime Minister Abe,

Members of the media,

I am delighted to welcome Prime Minister Abe to India.

It is a great pleasure to host a personal friend and a great champion of India-Japan partnership.

No partner has played such a decisive role in India's economic transformation as Japan.

No friend will matter more in realising India's economic dreams than Japan.

And, I cannot think of a strategic partnership that can exercise a more profound influence on shaping the course of Asia and our interlinked ocean regions more than ours.

That is why we deeply value our Special Strategic and Global Partnership". It enjoys unmatched public goodwill and political consensus in India.

It also comes with great public expectations and huge responsibilities for us.

In the course of the past year, we have done much to live up to them.

We have made enormous progress in economic cooperation as also in our regional partnership and security cooperation.

Prime Minister Abe has been prompt and positive on our economic proposals, many of which are now unique to India. Japanese private investments are also rising sharply.

Today, we have scaled new summits in our shared journey. The Memorandum we signed on civil nuclear energy cooperation is more than just an agreement for commerce and clean energy.

It is shining symbol of a new level of mutual confidence and strategic partnership in the cause of a peaceful and secure world.

I know the significance of this decision for Japan. And, I assure you that India deeply respects that decision and will honour our shared commitments.

No less historic is our decision to introduce High Speed Rail on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad sector through the Japan's Shinkansen, known for its speed, reliability and safety.

We greatly appreciate Prime Minister Abe's extraordinary package of approximately 12 billion U.S. dollars and technical assistance, on very easy terms, for this project.

This enterprise will launch a revolution in Indian railways and speed up India's journey into the future.

It will become an engine of economic transformation in India.

We also appreciate the sharp increase in Japanese bilateral assistance programme and the strength of public and private Japanese commitment for the Make in India mission.

In September 2014 in Tokyo Prime Minister Abe spoke of 35 billion U.S. dollars of Japanese finance and investments for India over five years.

It was ambitious. But, together we are quickly turning it into reality.

Our shared commitment to combating climate change is equally strong.

We are engaged in wide ranging collaboration in clean energy and energy efficiency technologies that will also create solutions for the benefit of others in the world.

The other agreements today reflect the depth and diversity of our cooperation.

Today, we have also taken two more decisive steps in our security cooperation. The two agreements will deepen our defence relations and promote defence manufacturing in India.

This builds on our decision to expand staff talks to all three wings of the Armed Forces and make Japan a partner in Malabar Naval Exercises.

We have also advanced our regional partnership in the course of the year. We have raised the level of our tri-lateral dialogue with the United States and launched a new one with Australia.

We will work together in East Asia Summit to promote an inclusive, balanced and open regional architecture and maritimesecurity in the region.

We stand strongly for ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight, and maritime commerce. We believe that disputes must be resolved peacefully and that all countries must abide by international law and norms on maritime issues.

I also appreciate Prime Minister Abe's support for India's membership of the APEC .

We will also strive for our rightful place in a reformed UN Security Council.

Culture and people breathe life into a relationship.

Our remarkable relationship also has a wonderful human touch.

The Kyoto-Varanasi partnership is one of its strong symbols.

Last year, Prime Minister Abe hosted me in Kyoto.

Later today, I will show him the ancient heritage of Varanasi and our plans for its modern future.

Finally, in recognition of our special relationship, India will extend 'visa on arrival' to Japanese citizens including for business purpose from 1st March 2016.

This is different from the electronic visa facility that is being extended globally.

Excellency,

in a world of intense international engagements, few visits are truly historic or change the course of a relationship.

Your visit, Mr. Prime Minister, is one.

As we work to realise the Vision 2025 of India-Japan ties, we will advance the prosperity of our people and shape an Asian century in our vision and values.

VICE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

International Neutrality Conference

Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, December 12, 2015

His Excellency Mr Gurbanguly Berdimohamedov, President of the Republic of Turkmenistan,
Distinguished Guests,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

I bring with me the heartiest felicitations and greetings from the government and people of India on the 20th Anniversary of adoption of the status of 'Permanent Neutrality' by Turkmenistan.

It was on this very day in 1995 that the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution recognizing and supporting the permanent neutrality status of Turkmenistan. India was a co-sponsor of the Resolution.

Recently, on June 3, 2015, the UN General Assembly had passed a Resolution to welcome the decision of the Turkmen government to declare 2015 as the 'Year of Peace and Neutrality' and to host an international Conference on the theme of Neutrality. My presence here today is a reaffirmation of India's continued support to our Turkmen friends.

Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,

The formal proclamation of neutral status was a historic event for Turkmenistan. The founding President of Turkmenistan, Turkmenbashy Saparmurat Niyazov, who in his wisdom and foresight had articulated the conceptual basis of Turkmenistan's Permanent Neutrality. It set the stage for Turkmenistan to chart out its path for development and progress on its own terms while respecting the fundamental principles of international peace and cooperation.

This wise, yet pragmatic vision, now enshrined in the Turkmen Constitution, has been a cornerstone of Turkmenistan's foreign policy since its adoption and has guided this young nation-state founded on the ancient culture of the Turkmen people to transform into a fast growing economy marked by political stability.

In the twenty years since adoption of a neutral status, Turkmenistan has remained committed to building harmonious relations with its neighbours and promote peace and security in the world. It has made a significant contribution to strengthening peace and stability in this region which is a part of India's neighbourhood, a contribution that is widely acknowledged.

International recognition of Turkmenistan's constructive approach towards regional issues is reflected in the decision of the United Nations to establish the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia in Ashgabat in the year 2007.

Friends,

The idea of neutrality or its use as a political precept is not unknown to India. The basic values that underlie the policy of neutrality are of peace, non-violence and peaceful resolution of disputes. This has remarkable similarities with the overall approach of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the fundamental objective of the latter also being preservation of world peace and security, and of which, Turkmenistan is now an active member. One of the cardinal principles of NAM was independence from great powers or block politics and rivalries. This did not imply a passive role for the Movement in international politics but formulation of positions in an independent manner so as to reflect the interests of its members.

As one of the founding members of NAM, India has always taken a supportive position on Turkmenistan's neutrality. We have- both bilaterally and at international forums- conveyed our appreciation of the positive contribution made by this policy towards providing security, stability, sustainable development and humanitarian assistance in the region as well as the all-round progress of the Turkmenistan.

Mr. President ,

India and Turkmenistan have shared historical links. The most revered Turkmen poet Magtymguly Pyragy (Makhtumqoli Faraghi) yearned to visit India, and this love for Indian people is reflected in his poems.

"Here and there," he wrote "all the ways in Turkmenistan go to my Hindustan".

This bond has grown stronger in the contemporary times. During the recent visit of our Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to Turkmenistan, we reiterated our vision for a shared future. Tomorrow, we will flag-off the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which we both recognize to be a 'key pillar' of our economic engagement and which is in

consonance with the particular emphasis that Turkmenistan puts on the economic aspect of neutrality.

Today, Turkmenistan lives in peace and harmony with all countries of the region and the world. Under your sagacious leadership, Turkmenistan has sought to harness its geopolitical, economic and human potential to provide to its people a high quality of life, dynamic economy and peaceful relations with the external world. We remain committed to supporting our Turkmen friends in this endeavor by deepening our cooperation in strategic, economic, cultural, humanitarian, scientific and educational spheres.

I am confident that under your wise and far-sighted leadership Turkmenistan will continue to gain in strength and confidence and become a key actor in regional affairs.

India wishes the Turkmen people and government further success in their policy of neutrality as we work together to address the challenges of cross-border terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism. We will be your true partners in your striving for regional and global peace and sustainable development.

Ceremony of the TAPI Gas Pipeline Project

Mary, Turkmenistan, December 13, 2015

Your Excellency Mr. Gurbanguly Berdimohamedov, President of Turkmenistan,
Your Excellency Mr Ashraf Ghani, President of Afghanistan,
Your Excellency Mr Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honour for me to represent India today at this historic Ground breaking ceremony for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project.

This is indeed a momentous occasion. TAPI is much more than a gas pipeline project for our countries. It is a reflection of the common desire of the four member countries to re-connect ourselves. We are seeking to re-claim our shared geography and revitalise an age-old legacy of our mutually enriching interactions. The launch of TAPI also marks the first step towards fulfilling the vision of an economically integrated region stretching from the Bay of Bengal to the Caspian Sea.

The fact that we are doing so in the historic Silk Road city of Mary (Merv) is entirely appropriate. It was here, centuries ago, that caravans carrying goods paused to refresh themselves and thereby bestow on generations to come a colourful tapestry of mutually beneficial exchanges. It was here that our ideas and imaginations, spirituality and song, art and architecture met and mingled, and a shared history was written.

In committing ourselves to a shared future and to a vision of common prosperity, we are moving beyond an alien script written in the ink of imperialism that has prevented us from realising the fullest potential of our people and the region so far. TAPI reflects our strong desire to put this chapter behind us and stride confidently into the future.

So today, we return to Mary, to write another chapter in our voyage through history. Indeed, the idea of an economically integrated South and Central Asia is an idea whose time has come.

President Berdimuhamedov,

I fondly recall my visit to Turkmenistan in 2008 and our discussions on India's participation in the gas pipeline project. I thank you for your untiring leadership and the strength of your commitment towards TAPI. It is largely due to your efforts that we are now in a position to commence implementation of this project. I am confident that we can rely on your continued support in the days ahead. Your role has been and will be central to the success of TAPI.

I also wish to thank President Ghani and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for their active involvement. Your strong support for TAPI reflects your interest in securing the economic future of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively. Your personal commitment to the success of our common venture augurs well for the entire region and for the people of all our countries.

I would also like to place on record my appreciation for our Ministers and officials who have worked hard to move the project forward. India's young and dynamic Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Mr Dharmendra Pradhan, who is with us today, represents a new generation of India's political leadership that is working hard to build a prosperous future for the country.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Even as we celebrate the progress we have made on TAPI so far, we must be aware of the challenges that lie ahead. We must work together with resolve to ensure that negative forces inimical to the success of the project are addressed in an appropriate manner. In doing so, we must recognise that the forces of violence and disruption can no longer be allowed to threaten the quest for economic development and security of our people. I am confident that with the active engagement of all four governments, and the support of our international partners, we can overcome such challenges.

We also need to work together to ensure the technical and commercial viability of the project in its broadest sense. The international marketplace for energy works on complex principles. Often these are difficult to fathom. However, given the widespread poverty that exists in our countries, it is essential to ensure that we can make energy available at the least possible cost to the largest sections of our people.

Energy is a strategic commodity for us in our quest to provide a better future to our citizens. Any uncertainty or disruption in supply will impact not only the prospects of economic growth but also our human development objectives.

I wish to assure you that India will take a constructive and cooperative approach towards addressing issues related to the TAPI project. We are confident that all issues can be addressed through a spirit of mutual accommodation and sharing of costs and benefits.

Friends,

India's association with the TAPI project goes back almost a decade. It began as an Observer country at the 9th Steering Committee Meeting in 2006. In April 2008, India was formally admitted as a member of the Project. This was just days after my visit to Turkmenistan and my talks with President Berdimohamedov. Since then, India has been actively participating in all

the meetings and has been an active votary of the project.

Recently, during the visit of Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi to Turkmenistan in July 2015, both India and Turkmenistan had reaffirmed strong commitment towards timely implementation of this strategic project for the common benefit of people of the four countries.

Excellencies,

We are here today as partners in a new journey of hope and progress. We cannot limit our aspirations by the narrow views of a few misguided elements or afford to live in the shadow of global power equations. We must seize opportunities as they arise and lay the foundations of shared progress. TAPI is a manifestation of such an historic opportunity. I am confident that if we work on the basis of a common vision and shared prosperity, we will be successful in realising a path-breaking project that will be of immense benefit to our future generations.

EAM'S STATEMENTS IN RAJYA SABHA

Situation in Nepal and State of Indo-Nepal Relation

December 03, 2015

Hon'ble Chairman,

1. I rise to make a statement on the Calling Attention Motion on "Situation in Nepal and the State of Indo-Nepal Relations". Hon'ble Members would agree that India and Nepal share a unique relationship of centuries-old civilizational ties based on shared geography, history, culture, language and religion. The two countries have close political relations, wide-ranging economic cooperation and deep-rooted people-to-people friendship. India provides Nepal broad-based development assistance for infrastructural projects in health, water resources, agriculture, irrigation, education, culture, and rural & community development. Our 1950 Friendship Treaty provides for open borders, free movement, and gives Nepalese citizens effective 'national treatment' in terms of education and employment in India, including in our Army as well as in some civil services, where they are allowed to compete along with Indians.
2. India has always stood for a peaceful conclusion to Nepal's on-going political transition after decades of instability and violence. At times, at the request of Nepali political parties, we have actively facilitated that process. Throughout the process of Constitution making in Nepal, there has been a political consensus in India on providing unstinting moral and material support to Nepal in its efforts to establish a peaceful, stable and Constitutional democracy. We have remained closely engaged with Nepal during its ongoing political transition and have consistently supported early promulgation of a broad-based, inclusive and durable Constitution. Prime Minister emphasized this during his two visits to Nepal in 2014, when he advised Nepal's leadership to work with a 'rishi-man' to frame a Constitution based on 'sahmat' rather than 'bahumat'. I believe that this advice, of a neighbour and will-wisher, reflects the broad opinion of the House as well as our polity.
3. Soon after assuming office in May 2014, our Government has embarked on a rejuvenated partnership with Nepal, injecting a new sense of optimism in this vital relationship. There

was significant progress in the area of hydropower cooperation and connectivity. Prime Minister visited Nepal in August 2014 on the first PM-level bilateral visit in 17 years, and again in November 2014 for the SAARC Summit. I myself visited Nepal in July 2014 to co-Chair the Joint Commission, which met after 23 years. When a devastating earthquake struck Nepal in April 2015, India was the first responder with its largest ever disaster relief operation appropriately called 'Operation Maitri'. For the long-term rehabilitation phase, India's commitment of US\$ 1 billion (1/4th of which would be as grant), was announced on 25 June 2015 in Kathmandu, which was the largest pledge among all international donors. It is over and above our existing commitment of another US\$ 1 billion, 40% of which would be grant, over the next five years. India will continue to extend all assistance, in accordance with the aspirations of the people of Nepal, for peace, stability and socio-economic development of the country. This should leave no one in any doubt of our care, concern and heart-felt friendship for our northern neighbor.

4. Prime Minister's call for consensus and broad-based ownership, conveyed during his two visits to Nepal, in August and November 2014, was strongly and consistently conveyed by Government both before, and after the draft Constitution was put out for public consultations from June-August 2015. Our advice was reiterated on several occasions including the visits by CPN-UML Vice-Chairperson Smt. Bidya Bhandari in January 2015, UCPN(M) senior leader Shri Baburam Bhattarai in March 2015, UCPN(M) Chairman Shri Prachanda in July 2015, senior leader of Nepali Congress Shri Sher Bahadur Deuba in August 2015, as well as other visitors from Nepal. I personally re-emphasized our advice during my visit to Nepal in June 2015, and Prime Minister re-stated it during his telephone conversation with PM Sushil Koirala in August 2015. Our Ambassador in Kathmandu was also in regular touch with Nepali political parties in this matter. Therefore, any suggestion that our position lacked clarity or that there was lack of engagement simply has no basis.
5. The draft Constitution that finally emerged was perceived as non-inclusive by several sections of the Nepalese society, particularly in the Terai, who became restive and came out in protest from mid-August 2015 onwards. Several contentious provisions in key areas - such as constituency delimitation, inclusion for needy sections of the society and provincial boundaries - were apparently incorporated in the draft, either at a late stage without due debate and discussion, or by diluting important provisions of the 2007 Interim Constitution under which two successful elections had already been held in 2008 and 2013.
6. In an effort to head off what clearly was a looming crisis, Foreign Secretary travelled to Nepal on 18-19 September as Prime Minister's Special Envoy. He advised the Nepalese political leadership to (a) give more time for dialogue to bring about broad-based acceptance; (b) send a positive signal to the disaffected sections of the Nepalese population that their grievances will be addressed; (c) reflect on our assessment that if the protests were not addressed politically, the agitation in the Terai areas could intensify; and (d) prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Terai and on the India-Nepal border. Regrettably, these cautions passed unheeded.
7. As a result, the Constitution adopted on 20 September 2015 was perceived by large sections of Nepal's population as non-inclusive and diluting the representation already available to Nepal's ethnic and social groups since 2007. Unrest in the Terai escalated sharply, causing over 55 deaths and injuries to hundreds since August. The agitation, which completed 100 days on 23 November 2015, has seen protestors obstructing movements of cargo trucks across

India-Nepal border crossings, thereby affecting supplies of fuel and other essential commodities from India to Nepal.

8. The Constitution was expected to mark the culmination of Nepal's peace process and political transition after decades of violent instability. That the new Constitution established Nepal as a federal democratic republic was duly noted and recognized by us. But we could not ignore the fact that several sections of the Nepalese society felt that their interests had not been taken care of. Our position, without being prescriptive, is that remaining issues about perceived under-representation, should be resolved through dialogue in an atmosphere free from violence and intimidation, and institutionalized in a manner that would enable broad-based ownership of the Constitution. The then Government of Nepal, led by former PM Shri Sushil Koirala, had also approved two important constitutional amendments on constituency delimitation on the basis of population and inclusion for needy sections, by the Cabinet on 2 October 2015. But the new government has not yet moved forward on these amendments.
9. This has caused continues resentment among the disaffected sections of the Nepalese population, and the situation in many parts of the country bordering India remains violent. With a 1751-km long open border with the five Indian States of Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim, India is directly affected by developments in the Terai. The unfortunate use of force on 2 November, to forcibly remove protestors obstructing the Raxaul-Birganj route, and thereafter on 22 November against protestors in Saptari, has further vitiated the atmosphere. An Indian citizen was also killed, and we have sought an investigation into his death.
10. Leading members of the international community as well as many in Nepal have increasingly taken a position similar to ours. The USA, UK, EU and UN have spoken about the need to ensure an inclusive Constitution and address fundamental issues through dialogue. Moreover, India's ties with Nepal have always stood on their own merits and will continue to be so. Even as protests continued in Nepal, India has maintained constant touch with its leadership. On 11 October 2015, Hon'ble Prime Minister called PM Shri K.P. Oli following his election and conveyed his hearty congratulations. I hosted the Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Shri Kamal Thapa on 18 October 2015. Hon'ble Prime Minister again spoke to PM Shri K.P. Oli on 2 November 2015. In addition, our officials including the Ambassador closely monitor the situation.
11. Let me take this opportunity to also clarify to Hon'ble Members that contrary to some canards on this issue, there is no blockade by India, which we have repeatedly clarified, of supplies going to Nepal. Obstructions are by the Nepalese population on the Nepalese side, in which GoI cannot interfere. There were incidents of violence resulting in death and injury in regions of Nepal bordering India following the promulgation of this Constitution. Our freight companies and transporters also voiced complaints about difficulties of movement and security within Nepal.
12. In fact, Government of India has facilitated supplies wherever possible. Several thousand trucks have remained stranded for weeks, waiting on the Indian side of the border crossings. We have kept them there to respond quickly if the blockages on the Nepal side are peacefully lifted. The primary crossing of Raxaul-Birgunj, which accounts for two-thirds of our trade, remains closed from the Nepali side for more than two months. However, every day, several hundred cargo trucks have still been passing through those crossing points that are open

and available. Despite constraints, Indian Oil Corporation has delivered POL supplies to the extent possible. More than 400 medical consignments were cleared through the India-Nepal border in November 2015. We are also assisting in re-routing stranded POL tankers and vehicles carrying medical supplies through other available crossing points, as also airlift. But there are also logistical constraints and the best remedy remains a political solution leading to the end of the agitation.

Hon'ble Chairman,

13. Yesterday, I had another good meeting with the visiting Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Nepal, Shri Kamal Thapa. He assured me that there has been progress in the dialogue on the contentious issues with the agitating parties. This gives us hope that an early resolution would be found for the political problems facing Nepal. We will continue to encourage all sides to come to a solution sooner rather than later.
14. The causes underlying the present state of confrontation in Nepal need to be addressed credibly and effectively by the political parties and people of Nepal themselves. India's only interest is in a peaceful, united and stable Nepal. And our approach to the present crisis is completely consistent with these objectives. There has also been the broadest goodwill for Nepal in India and full political consensus on our policy. In that tradition, I would urge the House to consider the merits of a visit to Nepal by an All Party delegation. The Government will be guided by the sentiments of the House.

Visit to Islamabad and Recent Developments Relating to Ties between India and Pakistan

December 14, 2015

Hon'ble Chairman,

1. I rise to brief this august House and Hon'ble Members on my recent visit to Islamabad, Pakistan to lead the Indian delegation to the 'Heart of Asia' Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan and recent developments relating to ties between India and Pakistan.
2. The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process on December 8-9, 2015 in Islamabad was devoted to the themes of security and connectivity. The Conference provided to us an important opportunity on a vital regional platform for political consultations and regional cooperation to reiterate India's commitment to Afghanistan's stability and development and our faith in its future. India has actively participated in the Heart of Asia Process since its beginning. The process brings together friends of Afghanistan from its immediate and extended neighbourhood as well as supporting countries and international organizations to promote political consultations and regional cooperation for a united, democratic, independent, strong and prosperous Afghanistan. My visit to Islamabad underlined India's strong commitment to that cause. In my statement at the Conference, I urged full and direct transit for Afghanistan through Pakistan to India. In the context of relations between India and Pakistan, I advocated working together for peace and development in South Asia, with self-confidence and maturity.
3. I also take this opportunity to inform the House that during my visit to Islamabad, I called on Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif and held discussions with my Pakistani counterpart

Mr. Sartaj Aziz. Following my meetings the decision of this Government to begin a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue with Pakistan was announced in a Joint Statement in Islamabad on December 9, 2015. This decision of the Government follows the recent developments and engagements between the two countries, especially the constructive discussions between their National Security Advisors in Bangkok on December 6, 2015. The meeting of the NSAs resulted from discussion between our Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif in Paris on November 30, 2015.

4. As the House is aware, the Prime Minister of Pakistan was invited in May 2014, among other SAARC leaders, by Prime Minister to attend the swearing-in ceremony of the new Government. This was a demonstration of our commitment to good neighbourly ties with Pakistan, in line with our vision for peace and development in the region through deeper regional integration in South Asia. In the first meeting between the two Prime Ministers during that visit of Mr. Nawaz Sharif to New Delhi, our views on India-Pakistan ties and our concerns on terrorism and violence were conveyed to the Pakistani authorities. The meetings as decided between the two sides in May 2014, however, did not take place.
5. As the House is also aware, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met in Ufa in July 2015 and agreed that the two countries had collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development. They condemned terrorism in all its forms and agreed to cooperate with each other to eliminate this menace from South Asia. To that end, they decided on a meeting of the National Security Advisors to discuss all issues connected to terrorism. They also stated that the two countries were prepared to discuss all outstanding issues. During the Ufa meeting, PM was extended an invitation by Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif to visit Islamabad for attending the SAARC Summit in 2016.
6. For the reasons that we all know, the expected meetings of NSAs and Directors General of Military Operations of the two countries envisaged at Ufa, did not materialize though Directors General of BSF and Pakistan Rangers met and a number of humanitarian measures, agreed at Ufa, were implemented.
7. In this background, when our Prime Minister met his Pakistan counterpart during the COP-21 Summit meeting in Paris on 30 November 2015, there was a discussion on how the two countries could build an atmosphere conducive for again re-engaging with each other. The underlying sentiment, on which I am confident that this House concurs fully, was that the continued estrangement of two neighbours was a hurdle to the realization of our shared vision of a peaceful and prosperous region. At the same time, there was also a sharp awareness that the principal obstacles to the growth of ties, especially terrorism, would have to be clearly and directly addressed.
8. Following PM's conversation with PM Mr. Nawaz Sharif in Paris, the two leaders decided that both sides should hold the NSA-level meeting. The National Security Advisors of the two countries accordingly met on December 6, 2015. The meeting was held in Bangkok. Discussions between the two NSAs in that meeting were held in a candid, cordial and constructive atmosphere. They focused on peace and security, terrorism, tranquility along the Line of Control, and Jammu & Kashmir – the State which has been most directly impacted by terrorism and violation of LOC.
9. My visit to Islamabad for the Heart of Asia Conference came two days after the constructive talks between NSAs on issues related to security, terrorism, etc. My meetings with PM Mr.

Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Sartaj Aziz in Islamabad were held in the backdrop of this positive development. Both sides condemned terrorism and resolved to cooperate to eliminate this menace. There we dwelt on the need for Pakistan to expedite the Mumbai terrorist attacks trial. The Indian side was assured of the steps being taken to expedite its early conclusion.

10. Accordingly, it was decided to begin a dialogue with Pakistan under the new title "Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue". The Foreign Secretaries have been tasked to work out modalities and schedule of the meetings under the new Dialogue.
11. I would like to assure the House that this Government accords the highest priority to the country's security. In order to meet any threats in this regard, the Government will take all steps, including through diplomatic channels. At the same time, the Government is also committed to building an environment of peaceful and cooperative relations with all our neighbours, including Pakistan, so that the efforts for peace and development in South Asia, initiated by the Government on the day of assuming office itself, are taken further forward. The new Dialogue with Pakistan has twin aims of removing hurdles in the path of a constructive engagement by addressing issues of concern, and at the same time, of exploring and establishing cooperative ties. Initiatives on trade and connectivity, people-to-people exchanges and humanitarian issues will contribute to welfare of the entire region, and promote better understanding and mutual trust. The new Dialogue, we sincerely hope, marks a new beginning also for peace and development in the whole region. I am confident that we have the support of the entire House in this expectation.

EAM'S SPEECHES/STATEMENTS

Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process

December 09, 2015

Your Excellency Mr. Ashraf Ghani, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

Your Excellency Mr. Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

Excellencies, Ladies & Gentlemen

It is a matter of immense happiness for me to participate in this, the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process.

I join my other colleagues in thanking the Government of Pakistan for their warm hospitality and excellent arrangements.

Excellencies,

We are here together today due to our commitment to Afghanistan's stability and development and our faith in its future.

The Heart of Asia process provides an important platform for friends of Afghanistan from its immediate and extended neighbourhood to promote political consultations and regional cooperation for a united, democratic, independent, strong and prosperous Afghanistan. My presence here underlines India's strong commitment to that cause.

The theme of today's meeting combines cooperation with security and connectivity. This is particularly relevant to Heart of Asia. India's vision of this process is one of interlinked trade, transit, energy and communication routes, with Afghanistan as an important hub.

Connectivity also lies at the heart of India's own efforts to develop regional economic cooperation.

The 'Heart' of Asia cannot function if arteries are clogged.

Nothing can benefit Afghanistan more immediately than full and direct overland access to India's markets to enable it to take advantage of the zero duty regime available to its exports to India.

Similarly, if Afghan trucks could carry Indian products to markets in Afghanistan and Central Asia, that would be the best way to make trucking from Afghanistan cost-effective and viable, and bestow benefits to the whole region.

India is willing to receive Afghan trucks on its territory, at Attari, and create necessary facilities for Afghan products there.

We have also formally indicated our willingness to join the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement.

India is also working with Afghanistan and Iran to develop trilateral transit. Participation in development of the Chahbahar Port will augment our connectivity with Afghanistan and beyond.

India's engagement in the Trade, Commerce and Investment (TCI) CBM within the Heart of Asia process as the lead country complements our bilateral development cooperation with Afghanistan, including in the spheres of infrastructure, connectivity and capacity building.

Let me take this opportunity to extend our hand to Pakistan as well. It is time that we display the maturity and self-confidence to do business with each other and strengthen regional trade and cooperation. The entire world is waiting and rooting for a change. Let us not disappoint them.

For its part, India is prepared to move our cooperation at a pace which Pakistan is comfortable with. But today, let us at least resolve to help Afghanistan – in the best traditions of good neighbourliness – through more effective transit arrangements.

Excellencies,

Democracy is taking roots in Afghanistan. We acknowledge the role of President Ghani and CEO Dr. Abdullah in building on the strong foundation created by former President Karzai to ensure peaceful, democratic and inclusive governance for the whole of Afghanistan.

However, as noted by the UN Secretary General in his latest report on Afghanistan, the country continues to face intersecting challenges. Afghanistan is threatened most by terrorism and not tribal or ethnic rivalries.

In the last few months, terrorism in Afghanistan has grown in both intensity and scope. Terrorists have made concerted efforts to capture and hold territory, reminding us that they have not changed.

We salute the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan people for countering the forces

of terrorism and extremism with courage and resilience. They need the continued support of the international community to defend Afghanistan's unity and security.

For its part, India is ready to work with Afghanistan to strengthen its defensive capability.

It is also the collective duty of all of us to ensure that the forces of terrorism and extremism do not find sanctuaries and safe havens in any name, form or manifestation. We, in Afghanistan's proximity, have a particular responsibility in this regard.

An end to terrorism and extremism, and adherence to internationally accepted redlines are essential for reconciliation and lasting peace in Afghanistan.

Excellencies,

Here in Islamabad, we are close to the millennia-old highway which an Afghan-origin ruler of Delhi named Sher Shah Suri restored and upgraded, over 450 years ago. Connecting Kolkata and Kabul in later centuries, that road exists even today as the Grand Trunk Road, reminding us of our shared destiny.

The honour to host the sixth Ministerial of the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process in 2016 in India will help us highlight the age-old message of that great artery connecting peoples and lands.

I look forward to welcoming you all in India next year.

ICCR Distinguished Alumni Award 2015

December 10, 2015

President, ICCR, Prof. Lokesh Chandrari,

Secretary (East) in MEA, Shri Anil Wadhwa,

Honourable Awardees -

Madam Zenebu Tadesse Woldetsadik of Ethiopia and;

Ambassador Le Luong Minh, the Secretary General of the ASEAN,

His Excellency Ambassador of France,

Excellencies,

Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen,

Today is an important day for the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). When we first founded the ICCR in 1950, it was with the objective of fostering and strengthening cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries and to promote cultural exchanges with other countries and people.

Through this cross fertilization of ideas, ideals and cultures, we have not only fostered the goal of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the world as a family, but we have also created a cadre of ICCR alumni who are infused with the same spirit of enlightened globalization.

Today is the day we honour three such individuals.

The quest for knowledge has always been a fundamental of Indian culture and civilization. Since time immemorial our country has attracted knowledge-seekers and inquisitive minds from all over the world. Moriz Winternitz, the renowned Austrian Orientalist said and I quote:

“If we wish to learn to understand the beginnings of our own culture, if we wish to understand the oldest Indo European culture, we must go to India, where the oldest literature of Indo European people is preserved”.

There have been many like Moriz who have inspired and motivated people of all ages, nationalities, colours and creeds to visit India to demystify and understand this nation and its various schools of thoughts and knowledge traditions.

In the Vedic time our Rishis were not only the embodiment of wisdom. They were in fact institutions disseminating knowledge among their followers and disciples. Post-Vedic period showed the emergence of number of institutions of world repute.

World-renowned seats of learning like Takshashila, Nalanda, Vikramashila, Valabhi, Somapura and Odantapuri dominated the education system and acted as magnets for the finest minds and scholars in the world.

Alumnus of Indian centres of learning - Megasthenes to Hiuen Tsang, Fa Hien, Hyecho and Al-Barauni not only spread Indian knowledge system all over the world, but they are also remembered for their contributions towards the development of human civilization.

I am proud that India has continued and continues to be a centre for learning. We host thousands of students from 160 countries in our educational and research institutions. Many of them come on ICCR scholarships.

The alumni of Indian institutions are playing a leading role in different fields across the world. In the field of politics, for example, Bangladesh PM Hon'ble Sheikh Hasina, Myanmar's respected leader Hon'ble Aung San Suu Kyi, Afghanistan's former President Hon'ble Hamid Karzai have all studied in India and gone on to lead their countries.

And today the students who were once on ICCR scholarships in India are also holding some very important, prestigious positions in their respective countries and even internationally. When we see them excelling in their fields, it gives us immense pleasure, which also evokes an instant connection and a sense of belonging and affinity with them.

The alumni of ICCR work as the goodwill ambassadors of India, for they have been in India for extended period and been a part of Indian traditions, festivals and systems. Hence when they return home after completion of their studies, they take back a bit of “India” with them.

But surprisingly, so far, we did not have a practice of recognising such illustrious alumni. We need not only note their accomplishments, we need to celebrate them proudly and highlight their connections with our educational institutions. I am glad that our Government has taken up this task.

To carry forward our rich and illustrious history and tradition of providing knowledge, I requested the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, to institute this award. I am glad that ICCR has been able to do this quickly, and here we are, today, to celebrate the successes of our distinguished alumni.

Let me turn now to the three distinguished individuals who are the recipients of the inaugural award.

It has been a great privilege to confer the Distinguished Alumni Award today upon His Excellency Le Luong Minh, Secretary General, ASEAN, Her Excellency Ms. Zenebu Tadesse, Minister of Women, Children and Youth Affairs of Ethiopia and Mrs. Milena Salvini from France.

Over the past year I have had the pleasure of meeting Ambassador Le Luong Minh in his capacity as the ASEAN Secretary General. We count on his support and energy in making India's engagement with ASEAN even more robust. He has also served as Vietnam's Ambassador to the UN and as Vice Minister with great distinction. Our good wishes are always remain with him.

Madam Zenebu Tadesse, you have greatly distinguished herself as a parliamentarian and a leader in public policy formulation in labour and social issues, in particular those related to women and child welfare. As a fellow woman Minister, I am very happy to meet you and confer this award. I would also like to appreciate your role contribution in strengthening India's fraternal ties with Ethiopia.

Madame Milena Salvini is not with us here today, but I would like to recognize her contribution in spreading knowledge of Indian culture in France and beyond. As we know she was the first French national to be awarded ICCR scholarship and has gone on to create the Centre Mandapa in Paris in 1975.

All our three awardees have done exemplary work in their chosen fields and have greatly contributed to the promotion of understanding, goodwill and friendship between India and their respective countries. I take this opportunity to thank them for their constant support and their untiring efforts they have put in to strengthen the relations between India and Vietnam, Ethiopia and France.

I compliment President Lokesh Chandra ji and ICCR for quickly instituting the Distinguished Alumni Award to felicitate the foster sons and daughters of India who have been making the country proud around the world.

I hope that this will commence a tradition which will inspire more such excellence both in India and also among the foreign students studying in India. Only then, as Mahatma Gandhi said, can we be the change we wish to see in the world.

Translating Aspirations into Reality- India@2022

December 18, 2015

Dr. Jyotsna Suri, President, FICCI,
Shri, Harshvardhan Neotia,
President-elect, FICCI,
Distinguished members of Indian Industry,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to address the 88th Annual General Meeting of FICCI.

It is appropriate that the theme for this year is 'Translating Aspirations into Reality'. Indeed, that is exactly what governance seeks to do in all societies, especially democracies.

It is in fact the extent of that translation that defines success in politics.

As India's External Affairs Minister, I have naturally been most interested in how our external engagements have helped us catalyse progress at home. Allow me, therefore, to take this opportunity to share with you all our current assessment in regard to foreign policy.

The results of the 2014 general elections were very much driven by the growing aspirations of our people, particularly the youth.

They sought more opportunities for improving their lot, whether it was in livelihood, education, health or housing. This was across the country, as much in rural areas as urban.

Electoral results showed that the people of India reposed faith in our party, under Prime Minister Modi's leadership, as being best placed to deliver in that regard. We are acutely conscious of that responsibility.

Even within the first few months, you have all seen a series of flagship programmes that are designed not just to improve the economy but to transform the entire society.

Expectations of change were not just limited to the quality of life. The nation also wanted a greater sense of security.

Beset by terrorist attacks sponsored from abroad and insurgency at home, there was a growing feeling that a firmer hand was required to steer national security. It was also natural that India's immediate neighbourhood was the focus of attention.

Disturbances there added to a feeling of instability. Equally, opportunities were often not exploited for lack of confidence. It was apparent that decisive policies were required to address longstanding problems and create a larger zone of cooperation.

Beyond our immediate periphery, the world had clearly taken a more complicated turn.

To our west, a new spectre of fundamentalist terror aggravated an already unstable region, threatening to spread its tentacles beyond. Given our energy dependence and community presence, its challenge could not be underestimated.

To the east, changes in the power balance and sharper territorial claims were impacting the security environment.

In Asia, our ability to influence key debates on connectivity and maritime security was clearly central to the securing of national interest. Indians, whose aspirations are as much for the nation as for themselves, looked forward to effective diplomacy that would make credible headway in that regard.

Yet another dimension of Indian aspirations was in the connected realm of culture and tradition.

As inheritors of an old civilization that values its openness and diversity, each one of us takes some pride in our global standing. For decades, we have operated in an international system that is driven by Western concepts and values.

The India of today aspires to project its own heritage on the global scene. In today's parlance, we could say that it is to build our national branding. There is much to be done on that score. Finally, we had to consider the concerns and aspirations of the Indian diaspora. Indians historically have traversed the world and made their presence felt through trade and culture.

However, contemporary economic aspirations have provided a new impetus to their presence abroad. In different corners of the globe, there are today communities – large and small - who maintain their ties with their land of origin. Many of them contribute directly or indirectly to growth and development at home, whether through remittances, best practices or investments.

Nurturing this bond of kinship is therefore truly a win-win situation. Standing by them in times of trouble is also our basic duty, especially in the case of the vulnerable in difficult situations. The presence of so many Indians abroad only highlights our society's enormous potential as a human resources superpower.

We have the demographics but the challenge is to derive the dividend. To do that, whether at home or abroad, it is imperative that our people are equipped with adequate work skills. This too has its international implications. With all these aspirations in mind, last year, we set about re-fashioning foreign policy to make it more effective to address these contemporary challenges.

So let me give you the score card on how much we have been able to translate them into reality. I do so bearing in mind that we have been in office for only 18 months and much work is still in progress.

It is apparent that many of the flagship programmes of the Government can be significantly strengthened through international collaboration. Consequently, much of our diplomacy focus has shifted to its economic dimensions, especially in facilitating business interactions.

Those of you who monitor our foreign policy would have noted that this is an increasing component of our programmes. Spreading the message of 'easier to do business' is one of our major goals. So too is the involvement of CEOs in this effort. The results are already beginning to make themselves felt.

There has been a marked increase in FDI commitments in the last year, estimated at 40% more than the one before. The 'Make in India' programme has started to gain increasing traction, the latest vote of confidence coming in the 12 billion dollars commitment made by Japan during PM Abe's visit.

Our 'Skill India' endeavour has found experienced and responsive partners, ranging from Germany to Singapore. The international response to the 'Digital India' campaign was particularly visible when Prime Minister visited California. The interest in 'Smart Cities' has also been very strong.

The Ganga rejuvenation programme has been offered best practices and effective technologies. What you are all seeing today is India's diplomatic skills at work in the service of the economy and society: delivering more jobs, ensuring better skills and accessing modern technology. The welfare of those who have gone abroad in search of a living has emerged as a particular priority in these difficult times.

Even in our short tenure, we have demonstrated our commitment to their well being by organising evacuations in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. In fact, there has been a sea change in how an

Indian in distress perceives the Government. From individual cases to small groups and entire communities, we respond with sympathy, speed and creativity.

This is one area, where I can confidently assure you that the mindset of our bureaucracy has completely changed. We have taken great trouble to also strengthen India's relationship with its diaspora.

This is reflected in better passport services, simplified visa procedures and changes in PIO/OCI cards.

By connecting directly with the diaspora, Prime Minister in particular has increased their enthusiasm to contribute to the changes underway in the country. We are seeing results of that, whether it be in 'Swachh Bharat' or in 'Namami Gange'.

Foreign policy begins on our borders and quite appropriately, we embarked on a 'Neighbourhood First' policy from the very inception of our tenure. You will recall the invitation extended to our neighbourhood leaders to attend the swearing in of the Government. Since then, considerable progress has been made in these key relationships.

Bangladesh is a particularly notable example, where we have not only settled the longstanding boundary problem but have agreed on economic and connectivity projects that will have a truly transformational impact. With Bhutan, we have further consolidated a longstanding relationship.

Where Sri Lanka is concerned, the new Government is a valued partner with whom we are expanding bilateral cooperation, while addressing the ethnic problem. With Maldives, recent events point to a more intensive engagement in future. In respect of Myanmar, we are preparing for a political transition, confident that India's interests are recognised by all parties.

With Nepal, our traditionally close relations were taken to the next level by this government. By calling for an inclusive Nepal and urging a political solution to long pending political problems, we are committed to unity, peace and stability of Nepal which will create a more durable foundation for our bilateral relations to prosper.

Ties with Pakistan have predictably been the most challenging to take forward. However, the recent NSA-level dialogue on security and terrorism and the establishment of a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue following my visit to Islamabad now offers a pathway.

Countering terrorism has become an increasingly salient feature of our national security calculations. It has also become prominent in the public discourse about foreign policy. Much of it centres on our relationship with Pakistan, but there are also aspects beyond.

In the last year and more, our efforts have ensured that this is adequately reflected in the global agenda, multilateral or bilateral. Equal attention has been paid to improving the security preparedness of our armed forces. Let me emphasize that it is India's diplomacy that has today created a situation, where we have ready access to defence technologies from all the key global sources.

Not many countries can claim that privilege. Accelerating long-pending procurement decisions at home complements the opportunities that we have created abroad. India's relations with major powers have seen an upswing across the board since we assumed office.

The strengthening of the relationship with the US is evident in President Obama's visit on January 26, the resolution of the nuclear liability problem and our working together on global issues. With key European powers like France, Germany and UK, our security and economic cooperation has expanded visibly.

China has been engaged with a greater sense of confidence, whether it is on the boundary problem or on exploring economic opportunities. With Russia we have deepened an already robust strategic partnership. As for Japan, all of you would have recognised the significance of the bullet train understanding as much as the conclusion of the civil nuclear cooperation negotiations.

Our engagement with other regions has been equally energetic. The Africa Summit was unprecedented in its scale and level of participation. This has dramatically changed the impression of India in that continent and opened up new opportunities for us. Similarly, we have made our presence felt through a range of activities in South East Asia as much as in Latin America.

Particular care has been given to engaging smaller nations who may have been neglected in the past. The summit of Pacific Island States underlines our new approach. The world is responding to our vision of progress, our stronger sense of purpose and the changes already on the ground.

There is no doubt that India's international profile has been significantly enhanced in the last 18 months. Our views on key international issues – be it on trade, climate change, terrorism or maritime security - are also being given greater consideration.

The overall image of India that we have managed to project, even in a short while, is of a country that is serious about meeting its commitments and responsibilities. This has made us a more credible player at international events, as you would have noticed in Paris recently.

The shift from 'Look East' to 'Act East' is also intended to underline that issues of connectivity, trade and security are being addressed more purposefully today. But equally, the projection of India as a civilization that enriches global culture, has also been much stronger.

The International Day of Yoga that was marked across the world is perhaps the most visible symbol of this development.

But there are other activities which support this effort, ranging from language conferences and performing arts to promotion of Ayurveda.

As this Government proceeds to execute its mandate for change, let me assure you all that its foreign policy component would deliver to the fullest. Our goal is to utilise international relations to ensure a prosperous, secure and modern India that emerges as a leading power. By doing so, we would be meeting the aspirations of the entire nation.

SPEECH

Address by MoS for External Affairs at the Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

December 15, 2015

His Excellency Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China,

Heads of Government of SCO Member Countries and Observers, Dialogue Partners and Special Invitees,

Secretary General of the SCO,

Heads of delegations, distinguished guests,

It is a privilege for me to attend the Plenary Session of the SCO Heads of Government meeting. I wish to thank the Chair, Premier Li Keqiang, for the excellent arrangements made for this meeting.

It is a pleasure to visit the beautiful city of Zhengzhou, a rapidly growing city that is emerging as an economic, educational and transportation centre of China. We are not far from Luoyang, where the famous White Horse Temple, marking the arrival of Buddhism in China from India is located. This represents India's age-old links with this region of China.

Excellencies,

The decision of the Heads of State Meeting in Ufa this July to include India as a member reflects the desire of member countries to significantly widen the scope of the organization. India's membership will create a broader framework for SCO that brings together, for the first time in history, countries of Central, East and South Asia as well as Russia, into a Eurasian regional cooperation entity.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi said at the Ufa Summit, this reflects the 'natural links of history' between India and the member states of the SCO. India enjoys excellent bilateral relations with all SCO countries. These political, cultural, spiritual and commercial links have existed through the centuries. The visit of the Prime Minister of India in July 2015 to all five Central Asian countries and Russia, as well as to China in May 2015, underline the importance that India places on revitalizing ties with the region.

India looks forward to the speedy completion of India's membership so that we can involve ourselves fully in SCO's programmes and activities at the earliest. We are confident of receiving the support of all members, in particular Uzbekistan as the new Chair, in this regard. In the meantime, we have continued to take active part as Observer in meetings of the SCO Health, Trade, Interior and Justice Ministers as well as Prosecutors General meeting and the SCO Trade Fair this year.

Excellencies,

Many of the problems confronting our region, especially the rising tide of cross-border terrorism and extremism, require transnational solutions. At the same time, if we are to fully realize the economic potential and progress of our shared region, we need to seek newer regional projects that can raise the level of our cooperation to a higher plane.

International terrorism has emerged as the most serious threat to our peaceful and pluralistic societies. Terrorism threatens to derail our developmental aspirations and undermine our very way of life. Closer coordination between SCO member states and zero tolerance towards terrorism will go a long way to address this menace. Political convenience can no longer provide an alibi for backing terrorist groups ideologically, financially or through material support. Today the world has realized that there are no good terrorists.

One of our most important goals remains a stable and peaceful Afghanistan free of external interference. This is absolutely essential to advance peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

There is enormous scope to push forward on the SCO's economic and developmental agenda. India's fast growing market provides an immense economic opportunity, especially for the relatively smaller economies of Central Asia. India's energy requirements can be met by new and more ambitious energy projects within the SCO bringing on board the interests of energy exporting, transit and importing nations.

On its part, India can bring to the region its strengths in financial management, especially micro-finance, pharmaceuticals, services such as IT and healthcare, as well as capacity building. The SCO should create a facilitating environment for trade and investment. We should bring down barriers to trade and enhance links between our businesses, especially our small and medium enterprises. We can also work together on issues of food security and agriculture.

The past few years have witnessed the steady growth of new modes of connectivity in our region. However, progress in this regard is still limited. As we move ahead, we should invest in improving regional transportation and communication networks through mutual consultation and sharing of benefits. On this basis, we can create new networks of physical and digital connectivity that extends from Russia's northern regions to the shores of Indian Ocean. The International North South Transportation Corridor is an important step in that direction.

In conclusion, Excellencies, I wish to state that a young and dynamic India, constituting one-sixth of humanity, which is growing at nearly 8% per year is joining the SCO to usher in a new phase of friendship with our partners. India recognizes that its extraordinary opportunities can be fulfilled faster and more fully through an active engagement within its shared neighbourhood. I invite our SCO partners to a partnership of mutual benefit and shared prosperity with India in the days ahead.

MEDIA BRIEFING

Prime Minister's visit to Russia

December 28, 2015

Official Spokesperson (Vikas Swarup): Good evening friends and welcome to this press briefing on Prime Minister's visit to Russia. As you know we have just come back from the Friends of India event. It was the last public event of Prime Minister held in Russia. To brief you on all the activities that happened today and yesterday when Prime Minister arrived and had the private(inaudible)... with President Putin. I have with me Foreign Secretary, Dr. S Jaishankar. I also have Ambassador to Russia, Ambassador P. S. Raghavan and your Joint Secretary Eurasia Mr. Shambhu Kumaram. With that I'll give the floor now to Foreign Secretary.

Foreign Secretary (Dr. S Jaishankar): Thank you. We are now at the end of what has been very productive, very intense visit to Moscow. Yesterday evening after we arrived the Prime Minister had talks with President Putin which actually lasted a little more than 2 and half hours, which was largely focused on regional and global issues. This morning Prime Minister went to the AMERCOM center, the emergency response center of Russia which was something which we thought that very useful in terms of how to respond on to disasters and civil emergencies.

And in the afternoon after he went to the ...(inaudible)... to pay his respects there. We had very extended period of talks again with President Putin and his delegations. Those also meeting of the President and the PM with the CEO's of India and Russia. I think that was televised, so many of you would have seen that and in the end of the talks we signed up I believe 17 agreements. Today some of them were signed in the presence of the PM and the President. Some of them were signed separately but which is not to take away the importance of any of them. And then we have issued the joint statement I think again many of you would have seen that already. So the big point I would make is that even we speak of Russia as a strategic partnership, is strategic in the fullest sense of the term, its strategic in the sense of two countries that look at the world which with very similar views and interest in that sense, their perspectives are self supporting, which each have an interest in the growth and development and prosperity and security of the other. It's also strategic that you have the defense and security facet, a lot of it very hi-tech, very sensitive, but which again has been very unique facet of the India-Russia relationship. And it's strategic in its economic dimension and I would for this visit in particular emphasis that perhaps much more than previous summits, a lot of attention was paid to growing the economic foundations of our relationship. The feeling was that we need, I think President Putin himself said that for a variety of reasons, some of it outside are controlled global developments but neither our trades, nor our mutual investment has done as well as we wanted it to do so, I think there was a very specific push in those departments. And again as all of you are perhaps aware and this functions that we have just come from demonstrated, this is a relationship which is really based on an edifice of popular good will. The sentiments of the average Indian and Russian towards each other is something which is also very special. And so that also express itself in different ways, particularly in terms of making travel and education and movement of people much easier. On the political side, the big international issues of the day were discussed, particularly the situations in the middle East but much closer challenges of terrorism, some of the issues perhaps a little closer to our neighborhood and I mean it will be no surprise to you largely there was a sort of convergence of view points on those issues. A lot of the international you know we are today both members of the BRICS, Russia's current chairman, we look forward to taking over from them, and we were very happy that they are going to handover the BRICS when they do in a very sort of energized state and we need to sort of take the bit and then move forward with it. We are very thankful to Russia for the SCO membership, and we expect to complete those formalities in to the next year. We also work closely with Russia in other international events from the G20 to the East Asia summit. And there are very practical forms of cooperation in most of those. So there was a sense that, on lot of these issues again we have a very solid working relationship, there was some interest I recall the press conference I addressed before coming here on Russia's position on our UN Security Council membership, I think President Putin answered that very clearly in express remark so there is nothing more that I need to say on my side. Moving on to the economic side and I used that in the largest sort of the sense of the term, broadest sense of the term, some of the agreements we did today speaks a lot about the development of our ties the intergovernmental agreement on the come out 2 to 60 helicopter, is a first make in India project in the field of defense, and I think it's very appropriate that our partner happened to be a Russian company. We also saw a number of agreements today in the field of energy and Russia again has been a long standing partner in energy and in a very wide spectrum of energy. You had today an agreement on acquisition of 15% of the second largest Oil field in Russia. But in the talks this issue came up of Russia as a reliable supplier of crude, a Russian company actually taking stakes in Indian refineries, possibly even in actually running petrol stations in India. Actually not the prospect but the reality of Russian companies now supplying LNG to India and LNG is one form of energy which is very sharply on the rise. You also had an agreement of an Indian company which was looking at coal from Russia and

then most important the long standing nuclear partnership was taken forward by an understanding on localizing nuclear components in India. So it was a sort of make in India version for the nuclear industry. So as you can see in the list of agreements and there was an important agreement on solar energy as well, so there was lot of progress in different areas, some of it was new, some of it was building on a very robust past, one of which was an MOU on modernizing the HEC, Heavy Engineering Corporation, which you may recall was a company which was set up with Soviet help many years ago. So one in all I would say on the economic side it's been a very good day, a lot of the discussions today really was spent reviewing very specific issues in our relationship. You can see that we have signed agreements to make travel easier between the two countries as well. Also some thought was given to connectivity. We have taken forward green corridor to make to facilitate customs inspection of goods going to the two sides but also literal connectivity, the north south international, north south transport corridor, which would really move goods from India through Iran to Russia was something which came up for some discussion. We have had meetings that's also a progress. So, the overall take as I said is so far very satisfying visit, a very substantive visit, very broad spectrum of issues have moved and some of them have moved very fast. The helicopter proposal for example was just a year old, it was proposed when President Putin came to India for the summit last year. So, there is a sense today that the relationship is moving much more purposefully in a number of areas. So, that's broadly what I have. I don't know if the ambassador would like to add something.

Question: Your view, I mean on the energy sector, basically the specific deals, the word specific deals in energy sector and will you please explain what you have said.

Foreign Secretary: Perhaps ambassador and Mr. Shambhu Kumaran might want to come in with more details but on the nuclear side, we already have a road map of 12 reactors and we will review the first 6 which are to be in Kudankulam and 4 & 5 are well on track and 6 was you know, today the subject of the meeting and there the new development in a sense was the agreement to localize certain number of components so that India's own nuclear engineering capabilities are strengthened. So, we had worked out a list, what is the actual transfer of technology to be done and reached an understanding on that? When it comes to the hydrocarbon side, hydrocarbon side you have ONGC, there is OVL, which had acquired 15% of a field called Onecore and then you had Rosneft which took 49% in a refinery in Vadinal. This is the SR refinery. Then you had Gazprom supplying LNG to India through GAIL and then we had this other agreements Rosneft with Oil India and Indian Oil Corporation as well.

Question: What was about this last word sir, Rosneft with Oil India?

Ambassador (P. S. Raghavan): That's another field...there is a field called 'Tasuriach'. So, this is a field on which they have signed a non-binding agreement and with a time frame of finalizing the deal in next couple of months, by the end of February.

Question: Sir, the President had said that the bilateral trade between India and Russia is dropped by 14%. So, what is the reason for this dip and what are the measures that have been taken to overcome this?

Foreign Secretary: Well, I think the number of reasons for the dip. One is that the price of petroleum and petroleum products has fallen. So, that itself lowers the value of the trade because that's part of the trade. Number two, the state of the global economy is such where clearly demand is not as robust as it was many years ago. Then I think the currency issues as well. the currency fluctuation has lead to pricing issues and in some case competitiveness issues, because

my understanding is for example pharmaceuticals, because the price is fixed in Rubels, you, it's harder to export at a lower dollar value then it used to be. So, it has complex set of reasons.

Ambassador: But, I would like to mention one thing. It was mentioned actually even during this conversation that the volume of trade has gone up, though the value has gone down, which is precisely the currency issue that he is talking about.

Foreign Secretary: President Putin has himself said that.

Question: Sir, on defense we heard about the Kamov deal, the 5th generation fighters, we haven't heard anything. If you could provide us some clarity and also the nuclear submarine, what are the plans? What's happening on that front? I mean, we thought that's going to be announced, but, if you could provide some clarity and just one more, on Pakistan, the Russian plans on defense with Pakistan. Have you express some concerns to them as that come up? Have they given any assurances?

Foreign Secretary: Well, typically we don't announce any. I'm not necessarily referring to any issues that you've raised. I mean, I'm now answering it more across the board. Typically we don't announce acquisition decisions on visits, because a part of it is the acquisition cycle is very difficult to match with the visit cycle. So, if you see the important defense agreement we signed, this was more in the nature of a defense industrial collaboration. I mean what was important in the case of the Kamov was the fact that the Kamov would be a make in India project and it would be made in India. But, other than that, as you would know neither in the joint statement, nor in the agreement have we actually touched on any issues dealing with acquisitions and that generally not in the tradition. Frankly when we looked at the breadth of the agenda that we were looking at in terms of our defense collaboration, we focused on what was important and substantive.

Question: I've a couple of questions. One which is clarified, the Kamov deal, you know, it's ...(inaudible)... first defense make in India project. Would you just give us some idea of is it going to be a deal where some of the helicopters are made in India and some in Russia or is it that some components are made in India and rest in Russia? That's one question. And the other question sir is, we have had this discussions with the Russian servile now on possible trade in national currencies and things like that. First time discussed as well and where is that you know that idea stand right now?

Foreign Secretary: In the case of the Kamov what we signed was the inter governmental agreement and this will now be followed up with the joint venture agreement and more details would be worked out and the joint venture partners would work out, you know what is the extent of the transfer of technology and what would be the thing.

Ambassador: On the national currency, you know trade in national currency, there is a sub group on banking and finance that actually considered it. It's headed by the central bank of the two countries. The central banks of the two countries have actually arrived at modalities for doing so. The process right now is in consultation with businesses of the two countries, because unless businesses take it up, there is no point in establishing the scheme. So, that's where we are now. So, after the consultation with business, banks will work out hedging methodologies by which level bring this into play. That's where we are. So, we are actively progressing this in consultation with business.

Question: You know there was a lot of expectation that possibly Netaji files issue we discussed with Russia. Has the prime minister taken up this in his ...(inaudible)... or during his respective meeting with President Putin and have we heard anything from the Russian side on this?

Foreign Secretary: The answer to your first question is a yes. And the answer was that, this was something which had been taken up earlier as well, that they are looking at it.

Question: Sir, regarding Afghanistan. Russia has recently said that they do not mind on favorably a Chinese involvement in it and India does not really favor a Chinese involvement on Afghanistan because of China-Pakistan ties. Was that taken up here and what is India's stand on it?

Foreign Secretary: There are two assumptions in your question. One that Russia said this and two, this is an Indian view. So, Afghanistan was discussed in some detail and but I think it was discussed more in sense of the common perspective and common interest that we had rather than where other countries and other players came in. I mean, meaning India and Russia have discussed Afghanistan more in the sense of how they saw it rather than necessarily how, where a third country, that particular third country fitted into the equation.

Japanese Prime Minister's visit to India

December 14, 2015

Official Spokesperson (Shri Vikas Swarup): Good afternoon friends and welcome to this press briefing on the ongoing visit of His Excellency Mr. Shinzo Abe, the Prime Minister of Japan, to India.

As you are aware, we have just had delegation-level talks. A number of agreements have been signed including some very very historic agreements. In fact we are now skipping lunch, which is going on in Hyderabad House, to brief you all. Today to brief you all I have with me Foreign Secretary Dr. S. Jaishankar. I have with me the Ambassador of India to Japan Mr. Sujan Chinoy. We have the Joint Secretary (East Asia) Mr. Pradeep Kumar Rawat, and Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security Affairs) Amandeep Gill.

Foreign Secretary will give you a read out on the discussions that have happened today and the agreements that have been signed, and then we can go into a Q&A session. Please note that we do not have too much time as we have to catch the flight to Varanasi. With that, I give the floor to Foreign Secretary.

Foreign Secretary (Dr. S. Jaishankar): Thank you Vikas.

Good afternoon. Let me just very quickly run you through the programme and then I will give you a sense of the discussion, and then the agreements and the other outcomes for today.

Before I do that, let me also say it is often during visits you hear superlative terms, a lot of adjectives in describing a visit. Those of you who were there when the agreements were being signed heard Prime Minister Abe describe it as a new dawn in our relationship and predict a brilliant future. I think when you hear me out I am sure most of you will understand and appreciate why today's discussions and outcomes were being described in such strong terms.

In terms of the programme, the Prime Minister arrived yesterday. The External Affairs Minister called on him. He attended an innovation event yesterday evening. This morning, the two Prime Ministers met for a business event. They received recommendations of the India-Japan CEO Group. They also both spoke to the CEOs present about their assessment of where our economic relations stood.

Prime Minister Abe then called on Rashtrapatiji, and then arrived in Hyderabad House for talks. There was a sort of a restricted session between the two Prime Ministers, and then delegation-level talks, then of course the signing of the agreements, the press statements, and they are now having lunch.

In terms of the issues that came up, obviously bilateral relations, generally bilateral cooperation, particularly economic issues, the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA), investment, civilian nuclear cooperation, the high-speed railways, the whole sense of easy to do business, the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor, the concept of Japanese industrial townships in India, Make in India itself, visa issues, defence and security issues, maritime security, the Japanese participation in Malabar, Japanese support for our export control regime memberships, connectivity issues, Japanese support for APEC. There was some discussion on the climate change conference COP21 which is taking place in Paris. UNSC issues were discussed yesterday by the External Affairs Minister with the Prime Minister.

In terms of the agreements, there was of course a Joint Statement which the two Prime Ministers signed. Then there was a memorandum on civilian nuclear energy cooperation, one on high-speed railways. There were two defence agreements, and there were 12 other agreements. The Joint Statement, a fact-sheet, and a list of agreements are all being uploaded on the website.

Now let me very quickly run you through the outcomes and then we can take this further. On the civilian nuclear cooperation issue, we have reached substantive agreement on that issue. There are some technical details and obviously legal scrubbing and the internal procedures to be gone through, but the key part of the agreement has been done. This is very important for a variety of reasons, one of course because Japan is a very important player in the global nuclear industry. They have a number of areas of particular expertise.

And in fact, the fact that we have an agreement which the Japanese system and our system will now look at and complete the formalities soon, will allow Japan to even partner other countries, particularly both Westinghouse and GE had Japanese partners in their nuclear reactor offers.

Again as most of you know, with the climate change right now being in news, India has in the INDC a 40 per cent non-fossil fuel commitment in terms of power generation capacity and nuclear is a very important part of this. So, both in a literal sense in terms of the nuclear industry, in terms of its implications for climate change, I think the fact that we have concluded the negotiations on civil nuclear cooperation with Japan today is a very very big step.

Let me stick with the political issues and then I will come to the economic issues. We also signed two defence agreements today - one on the transfer of defence equipment and technology, and the other one on protection of classified information. Together, the two make possible defence equipment cooperation, defence production cooperation between India and Japan.

Also on the defence side, we confirm today that Japan would be a regular participant at the Malabar exercises which generally take place between India and the United States. They did participate this year. But now we have agreed to have them on a more regular basis. We have

also agreed to expand staff talks between the two countries.

In terms of global, political and security issues, let me very quickly run you through some of them. I think you would see in the Joint Statement clearly the issues of freedom of navigation and freedom of over flights was one issue of significance. You see references there to the UN Convention on Law of Seas (UNLOS), on peaceful resolution of disputes, and also to the situation in the South China because it is something which is important to both countries given our energy security and trade and commerce concerns. And the message really from our meeting today is that unilateral actions should be avoided, and that they should establish a code of conduct quickly.

I would also draw your attention to the joint position of the two countries on the important, in fact increasingly urgent global challenge terrorism. What we have today is really the two leaders strongly condemning terrorism in all forms underlining that they have zero tolerance, calling upon all countries to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1267 which most of you are familiar with, referring to the need for eliminating terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupting terrorist networks and financing, stopping cross-border movement of terrorists, and underlining the need for countries to effectively deal with transnational terrorism emanating from their territory. There was also a very specific mention of the importance of bringing the perpetrators of terrorist attacks including those of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice.

Other than the freedom of navigation, over flight, and the terrorism issue, I think some of the global issues which came up for discussion were UN reform where basically there is identity of views and approach. In this we work very closely with the Japanese. In fact, we had a G4-level summit in New York in September which both Prime Ministers attended.

Then we also have an expression of Japanese support for India's aspiration to become an APEC member - again many of you would be aware that this is something which we had sought for some time now and it has now come a little bit more prominently into our diplomatic agenda - as well as for our membership of export control regimes - the four regimes, NSG, MTCR, Australia and Wassenaar. And we welcomed Japan's contribution to peace and security which were reflected in some of their recent policies. So, this is broadly the political, security, international issues outcome.

Let me move very quickly to the economic side. I think the most important outcome today was the agreement to conclude an MoU on the high-speed railway using Shinkansen technology. This is for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad sector on which Japan had done the feasibility report earlier. This is a big project, I think in dollar terms roughly about USD 12 billion project. Japan would roughly fund about 80 per cent of the project. The terms of funding have been very generous. Prime Minister expressed appreciation of that. So, that is the big project. My colleague tells me the estimate is actually a little bit higher, it is not 12 billion but 15 billion.

The second big takeaway was the facility which the Japanese have agreed to create involving NEXI and JBIC for a Make in India, this will be a sort of fund to support Japanese companies investing in India under the Make in India. This fund would be to the tune of USD 1.5 trillion, roughly again USD 12 billion. We take this as a sign of confidence in the Make in India programme and in the Indian economy and the direction of the Indian economy in recent times. So, that a country has explicitly created a fund labeled Japan-India Make in India Fund I think has its

own symbolism. It tells you the seriousness with which Japan today is looking at its economic prospects in India.

Coming to the Official Development Assistance part, again many of you would be aware that Japan has a long history of supporting infrastructure development in India using ODA. This year our discussions have been really very ambitious in this regard. We have an understanding roughly of about 600 billion Yen which is about USD 5 billion. I think my broad estimate is about 400 billion Yen is committed in this financial year and 200 billion Yen carries over into the coming year.

Again to give you a sense of what it is we are talking about, this is something - I think you have a map behind me because I really want you to appreciate today the role that infrastructure collaboration between us can play in terms of modernizing India's economy. We have really this time around 13 big projects which we have looked at. The first one is the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor.

The second one is the Ahmedabad Metro Project. The third is the modernization of ship recycling yards in Gujarat. Then there is the Mumbai trans-harbour link, the peripheral ring road around Bengaluru, the Chennai Metro project, the Tuticorin outer harbor project, then the Odisha transmission improvement project, the Odisha sanitation project, the Madhya Pradesh transmission project, Ganga rejuvenation, horticulture and irrigation in Jharkhand, and road connectivity projects in the North-East.

So, if you just look at the map, look at the geographical spread of these projects, look at the range of infrastructure covered by this, I think you would get a sense of the importance really that we attach to this particular part of our relationship. I think when people sometimes ask saying what does foreign policy really do for the country, I cannot give you a better example than what you see on the screen behind me.

Japan also has agreed to implement the concept of Japan Industrial Townships in India. You will find a reference to that in the Joint Statement. There was some discussion between the two Prime Ministers today on how to take that forward quickly. In terms of the corridors, you are all already aware of the Dedicated Freight Corridor which is progressing, of the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor which is also under implementation. Now we have a new corridor coming into being the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor. Our ballpark estimate for what this would cost would be about USD 5.5 billion.

So, really in a sense, let me say there is no value you are putting on this relationship, it is a relationship beyond value. But if I were to just sum up today in terms of the size of the economic agenda that we are looking at, we were really looking at this USD 12 to 15 billion on the high-speed train, the USD 12 billion on the Make in India Fund, the USD 5 billion on the Official Development Assistance, and some of it is overlapping, the USD 5.5 billion on the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor.

I would remind you that last year the two Prime Ministers had said that they would set out a goal of USD 35 billion over the next five years. Now what you have broadly is actually a year later a sense of where a very very large proportion of that commitment is going to go. So, we move from aspirational commitment into project identification, in some cases in much more detail than that, within the space of a year.

There was also a broad appreciation of the fact that business environment in India has improved very significantly in the last year. There was an understanding that 10,000 Indians would be visiting Japan as students, as trainees in various capacities in the next five years.

During the talks today, Prime Minister told Prime Minister Abe that given the importance of Japan and the uniqueness of this relationship, we have decided that Japanese visitors to India - all visitors, business, tourists, all of them - could avail a visa on arrival, they would not need a visa till they actually arrive at an Indian point of entry. So, this would be the only country for whom that arrangement would apply. This would come into effect from the 1st of March.

There was also some discussion, again you find reflection of it in the Joint Statement, on the local governments, States and cities. Japanese are particularly good at using that as a vehicle for cooperation. So, all in all, as you can see, though it is only lunch time we have really got a very good day's work done. I think this is a very strong relationship. For many many years it has held huge promise. I think you are seeing now the beginnings of that promise manifest itself in different ways.

That is really what I have to say to you currently. We will be off to Varanasi as soon as this press conference is over and come back later at night, and Prime Minister Abe leaves tomorrow. Thank you.

Official Spokesperson: After that comprehensive statement by Foreign Secretary, there should not have been any need for questions. But those of you who still need to understand better may ask questions.

Question: Since the nuclear MoU has been signed today, I just wanted to get a sense on the three issues that were challenges in the cooperation. One was the liability, the fuel tracking, and proliferation concerns that India is not part of the NPT, that was one of the issues. So, how have you managed these concerns, how have you passed through these humps?

Foreign Secretary: Are there any questions on the nuclear because I would like to take them all at one go.

Official Spokesperson: Let us take them in groups.

Question: Is it an agreement to in fact arrive at a final agreement at a later stage? Is it a framework agreement? What is the agreement? You have already said that there are legal issues also and the statement also mentions that it is not the final document.

Question: What kind of timeframe are you talking about by the time the actual agreement is signed and we start getting things done.

Question: You just mentioned a substantive agreement. What is done and what has been left?

Question: Can we say that India and Japan have done the nuclear deal? You said you have wrapped up negotiations. So, is the deal done and only the formality remains? And on reprocessing, how has that been worked out in the deal?

Question: You mentioned GE and Westinghouse. Is this agreement enough for those companies that have Japanese partners to come and start working in India's nuclear sector?

Question: There obviously was a difference of opinion on whether or not India could carry out any nuclear test once it entered civil nuclear cooperation with Japan. Have we given any assurance to Japan to reach this substantive agreement as you said?

Question: Japanese Government is concerned about the nuclear tests. If India does a nuclear test, Japan wants to stop their cooperation. How do you solve this issue?

Foreign Secretary: I think that gives me enough on this. I am not answering the questions in the order in which you have asked because some of the questions are repetitive and overlapping.

First of all, we have concluded the negotiations. Somebody asked me what do you mean by substantive agreement? That means, we have agreed on the substance of the various provisions which are in an agreement. But this is not unique to Japan. It also happened for example with the US too. We did sort of reach a certain point and then you had to have the technical and legal people to look at it, and then you have the various formalities. Each country has its own practice, and even the way we do the agreement is sometimes different. There are countries where we have done a framework agreement and then done the administrative arrangements, which are the actual operational procedures, later on. Sometimes those have been separately negotiated and take time. Some countries have ratification by legislature, some countries do not. So, you have a range of models here.

In this particular case with Japan, I think the two Prime Ministers signed a memorandum stating that there has been a substantive agreement. Let me just read to you the exact paragraph from the Joint Statement. It says, "The two Prime Ministers welcome the agreement reached between the two Governments on the agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India, for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and confirmed that this agreement will be signed after technical details are finalised including those related to necessary internal procedures". So, as you can see, technical details, and as I said usually mostly the negotiations continue till the very end and then you need a legal team which looks at everything, sometimes they make minor changes. So, the legal scrubbing, the technical details, and then the internal procedures.

Now in the case of Japan, my understanding is that that involves consideration by the Diet. So, I would hesitate to put a timeline because I am not conversant with the Japanese internal procedures and their timelines. But the fact that we have reached where we have, which is we have concluded negotiations, the two Prime Ministers have signed a memorandum, I think that sort of speaks really for itself.

Now, in terms of what were the obstacles and challenges and so on, I think from outside the room people had their own versions or their own sense of what the challenges were. They were not always the challenges in that priority that we face till the end.

For example, you raised liability. I think the Japanese side was assured of the efficacy of the liability solutions that we had found earlier in the year. So, certainly in the last few rounds this was not a particularly big issue. They have seen that today the liability regime is working, that other producers are satisfied, that there is a credible sort of market-based mechanism which will address industry concerns.

On the NPT issue, that issue in a sense we put behind us with Japan's help in 2008 itself when in fact the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to make an exception for India and Japan supported

making that exception. The world today accepts that NPT was a product of a particular time and a particular situation, and that sometimes there are some realities that you need to address which have happened subsequently, and if the record of the country is responsible, if their need is serious, if they have been credible in implementing their commitments, I think all these have led different countries to consider the need for making exceptions. So, I do not think the NPT itself is a particular obstacle to this negotiation.

Again the whole issue of what you call tracking, we have addressed this. We have addressed this not just with Japan, we have addressed it with a lot of other countries including the United States and Australia and Canada. I think we have today produced a template which satisfies all major nuclear suppliers.

Similarly, I think somebody asked a question on reprocessing. It has been a longstanding position of India that reprocessing is an integral part of our nuclear programme because the manner in which we run our nuclear programme, we reprocess the spent fuel. We do not let it accumulate, we reuse the spent fuel. So, any solution that we have done will be in consonance with our longstanding policy.

I think someone asked me whether this would make someone a partner, effective partner for GE and Westinghouse. Obviously that will all happen when the Japanese and the Indian side complete their internal procedures and the ratification takes place. But it would do much more than that. Once these formalities are effectively addressed, it will make the Japanese themselves as independent suppliers in the nuclear area for India. So, to my mind, this is a very very important development today. But it is not a complete development, there are still steps to be taken.

Question: ...(Inaudible)...

Foreign Secretary: We have again a longstanding position on this matter. At a time when the international community was considering making an exception for India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, India had reminded them of the voluntary moratorium that we had put in place. So, again I am not quite sure why you are raising it with that degree of concern but I really again do not see this as such a major issue. Most countries in the world accept that India's word is credible, that Indian commitments are serious. So, at the end of the day, international relations much depends on credibility and trust, and I would say that we are not wanting on either respect.

Questions and Answers:

Foreign Secretary: If they were not convinced, would we have had an agreement?

Question: What is the timeline, if you could tell us, on the high-speed train? Kab tak bullet train chalegi? Actually Prime Minister ka yeh dream kab se fulfil hoga?

Foreign Secretary: Any other questions on the train? I am running tight on time. So, please cluster your questions.

Question: Jo laagat hogi vo kya poora Japan vahan karega yah koi cost-sharing model hoga?

Question: Could you please elaborate on the terms of funding for the loan and repayment?

Foreign Secretary: We have right now an agreement in principle that for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad line, India has decided to use Shinkansen, the Japanese high-speed rail, technology. The package that Japan has offered us is a highly concessional loan with repayment over 50 years with a 15 year moratorium at an interest rate of 0.1 per cent. So, those are the terms. Again we have an in principle agreement that there will be transfer of technology under Make in India programme. Obviously it has to be done in a phased manner.

But at this time we have a broad understanding. It has been decided to constitute a Committee at a very senior level which will now get to work on this project. So, I will not be able to answer the timeline issue. But again I would say the idea of a high-speed train is something which is everybody's dream.

Question: ...(Inaudible)...

Foreign Secretary: My colleague who has been involved in this a little longer than me tells me that the feasibility study indicates that the Mumbai-Ahmedabad link will take seven years to complete.

Question: This Malabar Exercise, are you saying it is going to happen every year, whether in the Sea of Japan and in the Bay of Bengal? Do you also see bilateral naval exercises in the Sea of Japan? And also, what kind of reaction are you expecting from Beijing on this?

Foreign Secretary: Anybody else, not just on Malabar but on defence security?

Question: Any further progress on the purchase of the amphibious aircraft?

Question: I think from the ...(Inaudible)... Shinkansen train there was no answer about the percentage of sourcing that comes from Japanese companies. Is there any limitation? I want to know the percentage. Is there any limitation for India in Japan?

Question: As both sides discussed about South China Sea issue, what might be the further cooperation on South China Sea between India and Japan?

Foreign Secretary: On the high-speed rail, what was agreed to was that basically the sourcing would be from Japan or from joint ventures or from Indian companies. But there was not anything more specific than that. So, again as I said, at this time what we have is a broad understanding and this Committee which will work on this particular project obviously will evolve greater details as we go along.

If I can turn to the defence beginning with Malabar, yes, we do Malabar every alternate year, and one year it is done on the Japan's side. So, that routine would continue. I think the difference is that till now India and US do Malabar, some years Japan has joined on an irregular basis. Now it would be regular. So, from irregular, episodic to regular, that is the change.

US too was discussed and I think we do not have any decision or any indication to give right now. So, the matter remains under consideration and the Joint Statement reflects that.

In terms of cooperation on South China Sea, I am not sure I would characterise it that way. I think South China Sea is an arena which is of concern to us because both countries see a lot of their energy, and their trade and commerce pass through those waters. So, to have freedom of navigation and freedom of over flights for us is important. Also it is important for us to have

peace in that region and we would like the countries of the region to agree on a code of conduct so that peace and security is strengthened. But we have broad maritime cooperation with Japan. It is not something which we would say applies to one particular area and not to another particular area.

Question: ...(Inaudible)...

Joint Secretary(East Asia): At present there is proposal for about 11, but they are in very different stages. Supa (in Maharashtra) is certainly one. There is another one in Rajasthan (Ghilot), and they are taking about another in Madhya Pradesh. So, these 11 (industrial townships), as Foreign Secretary has explained the ODA projects on map, are also spread geographically in various parts of India.

Statement on Nepal

December 21, 2015

1. External Affairs Minister was informed by Nepal's Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa today that the Nepalese Cabinet has taken some important decisions to address and resolve demands regarding the Constitution raised by agitating Madhes-based parties.
2. These decisions include amendments to the Constitution on participation in the state organs on the basis of proportionate inclusiveness and delineation of electoral constituencies on the basis of population. The demarcation of provinces is also to be addressed through an appropriate arrangement in the Constitution on the basis of political consensus. Similarly, others demands including citizenship are to be resolved through negotiations and consensus.
3. Government of India welcomes these developments as positive steps that help create the basis for a resolution of the current impasse in Nepal. As a neighbour and well-wisher, India was deeply concerned at the unrest stemming from internal differences in Nepal on the Constitution. We urge all Nepali political forces to now demonstrate the necessary maturity and flexibility to find a satisfactory solution to the Constitutional issues through constructive dialogue in an agreed timeframe.
4. We are confident that a return to normalcy in Nepal would create a more secure and predictable climate for unimpeded commerce between our two countries.