gious affairs here. A precondi-

tion set by India was that he

won't engage in politics. Therefore, India declared a ban

for transgressions that have

never occurred. This is a sure

plausibly read into this is that New Delhi is paying obeisance to Beijing. This is the way India has received it, and this

is the way China would too.

India's several neighbours -

who are always looking at how Beijing and New Delhi deal

with one another — are also likely to read a similar mean-

Here on, then, we may expect

the Chinese to turn on the

squeeze even harder — the per-

fect example of an unequal and

inequitable relationship. In our ties with Nepal, which has

lately made no bones about privileging China over India, and with Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, our

supine stance in relation to

Beijing is likely to leave India

without any worthwhile lever-

age in the region. What would

ing into recent events.

The meaning that can be

sign of being overly courtly.

India's weak China policy can spell havoc



Anand K. Sahay

Far & Near

the Narendra ment to go out of the way to appease Beijing can only lead to the entrenchment of unhealthy ties with our northern neighbour. This would be singularly

unfortunate because there is some merit in the view — held by some of our prominent foreign policy practitioners that it is with Beijing that India must imagine her most important relationship.

This view has been obscured because, for the most part since the 1950s, our relations with the Soviet Union had very high value. There was a beneficial economic and defence component, besides Moscow's crucial assistance on the Kashmir question in the UN Security Council. And since

ecent steps of the end of the USSR, India has come to enjoy a very productive and comfortable connection with the West.

With China, the memory of 1962 has been somewhat effaced. Still, the bilateral interaction has at times been characterised by mutual mistrust, in part on account of China teaming up with Pakistan to discomfit India in a variety of ways. At the level of both popular perception and official deliberations, these factors have badly undercut the rapid rise in trade ties with China, about which some questioning has now begun to be

On the whole, broad Indian nationalism has been affronted. That's not a good sign in building relations with any country, leave alone a powerful neighbour with which there

is an unsettled boundary. There are several reasons

extremely important and ought to be seen as such. For one, China's economy is four times the size of India's, although India could forge ahead in about 30 years' time if we are sensible and can make our young population productive.

Two, China has been spending heavily on defence for a number of years, several times more than India. Three, China - like Pakistan, which it partners against India — is an unsatiated power, which makes it a troublesome entity.

It appears to have messianic zeal and a sense of destiny. In line with this, regionally it gives every impression of flexing its military muscle by growing as a maritime force, a missile force, and a cyber force in a manner that its neighbours find threatening. Its spectacular rise in recent decades has disturbed the placidity of the waters that surround it. If any neighbour of China

must deal with these harsh realities, it is evident that if ties are managed in an equable and mutually respectful way, India-China relations have enormous potential to be a stabilising factor for the international economy, and calming The way India has shaped its political response gives the impression of being obsequious to Beijing, leaving room for the impression that the present government is strong on words but weak, vacillating and unimaginative when it comes to action

political nerves from the Strait of Hormuz to the East China Sea and the broad Indo-Pacific zone, an area of extraordinary economic and human poten

For this to happen, India and China need to be sensitive to each other's essential concerns. Only that can lead on to the present century being an Asian century. Regrettably, however, India has lately given the impression of being ready to accept an unequal relationship. That will stunt India's potential, and impart an epidemiological dimension to the ties with unpredictable flareup possibilities.

Recently, China's foreign minister Wang Yi reportedly told the Indian foreign secretary, who was on a visit to Beijing, that India ought to be 'prudent". Last week, Mr Wang, answering media questions, held forth rhetorically on the good that may ensue from good Sino-Indian ties, but pointedly noted that China would "protect its legitimate interests". Is this a warning? And, if so, how is India going to prepare for it?

THE ASIAN AGE

Replying to a Parliament question recently, the minister of state for defence gave the impression that India needed to prepare for a renewal of Chinese military belligerence in the Doklam area, where the armies of the two countries held each other in a "standoff" for 73 days last summer. But the way India has shaped

its political response gives the impression of being obsequious to Beijing, leaving room for the impression that the present government is strong on words but weak, vacillating and unimaginative when it comes to action.

New Delhi asked all officials not to associate themselves with programmes featuring the Dalai Lama. The noted Tibetan spiritual leader was planning on a programme to thank India in the 60th year of being given shelter in this

There was simply no need for this as Indian officials have not then be left of India's standing in Saarc? participated in the Tibetan Prime Minister Jawaharlal monk's programmes in the six decades that he has been here. The Dalai Lama runs only reli-

Nehru gave the Dalai Lama refuge in 1959 when the Tibetan uprising against occupation was crushed. The Chinese attacked India in 1962, and gave our unprepared forces a thrashing with a view to belittle Nehru's leadership. But Nehru stuck to his guns. He did not turn over the Tibetan monk to Beijing.

But the Modi regime appears to be altering the terms of engagement against the Tibetan holy man. This sudden loss of nerve on India's part belittles us in the eyes of the Tibetan people and dents this country's image across Asia and the world, which regards the Dalai Lama with sympa-

It is now also easy to see why India backed off from underlining its strategic interests in the Maldives once it became clear that the absolutist government of President Abdulla Yameen was in cahoots with Beijing and has offered China a naval observation post, which, doubtless, will become a full-fledged military base on India's doorstep. We have caved in and our interests will be hit hard all round.

Beijing's defence budget unveils grand security ambitions



Jagannath Panda

ure, it is the intent behind the figure that matters. In a rather modest rise compared to its 2017 defence budget, Beijing has decided to increase its defence budget by 8.1 per cent in 2018. The 2017 defence budget was 7 per cent while the 2016 and 2015 figures were 7.6 per cent and 10.1 per cent respectively. Setting the goal to build a stronger armed force for the "new era", the hike projected by Premier Keqiang to meet the challenges emerging from the "profound changes in the national security environment" that China is facing. What are these "profound changes"

The Chinese firmness to establish a stronger armed force is not new. The Chinese leadership defends this rise by stating that China's total defence budget is \$175 billion, one-fourth of the United States budget, which is \$716 billion, making it nonimpressive and below par. So, this rise in the military budget is neither meant to engage in an arms race nor is it large enough to match with a superior military such as the US. In order to narrow the gap, Beijing's strategy is to focus on economic modernisation, which can direct sustained high rates of investment in the defence sector. Chinese state media further contend that the country must aim to increase the budget to 20 to 30 per cent to emerge as a

stronger military power with greater influence. There is obviously merit in this Chinese contention, but it becomes provocative when China links this increase to "profound changes" in the security environment. It points towards a grand Chinese thinking that is associated with its ambitions in the immediate Indo-Pacific, in particular, to the ongoing People's Liberation Army reforms, defence strategy and security ambitions.

Increase in China's defence hudget is indeed to the goal of transforming the PLA into a "modern, mechanised, IT-based force". emphasis is being offered to bring qualitative changes in the PLA, both on the technological and operational fronts. A continuous "technological revolution" is taking place in modernising the PLA for a "new era" where the military emphasis is on "information warfare" This points to the overall development, adoption and integration of micro-electronic technologies into weapons, precision-guided weapons and ITbased C4ISR system, in areas like artificial intelligence and Nano technology. The PLA reform is at the heart behind the rise of China's defence budget, but this reform is not taking place in isolation. The military leadership has always foreseen that a stronger and professional military is the key to challenge US supremacy. The main target therefore is to improve China's Comprehensive National Power

defence budget is closely linked to the goal of transforming the PLA into a 'modern, mechanised, IT-based force'. The emphasis is being offered to bring qualitative changes in the PLA, both on the technological and operational fronts.

(CNP), essentially to improve its economic, diplomatic and military prowess, and guarantee China its rightful place as a power at par with the US.

The reference to the "profound changes" is therefore linked to the recent security developments in the Indo-Pacific that are closely associated with China's international tions. The emphasis is given to maritime zones, building maritime and military capability, protecting maritime networks, and creating alternative maritime supply routes in the Indian Ocean. Along with the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean is factored highly as a "maritime lifeline". As a result, Beijing has been closely observing the security developments in Indo-Pacific, with special emphasis on the Indian Ocean. There is a continuous stress to promote China as a maritime power, where the immediate aim is to have a superior numerical strength which increases China's maritime influence. This is intended to alter the balance of power equation in Indo-Pacific, where the US naval presence continues to remain the dominant force along with the increasing understanding between India and Japan. The revival of the idea of the

'Quadrilateral" involving Australia, India, Japan and the US has further encouraged the Chinese security apparatus to focus more intently on the Indo-Pacific region. Donald Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) report has also strengthened the Chinese resoluteness since the US increasingly views China as a "revisionist power".

China's "revisionism" in mili-

tary strategy is visible in Beijing's international thinking in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The immediate target is to enhance its international profile as an advanced military. The recent deployment of the J-20 stealth fighters is a fine reference to this effect. Chinese officials were quoted stating proudly that the J-20 is aimed at safeguarding China's "sovereignty, security and territorial integriballistic missile tinental Dongfeng-41, which is to be launched this year, is aimed at boosting China's profile as a missile power. The electromagnetic railgun if developed will make China the first country to test such a weapon at the sea. The emphasis is offered in strengthening China's technological capability in artificial intelligence, quantum informa-tion science, hypersonic tech-nology, electromagnetic technology and supercomputing. These technological advancements are closely linked to China's defence budget and Xi Jinping's international security ambitions to put forth a strong military dream.

In fact, the changing security conditions in Indo-Pacific have constantly encouraged the Chinese leadership to increase the defence budget despite the slow growth rate in the Chinese economy. The reference to "profound changes", however, points to a more interesting fact: Beijing's defence budget and military dream are both complementary to each other. China's defence budget is critically discussed due to its nontransparency. The non-accounting of the budget allocated in military research and development, arms imports, nuclear forces and strategic rocket pro-gramme, budget spent for the People's Armed Police (PAP) to the overall defence budget have always been debated interna-tionally. Likewise, Beijing's military ambitions in the IOR are fast growing where Beijing is gradually establishing a number of military and strategic bases. China's naval base in Djibouti is a fitting reference to this effect. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) facilitates the Chinese Navy to stay focused in the Indian Ocean. Besides, what needs to be understood is that military per se, these are rather institutional foreign policy and national security centric goals tied to its national objectives. As a result, the Chinese military is in a position today to assert itself on defending territories and securing the country's interests.

Beijing's defence strategy and military planning has been mainly intended over the years to dissuade the US capability of supporting Taiwan and coerce the latter into unification. There seems to be a subtle change in this priority that is reflected in China's "profound change" reference while announcing the defence budget. The change is more towards enhancing military presence and enriching the maritime-military strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.

> The writer is a fellow and centre coordinator for East Asia at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

- REPORTERS' DIARY

JAYA IN RS, DISSENT IN SP

JAYA BACHCHAN's nomination by the Samajwadi Party for the Rajya Sabha had led to considerable discontent in the party. Party leaders, in hushed tones, are questioning the rationale behind giving Ms Bachchan a third term in the Rajya Sabha.

"She does not have any following in the party, does not have a caste identity and is not even a crowd puller — the present generations are not even aware of her contribution as a film star. Moreover, she does not share good relations with party workers. What can she give to the party?" asked a SP veteran. The fact that Ms Bachchan

has been chosen over stalwarts like Naresh Agarwal and Kiranmoy Nanda has also led to dissent.
"We will now have no voice in

the Rajya Sabha because Ms Bachchan is not very well conversant with UP politics politics. Moreover, when she raises her voice, it is mostly to scold people, said a former SP MP.

JUAL, THE GIANT

BJP STALWART and Union tribal affairs minister Jual is known for never giving in to pressures. This approach of Mr Oram inspires the party's rank and file to overcome the pain suffered due to electoral defeats

and not get bogged down by political opponents.

When the BJP, despite aggressive campaigning by half a dozen Union ministers lost the Bijepur bypoll by 42,000 votes, many of the party's leaders went into hibernation. The fearless Mr Oram, however, flew

down to Bhubaneswar from New Delhi and went straight to party's state headquarters to celebrate When mediapersons thronged


him to get his bytes on the poll debacle, he said: "Hum haare hain, mare nahin (We have been defeated, but certainly not got killed." He went on to add: "We will rise again from ashes with more fire and

beat the BJD." The party workers playing Holi with the minister whispered: "The giant is alive and he will go for the

As the television channels beamed live Mr Oram's statement, the party leaders sulking in silence at their homes

came out and started celebrating Holi.

THE NYT CROSSWORD



PUZZLE BY SEN. JOE DONNELLY AND MICHAEL S. MAURER

CELEBRITY CROSSWORD This puzzle is a collaboration by the basketball-loving senator Joe Donnelly of Indiana, working together with longtime crossword contributor Michael S. (Mickey) Maurer, the owner of the Indianapolis Business Journal. This is Mickey's 25th crossword for The Times. More information about the making of today's puzzle appears in the Times's daily crossword column (nytimes.com/column/ wordplay).

ACROSS

1 Exchange of words Smart farm animal? 14 Chevrolet model 15 Warning during a heist? 16 Washes against, as the shore 17 In baroque fashion 18 Gutterball?

20 Afternoon

22 Filler ads, in 24 Korean border area, for short 27 Sinus doc 28 Yukon or Sierra 30 Opening word at many a

21 Pigeon-

conference

33 Eric of old CBS News 36 Flipped (through) 37 Dinner at the end of Ramadan? 39 Where Socrates

lived 42 Artists' oil sources 46 Like Times Square on New Year's Eve 48 Diet of Jack Sprat's

49 "Doesn't excite me' 50 Spanish uncle 51 Elite team

member 53 Bowery boozer 54 "The Spy Who Loved Me" org. 57 Rug store promotion? 60 Pacifies

63 Establish 64 Something bleeped out for television? 65 Successful batter 66 Knocked over 67 Think about only

one thing DOWN

"Pact"

1 Works with 28 Thou pupils? 2 "No one's with make 3 Digital media player worries that's "big" in New York City? 4 Operated on, as 35 Two-bagger: the eyes 5 Beauty product line with the slogan "Ageless" 6 Cat, to Catarina 7 Site of a 1955 prefix 8 Comfort stand, say 9 32-card card 10 Punta del (Uruguayan resort) 11 Leading

12 Fa follower 13 Home on a 15 Noggin knocks 19 Footnote abbr. 23 Jennifer Lopez title role _ Tussaud: 26 The end of the British monarchy?

29 Things babies 31 ____ of one's 32 One might say "Happy Birthday 34 Not many

38 Part of N.R.A. 39 SAT alternative 40 Numerical 41 Has a one-night

43 Abu Dhabi, for 44 Signifies 45 An eiected player might be sent to them

47 Protect against the other team scoring 52 The end of the British monarchy? 53 Sharpens 55 More than a sip 56 Spalding or Voit

product 58 Bounce off the 59 Chicago daily, informally 60 Back, on a ship 61 Great Lakes' Canals 62 Bestow, to Burns

