


Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg
Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi-110010



Journal of Defence Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.idsa.in/journalofdefencestudies>

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To cite this article: Shruti Pandalai (2015): Recounting 1965: War, Diplomacy and Great Games in the Subcontinent, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 July-September 2015, pp. 7-32

URL http://idsa.in/jds/9_3_2015_Recounting1965

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Recounting 1965

War, Diplomacy and Great Games in the Subcontinent

*Shruti Pandalai**

'Stalemate', 'futile', 'forgotten'—the descriptions of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan often do injustice to its profound impact on the history of the Indian subcontinent. It was a war that altered the fates of India and Pakistan both politically and militarily, and officially began the new great game for Asia. For India, it was a test of leadership post Nehru and banishing the demons of 1962. For Pakistan, it was about Kashmir and testing India, playing roulette with the superpowers, and sealing its friendship with China. Fifty years on, this article attempts to understand the myriad motivations of this war and focuses on the political conversations and intense diplomatic manoeuvring that New Delhi undertook to emerge on the right side of history. Approached from an oral history perspective, conversations have been pieced both from India and Pakistan, to study the flash-points of a war, often underscored in its importance in the annals of history.

The 1965 India-Pakistan war neither evokes the scars of humiliation that we associate with the 1962 defeat against China nor the triumph of the victory that the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation war elicits in the national discourse. Yet history tells us that it was the 1965 war which showed India's resilience having been tested militarily, politically and as a people post the 1962 crisis which had left us a demoralised nation. A new

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political leadership lead by the iron willed Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was still finding its feet post Nehru's death and was under intense scrutiny from the international community. The Abdullah Mission to find a solution to the Kashmir crisis was aborted post Nehru's death and historians believe Pakistan felt emboldened to strike for the cause of Kashmir, sensing India was at its most vulnerable. While surprised at first, India fought back. In this war, fought between August and September 1965, according to government records India captured 1,920 square kilometres (sq km) of Pakistani territory while Pakistan captured 550 sq km of Indian territory.¹ Officially declared inconclusive, the war results ultimately did favour India. It was the litmus test of the lessons India had learnt from 1962 debacle.

Fifty years on, this article is an attempt to understand the myriad motivations of this war which has had so many interpretations in the Indian narrative—from being described in strategic circles as one which 'India won militarily and lost at the negotiating table at Tashkent' to 'a war of mutual incompetence' by an acerbic Indian press. There have been numerous accounts of the military battles won and lost on both sides, and will be elaborated in greater detail in this special collection of essays. This article, in particular, attempts to understand the political conversations and intense diplomatic manoeuvring that New Delhi undertook under the leadership of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri during this time, which saw India emerge on the right side of history. Helping this endeavour is a conversation with Ambassador M.K. Rasgotra, a prolific veteran diplomat and former Foreign Secretary of India, who was a war book officer with the Indian Government in 1965. His keen insights coupled with discussions most prominently from the war diaries of then Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan, biography of Prime Minister Shastri, the memoirs of then Pakistan President Ayub Khan, and the official history of the 1965 war, have been pieced together to understand briefly the flash-points and motivations of this 'stalemate of a war'.

PRELUDE TO THE GREAT GAMES

Let us then begin at the domestic political situation that India found herself in 1965. India was picking itself up from the fallout of the 1962 war, heavily dependent on dwindling US exports to battle an acute famine and dealing with a fractious Congress party, which had yet to consolidate around Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had big shoes to fill after Pandit Nehru's death. Prime Minister Shastri, in his first broadcast to the nation in

June 1964, welcomed Pakistani President Ayub's congratulations and conciliatory message of peace on the issue of Kashmir saying,

For too long have India and Pakistan been at odds with each other. The unfortunate relations between the two countries have somehow had repercussions on the relations between communities in the two countries, giving rise to tragic human problems. We must reverse the tide[...] President Ayub Khan's recent broadcast showed both wisdom and understanding and it has come just at the appropriate time. However, a great deal of patience will still be necessary.²

He followed this up by taking the initiative to stop over in Karachi on his way back from the Non Alignment Summit in Cairo in October 1964 to meet with President Ayub. Over a genial luncheon that lasted over ninety minutes, both sides assessed the leadership intent on the trajectory of Indo-Pak relations.³ While Prime Minister Shastri came back with a positive assessment of President Ayub as someone with a 'practical approach' to resolve issues, he described the Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to his aides as someone who could throw the spanner in the works for Indo-Pak relations.⁴ He was determined to convince President Ayub that 'India had no desire whatsoever to acquire even one square inch of Pakistani territory [...] [but] would never allow any interference by Pakistan in Kashmir which was an integral part of India.'⁵

India had in the beginning of 1964 made clear its position on Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) saying that it was prepared to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan if threats of violence in the valley were to cease.⁶ By December of 1964, the then Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda announced in Parliament that the government had put into force political measures which would put the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on par with other Indian states in the constitution.⁷ These developments did not sit well with Pakistan and it was only a matter of time that the 'illusion of peace' was going to begin to unravel.

A RESTLESS PAKISTAN PREPARES FOR WAR

Just as Prime Minister Shastri had gauged his Pakistani counterparts in his brief interaction at Karachi, President Ayub had made his own impressions of the Indian Prime Minister. M.K. Rasgotra recounts an anecdote Ayub told his Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto soon after meeting

Shastri, ‘This little man. What will I speak to him?’⁸ ‘A total miscalculation as time would prove’, Rasgotra said. Yet Prime Minister Shastri and his government’s firm stance at the UNSC on the Kashmir issue and the parliament declaration on J&K had told both President Ayub and Bhutto that the India would not be loosening its stance on Kashmir and for Bhutto, in particular, this was unacceptable. There was an additional driver pushing Rawalpindi to hasten the planning for destabilising India. Rasgotra recalled,

They were concerned as the Americans, after the Nehru-Kennedy understanding post-1962, were supplying India with light arms for troops on the eastern front. The Russians, Czechs and Romanians had offered to send us heavy machinery including tanks—now that they found common ground with India after having fallen out with China. Pakistan thought it could not give India more time to arm and had to act soon.⁹

Pakistan had also been stirring up the hornet’s nest for a while, rubbing into India after 1962, its special friendship with China. First, Foreign Minister Bhutto, in the National Assembly in 1963, and later President Ayub alluded to this: ‘If we are attacked by India, then that means, India is on the move and wants to expand. We assume that other asiatic[sic] powers, especially China would take notice.’¹⁰

President Ayub, after his meeting with Shastri, concluded it was time to act and left the planning of Pakistan’s policy towards India to Bhutto. A detailed strategy was worked upon. The Pakistani Army Chief in 1965, General Mohammed Musa’s book *My Version*, quoted widely in both the biography of Prime Minister Shastri and the war diaries of Defence Minister Chavan, provides a detailed account of the planning process. He says ‘the Kashmir Cell’, a highly secretive group put together by the Pakistani Army in early 1964, directly reporting to the President, had by now concluded that ‘it was time for Pakistan to take some overt action for reviving the Kashmir issue and “defreezing”, what from Pakistan’s point of view was a dishearteningly quiet and stable situation in Kashmir.’¹¹ General Musa says he wasn’t convinced of the foreign office proposal of clandestine raids in Kashmir and tried to impress upon President Ayub caution against hasty action. He says, alluding to Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed,

The sponsors and supporters of the raids had succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict

with India which, I feel, the President himself wanted to avoid and which the armed forces had to face under strategic limitations and when there was a great quantitative imbalance in the defence services and resources of the two countries.¹²

Bhutto had also convinced Ayub of the suitable timing of striking for the Kashmir cause by pointing out to perceived weaknesses in India that would be favourable to Pakistan,

...a new [P]rime [M]inister, economic crisis aggravated by food shortages, demoralisation after the 1962 defeat, Indian troops being tied up on the eastern front, China's all weather friendship with Pakistan and, finally, that at that time Pakistan had superior armour both for aerial and land warfare thanks to the US assistance, and should strike before India beefs up its defence capabilities.¹³

Ayub, relying on his close friendship with 'some key members in the Pentagon and in the UK' and even from Russia, after his efforts to improve ties, had felt he would get a sympathetic ear from the international community for Pakistan's case for 'wresting back Kashmir'.¹⁴

With these calculations, Pakistan prepared a four phased strategy for a war with India:¹⁵

1. A probing encounter in some place of Pakistan's choosing;
2. an all out disguised invasion of Kashmir by the Pakistani army for 'guerrilla warfare' camouflaged as a revolt by the local population;
3. a full scale assault by the Pakistani army in the Chhamb sector in Kashmir to cut off the Indian supply line in Jammu and Kashmir; and
4. a massive lightning armoured attack to capture Amritsar and as much of other Indian territory as possible, to be exchanged eventually for Kashmir.

ACT I: THE RANN OF KUTCH INCIDENT—THE SMOKESCREEN¹⁶

Part one of the execution of the plan, code named Operation Desert Hawk, was set in motion in by Pakistan in early 1965, in the Rann of Kutch. President Ayub raised a claim to about 3,500 sq miles of territory in 'adverse possession of India'. Both sides were aware that this sector had not been demarcated on the ground as the international boundary was based on the distinction of the provinces of Sindh and Kutch during Partition and could be mapped using the existing British survey records. Stray incidents on the Indian side from 1964, including the patrolling

by three men of the Indus Rangers of Pakistan along an 18 mile track, were first ignored and then led to minor skirmishes when repeated. By February 1965, violations from the Pakistani side were increasing and India lodged a strong protest officially, which Pakistan denied. By 24 April 1965 Pakistan attacked four Indian positions using Patton tanks and 100-pound guns for the first time. After a week of fighting back the heavy intrusion, the Indian army had held on to all but one post called 'Pt. 84'.

It was at this time that the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson initiated moves to secure a ceasefire and eventually the matter was referred to an international tribunal whose selection was facilitated by the UN Secretary General for arbitration. Prime Minister Shastri, agreeing to the ceasefire, had taken a firm stance in the Indian Parliament that the Rann of Kutch was not a territorial dispute for India and the government saw the arbitration by the tribunal as a means to demarcate the boundary between the provinces of Sindh and Kutch. There was opposition to this decision and also discontentment spewing within certain political sections in India. Very few, at that time, were aware that Shastri, in his consultations with Army Chief J.N. Chaudhuri and Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, had been advised against escalating the conflict in the Rann of Kutch as the terrain was unsuitable for India for large-scale operations. The end result was the ceasefire, declared on 1 July 1965, saw both countries restore the status quo as observed in January 1965; however, Pakistan retained the right to patrol the 18 mile track on the border because it was established that Pakistani Rangers used to patrol the track before January 1965. Many in India viewed this agreement as acceding to Pakistan.

Meanwhile, despite the ceasefire, the scale of assault in Kutch by Pakistan for a few acres of land was raising red flags in the official circles in Delhi. Ambassador Rasgotra was among the first to take this up with his superiors.

I was a war book officer at that time. An American embassy officer rang me up in the morning and asked for an urgent meeting. He said to me, 'Why are people sending forces to Kutch? This is a sham attack to divert your attention from the north. Pakistan army has been painting the warpaint on its tanks. This is a diversionary tactic and a bigger attack was planned in the north.' I wrote up a note and sent it to the concerned authorities who took it seriously since I had known that this source was authentic. I think the Americans were warning us. We took this threat seriously.¹⁷

He admits though that despite the warning signs, the scale and detailed planning of the next phase of assaults in Kashmir did take New Delhi by surprise.

Pakistan, however, had interpreted the outcome of the Rann of Kutch conflict as a sign of encouragement for its future designs on Kashmir. Ironically, Ayub too did not want to escalate the war, because the 'probing in Kutch' had completed their trial run to launch the full scale attack on India now, having tested the will of India which had 'agreed to settle'. As Altaf Gauhar, author of the biography on Ayub Khan and his Minister for Information and Broadcasting recounts,

For all his realism and prudence, Ayub's judgement did get impaired by the Rann of Kutch in one respect: his old prejudice that 'the Hindu has no stomach for a fight' turned to belief, if not a military doctrine, which had the decisive effect on the course of events.¹⁸

ACT II: OPERATIONAL GIBRALTAR—BLOW FOR PAKISTAN, WAKE UP CALL FOR INDIA

By 28 July 1965, five groups of the Pakistani army's guerrilla forces, numbering approximately 30,000 men, had infiltrated across the Ceasefire Line (CFL) and made their way to operational positions inside Kashmir.¹⁹ On 5 August 1965, the covert operations commenced, which had planned:²⁰

1. a slew of attacks including arson to destroy bridges, communication and government properties in 60 different locations in Kashmir and causing large scale damage;
2. to use propaganda machinery to disguise the invasion as a 'people's uprising' in Kashmir on the anniversary of the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah;
3. to announce that a revolutionary council had taken over Kashmir and reject all agreements with India;
4. to officially deny Pakistani operations and use India's retaliation across the CFL as 'aggression by India into Pakistan occupied Kashmir; and
5. launch attacks in Chhamb and capture of Akhnoor to cut off supply lines as a defensive action and build on the plan to capture Amritsar.

But Pakistan had not accounted for a lack of support from the local Kashmiris. The top secret operation 'was met by a hostile (valley)

population which knew nothing about Gibraltar or its purpose.²¹ General Musa, who had been against the raids commented, 'Historical lessons were ignored [...] We hadn't even consulted public leaders across CFL about our aims and intentions, let alone associating them with our planning for the clandestine war.'²² In fact, as the popular Indian version goes, Mohammad Din, a local shepherd boy, apprehended by the guerrillas, reported back to the Indian officials and helped the capture of the Pakistani intruders who then spilled the beans on the entire operation.²³

Initially, on the Indian side, information on this attack was extremely sketchy. It was only after the attack and after the capture of the intruders that Prime Minister Shastri took command of the situation. An emergency meeting of the Cabinet Committee was convened and the military chiefs were asked to take all necessary steps to push back Pakistan. His policy response was that India would not approach the UNSC and would defend its territorial integrity on its own strength; India would not tolerate Pakistan's interference on Indian sovereignty; and plans would be prepared for various eventualities including the threat from China and the nation would be kept abreast of all of government decisions.²⁴ He followed this up by getting an approval from the full Cabinet on his future course of action on 12 August and a public address to the nation on 13 August 1965 which assured the Indian public that 'force will be met with force'.²⁵ Militarily, by then, Indian forces had taken the decision to capture the Haji Pir Pass and the Kishen Ganga bulge, the two supply routes for infiltration into the valley. This had meant crossing over the CFL to carry out the operation, a decision that had the firm backing of Prime Minister Shastri and his government which was prepared to handle the consequences.²⁶ The capture of the Haji Pir Pass along with various counter-insurgency operations by the Indian security forces was seen as a major triumph for the political-military operations, and was announced with much jubilation in the Lok Sabha on 30 August 1965.²⁷ New Delhi was by now anticipating a severe retaliation by Pakistan and had begun diplomatic consultations for future contingencies as well.

FALL OUT OF OP GIBRALTAR: PROPAGANDA WARS AND THE DIPLOMATIC PARLEYS

It was evident by now that Op Gibraltar had not produced the desired results for Pakistan and the propaganda machinery churning out stories of uprisings in Kashmir had only added to the embarrassment. Gauhar, who

was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting during the Ayub era, writes of the reports sent to the army HQ, 'Whether it was an advanced form of camouflage, self delusion or prevarication by common consent to boost one another's morale and prospects, conscience had certainly yielded to wilful fabrication.'²⁸ The western press was quick to pick up on the ruse, with *The Guardian* headline asking whether Pakistan was attempting their Bay of Pigs²⁹ in Kashmir. This was aided perhaps by the US government spokesperson explicitly adding, 'We have noted reports that infiltrators from Pakistan have violated the ceasefire line in Kashmir.'³⁰ In fact, the growing disenchantment of the US with Pakistan was becoming evident. An editorial in the *Denver Post*, reproduced in the *Hindustan Times* on 28 August 1965, stated,

We have given great quantities of military and economic aid to Pakistan. Now they have turned on us. [...] It may well be that President Ayub is betting on the takeover of all of Asia by the Red Chinese [...] If that becomes clear, the US must then take the other task of giving India all the help she needs in defending her borders.³¹

At the same time in New Delhi, Prime Minister Shastri was braving domestic anxiety over Pakistan's aggression. Opposition was pressing for the revocation of the Rann of Kutch agreement and a stronger stance on Pakistan.³² Shastri was resolute that an international commitment could not be backtracked if India was to remain a reliable actor in the global arena and his government withstood and won a no-confidence motion that increased the nation's confidence in his leadership.³³ In an interview to the *New York Times*, he stated firmly, 'If Pakistan continues her aggression, India will not limit itself to defence, but will strike back.'³⁴

He had also stepped up diplomatic activity entrusting diplomatic missions to keep foreign governments informed of challenges India was facing. The US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, met Indian envoy B.K. Nehru and was briefed on the restraint with which India had dealt with Op Gibraltar.³⁵ At the same time, Pakistan's representative to the UN was meeting Secretary General U Thant, reportedly to deny Pakistan's role in pushing infiltrators into Kashmir.³⁶ This story would not stick as the independent UN Observer General Robert Nimmo sent regular reports to U Thant, which supported India's claims of a disguised attack by Pakistan on Kashmir.³⁷ At first, based on the reports the UN Secretary General was preparing a statement which squarely blamed Pakistan for the aggression in Kashmir, but before it could be approved by the UNSC, Pakistan threatened to resign if the statement was issued. Wanting not

to lose the role of mediator, the UN Secretary General withheld the statement, causing many in India to question if Pakistan had been exposed and whether international pressure could have stopped it from launching the 22-day war in September of 1965.³⁸

The role of international powers saw a shifting of attitudes from the build up to 1965 and after the attack on Kashmir, and this led to further escalation of insecurities on the subcontinent.

American relations with India had a history of ambivalence in the 1950s, as India was seen as the voice of the Third World and leader of the Non Aligned Movement, especially after the Bandung conference in 1955. The US was cautious, worried that India's ideological leanings were towards the left.³⁹ Nehru reaching out to Kennedy during the 1962 India-China War changed that and US economic and military assistance (basic mortars, rifles and shells), along with assistance from the UK to India started flowing in—a development that Pakistan was unhappy about. Ayub was getting 'distressed about seeing the American wooing of India regardless of their military alliance with Pakistan' and Islamabad had threatened to quit the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the co-operative security frameworks, much to Kennedy's chagrin.⁴⁰ Post the Kennedy era, Ayub had re-established a personal relationship with the new US President Lyndon Johnson, who in the beginning of his tenure had shown a lack of enthusiasm towards India.⁴¹ This had led to a rethink of the five-year military assistance pact with India which had been ready for approval but remained unsigned owing to Kennedy's assassination.⁴² India's attempts for a Presidential meeting were turned down but Bhutto was received as Johnson was said to be worried about Pakistan and China closing ranks.⁴³ India was agitated further with Johnson when he decided unilaterally to turn down invitations to both Ayub and Shastri to Washington in March 1965 since the US was preoccupied with Vietnam.⁴⁴ The Indian press was already unhappy with Johnson's stance on delaying food shipments and military aid to India till the last hour. This put more pressure on Shastri's leadership of Indian diplomacy.

In 2005, it was revealed by the late K. Subrahmanyam, India's foremost strategic thinker, that the Pentagon and Harvard University played a war game at the Institute of Defence Analysis, Washington DC, in March 1965, in which the US believed that India would lose in a confrontation with Pakistan.⁴⁵ The US support to India was always held in suspicion in New Delhi.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's strengthened relationship with China had caught the attention of the world powers at the height of the Cold War. After concluding a border agreement with China in March 1963, which handed over disputed territories with India in J&K to China, Pakistan had openly begun to court Beijing.⁴⁶ Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had made a state visit to Pakistan in February 1964 and had laid out the red carpet for Ayub in March 1965, including organising a meeting with Mao.⁴⁷ Zhou Enlai returned to Pakistan in June 1965 and there has been speculation that it was the Chinese tactics of guerrilla warfare that were deployed by the Pakistani's in the attack on Kashmir.⁴⁸ Right after his visit to China, Ayub also visited the Soviet Union attempting to convince Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin to look at the Kashmir dispute not just from its friend India's point of view.⁴⁹ Russia too was concerned of Pakistan falling into the lap of the Chinese and decided to adopt a less strident posture in support of India and rephrase its stance on Kashmir as the need for India and Pakistan to find an agreed peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue.⁵⁰ While there was no departure from its stand on Kashmir being an integral part of India, the Soviet Union wanted to look more balanced in its approach. So, while it accepted that infiltrators from Pakistan had launched attacks on Kashmir, it advised that the best policy for both countries was to avoid escalation.⁵¹ Prime Minister Shastri visited Moscow soon after Ayub's visit. Soviet leaders reassured him that they were trying to wean Pakistan away from military pacts as well as from China and if they were successful, India would benefit more than the Soviet Union.⁵² Great games were at play, but India could not afford to second guess its relationship with USSR at this juncture.

Meanwhile, even as Shastri was busy managing diplomatic manoeuvres, Ayub had launched Op Gibraltar and flown to Swat valley to keep up the illusion of Pakistan's non-involvement in the attacks on Kashmir. Gauhar records that Ayub was away from all the action, unaware that India had fought back till 29 August 1965. In fact, in a directive he sent back with Bhutto, he continued to assert that '...the aim [...] to weaken Indian resolve and bring her to the conference table without provoking a general war.'⁵³ His non-availability had put Bhutto in a pre-eminent position and he gave the Presidential approval for the launch of Operation Grand Slam, which now involved the transgression of the International Boundary (IB) with the plan to attack Akhnoor.⁵⁴ Ayub, Bhutto and the Pakistan military top brass had assumed that the Indian forces were left exposed in Akhnoor after fending off the invading

forces and had no back-up plans.⁵⁵ Having stopped receiving euphoric messages on the success of Op Gibraltar, a now suspicious Ayub flew back to Rawalpindi to witness what he thought would be a decisive win for Pakistan.⁵⁶ On 31 August 1965, Pakistan officially took a full-blown war to India's territory.

OPERATION GRAND SLAM AND INDIA'S MARCH TO LAHORE

Y.B. Chavan's diary of the 1965 war proves that India was caught in complete surprise on 1 September, when Pakistan attacked Chhamb in J&K. His entry shows that a briefing that morning by military intelligence had given India 'at least sixteen days before Pakistan retaliated', an assessment that was completely off the mark.⁵⁷ The Army Chief, General J.N. Chaudhuri, rushed back from Srinagar to New Delhi asking political clearance for airforce support to battle the massive show of Pakistani tanks advancing with large quantities of ammunition and artillery with full logistics backup. Geography and time would not afford India the same luxury.⁵⁸ Chavan gave the go ahead to involve the Indian Air Force (IAF) and promptly informed the Prime Minister about the gravity of the crisis. Air Marshal Arjan Singh agreed without hesitation to go to the Army's support, only pointing out that in attacks launched without adequate preparation, losses must be accepted and that pilots may make mistakes between friend and foe.⁵⁹ Shastri backed the decision, in a departure from the 1962, but was also aware that this would escalate the confrontation to an open war and have international implications.⁶⁰ Collusive military action from China was a looming threat and this would also open the theatre for intervention from both the US and USSR. Domestically, a communal flare up in Poona (now Pune), an anxious Parliament and press, and an excited nation, all demanded Shastri's attention.

By 2 September, UN Secretary General U Thant had already sent an appeal for a ceasefire, which the Indian government officially considered but practically could not accept because of Pakistan's bid to capture Akhnoor.⁶¹ As intense ground and air battles raged on, Shastri was considering a monumental decision. He convened the emergency committee of the Cabinet and explained his consultations with the military commanders.⁶² He said that in order to defend Kashmir it was essential to make a diversionary attack in West Pakistan, which would need to be immediate, in order to ensure that Pakistani forces were pushed from the offensive to the defensive.⁶³ Two sessions and discussions later,

this decision was endorsed. On 3 September 1965, India decided to carry the fight to the invaders territory, and the military had orders to march to Lahore.⁶⁴

According to Chavan's diary, right after the Rann of Kutch episode, General Chaudhuri, with Chavan's approval, had worked out a plan codenamed Operation Riddle to launch an offensive action to secure the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal (running from India to Lahore).⁶⁵ It was felt that the mere presence of the Indian troops on the canal opposite Lahore would draw Pakistani forces from Indian territories and reduce its offensive capabilities in other sectors.⁶⁶ However, in all of the conversations recorded by P.V.R. Rao, the Defence Secretary, the memoirs of C.P. Srivastava, Private Secretary to Prime Minister Shastri, and the recollections of L.K. Jha, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1965, it becomes evident that the brief which constituted the 'higher direction of war', made it clear that the government was determined not to enlarge the scope of the conflict beyond the minimum required to safeguard its position in Kashmir and to prevent any escalation of the conflict beyond this objective.⁶⁷ It had no interest whatsoever in occupying territory in Pakistan and declaring a war in the legal sense between India and Pakistan.⁶⁸ This decision has been cited as the reason why the Indian Navy was limited in its role in the 1965 operations.

In Pakistan, according to Altaf Gauhar's memoirs, the persons most surprised by the Indian attack were President Ayub and his Army Chief.⁶⁹ He recalls that Shastri's public speeches indicating India's intent were dismissed as bluster and a cyphered message from the High Commissioner in New Delhi through the Turkish embassy warning of an attack on 6 September was kept away from the President allegedly by Bhutto and Aziz, who thought of it as a panicked reaction.⁷⁰ The US ambassador reportedly told Ayub on 6 September, 'Mr President, the Indians have got you by the throat,' to which Ayub responded, 'Any hands on Pakistan's throat will be cut off.'⁷¹ He then went public to speak to the people of Pakistan, assuring them of India's defeat and gave the orders to launch Operation Mailed Fist, which was the attack on Amritsar.⁷² For the next fortnight, both Indian and Pakistani forces would dual in exhausting battles of one-upmanship, exposing military and political miscalculations on both sides,⁷³ but ultimately with outcomes favouring the Indians. However, the war games on the diplomatic chessboard seemed to be more frantic than those on the ground.

**GREAT GAMES IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT:
UN AND THE MAJOR POWERS**

Even as the Indian and Pakistani forces slugged it out on the battlefield, by 4 September India was preparing a response for the UN Secretary General's appeal to cease escalation of conflict immediately. Prime Minister Shastri's objective was to first ensure that the world community recognised Pakistan as the aggressor of the conflict and then prepare the Indian position once the news of India's counter attack in Lahore broke, keeping in mind the inevitability of a UNSC meeting on the issue. The UNSC met on 4 September and noted India's position on Pakistan's aggression, but as the news of the Lahore attack broke, it reconvened on 6 September and passed a resolution calling upon both sides to adopt an immediate ceasefire.⁷⁴ However, from India's point of view, the resolution was a diplomatic triumph because while it called for immediate cessation of hostilities, it indirectly recognized Pakistan as an aggressor and outlined that it could no longer seek assistance from its alliance partners for further aid, thus exposing the complete failure of Pakistan's propaganda.⁷⁵

As the UK and US ambassadors pressed Shastri for restraint, it was the message from the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to both Ayub and Shastri that angered India and eliminated any future role of the United Kingdom for further mediation.⁷⁶ Wilson's letter, while blaming both sides for the conflict, suggested India's attack on Lahore had escalated it, and this was dismissed as a biased view in New Delhi.⁷⁷ Wilson later admitted to have been 'wrongfully advised by his people' responding to accusations of partisanship.⁷⁸ US President Lyndon Johnson, who was then heavily involved in Vietnam and working through the UNSC, was worried over Chinese involvement in case of an escalation of conflict.⁷⁹ India's complaint that Pakistan was using American made tanks against India, despite the assurances of Eisenhower to Nehru, was also causing anxiety for the Americans.⁸⁰ It was then that the US and UK decided on an embargo that would stop military aid to both India and Pakistan.⁸¹

In Pakistan, President Ayub had dismissed the UN resolution as 'yielding to Indian pressure' and told UN Secretary General U Thant, who was then visiting Rawalpindi, that a ceasefire without resolution of the Kashmir conflict would be laying down the foundation for another war.⁸² He saw this as 'America doing everything conceivable to help India', and Bhutto in a meeting alongside Ayub and US Ambassador Walter P. McCaughy continued to deny any role in the Kashmir attacks and equated the US attitude 'as plunging a knife in Pakistan's back'.⁸³ Ayub

now swung into high diplomatic activity to assist Pakistan's efforts. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who had been the Chief of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) during the Rann of Kutch incident, was sent to China, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran to seek aid.⁸⁴ While Saudi Arabia had promised financial aid and France offered to provide a few aircrafts, it was hardly enough.⁸⁵ Offers of support came from the Shah of Iran and President of Turkey, but military assistance was not possible since hardware was US made and without whose approval it could not be sent to Pakistan.⁸⁶ The Soviets had continued to maintain a neutral stance, demanding both sides not to escalate hostilities, while they were keeping a wary eye on Chinese involvement.

As the demand for spare parts and reports of acute shortage of ammunition started coming in from the battlefield, an exasperated Ayub reportedly said at an emergency cabinet meet:

The Americans have let us down, but they are afraid of Chinese involvement[...]. Our best card is the China card. We have to decide at what stage the Chinese aid needs to be obtained. Our dealings with China should be frank and above board.⁸⁷

The final message from Ayub to UN Secretary General U Thant on 11 September 1965 was that Pakistan was not ready for a ceasefire.⁸⁸

THE CHINESE ULTIMATUMS

The Chinese were only too happy to come to Pakistan's rescue. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, had already met with Bhutto in Karachi on 4 September supporting Pakistan against 'India's armed provocation in Kashmir'.⁸⁹ It followed this up with a statement on 7 September which read, 'The Indian government probably believes that since it has the backing of the US imperialists and modern revisionists, it can bully its neighbours, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes.'⁹⁰ It had previously, in an attempt to bully India on 27 August, accused the Indian army of committing acts of aggression and provocation on the border of Sikkim and Tibet in July and August, which the Indians had rejected.⁹¹ By 8 September, it renewed these accusations claiming, 'India must bear responsibility of all consequences arriving therefrom,' which India again rejected and offered for a neutral and independent observer to visit the China border and look at these complaints.⁹² On 17 September, the Chinese again upped the ante dismissing India's offer as 'pretentious' and sending a fresh note accusing India of 'maintaining

56 military installations on the Tibetan side of the Sikkim-Tibet border and demanding their dismantling within two days or face grave consequences.⁹³ It also demanded the return of Tibetans, 800 sheep and 59 yaks allegedly abducted from Tibet.⁹⁴

Prime Minister Shastri by now had calculated that 'China was unlikely to launch an attack like 1962 because they had no immediate objective of their own to achieve' and 'would not risk a war with the US' or 'draw USSR into the South Asia' just for the sake of 'friendship with Pakistan'.⁹⁵ So, while addressing the Parliament after the emergency Cabinet Committee meeting, he once again reiterated India's offer of joint inspection to assuage Chinese complaints and carefully conveyed that he hoped 'China would not take advantage of the present situation and attack India'.⁹⁶ He, however, assured the house that India would protect its territorial integrity in case of an attack from China and fight back.⁹⁷ India had already sought the offices of the US and USSR to help tackle an impending attack from China. The USSR, in fact, had come out with a statement warning those powers which by their 'incendiary statements' or policy were trying to push India and Pakistan towards further aggravation of the conflict, adding that such actions would implicate them further.⁹⁸ While the Chinese ultimatum was set to expire at the midnight of 19 September, the Chinese had already begun moving their troops towards the Sikkim border on 18 September, with reports of firing in Nathu La reaching New Delhi.⁹⁹ In a new move, they extended their deadline of dismantling of military structures to 72 hours, knowing that a UNSC resolution demanding a ceasefire would be tabled by 20 September and that continuing the pressure on India would bolster Pakistan's case.¹⁰⁰

It was later revealed that China was pushing Ayub Khan to continue the Indo-Pak war. Ayub, who flew to Beijing for a secret meeting on 19–20 September, was assured by Zhou Enlai of continued support 'for as long as necessary' and told 'but you must keep fighting even if you have to withdraw to the hills'.¹⁰¹ To this President Ayub responded, 'Mr Prime Minister I think you are being rash'.¹⁰² Zhou Enlai then smiled and cautioned Ayub against succumbing to American pressure, saying, 'and don't fall into the Russian trap. They are unreliable. You will find out the truth'.¹⁰³ Gauhar records that it was now that it became 'clear to Ayub and Bhutto that if Pakistan wanted full Chinese support it had to be prepared for a long war and the loss of important cities like Lahore,' which they were not prepared for.¹⁰⁴ They were looking at 'a quick fix to push the

Indians to the negotiating table' and moreover 'their Army and Air Force were totally against the prolongation of the conflict.'¹⁰⁵

Indian assessment of the Chinese ultimatums proved thus correct and now the stage was set for high level diplomacy and war of words at the UN.

CEASEFIRE AND THE ROAD TO TASHKENT

Prime Minister Shastri had by 18 September, having discussed India's position with UN Secretary General U Thant, sought the army Chief's assessment on the war, anticipating the UNSC resolution on September 20. General Chaudhuri asserted that the objectives of the war were achieved and added, 'We are on top of the situation [and] if we agree to a ceasefire now, the army would support it. The respite we will get will be good to put things right as far as supplies are concerned.'¹⁰⁶ The Prime Minister decided to send a message to U Thant on the decision that India was ready for an unconditional ceasefire, but would not accept Pakistani President Ayub Khan's demands for a plebiscite in Kashmir after withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces from the state and international mediation in the matter.¹⁰⁷ On 20 September 1965, after a protracted debate for three days, the UNSC passed a resolution demanding immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of armies to the pre 5 August positions, stressing that a political solution would be sought later.¹⁰⁸ India's representation had ensured that there was no reference to past resolutions on Kashmir, that reverting to the pre 5 August positions would definitely vindicate India's stand on Pakistan being the aggressor, and had also secured support from major powers on India's position, with the USSR openly backing India on the floor of the house.¹⁰⁹

In Pakistan, President Ayub had understood the war was over for Pakistan and now diplomatic bargaining was the only way to save face. He was concerned that acceptance of the ceasefire would invite public backlash and raise questions on the futility of the operation.¹¹⁰ The exclusion of all of Ayub's preconditions from the resolution added to his worry, but it was decided that the public would be told that 'Pakistan would agree to hold its fire but if Indians did not yield on Kashmir hostilities would be resumed.'¹¹¹ With the decision taken, Bhutto, while dramatically threatening to leave the United Nations if no 'honourable solution was found to the Kashmir issue', accepted the ceasefire in the wee hours of 22 September.¹¹² On 23 September 1965, the ceasefire came into effect.

Having sensed American reluctance to mediate in the Indo-Pak conflict given its preoccupation in Vietnam, USSR had stepped up its efforts under Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin to occupy the diplomatic space vacated, in an ironic convergence of interests to keep China at bay. As early as 20 September, Kosygin had offered the good offices of Tashkent to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the differences between India and Pakistan.¹¹³ First, Ayub rejected the offer thinking USSR mediation in the conflict would only play to India's advantage.¹¹⁴ Bhutto was then sent to Moscow to push Pakistan's cause for a discussion on Kashmir. While he accepted the offer for talks in Tashkent unconditionally, he told the press back home that he had got assurances from Russia on mechanisms for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute in Tashkent.¹¹⁵ Ayub meanwhile sought out US support with a meeting with Lyndon Johnson in the hope to put the spotlight back on the Kashmir issue. He had to come away disappointed when Johnson refused to be drawn in, and ended the meeting by saying, 'I am not going to let Pakistan say we cannot feed India. Nor are we going to let India think we cannot protect Pakistan.'¹¹⁶

During this time, Prime Minister Shastri was involved in deep consultations with his government, military commanders, party members, etc., to develop various contingencies to press forth internationally that while India was prepared to discuss a whole gamut of Indo-Pak relations at Tashkent, it would not allow any declarations on Kashmir.¹¹⁷ India was also aware that the 20 September UNSC resolution required forces to withdraw to the pre 5 August positions would mean Pakistan having to vacate Chhamb and India having to vacate the strategic Haji Pir Pass and other areas won in battle.¹¹⁸ The question of troop withdrawal was undoubtedly weighing on Shastri's mind as he agreed to an Indo-Pak meeting in Tashkent in January 1966.

THE TASHKENT AGREEMENT: LOSS OF HAJI PIR AND THE MAKING OF AN INDIAN STATESMAN

Discord was apparent from the beginning at Tashkent with the press briefings given by both sides after the inaugural meetings. Pakistan told the international press that President Ayub Khan was in Tashkent to 'discuss the totality of our relationship with India, including the Kashmir question'; while the Indian Foreign Secretary, C.S. Jha, maintained that 'Kashmir was non-negotiable'.¹¹⁹ Ayub, recounting his initial talks with Shastri to his delegation, described him as a reasonable man who kept

insisting, 'General you have to understand my position.[...] I have stepped into the shoes of giant and I am really too small for the job.'¹²⁰ Bhutto reacted angrily to what he thought was Ayub's softening of stand, frustrated that he too, in his talks with the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, had not found any breakthroughs on Kashmir.¹²¹ The Soviets too had reiterated that Pakistan could not expect any mechanism to solve the Kashmir dispute to come out of Tashkent and hence by 8 January all discussions between the two sides had ceased.¹²²

Prime Minister Shastri and his delegation by now were aware that while Soviet support to the Indian position was constant, Prime Minister Kosygin had in consultations indicated that international opinion would shift if India refused to budge on the issue of vacation of the strategic Haji Pir Pass, which was a requirement of the UNSC resolution.¹²³ A failure on both sides to withdraw troops would result in the failure of the conference.¹²⁴ Shastri was also conscious that giving up the Haji Pir Pass would evoke an emotional response and open him up to accusations of betrayal and uniformed criticism. In his preparation for Tashkent, he had asked his military commanders for advice and both the Army and Air Force chiefs had stressed that while they would not want to vacate the pass, it could not come at the cost of peace in the subcontinent.¹²⁵ In his conversations with Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan from Tashkent, he was given the same reassurance.¹²⁶ Even as Shastri was pondering over the momentous decision, Pakistan continued to assert that the declaration should include a reference to the resolution to the Kashmir dispute. The conference thus was officially deadlocked.

What followed were intense one to one discussions between Kosygin and his team respectively with the Indian and Pakistani delegations for the next few days.¹²⁷ Even as chances of a breakthrough looked bleak, China added to the tensions by accusing India again of provoking tensions on the Indian border and threatening consequences in a bid to pull its weight behind Pakistan.¹²⁸ But Kosygin's agency finally came through when he convinced Shastri that in the interest of peace, the declaration would include a reference to Kashmir but only to repeat the respective positions of both countries on the dispute and no other declarations.¹²⁹ In his consultations with Ayub, he was able to convince the Pakistani President that he had provided him with a face saver and no further concessions could be expected. He contended, 'Mr President it is too late now. Your Foreign Minister [Bhutto] had given us an assurance in Moscow that Kashmir will not be made a decisive point in these negotiations. Is

that not correct?' To this Bhutto remained silent, for his omission had been caught.¹³⁰ What followed was President Ayub being painted as the villain of Tashkent by Bhutto and company, and faced a severe public backlash in Pakistan.¹³¹

The final text of the Tashkent Declaration was signed on 10 January 1966.¹³² It had achieved restoration of peace in the subcontinent. Both sides agreed to revert to positions held before 5 August, within six weeks of the declaration relieving occupied territories, with the CFL being re-established as inviolable. It had also gotten a reassurance from both sides that no recourse to force would be used to resolve the Kashmir dispute. It was seen as a triumph of statesmanship for Shastri and Kosygin, but the Indian Prime Minister had told his team he was aware that President Ayub, despite the declaration, would not give up the Kashmir issue so easily.¹³³ It is unfortunate that Prime Minister Shastri, who by then had shown the mettle of his leadership and surefootedness to the nation in a time of crisis, passed away at Tashkent succumbing to an ailing heart. India had lost a stellar statesman and the world was in shock.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, the description of the 1965 India-Pakistan War as a 'futile war' could be contested for it laid the foundation of changing the course of history of the subcontinent in more ways than one. For India, it banished the ghosts of 1962, and proved to the world that India had found for itself a leader after Nehru, who decisively managed the great games in the subcontinent, uniting India even with a menacing China meddling in its international affairs. The China-Pakistan entente was now a reality that India would have to live with and battle, both militarily and politically. The military too despite the many lessons learnt in the battlefield, emerged more confident in its capacities and looked at new strategic partners to arm its forces. Thus, 1965 despite the short-lived peace achieved at Tashkent, seemed to have provided a steep learning curve for India.

As M.K. Rasgotra concludes:

President Radhakrishnan had told me 'if Lal Bahadur Shastri had come back alive from Tashkent having ceded Haji Pir he would be torn alive politically.' But I think he would have prevailed. I was among those who weren't happy with the decision, but understood it had to be done. This treaty had no mention of Kashmir, it was a

normalisation of relations treaty which Pakistan didn't want and so it really amounted to nothing. But it was the first and final stage of getting US and Britain out of Kashmir issue to bilateralism and strengthened India's position with the US and UNSC.¹³⁴

India had indeed come a long way from 1962.

For Pakistan, 1965 changed history irrevocably. The 'terrible isolation' of East Pakistan during the course of the conflict would snowball into a demand for independence from that region, culminating in the 1971 war and creation of Bangladesh. While Ayub was battling backlash on the Tashkent Declaration in Islamabad, opposition parties in East Pakistan, while not condemning Tashkent, claimed 'that the war had thoroughly exposed the absurdity of the [Pakistan] army's cherished doctrine that the defence of East Pakistan lay in the plains of West Pakistan. East Pakistan had been left entirely defenceless during the war. They now demanded that East Pakistan must have adequate military capabilities to defend itself.'¹³⁵ Ayub Khan, thus, found himself in a political and diplomatic quagmire—with East Pakistan demanding virtual independence, he had to also convince an unhappy China that Tashkent was no way a signalling of close relations with the Soviet Union; reiterate to the Soviets its commitment to the agreement; and assuage the US that Pakistan's friendship with China did not come at the cost of US-Pak relations. Most importantly, 1965 cemented China as the foremost arms supplier to Pakistan and began its negotiations on nuclear weapons technology aimed at containing India.¹³⁶

The events of 1965, clearly, had profound consequences for India, Pakistan and the geo-politics of Asia.

NOTES

1. S.N. Prasad (ed.), *History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965*, New Delhi: History Division of Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992.
2. C.P. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.184–85.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 186
6. R.D. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story—Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of the India Pakistan War*, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2007, p. xvii of Prologue.
7. Ibid.

8. Interview with M.K. Rasgotra, Distinguished Diplomat and Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India on 27 April 2015 at his residence in New Delhi.
9. Ibid.
10. J.W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, pp. 192–93.
11. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 186.
12. Ibid. p. 187. Also see Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, Karachi: Oxford Unity Press, 1996, p. 210.
13. Ibid., p.188.
14. Ibid., pp. 188–89.
15. Ibid. Also see R.D. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, p. xviii of Prologue.
16. This section is based on information collated from pp. 192–202 of C.P. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2. Inputs have also been taken from Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, pp. 199–206.
17. Interview with M.K. Rasgotra, on 27 April 2015 at his residence in New Delhi.
18. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 203.
19. Ibid., p. 212.
20. General Musa, then Chief of Pakistan Army, quoted in C.P. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, pp. 206–07.
21. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 214.
22. General Musa, then Chief of Pakistan Army, quoted in C.P. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 204.
23. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, p. 5.
24. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 213.
25. Ibid., pp. 213–16.
26. Ibid., p. 217.
27. Ibid., pp. 216–17.
28. Ibid., p. 212.
29. The Bay of Pigs invasion was a failed military invasion of Cuba undertaken by the CIA-sponsored paramilitary group Brigade 2506 on 17 April 1961. Launched from Guatemala, the invading force was defeated within three days by the Cuban armed forces, under the direct command of the Prime Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro. The failed invasion reportedly strengthened the position of Castro's dictatorship as well as his ties with the USSR. This is said to have led eventually to the

events of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. For more details see www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-history/The-Bay-of-Pigs.aspx, accessed on 24 June 2015.

30. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 213.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 219–20.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. For more see ‘Records of the Office of The Historian’, US Department of State, Milestones 1953-1960, available at <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf>, accessed on 10 June 2015.
40. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler*, n. 11, pp. 118–21.
41. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 170.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
45. K. Subrahmanyam, ‘1965 Decided Fate of the Subcontinent’, *rediff.com*, 6 September 2005, available at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/06war1.htm>, accessed on 10 June 2015.
46. For more details see <http://historypak.com/pakistan-china-boundary-agreement-1962/>, accessed on 10 June 2015.
47. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 225.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
50. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 182.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
52. G.M. Hiranandani, *Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975*, published in 2000, available at <http://indiannavy.nic.in/book/transition-triumph>, accessed on 10 June 2015.
53. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 216.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, pp. 21–22.

58. Ibid.
59. Defence Secretary P.V.R. Rao, quoted in G.M. Hiranandani, *Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965–1975*, 2000, n. 52.
60. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, pp. 225–28.
61. Ibid., p. 227.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 228.
65. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, p. 120.
66. Ibid.
67. Conversations reproduced in in G.M. Hiranandani, *Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965–1975*, n. 52.
68. Ibid.
69. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 223.
70. Ibid., pp. 223–24.
71. Ibid., p. 224.
72. Ibid., p. 225.
73. For more details see R.D. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, pp. 31–64 and Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, pp. 220–42. Analysis also useful in Jaswant Singh, *India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy*, New Delhi: Rupa, 2013, pp. 77–98.
74. Ibid.
75. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, pp. 245–47.
76. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, p. 89.
77. Ibid.
78. Interview with M.K. Rasgotra, on 27 April 2015 at his residence in New Delhi.
79. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 243.
80. Ibid., pp. 243–45.
81. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 227.
82. Ibid., p. 227.
83. Ibid., pp. 227–28.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., p. 231.
88. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, p. 90.
89. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 232.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, p. 95.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 275.
96. Ibid., pp. 276–80.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 276.
99. Ibid., p. 279.
100. Ibid.
101. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 237.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story*, n. 6, pp. 96–98.
107. Ibid.
108. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, pp. 286–87.
109. Ibid.
110. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, pp. 238–40.
111. Ibid.
112. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, pp. 316–17.
113. Ibid., p. 330.
114. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 246.
115. Ibid., p. 247.
116. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, p. 339.
117. Ibid., pp. 325–29.
118. Ibid.
119. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 261.
120. Ibid., p. 262.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid., p. 265.

123. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, pp. 359–60.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., p. 334.
126. Ibid., p. 360.
127. Ibid., pp. 376–78.
128. Ibid.
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130. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 266.
131. Ibid.
132. This section is based on Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*, n. 2, pp. 387–90.
133. Ibid.
134. Interview with M.K. Rasgotra on 27 April 2015 at his residence in New Delhi.
135. Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, n. 11, p. 276.
136. Subrahmanyam, '1965 Decided Fate of the Subcontinent', n. 46.