# Fit for Command

## Leadership Attributes for PSO–COIN Operations

***Ivo Moerman****
***Paolo Tripodi*****

*Peace support operations (PSO)–counter-insurgency (COIN) operations are different and often significantly more complex than conventional operations. Such a complexity places greater demand on military leaders both at the tactical and operational levels. The diversity of tasks and threats, primacy of politics and the decentralized nature of PSO–COIN operations have serious implications for both junior and senior leaders. Although the fundamental leadership attributes for both conventional and PSO–COIN operations are timeless and common, in order to be successful in a PSO–COIN environment, military leaders should be more adept in certain attributes. This article, based on several case studies and a survey of military officers, shows that military leaders who possess and develop seven leadership attributes—adaptability, judgement, sociability, resoluteness, empathy, independence and knowledge/experience—are more likely to be successful at the tactical and operational levels in PSO–COIN.*

During the last two decades, military forces have been deployed in several different operational settings that range from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, intervention, crisis response, peacekeeping, peace enforcing, counter-insurgency, anti-piracy, deterrence and stabilization. We believe that an effective way to group these operations together is to refer to them as 'small wars', a term introduced by the United States (US) Marine

* The author is in the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps.
** The author is in the Lejeune Leadership Institute, Marine Corps University.

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Corps in the 1940 *Small Wars Manual*.[1] However, as many armed forces in the world have labelled these operations as peace support operations and counter-insurgency operations, in this article, we will refer to them as PSO–COIN.

Veteran and experienced military leaders have emphasized how performing successfully in these operations might be a challenge, mainly due to the complexities of playing roles that could be at odds with each other. Soldiers are asked to perform a number of roles that, often, are not related to their training and their traditional tasks. The classical definition of 'victory' and 'winning' on the battlefield is rarely, if ever, applicable to a PSO or a COIN operation. US Army General, Peter Chiarelli, explained that while he was deployed in Iraq[2] and conducted COIN and stability operations, the 'Synchronization and coordination of the battle space, was not to win the war, but to win the peace.'[3] In Baghdad, he wrote, 'we witnessed...that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought. Our own mentality of a phased approach to operations boxed our potential into neat piles the insurgent and terrorist initially exploited.'[4] Often, Chiarelli was frustrated by many of his fellow leaders' inability to understand the requirements of COIN and stability operations. As the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq, he stressed that his unit had been able 'to rapidly change from a traditional armored force and focus quickly on a new environment because of the adaptability of soldiers and leaders who had developed the necessary leader skills and team comfort.'[5] British Army General, Nigel Aylwin-Foster, noted the limitation of the US military organization to deal with COIN and PSOs. In Aylwin-Foster's view: 'The Army's focus has been conventional warfighting, and its branches into COIN and S&R [stability and reconstruction] have been regarded as a diversion, to be undertaken reluctantly, and preferably by Special Operations Forces and other specialists, many of whom are in Army reserves.'[6]

In the middle of the 2000s, the intensity of such a debate and the mixed and often poor results the US and coalition military achieved in the conduct of COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq paved the way that led both the US Army and the Marine Corps to develop a new manual to help those operating in a COIN environment. The US Army and Marine Corps 2006 *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* provides much-needed clarity about the role soldiers and Marines are supposed to play in such an environment. In a COIN operation:

> Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies. Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign are daunting.[7]

For the objective of this article, it should be noted that the COIN manual emphasizes that 'Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.'[8]

Both conventional and PSO–COIN operations are aimed at protecting and promoting national interest; however, in conventional wars, the protection and defence of national interest is immediate, direct and clear, while in PSO–COIN, national interest is indirect, often unclear and long term. Such a difference has created a significant degree of frustration among some military leaders who are unable to see the long-term promotion and protection of national interest when conducting PSO–COIN.[9]

To make things even more complicated, when conducting conventional wars, military leaders at the tactical and operational levels are mainly focused on the application of military power, which is their main area of expertise, an area in which they are rather 'comfortable'. When conducting PSO–COIN, military leaders should be able to apply all elements of national power in order to deter war, promote peace and create stability. The use of military power is often the last resort and certainly is one among many other tools.

Although there are many differences between conventional warfighting and PSO–COIN operations, two stand out: the centres of gravity and the use of force. In a conventional war, several key centres of gravity can be identified; they represent the enemy 'sources of moral and physical strength, power and resistance.'[10] They can be the enemy army (the military overall), the country, its capital and political and military leaders.[11] In PSO–COIN too, there are several centres of gravity: the insurgency organization and its structure; its leadership and the territory they control, where they might also have their headquarters (HQs); and yet, very likely, one of the most important centres of gravity is the

local population. David Kilcullen, a former Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) and an expert of COIN operations, rightly noted that:

> Counterinsurgency is a competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population...for your side to win, the people do not have to like you, but they must respect you, accept that your action benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security.[12]

In relation to the use of force, in a conventional war, the application of decisive force within the rules of the law of war is the normal course of action. While in PSO–COIN, force has to be applied extremely wisely, with the right intensity and always considering the consequences and impact that the use of such a force will have on the local population. When deployed in a PSO–COIN operation, leaders should have a proper understanding of the second and third order of effects caused by the use of force. Again, Kilcullen provides much wisdom on this point as he noted that 'Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuel and perpetuate the insurgency.'[13] The careful use of force, however, does not mean that force should not be used; on the contrary, when necessary, force should and must be used. Gareth Evans, one of the main advocates of the 'Responsibility to Protect', stressed that: 'Hard as it may be for many to instinctively accept, if there is one thing as bad as using military force when we should not, it is *not* using military force when *we should*.'[14] Recent events in Syria at the strategic level, and in the Central African Republic at the tactical and operational levels, are a sad reminder of the reluctance of many political and military leaders to use force when necessary to protect the defenceless.

Over the past 20 years, the outcome of PSO–COIN has been mixed; and while it is now clear that the role of the military, although important, is only one component of what is required to succeed, often the role played by military leaders has been critical for the outcome of such operations. Successful military leaders deployed in these operations were able to switch their mindset from conventional warfare to the new, more complex security environment. Other leaders, however, were unable to understand and adapt to PSO–COIN operations, and often caused catastrophic failures. In *The Generals*, Thomas Ricks stated that the generals leading the US Army in Iraq during the first few years that followed the invasion 'were not mentally prepared for the war they encountered.'[15]

In 1940, the Marines, who over the late part of the nineteen and early twentieth centuries had acquired a significant amount of experience in 'small wars', stressed the significant role leaders play in such an environment. The manual also stressed the importance played by a number of leadership attributes. In small wars, 'Particular attention should be paid to the development of initiative, adaptability, leadership, teamwork, and tactical proficiency of individuals composing the various units. These qualities, while important in no small degree in major warfare, are exceedingly important in small wars operations.'[16]

This article explores the role played by military leaders in PSO–COIN operations and analyses what a small but diverse group of military officers believe should be the attributes leaders should possess to be successful in such an environment.

Twenty-seven military leaders (the ranks of the respondents varied from Major to Lieutenant General) with experience in PSO–COIN responded to a questionnaire that aimed at assessing the role played by leadership in these operations and the attributes that leaders should possess or develop to succeed in such an operational environment. The officers were predominantly from Western nations, including the US, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, the Czech Republic and Spain. They held billets from platoon and company commander to battalion commander, staff officer, training team commander, task force commander, division commander and military assistant to the United Nations (UN) Secretary General.

## Leadership Attributes in PSOs And Coin

The survey we submitted to the officers was divided in two parts. The first part contained three questions that addressed broadly the role of leadership in conventional and PSO–COIN operations. In the initial two questions, the officers agreed and strongly agreed[17] that military leadership had been instrumental to prevent humanitarian disasters or violent escalations during PSO–COIN, and a significant number agreed and strongly agreed[18] that poor leadership failed to prevent a humanitarian disaster.

The third question explored the officers beliefs about whether leadership attributes that are required for PSO–COIN differ from those required for conventional operations. More than half of the officers disagreed and strongly disagreed with the proposition that PSO–COIN requires different leadership attributes from a conventional war. It should

be noted that only a combined 33 per cent of the officers surveyed agreed and strongly agreed that a PSO–COIN operational environment requires different leadership attributes from a conventional war.

In the second part of the survey, the officers were asked to consider 19 leadership attributes—adaptability, courage (moral and physical), commitment, decisiveness, determination/perseverance, empathy, ethics, initiative, independence, integrity, intelligence, judgement, knowledge/experience, personality/charisma, persuasiveness, respect, risk taking, self-confidence and sociability—and indicate how important these attributes are for both PSO–COIN and conventional wars.

These 19 leadership attributes were selected after a careful examination of leadership theory literature. A special focus was placed on the trait approach as it concentrates exclusively on the leader and not on the followers.[19] Ralph Stogdill conducted innovative research on leadership traits between 1904 and 1947, followed by another study between 1948 and 1970.[20] Besides identifying several traits that are crucial for a leader, he also suggested that the traits of a leader must be relevant to the situation in which the leader is operating. Peter Northouse used Stogdill's trait approach to analyse leadership and concluded that 'leaders in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in another situation.'[21] In other words, the situation influences leadership requirements. When this principle is applied to military leadership, it implies that the required leadership attributes for conventional warfare are likely to differ from the required attributes for PSO–COIN.

The results of the second part of our survey confirm Stogdill's and Northouse's leadership traits research. Although the military leaders surveyed believe that several fundamental leadership attributes are equally important during both conventional and PSO–COIN operations, they also heavily suggest that in order to be successful in a PSO–COIN environment, leaders should possess and develop a number of specific attributes. They identified seven attributes to be particularly important for PSO–COIN: adaptability, judgement, sociability, persuasiveness/resoluteness, empathy, independence, knowledge/experience (see Table 1).

One of the respondents, a British officer with experience in a wide variety of PSO–COIN, explained that:

> Of course, there is plenty of discussion about the Strategic Corporal, and Northern Ireland was a very particular situation, that has few parallels with the likes of Iraq or Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, each commander has to react to the situation he faces, which may be very

**Table 1** Importance of Leadership Attributes Per Type of Conflict

| *(1) Conventional War* | *(2) Equally Important* | *(3) PSO–COIN* |
|---|---|---|
| • Courage (moral and physical)<br>• Risk taking | • Initiative<br>• Intelligence<br>• Perseverance<br>• Self-confidence<br>• Ethics<br>• Commitment<br>• Integrity<br>• Personality and charisma<br>• Decisiveness<br>• Respect | • Adaptability<br>• Judgement<br>• Sociability<br>• Persuasiveness<br>• Empathy<br>• Independence<br>• Knowledge and experience |

*Source:* Authors.

> different from that faced by a colleague just a couple of kilometers away—he has to take daily decisions on actions and activities that may promote stability or lead to a negative response; it is a balancing act, with the use of soft and hard effects in varying degrees—this requires a heightened range of skills than necessarily required in a 'straightforward' conventional operation; many of the same qualities are required, but small wars requires some to come to the fore more readily.[22]

In the following pages, we provide more details about the seven attributes the respondent population identified as being particularly important in a PSO–COIN environment.

**Adaptability**

Adaptability is the ability to change to fit fluid circumstances. The degree of adaptability is determined by a leader's creativity and flexibility.[23] Creativity is the ability to generate new methods to solve re-occurring problems or to come up with improvising solutions to immediate problems.[24] Creative leaders have the ability to think outside of the box without losing touch with reality. Flexibility is the ease with which one is able to switch quickly from one type of thought or action to another. The US Army General, David Petraeus, stressed that 'There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.'[25]

In PSO–COIN, often, military leaders will encounter unfamiliar challenges that require adjustment of established practices. Leaders who lack creativity and flexibility might develop a tendency to rely on standard tactics, techniques and procedures, rather than explore and consider new ones that could prove to be more effective. Creative leaders have a talent

to combine one or more unrelated techniques and to explore and adopt new courses of action. Flexibility also allows leaders to deal effectively with the moral challenges and ambiguities that are typical of PSO–COIN. Creativity and flexibility are not the same, and in most instances, one quality is often present without the other.[26]

The officers we surveyed stressed the importance of adaptability in both PSO–COIN and conventional wars. However, the number of those who believe that adaptability is particularly important in PSO–COIN is significantly high. While a small number, 5 per cent, of the officers strongly agreed about the importance of adaptability in conventional wars, 85 per cent strongly agreed that adaptability is important in PSO–COIN. A Dutch officer noted that:

> Leaders, especially at lower levels and/or less experienced, tend to approach new or 'chaotic' situations with a posture which is more kinetic/robust than the situation requires thus rather fusing instead of defusing the situation while also denying themselves proper escalation of force if this should be necessary. I saw this in both planning as in actual activities/operations.

There are many cases of adaptive leaders and rather rigid leaders that made an impact, either positive or negative, on the entire mission. The case of two distinguished and successful senior officers, British Army General Mike Jackson and US Army General Wesley Clark, illustrates how adaptability may influence success in command in a PSO–COIN. In 1999, they faced the same crisis while they were deployed, with different command responsibilities, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Kosovo. General Jackson was the Commander of NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR) and reported to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe at that time—the US Army General, Wesley Clark, a highly educated officer, clever, confident, energetic and driven. However, he was an officer who seemed to have a strong conventional mindset and approached the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo with very little flexibility. In Jackson's view, Clark was convinced that the only way to stop the Serbs was an all-out war.[27] General Jackson was surprised when Clark—in a speech to a group of senior officers of the multinational force—claimed that operations should switch to total war and that NATO soldiers had to relearn the spirit of the bayonet.[28] Later during a press conference, when it was clear that there was no political support for a ground war, Clark advocated a forced entry into Kosovo.

In June 1999, just before NATO forces moved into Kosovo, a contingent of Russian troops on armoured vehicles was also about to deploy to Kosovo and headed to the Pristina International Airport. General Clark perceived the Russian initiative as a threat and ordered General Jackson to send his troops into Kosovo earlier than planned, a course of action that might have been considered as a breach of the recently signed agreement with the Serbs. Still operating under Cold War assumptions, Clark had drawn an analogy between the need to claim the airfield of Pristina Airport and the race to Berlin in 1945.[29] Political pressure generated by such a possible course of action was so strong that Clark had to abandon his plan.

After the Russian forces occupied Pristina airfield, Clark ordered Jackson to block the runway.[30] General Jackson tried to reason with Clark to prevent a possible confrontation and use a more subtle approach to deal with the Russians. Ultimately, Jackson refused to execute the order and allegedly told Clark, 'Sir, I'm not going to start World War Three for you.'[31] The runway was not blocked, and an unnecessary and potentially dangerous confrontation with the Russians was prevented. Two months after this incident, earlier than scheduled, General Clark was replaced as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

General Clark clearly lacked adaptability, while his default mindset was mainly the one of a conventional military leader. Although he was a successful leader during the Cold War, he found it difficult to adapt to the new operational environment in the Balkans. General Jackson also grew up in a military organization, the British Army, that was preparing for the Cold War, but he was able to adapt his mindset to the new security environment. Very likely, his multiple deployments in an extremely challenging and non-conventional environment such as Northern Ireland helped him to develop a high degree of adaptability. In Kosovo, Jackson understood that succeeding required preventing confrontation and escalation, promoting peace and creating stability.[32]

**Judgement**

Judgement is the use of logic and intuition to quickly assess information and make sound and timely decisions.[33] Judgement is indeed a key leadership attribute during PSO–COIN. A leader's decision-making process in a PSO–COIN is complicated by an environment that is more dispersed, chaotic, and often changing more rapidly than the conventional operating environment; and by the presence of a multitude of actors and agencies

with the potential to influence the operational environment: media, non-governmental organizations (NGO), governmental institutions, criminal and terrorist organizations and, more important, the local population.

The *Small Wars Manual* rightly emphasizes that 'Small wars [PSO–COIN] are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.'[34] Military leaders at the tactical level operate in a decentralized environment that requires them to be confident, independent and capable to operate following the intent of their commander. Senior leaders, both at the tactical and operational levels, will often find that they might receive conflicting orders. In addition, in highly threatening and dangerous situations, they have to constantly assess their priorities. Does the priority lie with their mission, or with the safety of their personnel? This is a moral issue that requires sound judgement.

In our survey, more than half of the officers strongly agreed[35] about the importance of judgement in conventional wars; however, 78 per cent strongly agreed about the importance of judgement in a PSO–COIN environment.[36] The response to this question reveals the importance military leaders place on their ability to exercise judgement in PSO–COIN. In such an environment, they might receive broad and often unclear, rather than specific and narrow, guidance and orders. Their ability to retain the initiative and take the best course of action will be enhanced by their ability to understand and properly assess the environment.

A veteran leader of PSO–COIN, British Army General Rupert Smith, stressed that during PSO a leader's true skill lies in his or her assessment and decision-making abilities.[37] He argues that the priorities tend to privilege urgency of action rather than focusing on the issues that have the greatest value in achieving the desired outcome.[38]

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a sad reminder of how even well-intentioned leaders who are unable to properly assess the situation and take action accordingly can become passive witnesses to the greatest evil. In 1994, a Canadian General, Romeo Dallaire, faced several extremely difficult and challenging decisions as the Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR. On 7 April, after the killing of the Rwandan president, the situation in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, quickly became violent, and thousands of moderate Hutu and Tutsi were slaughtered. General Dallaire received conflicting instructions from the UN HQ in New York. Although the rules of engagement allowed for the

use of deadly force to prevent crimes against humanity, he was told that UN forces could only return fire when fired upon.

On that morning while the crisis was unfolding, General Dallaire left his HQ to meet with the new leaders of the Hutu-dominated military. On his way to the meeting, he saw that several Rwandan soldiers were badly beating a few of his Belgian peacekeepers. The situation was quickly getting out of control. Several Rwandan moderate political leaders had been murdered, UN personnel had been captured and Kigali was falling into a state of anarchy. Dallaire held onto the hope that he could bring the situation to some kind of resolution, and continued to engage with the Hutu military leaders throughout the day. In the evening, he found out that 10 Belgian soldiers, those he had seen in the morning being badly beaten, had been slaughtered.

Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie is very critical of Dallaire's leadership during the crisis in Rwanda. He claims that Dallaire was only experienced in conventional warfare and totally unfamiliar with the ambiguities of the UN decision-making process.[39] According to MacKenzie, General Dallaire was unable to make a proper judgement call and shift his priority from his futile attempts to save a UN mandate that had been overtaken by irreversible events, to saving the captured Belgian peacekeepers.[40] The mandate was made even more implausible by the ambiguous direction that Dallaire received from the UN HQ, which basically ordered him to be a bystander as the genocide was taking place.

A case that illustrates the value and positive outcome of sound judgement is the deployment of British troops in Sierra Leone in 2000. British Army Brigadier General David Richards, the Commander of Operation Palliser, was tasked with conducting the evacuation of Commonwealth citizens from the African country. Once on the ground, Richards met with political and military leaders from the Sierra Leone government and the UN. It did not take too long for him to find out that both the local government and the UN mission were in complete disarray and near collapse. Rebel army, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), troops were less than 20 miles from Freetown. Richards also met with the leaders of several armed factions roaming the streets of Freetown. After assessing the situation, on his own initiative, Richards decided to expand his mission to include saving the UN operation from collapse.[41] He quickly dispatched British officers to provide military advice and resolve to UN peacekeeping units and Sierra Leone Army (SLA) units at key points in and around the city. According to Richards, the most decisive factor that

needed attention was to stiffen the resolve of the UN units and turn them into an effective fighting force.[42] He successfully discouraged other hostile armed factions from joining the fighting by demonstrating the resolve of the UK and UN to remain in control.[43]

By the end of May 2000, a coalition of UN, SLA and British forces drove the RUF away from Freetown and Lungi Airport. On 15 June, Operation Palliser came to an end, and British forces departed Sierra Leone. With renewed confidence, UN and SLA soldiers were able to take over positions previously secured by British soldiers and began actively fighting and winning battles with the RUF. Brigadier Richards came under some criticism for driving the British mission from the scene by his independent actions. Such a criticism does not detract from his stunning success.[44]

**Sociability**

A third critical leadership attribute during PSO–COIN is sociability. Phillips and Loy noted that interpersonal relationships and alliances are means that military leaders can use to achieve their mission.[45] Relationships and alliances are built on trust, reliability and credibility, and therefore it takes time to establish them. Sociability is a crucial attribute that will enable military leaders to build and establish relationships and alliances.

During PSO–COIN, leaders deal with a variety of actors, including leaders of other organizations and nationalities. They also interact regularly with the local population that has the potential to provide invaluable assistance and information. Phillips and Loy rightly noted that 'The middle of the crisis is the worst time to exchange business cards.'[46] Without periodic and consistent engagement, these relationships often lack the depth of understanding and strength needed to generate support and collaboration on important issues.

In addition, sociable leaders tend to spend more time interacting with their unit personnel, thus they are more effective at motivating, influencing and monitoring subordinates. A commander who is not in close contact with his personnel will have little appreciation of their concerns.

Stefan Seiler and Anders Pfister noted that, during small wars, it is crucial for military leaders to understand the requirement for, and to become a valuable and trusted member of, military and non-military networks.[47] Sociability, along with empathy and the ability to interact, is a crucial attribute to build relationships and gain access to networks.

The officers we surveyed indicated that while sociability is extremely

important in a PSO–COIN environment, it might be irrelevant in a conventional setting. Only 4 per cent 'strongly agreed' about the importance of sociability in a conventional environment.[48] Yet, more than half, 59 per cent, strongly agreed about the importance of sociability in PSO–COIN.[49] Indeed, the survey indicated how important it is for the officers to be able to establish a network that goes beyond their chain of command. Success in PSO–COIN is often determined by the establishment of an environment in which a strong dialogue among potential foes takes place. This understanding of sociability has to be embraced by all troops deployed in PSO–COIN.[50] The *Small Wars Manual* stressed that while '[i]n major warfare, hatred of the enemy is developed among troops to arouse courage[,] in small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.'[51]

General Jackson showed excellent sociability skills at many levels during his time in command in Kosovo. An instructive example of Jackson's sociability is provided by his ability to establish good relations with the Russian force commander, General Viktor Zavarzin. After the tension that followed the Russian occupation of the Pristina airfield, Jackson met several times with Zavarzin and developed with him a solid professional relation. He supported the Russian troops by providing drinking water, and sent a British unit, commanded by his own son Mark, to provide protection against Kosovo Liberation Army snipers.[52] In a short period of time, relations between the two contingents improved significantly. Russian troops deployed into sectors with other NATO forces and British troops took over responsibility for air traffic control and logistics at the airfield.

In another crisis in Bosnia, in the middle 1990s, a leader's lack of social skill proved to be a major problem. In the early months of 1995, a Dutch Army Lt Col, Thom Karremans, was deployed with his battalion, Dutchbat III, in Bosnia to protect the enclave/safe area of Srebrenica. Karremans had very limited social skills: he was an introvert, not very approachable and withdrawn. He was more a staff officer than a battalion commander.[53] His executive officer, Major Rob Franken, was in charge of leading the battalion's daily activities, while Karremans focused on reporting to his chain of command.[54] Karremans' visibility with the battalion was minimal. For some of the Dutch soldiers, it was unclear whether he or his executive officer was in charge of the unit.[55] Members of the battalion agreed that Karremans found it hard to relate and connect

with his soldiers.[56] As a result, there was not a lot of trust in Karremans' leadership, and clearly this had a negative effect on the battalion's morale. The lack of trust most likely contributed to the fact that, when the crisis escalated in July 1995, following the Bosnian Serb decision to take Srebrenica, there were several incidents in which battalion orders to defend UN positions around Srebrenica were not executed.[57]

Karremans' personal interaction with the local population and key leaders was also very limited. It was mainly the battalion's Civil–Military Affairs section that conducted meetings and negotiations with representatives from the local population, NGO, the Bosnian Army (ABiH) and the Bosnian Serb leadership.[58] Often, Karremans was not fully aware of the developing situation, and he was unable to directly influence the key leaders in the area. During the deployment of Dutchbat III, the situation in the enclave deteriorated and tensions increased between the Dutch peacekeepers, the local population, the Bosnian Army and Bosnian Serbs. When the Bosnian Serb troops decided to take Srebrenica, Karremans and his battalion were isolated and unable, and probably also unwilling, to confront them. Srebrenica was easily taken by the Bosnian Serb troops who, over a period of a few hours, gathered and later executed all male population in age range 14–70 years. More than 7,000 men were killed in one of the worst massacres in Europe since the end of World War II.

**Negotiation Skills—Resoluteness and Persuasiveness**

Sociability enables military leaders to build and establish relationships. However, they should also be resolute and persuasive when involved in a negotiation process. Military leaders find themselves in a multinational and multicultural environment in which they will deal with coalition forces, indigenous security forces, the local population, NGO, key civilian leaders, tribal elders, warlords and religious leaders. Often, they conduct negotiations that are critical to build and maintain support for their mission. They should expect to have to deal with a wide range of actors that might be cooperative, friendly, unreliable and hostile. In this dynamic and complex environment of communication, intimidation and persuasion, both junior and senior leaders should be able to hold their ground.

In our survey, we asked the officers how important they thought 'persuasiveness' is in PSO–COIN and in conventional war. They believe that 'persuasiveness' is very important in a PSO–COIN, and only a small

number indicated that 'persuasiveness' is important in a conventional war.[59] Indeed, the conflicts of the last two decades provide strong evidence that leaders' ability to negotiate, persuade and coerce, when necessary, is indeed extremely important in a PSO–COIN environment.

The case of the mission in Somalia in the early 1990s is particularly enlightening. In Somalia, leaders were faced with the challenge of dealing with a large number of different actors, some of whom were irrational and often erratic. In addition, military leaders had to deal with a broad, and at times dysfunctional multinational organization, an elusive enemy, an uncertain local population, a myriad of NGO, several government agencies and the world media. The majority of military leaders deployed in Somalia were unprepared to deal with such an environment; only a handful among them were able to understand the important role all the actors played for their mission and its success. The bad consequences of the extremely disappointing outcome of the mission in Somalia are still felt today, more than 20 years after the first international troops arrived in Mogadishu.

A few years later, the former Yugoslavia became another very challenging ground for military leaders' negotiating attributes. General Rose stressed that in such circumstances: 'The traditional peacekeeping weapons of patience, persuasion and persistence…were more appropriate than bullets.'[60]

During their deployment in the former Yugoslavia, both General Rose and General Smith, while in senior leadership positions in Bosnia, had to negotiate with hostile leaders such as the Serbian Army General, Mladic, who was extremely confrontational—in the words of General Smith, 'a confident and arrogant bully.'[61] General Rose conducted multiple negotiations with Mladic, who he describes as brutal and manipulative. He suffered rapid changes of mood and used a combination of persuasion, trickery, and intimidation to win arguments.[62] General Smith described his negotiations with Mladic as mental battles, where he needed all his wit, ability to escalate and persuasiveness to prevail. Mladic did not see the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as a threat and was once overheard referring to Smith as the 'blue lamb'.[63] Being persuasive and resolute allowed both Smith and Rose to achieve some degree of success in their negotiations with Mladic.

While General Rose and General Smith stood their ground and behaved with resoluteness, Lt Col Karremans was far from showing a similar determination. After the fall of the UN protected enclave of

Srebrenica in July 1995, Karremans had to negotiate with General Mladic about the humanitarian situation in the enclave. Karremans was under strict orders of General Rupert Smith to obtain guarantees for the safety of the wounded Bosnians and refugees. Another condition was that Dutchbat would take all its weapons and equipment when it would leave Srebrenica.[64] Karremans appeared to be intimidated by Mladic who used his typically repeated tirades to overawe his opponent.[65] Mladic also ensured that Karremans was filmed while he appeared to be toasting to Mladic's victory.

Mladic accused Karremans for the air attacks on Serb forces and for the death of some of his soldiers. Karremans' response was rather weak[66] and Mladic took advantage of such a weakness and established a stronger position for himself during the negotiations. Miroslav Deronjic (the Serb Civil Commissioner for Srebrenica) stated that Karremans did not exactly help the humanitarian situation in Srebrenica and the intended withdrawal of Dutchbat forces. He thought that Karremans was afraid to offend Mladic and agreed to everything he said, even if it was against the interests of Dutchbat. Deronjic was under the impression that Karremans was definitely scared of Mladic.[67]

Indeed, Mladic was manipulative and a master of intimidation. This was his usual approach to negotiations with UNPROFOR personnel and leaders. During the negotiations, Karremans seemed to be a defeated man, who even avoided making eye contact with Mladic.[68] He lacked the strength, resoluteness and persuasiveness to counter Mladic's intimidations, and thereby influence the negotiations. This does not imply that more successful negotiations by Karremans would have prevented the humanitarian disaster that followed. However, it does reinforce that resoluteness and persuasiveness are crucial attributes for military leaders in order to successfully negotiate during PSO–COIN operations.

**Empathy**

Empathy enables leaders to appreciate and consider the thoughts, feelings and needs of others. Empathy means thoughtfully considering the subordinate's feelings, along with other factors, during the process of making intelligent and sound decisions.[69] Leaders need to be sincere and show genuine compassion and true concern for others. Empathy is also important as military leaders will interact with other cultures, and cross-culture dialogue can easily lead to misunderstandings. Daniel Goleman argues that people with empathy are attuned to subtleties in non-verbal

communication and tend to be more aware of the importance of cultural, social and ethical differences.[70]

The ability to empathize will help leaders to understand the hardship the local population has been subjected to, putting them in a better position to connect with those civilians. Indeed, when military forces deploy, no matter how good the intent of the mission, it is likely that many among the local population will look at them with a certain amount of suspicion. Only empathy and true commitment to protect defenceless people will create a connection between the troops and the local population.

In April 2003, General Petraeus, as the commanding general of the US Army's 101st Airborne Division, deployed in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. While in Mosul, General Petraeus proved to be an empathetic leader, insisting that his soldiers respected local customs and focused on winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.[71] Petraeus worked hard to improve living conditions for the local population and to include also the inmates of the local prisons. He also invited Iraqi leaders to observe these improvements. Cordon-and-sweep operations were replaced by cordon-and-knock searches, an approach that prevented unnecessarily insulting Iraqi dignity.

Besides having good sociable skills, General Mike Jackson also showed empathy when he dealt with the Russian General, Viktor Zavarzin, in Kosovo. He understood that Zavarzin was in an isolated situation with no real power since he had to refer all issues back to Moscow. Jackson also had a good understanding of the Russian culture and regularly offered Zavarzin a sip from his hip flask of whisky. He also appreciated the sentimental nature of the Russians, and therefore assured the Russian General that Jackson's own son would command the British unit that would provide force protection at the airfield.

The military leaders we surveyed stressed the importance of empathy in PSO–COIN. Nearly 50 per cent strongly agreed that empathy is important in such an environment, while only 15 per cent strongly agreed about the importance of empathy in a conventional war. One of the officers stated:

> Empathy for me is one of the universal skills that does not change. The empathy challenge in stability operations is to not see and accept the 'other' as the enemy, but as a person with values, views, demands, and rights. These can be completely different to our own, but that doesn't make them wrong.

**Independence/Autonomy**

Independence/autonomy can be described as the ability to operate without direct supervision, guidance and support from others. The PSO–COIN environment is highly decentralized, and the ability to make sound choices in autonomy is therefore an essential attribute. Junior and senior leaders are responsible for areas of operation that are normally larger than those they would be responsible for in a conventional war. In addition, they deal with a far more complex human terrain.

The majority of officers surveyed, that is, 59 per cent, strongly agreed about the importance of independence for leaders operating in a PSO–COIN environment, while 15 per cent strongly agreed about the importance of independence in a conventional operational environment. The *Small Wars Manual* emphasizes this aspect as it stressed that '[f]requently the commander of a force operating in a small war theater of operations is not given a specific mission as such in his written orders or directive, and it then becomes necessary for him to deduce his mission from the general intent of the higher authority.'[72]

A French officer who participated in the questionnaire provides an excellent example of the complex contemporary operating environment when he was deployed as a platoon commander in the Ivory Coast in May 2003.[73] There, he was in charge of an area almost the size of Luxembourg. His company commander was a two-hour drive away, and the closest French unit was a one-hour drive away from his combat outpost. Often, he had no radio contact with his higher HQ during patrols and as a result, he regularly had to make decisions that would normally be made by a more senior officer. He represented the French government in the area of operations and had to deal with local tribal and militia leaders. In addition, the ethnicity mix and tribal issues were peculiar to that area, and therefore he had to quickly develop his own situational awareness and understanding.

Large areas of operation, with significant distance between small units, are typical of a PSO–COIN. The French officer stated that military leaders are required to quickly understand the situation and identify, with the right priority, the issues they have to address. In order to operate independently in a highly decentralized environment, leaders need to have clarity about their commander's intent and at the same time, they have to make clear to all their subordinates their own intent. Under these circumstances, it is crucial that military leaders are self-reliant and

independent. Without direct supervision from their superiors, often they will have to make decisions without additional guidance.

**Knowledge and Experience**

Military leaders can acquire knowledge in preparation for future operations; with proper education and training programmes, they can prepare themselves and their subordinates for both PSO–COIN and conventional wars. Experience is something that every military professional will acquire throughout his career. The relevance of that experience depends on timing and opportunity. The role played by education in preparation for PSO–COIN operations is extremely important, very likely more important than training. Ricks noted that 'American troops deployed to Iraq fit and well trained. However, training tends to prepare one for known problems, while education better prepares one for the unknown, the unpredictable and the unexpected.'[74] Education is indeed the most effective way to acquire experience and knowledge. General Chiarelli emphasized the practical aspect of education. He wrote that:

> Critical thinking, grounded in the controlled application of violence yet exposed to a broad array of expertise not normally considered as a part of traditional military functions, will help create the capacity to rapidly shift cognitively to a new environment. We must create an organization built for change, beginning with the education of our office corps.[75]

The majority of the officers surveyed for this study consider extensive knowledge and experience a crucial attribute for leaders in PSO–COIN.[76] Several of the officers stressed that knowledge is essential to develop a strong situational understanding during PSO–COIN. In-depth knowledge about the history, culture and religion of the local population will facilitate this process. Having a basic knowledge of the local language will facilitate the interaction and communication with local leaders and the population.

On the one hand, the case of General Dallaire in Rwanda, and on the other hand, the case of General Rose in Bosnia, show the negative and positive consequences of leaders' experience and knowledge on the entire mission. Throughout his whole career, General Romeo Dallaire had never led a mission, and had no direct experience of peace support operations or any knowledge about the African continent, when he was appointed the Force Commander of UNAMIR.[77] In his book, General Dallaire himself

questions his ability to lead a mission for which he had little experience in a country he did not know at all. With some frustration, Dallaire wrote:

> Why was I chosen to lead UNAMIR? My experience was in training Canadian peacekeepers to go into classic Cold War-style conflicts. I had never been in the field as a peacekeeper myself. I had no political expertise, and no background or training in African affairs or maneuvering in the weeds of ethnic conflicts in which hate trumps reason.[78]

Despite Dallaire's good intentions and outstanding commitment, his lack of experience in UN missions, coupled with an extremely shallow knowledge of the environment, probably compromised his ability to be an effective mission commander, even more so when violence in Rwanda began and quickly escalated out of control.

In contrast, General Rose was an experienced officer who contributed to several successful tactical and operational operations while in command in Bosnia. Before he became the UN Commander in Bosnia in 1994, he had experience as a Commander of Special Forces in the Falklands, and was the Deputy Joint Force Commander overseeing the UK contribution to the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia. He had also been the Commandant at the Staff College in Camberley, where he studied peacekeeping operations in support of the UN.[79] After he took command of UNPROFOR, it became clear that a radical change to the UN mission was required in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Rose decided to change the UN posture and approach to humanitarian aid convoys, and ordered his subordinate commanders to forcibly deal with illegal roadblocks and other obstacles to the convoys.[80]

In order to deter attacks on these convoys, he repositioned a unit of Danish tanks, Leopard 2 of the Danish International Brigade, so that they could provide the required firepower for this more robust approach to peacekeeping. Due to the sensitivity of employing tanks during peacekeeping operations, this course of action would have required political approval from Zagreb or New York. However, based on his experience, General Rose identified a tactical need for the tanks to be redeployed and decided not to ask for permission or wait for directions from the UN HQ. Although he received some bureaucratic criticism from the Security Council, the firepower of the tanks proved to be a great asset that helped Rose accomplish several important humanitarian tasks and to provide much-needed relief to the local population.

## Conclusions

PSO–COIN operations are significantly more complex than conventional wars. In the future, it is likely that military leaders and their troops will operate in a PSO–COIN rather than in a conventional environment. The threats they will face will rarely resemble those of a traditional battlefield. As General Chiarelli stated, 'Although we train and are comfortable executing wide sweeps through the desert, warfare as we know it has changed.'[81] This places greater demand on military leadership at all levels; tactical, operational and strategic. The diversity of tasks and threats, primacy of politics and the decentralized nature of PSO–COIN have major implications for both junior and senior leaders. Recently, a group of Marine leaders agreed that 'the personal qualities that pre-disposed an individual for success in COIN were not necessarily the same as those valued most highly in conventional operations.'[82] A senior US Marine Corps officer we surveyed stressed that:

> There are many who say that if you can do conventional operations, you can do stability operations, so there is no need to specifically train and prepare for them. I could not disagree more. Everyone has to be prepared to specifically deal with the challenges of stability operations—when no one is, especially leaders, you have a significant risk of failure. We paid a great deal of attention to this with my battalion prior to returning to [Iraq] and it paid off in a big way...I saw many other units that 'did not get it' with regard to stability operations and the results were always bad.

The officers we surveyed believe that the fundamental leadership attributes are timeless and common to both conventional operations and PSO–COIN. What should be noted, however, is that although in the broad question about the role of leadership they overwhelmingly agree on the important role played by leadership in conventional wars, when engaging on the specific attributes, they identified more of them as particularly important for the PSO–COIN environment.

In PSO–COIN, military leadership plays a decisive role, both at the tactical and operational levels, in the prevention of humanitarian disasters and the escalation of violence. Military leaders who possess certain attributes are more likely to be successful in a PSO–COIN environment. Not all leaders will rate high in all seven attributes identified by the officers we surveyed, but the extent of their adeptness in these attributes will determine their ability and likelihood to perform successfully. These

military leaders can quickly adapt; make the right assessment; easily establish relationships with other key actors; effectively negotiate; handle cultural and social issues; and operate comfortably in a decentralized environment. They are, therefore, more capable to deal with the constantly changing characteristics of PSO–COIN.

In order for military leaders to acquire and develop the attributes that will make them successful in a PSO–COIN environment, at least two important things should happen. The first one is about the formation of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at all levels. Training and education programmes should focus on the development of leader attributes that are appropriate for a PSO–COIN environment. Such an approach will make them more effective at conducting and operating in PSO–COIN, while they will be better prepared at conducting conventional operations. The concern is that military education organizations might treat programmes on PSO–COIN as an 'add-on' requirement and not, as they should be, as core courses central to the professional development of officers and NCOs. It is extremely important for senior military education organizations, in particular at the level of war colleges, to develop strategic thinkers who develop the ability to think creatively and innovatively and, more important, are open-minded about the future of warfare. These forward thinkers will provide stimulus and challenges to their organizations. They will challenge the tendency that many military organizations have of preparing to fight more effectively the 'last' war they fought, rather than anticipate what the next one will look like. This tendency is common among military organizations. When the US Army began military operations in Afghanistan, and later on in Iraq, it had only a handful of senior military leaders who were able to think about their engagement with innovation and open mind. The large majority was still mentally constrained by a Cold War and the 1990 First Gulf War approach. It is probably a coincidence, yet a coincidence worth noting, that many of those leaders in the US Army who were fast at grasping the real challenge and complexity of the new environment had successfully completed a PhD. Several among them had also previously deployed in peacekeeping and PSOs. The Marines had a rather large number of officers who were quick at understanding the challenges of COIN, the reason being that the Marine Corps is constantly required to accomplish a broad variety of missions and operations. In the 1990s, General Krulak, a former Commandant of the Marine Corps and one of the most forward military thinkers, fully understood the challenges of PSO and stability

operations. He developed important concepts such as the 'Three Blocks War' and the 'Strategic Corporal'.[83] Such concepts have been instrumental for the development of leaders of a more agile and adaptable mindset.

The second one is about the perception PSO–COIN operations have among the military and how such a perception shapes their mindset. Both PSOs and COIN should be regarded and valued as equal to 'combat' operations. The hidden and invisible enemy US forces had to fight at the early stages of the campaign in both Iraq and Afghanistan was the mindset of many senior military leaders who had to make critical decisions while they were unable to understand and adapt to the requirements of the COIN mission. This mindset was mainly the result of a decade during which US Army leadership had successfully pushed back on any major commitment in a variety of PSOs. It is important that in the future, military organizations embrace PSO–COIN and continue to develop the ability to operate in such an environment as one of their core competences. It is equally important that those who are deployed in PSO–COIN receive the right recognition, and that participation in these operations is not treated as some sort of second-class deployment.

Finally, most of the leadership attributes can be improved. It is important that commanders set the right command climate to inspire and motivate individuals to learn and develop. Subordinates should be allowed to make mistakes during training because that will encourage initiative, creativity and risk taking. Most of the key leadership attributes can also be enhanced through education and training, under the condition that commanders establish and enforce a systematic approach of feedback and evaluation.

**Acknowledgement**

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## Notes

1. Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1940.
2. General Chiarelli was deployed in Iraq during Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) II. From March 2005 to November 2005, he was the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division and from November of 2005 through February 2006, he served as the Commander of the Multi-National Corps.

3. Chiarelli, Peter and Patrick Michaelis, 'The Requirement for Full-spectrum Operations', *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXV, No. 4, July–August 2005, p. 4.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 16.
6. Aylwin-Foster, Nigel, 'Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations', *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXV, No. 6, November–December 2005, p. 8.
7. Headquarters Department of the Army, 'Foreword', Field Manual 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Washington DC, 15 December 2006.
8. Ibid.
9. There is a significant difference between PSO–COIN operations that are conducted abroad or against a domestic insurgency organization. In the latter case, military leaders will have extreme clarity about the short and long-term goals and objectives of conducting PSO–COIN operations against a domestic insurgency.
10. Strange, Joe, *Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities*, Quantico: Marine Corps Association, 1996, p. 12.
11. Ibid.
12. Kilcullen, David, '"Twenty-eight Articles": Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency', *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 3, May–June 2006, p. 103.
13. Ibid.
14. Evans, Gareth, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008, p. 128.
15. Ricks, Thomas, *The Generals*, New York: Penguin Books, 2013, p. 420.
16. Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, n. 1, Chapter 4, Paragraph 1, p. 3.
17. A combined 96 per cent.
18. A combined 63 per cent.
19. Northouse, Peter G., *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 6th edition, Washington, DC: Sage Publications Inc., 2013, p. 28.
20. A prolific scholar, one of Stogdill's most important papers, 'Personal Factors Associated with Leadership; a Survey of the Literature', was published in the *The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1948, pp. 35–71.
21. Northouse, *Leadership*, n. 19, p. 20.
22. Interview with a major from the British Royal Marines (via questionnaire) by Ivo D.L. Moerman, 19 December 2012.

23. Moyar, Mark, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 8–9.
24. Phillips, Donald T. and James M. Loy, *The Architecture of Leadership: Preparation Equals Performance*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008, p. 45.
25. Petraeus, David H., 'Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq', *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 1, January–February 2006, pp. 2–12. General Petraeus wrote this article after he returned from his second tour in Iraq.
26. Moyar, *A Question of Command*, n. 23, p. 9.
27. Jackson, Mike, *Soldier: The Autobiography*, London: Bantam, 2007, pp. 221–35.
28. Ibid., p. 236.
29. Ibid., p. 262.
30. Ibid., p. 270.
31. Ibid., p. 272.
32. Ibid., p. 280. Also see Jackson's analogy of the rope in Ibid., p. 5.
33. Moyar, *A Question of Command*, n. 23, p. 9.
34. Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, n. 1, p. 9.
35. In our survey, 48 per cent officers agreed and 52 per cent strongly agreed about the importance of judgement in conventional wars.
36. As mentioned, 78 per cent of the officers surveyed strongly agreed about the importance of judgement in a PSO–COIN environment and 22 per cent agreed.
37. Smith, Rupert, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, London: Penguin Books, 2006, p. 390.
38. Ibid., p. 374.
39. MacKenzie, Lewis, *Soldiers Made Me Look Good: A Life in the Shadow of War*, Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd, 2008, p. 227.
40. Ibid., p. 228.
41. Woods, Larry J. and Timothy R. Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008, p. 61.
42. Bailey, Jonathan, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan, *British Generals in Blair's Wars*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, pp. 58–59.
43. Ibid., pp. 55–63.
44. Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, n. 41, p. 77.
45. Phillips and Loy, *The Architecture of Leadership*, n. 24, p. 69.
46. Ibid.

47. Seiler, Stefan and Anders Pfister, 'Coping with Complexity—Preparing Military Leaders for an Interlinked World', in Julie Bélanger and Psalm Lew (eds), *Developing the Next Generation of Military Leaders*, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2011, p. 96.
48. The largest number, 52 per cent, agreed, and 44 per cent considered sociability to be neutral in a conventional operation.
49. Among the officers that agreed about the importance of sociability in PSO–COIN, 33 per cent agreed and 7 per cent believed it to be neutral.
50. Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, Chapter 1, Paragraph 17.
51. Ibid., p. 32.
52. Jackson, *Soldier*, n. 27, p. 283.
53. National Institute for War Documentation, *Srebrenica—A Safe Area: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences, and Analyses of the Fall of a 'Safe' Area*, Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Boom, 2002, p. 1847.
54. de Vin, P.J., 'Srebrenica: The Impossible Choices of a Commander', Master's thesis, Marine Corps University, 6 March 2008, p. 8.
55. National Institute for War Documentation, *Srebrenica—A Safe Area*, n. 53, p. 1844.
56. Ibid., p. 1847.
57. de Vin, 'Srebrenica', n. 54, pp. 19, 23.
58. Ibid., p. 11. In addition, Dutchbat III had very limited reliable intelligence. The Civil–Military Affairs section was in regular contact with the civilian, military and non-governmental actors in the area, but they were not properly trained, only had limited assets and had no clue what their mission was.
59. The survey indicated that 69 per cent strongly agreed about the importance of 'persuasiveness' in a PSO–COIN; while 19 per cent strongly agreed about the importance of 'persuasiveness' in a conventional war.
60. Rose, Michael, *Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994*, London: The Harvill Press, 1998, p. 172.
61. Smith, *The Utility of Force*, n. 37, p. 348.
62. Rose, *Fighting for Peace*, n. 60, p. 33.
63. Smith, *The Utility of Force*, n. 37, p. 363.
64. National Institute for War Documentation, *Srebrenica—A Safe Area*, n. 51, p. 1847.
65. Honig, Jan Willem and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*, New York: Penguin Books, 1997, p. 31. There is also the apocryphal story that Karremans was confronted with the scene of a Serb soldier slitting the throat of a pig. Mladic reportedly told him, 'that was how he would treat people like those protected by the Dutch peacekeepers'.

66. Ibid.
67. National Institute for War Documentation, *Srebrenica—A Safe Area*, n. 53, p. 1888.
68. Westerman, Frank and Bart Rijs, *Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario*, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Atlas, 1997, p. 165.
69. Goleman, Daniel, 'What Makes a Leader?', in Robert L. Taylor, William E. Rosenbach and Eric B. Rosenbach (eds), *Military Leadership—In Pursuit of Excellence*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2009, p. 48.
70. Ibid., p. 49.
71. Ricks, Thomas, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, New York: Penguin Books, 2007, pp. 228–29.
72. Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2, p. 2.
73. Interview with a major from the French Marines by Ivo D.L. Moerman, 7 January 2013.
74. Ricks, *The Generals*, n. 15, pp. 419–20.
75. Chiarelli and Michaelis, 'The Requirement for Full-spectrum Operations', n. 3, p. 15.
76. Seventy-four per cent of the officers 'strongly agreed' about the importance of knowledge and experience in PSO–COIN, while 41 per cent 'strongly agreed' about the importance of knowledge and experience in conventional war.
77. MacKenzie, *Soldiers Made Me Look Good*, n. 39, p. 219.
78. Dallaire, Romeo and Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003, p. 515.
79. Rose, *Fighting for Peace*, n. 60, p. 11.
80. Ibid., pp. 35, 36.
81. Chiarelli and Michaelis, 'The Requirement for Full-spectrum Operations', n. 3, p. 17.
82. Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 'Infantry Battalion Commander Leadership in Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)', 6 June 2013, p. 10.
83. Krulak, Charles C., 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', *Leatherneck*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 1999, pp. 14, 16.