

Multidimensional Peacekeeping

Protection Mandate and Recalibration of the UN Military Peacekeepers

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The United Nations has introduced a layered approach to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) with wide-ranging enablers based on many reviews. Accordingly, a new resolution on the protection of civilians (POC) was adopted by the UN Security Council in 1999. The study attempts to understand the complexities of multidimensional PKOs, POC, 2019 policy, specific role of the UN military force and the need for new structuring and training of the UN military presence in the mission areas. A systematic reviews based study, looks at the multidimensional peacekeeping as an offshoot of the international theory of multilateralism. The study has analysed the 2019 POC policy in detail and infers that each regulation and guideline needs careful preparation by all peacekeeping components. The same has been analysed in connection with special application to the UN military, to understand the role in the execution of protection mandate. There is a need to re-orient UN peacekeeping military forces to this challenging role, which can only be accomplished by an integration of all resources and understanding protection mandates of other humanitarian components.

Keywords: Protection Mandate, Protection of Civilian, New-age Peace Operations and High-level Panels on Protection Mandates

BACKGROUND

The first peacekeeping mission of 1948 saw the use of high-profile mediators as an innovative solution by a young 3-year-old United

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Nations (UN). Approaching 75 years of its existence and maturity, the UN has of late introduced a layered approach to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The current missions have many wide-ranging political enablers, including special political missions, good offices and mediation initiatives, to keep the PKOs relevant to the ever-evolving global requirements. From time to time, many reviews, such as by the Brahimi panel, blue-ribbon committee and high-level panels, have recommended widely acceptable directions to the PKOs, which have now metamorphed into multidimensional operations. Brahimi panel reviews were conducted after the failure to protect civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica. The report¹ made several recommendations designed to improve the operational and doctrinal aspects of peacekeeping, but very few of these were implemented. However, the report greatly contributed to the progress of peacekeeping by highlighting its operational and doctrinal flaws. While commenting on the future of multidimensional PKOs, the relevance of PKO was asserted by Adam Day in *The Global Observatory*. According to him, the world needed to ask as to 'how peace operations could shape the future of conflict prevention, rather than whether peacekeeping has a future'.²

Over some time, the UN moved from traditional bi-party PKOs to intra-state conflicts. The peacekeepers in the field also witnessed changes in the application of basic principles, namely, consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. This was witnessed by the UN forces operating in the 1990s in Cambodia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and former Yugoslavia. All conflicts gave rise to millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees, accompanied by untold violence against helpless citizens in these conflict-prone countries. There was a growing clamour for 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), or 'action for peacekeeping' (A4P), and the UN interference in case of genocide-like situations. The UN experimented with it in some places such as northern Iraq, in Kurds-dominated areas, by deploying UN Guard Contingent in Iraq under the UN Department of Political Affairs in 1991.³

After many debates under the UN Special Committee on PKOs (C34) from the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the first resolution on the protection of civilians (POC) was adopted by the UNSC in 1999.⁴ For all future PKO applications, this was a watershed moment and provided provisions

under the UN mandates to ‘take necessary action to protect civilians under an imminent threat of physical violence’.⁵ The UN published its ‘Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians’⁶ in 2010, which were the waypoints for operational planning in mission areas. A high-level panel on PKOs, established on 31 October 2014, further gave many comprehensive recommendations on the new-age operations. The panel considered a broad range of issues facing peace operations, including the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, good offices and peace-building challenges, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, human rights and POC.⁷ Thus, 2015 brought in a comprehensive policy on the protection mandate. These documents were drawn from expert committees and the experience of many peacekeepers operating in an environment of protection mandate. Concerted efforts of the UNSC and Special Committee enabled a comprehensive policy on the POC in 2019, which applies to most of the current missions, especially in Africa.⁸

OBJECTIVES

This study attempts to look at the need for the UN military recalibration concerning the ‘POC mandate’. The study has been specifically contextualised on the cases of UN missions in the DRC (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUSCO]), South Sudan (United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan [UNMISS]), Central African Republic (CAR; United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic [MINUSCA]) and Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali [MINUSMA]). Specific objectives are as follows:

1. To understand the complexities of multidimensional PKOs.
2. To highlight POC, 2019 policy, with special application to the UN military.
3. To understand the role of UN military force in the application of protection mandate.
4. To evaluate the need for new structuring of the UN military presence in the mission areas.
5. To discuss the training needs of the military deployed on PKOs.

METHODOLOGY

The study is based on systematic reviews of UNSC resolutions, UN policy documents, various studies by experts, UN General Assembly special committee discussions and interactions with the past and present peacekeepers. Use of keywords, 'protection mandate', 'protection of civilian', 'new-age peace operations' and 'high-level panels' on protection mandates, was done. The systematic review was done by searching relevant and reliable literature in various databases, such as Emerald, Google Scholar, APA PsycNet, Researchgate, JSTOR, EBSCOhost and ProQuest, and through primary source documents on the UN Peacekeeping web pages, including its archives.

Use was also made of other strategic think tanks, including Stockholm-based Challenges Forum, Danish Institute of International Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Peace Institute (IPI), United Services Institution of India (USI) and Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). Collation was done by using Mendeley Web Importer⁹ and theme-based organisation. The initial search resulted in 130 studies and articles, which were filtered with the study's inclusion and exclusion criteria. The final studies for the review were 35 articles or documents.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL PKOs

The PKOs have evolved over the last 73 years through various stages and remain relevant even today. These operations are based on the fundamental principle of an impartial presence on the ground to calm prevailing hostilities and tensions between hostile parties. This hopefully creates a space for peace-making activities and political negotiations. Therefore, peacekeeping has been recognised as the closing of a chasm between the ceasefire and durable peace for eventual nation building. However, modern-day conflicts are increasingly intractable due to many unknown variables, like transnational organised crime, globally linked jihadi networks, mercenaries or bilateral defence forces¹⁰ assisting the host governments and even regional states meddling in the internal conflicts. This has made any lasting political solution more elusive,¹¹ adding to the ever-growing complexity of a multidimensional PKO, which needs well-trained and determined peacekeepers on the ground.

Towards the PKO efforts, over 90 per cent of the uniformed personnel come from countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, while

contributing 15 per cent of the budget.¹² Sensing the importance of PKOs, and perhaps after the disengagement from Afghanistan, European nations also increased their contribution to the cause of multidimensional PKOs in 2020. While writing for IPI, Arthur Boutellis and Michael Beary¹³ have explained the lessons from re-engagement by European countries and Canada towards collective endeavour to improve PKOs efficiency and effectiveness.

Commensurate with the evolving nature of conflict, the structure and tasks of the peacekeeping missions have also evolved, though there are still a few PKOs (such as Lebanon, Golan Heights, Cyprus and Palestine) based on the 'traditional' model. Increasingly, the PKOs have become multidimensional, with vital components drawn from civil affairs, political, military, rule of law, human rights, civilian police, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender experts. This complexity can be overwhelming for any traditional force, as there is always a requirement to collaborate and cooperate with all the components in the field. The multidimensional nature also reflects its mandate character, which may include:

1. Assistance to implement a comprehensive peace agreement amongst the parties.
2. Ceasefire monitoring to allow space for political negotiations.
3. Creating a secure environment for the civil population, also called POC.
4. Assisting the state to transit into a stable government that is largely based on democratic principles and good governance.
5. At times administering a state for a transitional period, assuming temporarily all the governance functions.
6. Assisting and enabling the host government to resettle refugees and IDPs in their place of origin.

To carry out multiple mandated tasks, a UN multidimensional mission deploys an array of enabling agencies, department resources and uniformed personnel in a mission area. Most missions have the field staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Besides these well-

recognised offices, civil affairs coordinators in women, peace and security (WPS), child protection teams and Justice and Corrections Section (JCS) may also be working closely with other peacekeepers. In addition, peacekeepers have been called upon to support the activities of international or local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to victims of conflicts. ‘The complex and increasingly multifaceted nature of conflicts, especially in Africa, has underlined the need to further strengthen the strategic and operational partnership between the United Nations, the African Union and other regional organizations.’¹⁴ As an example, MINUSCA consists of 20 agencies, programmes, funds and departments in the CAR, along with its mandated mission components. These organisations and agencies must work together with the Government of the CAR to develop good governance, assist in humanitarian aid and bring peace to the conflict-torn nation.¹⁵

Modern multidimensional PKOs not only maintain peace and security but also enable and facilitate a multitude of peace-building activities. These include popular mandate-based political process; protection of the civilian population, especially the most vulnerable groups, that is, children and women; ‘assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process’; actively support the organisation of elections; develop and assist in security sector reforms and judicial infrastructure; and finally, protect and promote human rights.¹⁶

POC, 2019 POLICY¹⁷

Perception of what POC means differs from military, civil police and humanitarian workers’ perspective. In 2014, Australian Civil–Military Centre, along with Oxfam, carried out a study based on survey responses. It found that the difference in the structures greatly influences the understanding of this term. The military is designed for defence and warfighting in a country, whereas the police are responsible for upholding the rule of law. Humanitarian agencies are mostly guided by humanitarian principles and, as a priority, attempt to create conditions conducive to living a life with dignity. The study also found that the military considers POC as one of the themes, while the humanitarian actors perceive it as an objective.¹⁸ The 2019 policy defines POC as:

Without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed

mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission's capabilities and areas of deployment through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly force.¹⁹

The policy on the protection mandate was initially issued in 2015, which eventually formed the guidelines for the final POC policy of 2019. This is a comprehensive policy on the protection mandate, which is applicable in most of the current missions in Africa. The policy lays down a conceptual framework, dwells on the guiding principles and some of the key considerations of POC mandates. It also explains the roles and responsibilities of various components in a mission area and emphasises that an 'integrated approach to the protection of civilians requires the combined effort of all mission components: civilian, police and military, and where relevant and appropriate, coordination with other UN actors including the UN Country Team'.²⁰ The policy was followed up with a *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2003)*²¹, giving exhaustive guidelines for all components.

The POC mandate lays special emphasis on humanitarian assistance, promotion and protection of human rights, building the rule of law and security, child protection and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). It is grounded in international laws and addresses serious crimes against the civil population of a conflict-ridden country. The guiding principle laid down in the policy is that the host country is primarily responsible for the POC. All UN mission components are required to actively plan and carry out POC activities in their areas of responsibility, including operations with humanitarian and development actors, such as NGOs.²² The operational concept of the POC mandate, as laid down in the 2019 policy, has three tiers of POC action.

Tier I encompasses protection through dialogue and engagement; an ongoing political and multi-component initiative. The lead role is envisaged to be that of political, human rights and humanitarian agencies. Dialogue and engagement are carried out by all mission components, civilian or uniformed, at the local levels. It can include engagement with communities and potential perpetrators, including non-state armed actors, as well as the use of community violence reduction programmes and DDR programmes, where mandated. Tier II is of primary interest since it looks at the provision of physical protection: an active safeguarding of civilians primarily done by the military force. It includes activities by mission components to physically protect civilians and deter any hostile

action against them by the parties to the conflict. Tier III, on the other hand, looks at the long-term end state and advocates the establishment of a protective environment. This includes peace-building, rule of law, continued deterrence against spoilers and provision of good governance by the host state.

The POC policy of 2019 recognises that 'A key distinguishing element of the POC mandate in peacekeeping is the authorization given to peacekeeping operations to use all necessary means, up to and including deadly force, to protect civilians under threat or imminent threat of physical violence' (p. 2). This includes the provision of physical protection by military and/or police components. A 'robust response to threats posed by a host state may be beyond the mission's capabilities', and such action may result in 'insecurity for peacekeepers and can affect the host state's strategic consent to the mission' (p. 14).²³ These are realistic assessments and therefore, call for active engagement with the host state at the political level. The MONUSCO mission in the DRC was the second mission with POC mandate in 1999. The mission developed and tested new protection instruments that were later mainstreamed into other PKOs.

The UN military component may also have to work with regional military groupings, or international military coalitions, to implement a common international strategy for peace. In the African context, these could be the African Union forces or specialised troops, like the long-range patrols of the British Army in Mali. These requirements have been amply described in the *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*.²⁴ Different participating actors and the scope of multidimensional PKOs necessitate increased interface between military and non-military components. The UN forces have to operate in an uncertain environment, which may have transnational crime syndicates,²⁵ neighbouring countries exploiting the rich resources²⁶ and non-UN actors, like the Russian Wagner Group,²⁷ assisting the host government in the CAR.

It is not only the UN military component but also the civilian mission components that act as a protective presence for the POC mandate. Their direct, regular engagement with the civilian populations at risk provides succour and assurance to the population. While the main responsibility under Tier II will be of the military component, there is a need for a comprehensive and integrated approach with all civilian and uniformed components. The POC policy envisages a proactive posture and mindset

from the military force to protect the civilian population. Indeed, the POC is expected to be prioritised in decisions on location, posture, length and type of deployment and patrolling. Further, the policy expects quick actions on a report of imminent threat, including inter-positioning, a show of force and securing key sites. In case of physical violence, the UN force is expected to act under the rules of engagement (ROE) decisively. The 2019 policy specifically lays down the responsibilities for the POC. The Head of Mission is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and POC mandate. The Head of Mission delegates the relevant responsibility, authority and accountability.

The POC has gained wider acceptance and coverage in the PKO mission areas. Peacekeepers are now called upon to address these serious issues, which were kept at the local investigation level in the past or were swept under the carpet. Some of the terms and POC areas causing concern and requiring careful attention of all peacekeepers, including uniformed military contingents, are as follows:

1. *CRSV (conflict-related sexual violence)*: The definition of CRSV²⁸ refers to incidents of sexual violence that occur in conflict or post-conflict settings and includes rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, against women, men, girls or boys. The term also encompasses trafficking in persons, when committed in situations of conflict, for sexual violence/exploitation. It is a subset of sexual and gender-based violence.
2. *Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)*: Sexual exploitation is any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation. Similarly, 'abuse' means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. This generally correlates with all the peacekeepers, whether uniformed or civilians, and has been reported widely in the international media. Gender sensitisation must form a part of training measures before induction into mission areas for all peacekeepers.
3. *Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)*: This relates to any harmful act committed against a person's will, based on socially

ascribed (gender) differences between women and men. The nature and extent of specific types of SGBV may vary across cultures, countries and regions.

A study by Janosch Kullenberg²⁹ investigated the overlaps between these three major UN policy agendas and analysed the structures of these international interventions. Linked to the evolution of the POC mandate, the study highlights the divergent emphasis on children and armed conflict, POC and WPS. The author concluded that though multiple yet separate mandates for these issues reinforced each other, the multiplication of administrative structures led to the compartmentalisation of protection.

ROLE OF UN MILITARY IN THE APPLICATION OF PROTECTION MANDATE

In the ongoing PKOs from Mali to South Sudan and Congo, multidimensional UN missions have struggled to address the threats posed by violent extremist groups. In eastern Congo and the CAR, the missions have had to deal with armed groups that often target civilian populations and also the UN peacekeepers. In Libya, the political mission has few resources to combat terrorist groups, but is also not directly mandated to confront them. Each of these missions has faced some form of asymmetrical threat, and each is structured differently.

The first major challenge given the asymmetric threats is the right configuration model of the contingents. State institutions have invariably weakened due to prolonged civil wars in most of these countries. While the UN mandates stipulate the primary responsibility of POC with the host governments, most often these governments are either unable or unwilling to carry out this responsibility. The UN missions in South Sudan, the CAR and the DRC have experienced that the host governments can be one of the most serious obstacles to their effective POC operations. There are studies on what type of military configuration is best suited for these conflicts and POC mandate challenges. Richard Gowan and Louise Andersen, in their study on 'what next for UN PKOs', have argued in favour of a smaller force, but with increased mobility and flexibility to respond to the new conflicts.³⁰

The UN Department of Peace Operations and Department of Field Support have created new mechanisms to enhance coordination, joint planning, and improve training, preparedness, rapid deployment and logistical support. However, issues of equipment interoperability and

compatibility, especially in communication among different UN military contingents, remain a challenge. The role of the military concerning POC has been defined under the new 2019 Policy which was based on the first DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping in 2015.³¹ The existing role to implement the POC mandate incorporates the following guiding principles, given under the POC policy of 2019:³²

1. The POC mandate is guided by a set of legal and practical principles and is rooted in the UN Charter and international law.
2. It is a priority mandate for all components but the primary responsibility remains on the host state.
3. It has to be consonant with the principles of peacekeeping; and all activities to protect civilians must be planned, deliberate and ongoing.
4. A comprehensive approach involves jointly planned and coordinated action by civilian and uniformed mission components. It requires multiple actors coordinating and carrying out distinct activities simultaneously under an overarching strategic vision.
5. The mission components must be careful about their activities, which may result in exposure of the civilians in their area to reprisal or harmful action by the different factions or groups.
6. The mandate must be carried out in cooperation with humanitarian and development actors³³ and respect humanitarian principles. Actions, plans and programmes to protect civilians must always be informed by consultation with the local community.
7. The POC needs to meaningfully integrate the WPS priorities. The protection needs of children must be considered and responded to when implementing the POC mandate.

As mentioned earlier, the POC operational concept involves a three-tier approach, with the UN military component being the primary lead of Tier II. The military is primarily engaged in physical protection of the civilians when a threat to their safety is identified. This also includes active deterrence of hostile acts by armed groups by the UN force by way of patrolling or area dominance. Thus, most of the burden to implement Tier II protection falls on the UN military component. As per the policy, operationally this will normally translate into:

1. Protective presence in areas vulnerable to hostile action against the civilian population.
2. Inter-positioning of the forces between the civil population and known hostile camps.
3. Visible threat or use of force in case of violence against civilians.
4. Facilitating a safe passage or refuge to the vulnerable population.
5. Creation of space and opportunity for peace-making and political negotiations.

NEW STRUCTURING OF UN MILITARY PRESENCE

Many authors and experts lament the fact that military contingents are trained to operate autonomously, regard intelligence as non-shareable and wish to keep the media glare and other civil components away from their camps.³⁴ In an environment which has collaboration and jointness as the key pillars, there is a need to bridge this gap with some new restructuring initiatives at the level of the UN and troop-contributing countries.

More Women Peacekeepers

The threat to women comes not only from the armed rebels but also from the peacekeepers themselves, in terms of SEA. In 2000, the UN, through an important resolution, called for the 'active participation of women in the process of peacemaking'.³⁵ Participation by more women in peacekeeping can help create better awareness and can also act as an inherent deterrent to SEA by the peacekeepers. In 1993, women were just 1 per cent of uniformed personnel deployed in the PKOs. Keeping this in mind, the UN kept an 18 per cent target for women peacekeepers as staff and military observers, and 8 per cent for military contingents, by the end of 2021. As of 31 October 2021, the share of women peacekeepers in the military force was 6 per cent and that of UN civilian police was 18 per cent.³⁶ The composition of active PKO missions is shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Composition of Active PKO Missions³⁷

<i>Military Force</i>			<i>Police Personnel</i>			<i>Total Uniformed Force</i>		
<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
62,586	4,158	66,744	6,258	1,436	7,694	68,844	5,594	74,438

Source: Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Personnel Type, and Gender, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/07_gender_statistics_42_oct_2021.pdf

Presence of Experts

Armed contingents are trained and operate as combat units to tackle hostile forces on the ground. To expect them to accept any different role during the whole PKO tenure may be diverting them from their primary duty. There is an urgent requirement to create a small team of experts from diverse fields, embedded on the roster of each unit, who can be the integrated liaison persons in a mission area. They must be fluent in the local language, understand the cultural nuances and be aware of the operations of the UN civil components. Further, they need to be fully embedded into the military unit(s) and understand both sides of the domain knowledge. Specialised expertise on children, women and sexual violence must be co-opted with the military contingents to provide better liaison and coordination with other agencies.

Better Mobility

The multidimensional mission in Mali has demonstrated the utility and effectiveness of mobility of the UN military with British-led long-range patrols. These can move in quickly and dominate the areas under conflict to protect vulnerable populations. The same is not possible with road-bound vehicles held with other military contingents. South Sudan has experimented with quick reaction forces combined with temporary operating bases.³⁸ There is a need to scale down larger military contingents to smaller, highly mobile units, to counter the sporadic violence of local militia groups. Again, the need has been felt for more amphibious capability because of floods and cross-country mobility vehicles for all the contingents.

Role Clarity

Mandates of MINUSMA and other states with active terrorist activities have also shown a lack of cohesive strategy and role clarity in counter-terrorism. A robust force like the G5 Sahel Joint Force remains outside the purview of MINUSMA, revisiting United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR; former Yugoslavia) mistakes. Organised crime, increased military involvement of external actors in civil wars and the presence of jihadist groups, all constitute a major challenge to the idea of POC.³⁹ There is no doctrine or guidance to the UN system in the field about the risks and countering the threats by active terrorist groups. The UN military requires clarity about dealing with the non-state actors or terrorist organisations obstructing the function of the UN mission,

specifically as regard the POC. Naureen Fink and Boutellis⁴⁰ have raised three issues faced by the strategic planners and the UN: (i) coordination of multiple military forces to address counter-terrorism; (ii) urgency to address the root causes of violent extremism, which include the lack of accountability of regional security forces accused of perpetrating human rights violations; and (iii) different strategic priorities in its mandate in UNSCR 2584 (2021) to support the implementation of 'the Agreement' or commit resources to counter-terrorism. This has surfaced as a major issue in east Congo when dealing with Mai-Mai and M23 elements. Often, it is the lack of resources which prevents contingents from undertaking large-scale operations in far-flung areas.

TRAINING FOR UN MILITARY CONTINGENTS

The POC mandates in new-age peacekeeping missions require the military components to work in close cooperation with all components of a PKO because the success of a multidimensional operation is measured by much more than simply the absence of conflict. The training responsibility for pre-deployment is that of the troop/police-contributing countries as per the UN General Assembly resolution of 1995.⁴¹ India has been at the forefront of troop contributions, and presently deploys 5,581 uniformed troops⁴² in South Sudan, Congo, Lebanon and Golan Heights, besides observers and police personnel in four more missions. The Indian Armed Forces have an extensive experience in POC in active insurgency areas as well as in the hinterland. Experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia and Lebanon bear testimony to the Indian soldiers' resilience and humane approach. The Indian soldiers are also, primarily, rural inhabitants, and hence well aware of agro-economy and animal husbandry. This has helped all Indian contingents to contribute towards nation building (digging wells, repairing bridges, schools, creating playgrounds, treating sick animals), local economies and infrastructure, thus creating long-term effects in their areas of operation.

While troops need little orientation on POC, being an in-built ethos of any unit, changes in the legal aspects and collaboration with the components in the field require detailed preparation. The UN expects training to be structured⁴³ to meet the evolving challenges of PKOs, following principles, policies and guidelines, as well as lessons learnt from the field. This will enable troops to perform their specialist functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner and demonstrate the core values and competencies of the UN. The UN Department of

Peace Operations has an integrated training service (ITS) to facilitate pre-deployment training, in conjunction with the national peacekeeping training centres based on the UN peacekeeping pre-deployment training standards and materials. The ITS has pre-deployment training manuals, specialised training and scenario-based material and reinforcement training modules available on its homepage.⁴⁴ The specialised training material on POC at the tactical level must be emphasised in peacekeeping training institutions through a series of train-the-trainer courses.

Notwithstanding a large amount of material available with the ITS and national training centres, the POC mandate requires a renewed emphasis on training in protection mandate and its application on the ground. Field experiences are valuable and therefore, much of the training must be based on case studies and practical experiences. Collaboration and understanding of the mandates of other components need to be discussed in detail before deployment in any mission area. Language training has its advantage and this must be a continuing affair, with online language training facilities round the clock.

Simulations, use of virtual augmented reality or simulations and data sciences, clubbed with the online education packages, are the most effective tools in pandemic-like situations. For a country like India, assembling a battalion or troops for a prolonged period in a central location may not be viable. Therefore, the use of e-packages, expert trainers, in situ exercises and briefings could be ideal alternatives. Understanding and speaking the local language has unique advantages in a foreign mission area. There should be a specific percentage of mid-level language qualifications for the contingents. However, all staff personnel, military observers and police personnel must be reasonably fluent in the language spoken in the host country.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Multidimensional peacekeeping is an offshoot of the international theory of multilateralism, which traditionally refers to a collective action coordinated between at least three actors. It implies a shared understanding of mutual interest to work together to resolve problems that are bigger than individual capabilities. The evolving nature of conflict has also changed the structure and tasks of the peacekeeping missions and modern PKOs have become multidimensional. Roles and responsibilities are equally divided between major components drawn from the military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human

rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender experts. The operational environment of the UN multidimensional mission is highly complex and different from the usual role of a military force in a traditional peacekeeping operation. The troops need to be trained and prepared to understand this new reality before they land in an alien country. In a study, it has been found that the peacekeepers' diversity, in terms of geography, language and religion, helps immensely in a mission's success. Indeed, high diversity among the peacekeepers and between the military and the civilian leaders has been a contributing factor to the success of a mission.⁴⁵ This requires a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of multiple components in the mission area.

This study has analysed the 2019 POC policy in detail and infers that each regulation and guideline needs careful preparation by all peacekeeping components. After evaluating the complexities of multidimensional PKOs and POC, 2019 policy, the same has been analysed in connection with special application to the UN military, to understand the role in the execution of protection mandate. Many studies and trends suggest a need for new structures of UN military presence in the mission areas, which heavily weigh towards increasing the number of women peacekeepers in the field. To achieve comprehensive results in a multidimensional enterprise for long-lasting peace, all components should be trained to understand and appreciate each other's role. Besides structural changes and mandated focus on protection, the UN military needs a constant reappraisal of its contingency planning and rehearsals to respond to any emerging threats to the civilian population.

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