

An Appraisal of the UN and Its Peacekeeping Structure

*Mono Bhagat**

Thanks to the Director General, MP-IDS Amb. Chinoy, Col. Pillay, Dr Ruchita Beri and their team for providing the opportunity to share my views from an Indian viewpoint on the Appraisal of the UN's Peacekeeping System and Mechanism.

My views are based on the several facets of peacekeeping that I as an individual was exposed to and my observations at all ends of decision-making, planning and implementation, both at the United Nations headquarters at New York (UNHQ NY) and on field missions; and both again, as a military professional and a UN civilian official. I have played the game from all sides and in all positions to get a good feel of what needs to be done properly and if more needs to be done.

As we are on the subject of an Appraisal, I often hear many speakers exclaim 'REFORM OR PERISH'. How relevant is this phrase to the UN, and reforms of which kind: in quality or in quantity?

Addressing the need for reforms, if any, my observations are entirely of my hands-on experience and are not meant to be either personally directed towards anyone or any group of working hands, nor should they be looked at as being critical or cynical of the system that makes peacekeeping a worthwhile subject. I would be candid in putting across what I feel can be done to give a meaningful expression to the entire gamut of a peacekeeping operation (PKO), from start to finish and beyond.

* Major General Mono Bhagat, PVSM, Retd, former Cdr. Indian Bde UNOSOM, Mil Adv to UNSG, Head of Admin and Logs, UN Mission in Congo and Sierra Leone.



I would walk you through the subject, first, with a short deliberation in general for an overview on the points common to many and India in particular and then follow it up with some specifics pertaining to the process of peacekeeping. I would not dwell much or in detail on the nuances of peacekeeping.

DELIBERATION ON A BROADER FRONT

1. To begin with, I prefer to ask myself one or two questions: Has the UN been a success or failure as a creation? Is peacekeeping the best solution to ensure international peace and stability, that is, collective security? The answer that comes to my mind is yes. It has been successful in curtailing and containing conflict in several parts of the world. At the same time, since the end of World War II there has been no alternative to peacekeeping by the UN. Peacekeeping Operations, no doubt, are not a panacea for the world's problems for it is only a 'facilitating mechanism to help collapsed nations get back on their feet and move forward thereafter on their own'.
2. I would address the proposition from three angles for a three-sided view of what is the peacekeeping business all about as I have experienced in my work capacity in that system, and what can therefore be done to enhance its capacity and capability. In order to make it fruitful in delivery at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, that is, New York–Security Council, member states and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the authorisation and resourcing end; next being the peacekeeping mission area–host nation and mission HQ; and finally, the show at the delivery end on ground between the Blue Helmets and the locals in their areas of responsibility (AOR), which all together make a PKO mission area.
3. Needless to remind that peacekeeping is all about doing and performance on the ground with the people of a failed state or states in crisis, and is far distanced from mere classroom discussions and symposiums on the subject. All the theory on it has to be translated into doable actions. Sustainability and consistency at work are the primary factors of consideration in all actions. It is all about starting at the grassroots and then growing outwards and upwards, of recognising the people who matter and could be of assistance in promoting the purpose of a mission. Imperative is the identification of the 'impediments of security' and dealing with them, as also,

‘people are the key factor’ and matter in all that one does in a mission area. It is their consent and consensus that rules all your thoughts and actions and is unlike the past when peacekeeping during the Cold War era was used as a separating agent and was then passive in attire and design.

4. Unfortunately, the UN’s peacekeeping architecture at UNHQ NY is composed mainly of diplomats, rather than a happy balanced mix of military and civilians—civilians such as economists, social scientists, members of NGOs, scholars, researchers, all of whom are vital ingredients of the contemporary peacekeeping mould.
5. All parlance, papers, journals and drafts are loaded in semantics and rhetoric but in the practical sense are light in weight in application. They are limited in knowledge of the interplay of dynamics on the ground between aid seekers and aid providers, resulting in a wide gap between expectations and performance and they are nowhere close to any well-conceptualised timeframe or timelines.
6. As for the Indian stage, peacekeeping is of very limited value or interest to our academic, political or economic world, except as a job necessity for the Ministry of External Affairs and its linkage to the UN system, and, to a small extent, to our military and media on a secondary basis as a professional requirement. This is quite understandable since we have many a problem of developing and growing societies and our focus lies on those essentials than on peacekeeping.
7. Most of the literature on peacekeeping is authored by Western writers and is funded by relevant institutions—people who have the least feel of what to do with the contents of a PKO package when unrolled on ground. A lot that is written is based on hearsay, interviews, personal perceptions and prejudices and not on what needs to be told and seen and measured objectively. Leave alone that, most of the seminars and conclaves the world over that I have been a part of are attended by military personnel in majority and a negligible number of parliamentarians, bureaucrats from the government and ministries, or from non-government organisations (NGOs), the media or for that matter by students of international relations studies. Strange as it is, these absentees are mainly the decision-takers and fund-providers or people meant to be accountable and in support, but they are quite complacent with the little knowledge that they have of ground dynamics. Who suffers in the bargain? The uniformed man in the Blue Helmet who has to deliver on ground

and is often found handicapped for resources, support and time or is targeted by human rights activists, social activists and the media to add sensational content to all reporting. It indeed is a paradox of anomalies if I may consider it as such, for the protector, more often than not is labelled as the assaulter or exploiter rather than the protector of innocents and unarmed civilians. Whereas the rebels who attack the security providers are viewed as victims by some unscrupulous reporting. Nothing could be more discouraging to the good intent in peacekeepers and peace providers.

8. Digressing a little, our Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is a case in point. The AFSPA is an aid tool for the benefit of innocents but has been mis-projected as a tool of exploitation by the military. Of course, as in any system, there will be aberrations, but these are taken notice of and attended to in accordance with the requirements of good military discipline and justice to the victims, if any. I would find fault with our own military and media in not educating the masses enough on the usefulness of AFSPA or in not being able to put it across well to the people in power within our legislature for their understanding. Peacekeeping or Aid to Civil Authority are one and the same thing in most respects and should be guarded against politicisation if it has to succeed. It is not an opportunity for social enthusiasts or HR Monitors to promote their hidden agendas of inflated reporting without substance or adequate evidence.
9. Peacekeeping operations in the future are going to be robust and in accordance with the dictates of Chapter 7. It will be more comprehensive, composite, inclusive and conclusive in nature. It will be very demanding and prone to high risks. Countries averse to body bags coming home should stay away from the PKO arena. Where there is military, there are bound to be casualties on both sides and body bags are part of the game of offensive and defensive fire. This needs to be digested and understood well. No matter what, casualties are bound to happen and that is one reason for getting the military, and not the non-military, to undertake such tasks in a high-risk, danger-infested environment.
10. Since this morning's topic is essentially an appraisal of today and tomorrow's UN peacekeeping, I am highlighting the risks, gaps, shortfalls and misinterpretations that hinder successful outcomes. And if given the attention they merit, can become mission accomplishments in good time and at fair costs.

11. As said earlier, there is a definite need to have the military and civilians work together and closely in all spheres of UN peacekeeping so as to 'civilianise the military mind and militarise the civilian mind', so that both can understand each other's working ways and talk in the same lingo. The military and civilian work ethos and culture are unique and unless one has spent a life in uniform or in a blue suit, it is not easy to get into the others' work mind, pattern of thinking or get their acceptance.
12. We as a nation are not yet politically or militarily, diplomatically or economically aggressive within the UN campus or the world environment. By aggressive, I am implying being proactive and having sufficient networking, not being hostile. The Chinese are flooding the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa and in our close neighbourhood with a cultural invasion, technology and monetary aid, and hence enjoy a favourable influence on the dependant nations towards their worldwide designs. What and how much have we done or are seen to be doing, I leave it to your assessment. And unless we expand in that strategy under the heads I enumerated above, there will be very little for us to benefit or gain, be it in the UN or the world per se.
13. Our interest lies in seeking an entry into the Security Council (SC) as a permanent member for which we count all our assets in terms of peacekeeping contributions as a Troop-Contributing Country (TCC). We rejoice in the fact that we are in the top three by way of Blue Helmets fielded to UN PKOs or that we have the highest numbers who have made the supreme sacrifice in the line of duty in UN PKOs. Believe me, that argument matters very little to the Western world or member states in the General Assembly (GA). It is only a statistical figure on paper and for historical records. To matter we have to make our presence matter in the UNHQ NY in all our political and diplomatic manoeuvres.
14. We have to play an effective supporting role and ought to question the lapses on part of the UN or why is it that it has been over 50 years and most of the world's refugees continue to live in relief camps such as United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near East (UNRWA). Seventy-five years ago, the UN came into being and still a few missions remain operative, 50 years gone by—UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNTSO, UNIFIL, MINURSO, etc.—why? Unlike our neighbour across the border

to the west, our representatives prefer to remain in a reticent mode and behave like good public school educated boys, cultured and well mannered, rather than assert their presence in the General Assembly and Security Council sessions. Take for example the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). As a peacekeeping mission it failed the international community in providing them early information of the build-up on the Pakistan side of the LOC, and we did nothing to have UNMOGIP terminated, instead we ousted it from our side and became losers as a result of that—UN officials in their morning briefs now got only one side of the story from our adversary's side, biasing their minds. Knee-jerk reactions do not pay well. On the other hand, Angola had United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) close down when it failed to deliver in their favour.

15. At New York it is all a game of how many member states (MS) can you get to win on your side for it is all about a hand count in your favour. It is all about give and take! When we went to Somalia, our High Commissioner in Kenya then, would question, "How does it matter if the US or UN is too pleased with the methodology introduced by the Indian contingent in United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM-II)?" Although accredited to our role in Somalia, he failed to visit us even once. Mileage could be drawn in the fact that a count of 54 hands of the African continent in the GA can be with us in support of us being of assistance to the Africans when all others of the prosperous world withdrew, but we stood with the African nation in distress!
16. Incidentally India has Honorary High Commissioners in a lot of African states unlike China, which has seasoned diplomats. Our diplomats eye postings to the West where they can educate their children well. Interests at conflict, if I may say so!
17. A seat in the SC does not come easy or cheap. Even China, which stayed aloof at one time in PKOs, now is seen to be taking a very active role in peacekeeping participation in every respect. The day India becomes militarily or economically a force to reckon with, or at least strong in one of the two parameters of reckoning, or has a large political and diplomatic following, it would be invited to join the SC, as is the case for Germany and Japan; both being hot favourites to be given a SC seat whenever that is to be. We lost 70 years in becoming economically powerful and it would take 70 more years if we are to

follow that course, but to become militarily a nation that has a say takes much less time; however, that is financially a very expensive deal. Time having been lost, no other option is now available to us but to go for the quickest one, though at a heavy cost. All eyes would then be on India to be given a seat of prominence within the SC for all times and not seen to go begging as we have been doing for the last six decades or so. Our canvassing hasn't fetched us much on that, except for plenty of lip service and polite assurances.

SECURITY COUNCIL (SC)

1. *The Military Staff Council (MSC)*. The Military Staff Council, organic to the SC framework, is in reality defunct and non-existent, thereby handicapping a sound analysis of the military component of the Secretary-General's (SG's) Report to the SC. As of now it is a single-line approach. Sixty per cent of SG's report is on military content, 30 per cent on budgetary needs and 10 per cent on the political way forward. The MSC is a must for the SC to have an independent analysis from its own experts' council.
2. *Mandate is perfect*. Finding fault was an alibi to prevent heads roll post Somalia. A mandate is an Op Directive, not an Op Order with 30 odd tasks spelt out. The Directive provides a wider coverage in an overall aim, than a specific task-oriented Op Order, which is meant to be issued at the field end and not at the strategic level. For example, the mandate in Somalia was of three simple, straightforward statements. It was "to provide a safe and stable environment; to assist re-establish a political process; and to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid." The rest was for us to infer from the given mandate, how much we wanted to do or not! The Somalia mandate said it all in those simple three sentences as a directive for us to follow and work within, tasking with relevance to the overall aim.
3. The timeframe of any initial SC mandate ought to be between 1–3 years and not 6 months to start with nor less than a year or two.
4. Fancy military terms came up such as the mandate being ambiguous, mission creep, force protection, end game, exit strategy, etc. All such terms are well explained in the *Glossary of Military Terms*, a training manual with all armies. There was no such need whatsoever to intimidate the civilians or diplomats at the SC with military fancy terminology.

5. *Force Strength and Composition—Formations vs. numbers.* Nowhere in the world is military planned in numbers. It is alright to do so for Military Observers (MILOBS) or Civpol monitors or mentors, etc. The military Blue Helmets have to be defined in units of battalions and brigades and no bigger units or formations than that are required. A division as a formation is not at all required for PKOs unless a situation so warrants it, which would be only in rare circumstances. The initial composition and type of combat units should be replaced by technical support units when peacekeeping transcends into a peacebuilding stage as the nature of requirements change and threats are considerably reduced.
6. Reforms of SC is mainly being looked at in its expansion and as an obsession with us. Not directed towards strategy or doctrines or methodology. Increase in permanent members is going to make no difference in the work style or decision-making, except for a better word of a status symbol. The Big Five + 10 others in rotation on a two-year cycle are enough, increasing the members to 23 is not going to add any major gains or make a healthy difference. Rather, a reform is much needed in the veto power of the P5. Talking informally to the SC Secretariat on SC reforms, I was given to understand that have they as the SC failed the world, for one has not had a Third World War in the last 75 years vis-à-vis the first two within two decades, so where is the necessity for reforms? I leave the input to our policy-makers, what they wish to make of it. Would canvassing be sufficient in itself or much more in tangible terms is desirable?
7. The Brahimi Report on reforms did nothing for the Doctrine but for restructuring the DPKO with the creation of a Department of Support (DOS)—another bureaucratic step in coordinating. Yes, it did speak of protection of civilians, immediate initial 25 per cent funding to missions etc., but that was all. The initial times were best when all were part of one department and under one roof in Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPA)/DPKO with one head. After all, the Agenda for Peace of the four stages from PM-PK-PE-PB are steps in sequence or in series, and done best under one set of leadership from start to end. It is not a process of parallels. The Brahimi Report, to my way of looking at it, is an overrated document that has failed to reform the peacekeeping doctrine, amplify the needs to fulfil the needs of the Agenda for Peace, nor to be of relevance to suit current mission area conditions

and environment and associated high risks in intra-state conflict areas deprived of the rule of law. It did partial structural and surface level functional reforms, not in-depth overhauling from the foundation to the entire mapping being in consonance with the changed profile of the new face of peacekeeping.

8. *Standby Arrangements (SBA) and Rapid Deployment Mission Headquarters (RDMH)*: An inventory exercise. Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), both fizzled out with time. SHIRBRIG tried widening its group and thereby suffered from what the UN does. Its member states are very keen to join any group established on peacekeeping without understanding the rationale. It takes no less than six months to put Blue Helmets boots on ground and the void till then has to be filled in by a Regional Task Force (RTF) or Multinational Task Force (MNTF) to monitor ceasefires. The mix has to be thought of in that context to fill the voids. The current SBA is more of a photo-op.
9. UN and Regional Plot Setups are no doubt necessary but in the enthusiasm to empower Regional Organisations (ROs) there's a need to guard against the tendency of mini UNs or mini DPKOs from mushrooming. Best is a healthy cooperation and understanding between the ROs and the UN. In a partnership at work, the ROs can supplement in the PM stage and for the peacekeeping stage, and alongside cater for deployment of a RTF or an MNTF in the interim period, as necessitated, so as to set the stage for takeover by Blue Helmets. It is imperative that UN PKOs have a multinational complexion and not geographical divides of Africa by Africans or Europe by Europeans.
10. *ROEs and Use of Force*. PKOs of today and tomorrow are going to be mostly robust operations with Chapter 7 Rules of Engagement (ROE). There is never a permanent state in the implementation of ROEs, be they as part of Chapter 6 or 7 deployment in intra state conflict conditions. A carrot and stick approach has to be followed with a to and fro changeover to either passive or active use of fire. Nor can it be a ROE to a MS's liking, but ought to be the UN planned ROEs in accordance with the two chapters.
11. *UN Chapters 6, 7, 8 on Conflict Resolution*. Unnecessary debates are being generated on Chapters 6 and 7 and a compromise on a so-called 6.5 or The Chinese Chapter, so to say by some. There is no

halfway use of force; either you use it or you do not use it. There are no shades in the use of force. Use of force under any of the two chapters is all controlled by the military training on fire control and fire discipline with the conditional stipulation of no collateral damage or proportionate use of fire as justified by a situation or a threat. All use of force in defence of a mandate is justified. The interpretation by a few MS that the use of imminent deadly force (IDF) against peacekeepers should be the deciding factor on use of force in self-defence is a fallacy and wishful thinking. It is good for lawyers and social activists for a verbal defence in theory, but in reality IDF is unidentifiable and kills before one reacts in self-defence and is non-provable.

TCCs, MISSION HQ AND HOST NATIONS

1. *Induction of Mission Leadership.* The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Force Commander (FC) should be the first to be appointed when a mission is in sight and they should be co-opted into the planning and setting up of a mission—this is what the RDMH concept is all about. Unfortunately, it is not happening as such and while others in the form of a mission assessment team followed by a technical survey team do all the initial reconnaissance and survey a mission area, the actual mission accountable heads are not in the planning loop at all. It is imperative that both the military and the political head be inducted into the process before any assessment or survey team sets out on its fact-finding responsibilities.
2. *Deputy Mission Head.* Rightfully the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Coordinator is now appointed as the Deputy Mission Head and can coordinate the humanitarian tasks within the overall framework of the mission aim and goals as mandated. But at the same time, too many other Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-Generals (DSRSGs) are being appointed in the titles of DSRSG Political, DSRSG Support. This is unnecessary and making a mission top heavy can have its own problems of command and control. One mission head assisted by a DSRSG from UNDP and a FC are a good mix for a balanced command and control structure.
3. *Tenure.* Tenures of 1–2 years to the present six months of rotation of military contingents is too little a time for any worthwhile activity on

part of the Blue Helmets. It takes six months or more to comprehend the dynamics at play in a mission area. A minimum of a year should be the prescribed period of any rotation to be done.

4. *Civilian Staff.* The civilian staff too suffers from job insecurities as most of them are recruited on contract basis. Appointments and selection of civilian staff should be merit-based and not on geographical, political or gender considerations. Migrations from United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), or any UN aid agencies to peacekeeping missions of DPKO should be discouraged as the experience of the staff coming in is at variance to the job requirements in PKOs.
5. *Political Considerations for TCC Participation.* Not all nations are suited to do peacekeeping. It is best to use those that are familiar with community operations or assist governments in aid to civil authority during natural and manmade disasters or for suppression of law and order situations. Such training is a part of their basic training curriculum, as in the case of our nation or our neighbours.
6. *Real Time Supervision or Contact.* All peacekeeping is east of New York and so no real time management or sitreps come in or can be done. New York is asleep when missions are at work and vice versa. Also, there is a mismatch of military routine and civilian staff schedules; military works 24X7, which is not the case with mission civilian staff. Hence, servicing staff, aviation assets are not available for commitment during weekends and the military is handicapped for support.
7. *Ancient and Outdated Admin Manuals.* The logisticians and auditors were doing peacekeeping tasks in 2021 with administration (admin) manuals of 1951 or earlier for reference and guidelines. The civilian Secretariate staff is hence ancient in its thinking and mental approach and often ask where is the peace to keep? They don't know that you induce peace now and then sustain it. Hence there is a mismatch in the work ideology of rear support and forward line doers.
8. *Civilian Contingent-owned Equipment (COE) staff* ask you to dismantle all that you set up for peace efforts, which is crazy as how can one undo the wells dug or bridges erected for mobility. Have to compensate the COE of contingents and not deprive the TCCs. No proper COE verification is done when contingents leave and that makes TCCs lose out on the monetary compensation due to them.

9. *Security Sector, UNCIVPOL and Rule of Law.* Policing is a domestic subject, and the UN should only mentor, guide, train and fund, but let the locals do the policing. It also provides a bumper or cushion strategy for the locals can take a shooting from their own police but will revolt against a shootout by police other than their own. Policing is not gender-specific and an all-women's formed unit doesn't give more gains, other than a public relations exercise, sounds good to the ear, for publicity on women empowerment or gender balance. We are too enamoured by the fact that we fielded an All Women's Formed Police Unit in Liberia. I would advocate for United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) to be of mixed gender and refrain from active policing. The police needs immunity, subject to local laws and the UN has no legal jurisdiction on the same. It is not merely policing that is essential but the whole legal apparatus, comprising of a police, judiciary and prison set up as a security and safety need, is the one that should be accorded priority in the security sector.
10. *Area of Responsibility (AOR).* The AORs should be defined on nationality basis rather than a mix of nationalities by putting troops under command, etc. This is so because Blue Helmets associate a lot of national pride with their respective AORs and the safety and well-being of the people in it. This is a great motivator and there is a silent competition amongst contingents. A UN AOR at best should not be more than a brigade- or battalion-sized AOR; division-sized AOR is a waste of resources, for example, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has a Division HQ deployed, which is totally redundant to the mission as all the brigade commanders are functioning very well under a FC.
11. *Intervention Brigade in DRC [United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)].* Employment of such a resource is beyond all logic and rationale in a Chapter 7 mission. Rebels operate in small groups in hit-and-run tactics and a brigade is certainly not required to tackle them. This can best be done by the battalions in the AOR. Blue Helmets are 30–40 times superior in all respects to the rebels involved in an insurgency. Surprisingly, the FC, our own professional, accepted such a set-up propagated by nations from the West that had no troops on ground there. There couldn't have been a bigger mockery than that as the gains were ridiculous at wasteful costs. It is best that the RO finds a political solution so that the rebels are not provided safe havens

across the borders in neighbouring countries. In fact there is a role for the RO such as the African Union (AU). Take, for example, that the US Delta Force in Somalia and NATO Airforce in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) could achieve nothing on their own which could have been of utility to the peacekeepers functioning on ground. Peacekeeping actions are comparatively very small, quick and swift in action and a very invisible force attacks a very visible peacekeeper. The requirements are more of intelligence and swift real time ambush and rapid counter ambush operations with surprise as the paramount factor. Also, PKOs deal with fighting in built-up areas and that becomes a major tactical requirement and not one of an aerial bombing or large size frontal assaults. Intervention brigades or air attacks are not suited to such ground requirements.

12. *Preventive Deployment.* It is worth considering a preventive deployment such as United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in North Macedonia, and that ought to be the billboard for the current century. It is most economical in terms of casualties, running expenses and damage control. The initiative rests with the deployed Blue Helmets. The UN would be seen to be taking the first bus to the crisis centre rather the last bus and manage the Crisis Control Centre (CCC) as their way as a neutral and yet an active participant, not confronted by fait accompli. The SC and MS may like to ponder over it as an effective tool of PKO for the future. Of course, that would mean that the dictionary meaning of sovereignty may have to be more explicit to enable a wider application of it.
13. *Contingents and Locals at the Sharp End of the Tools DPKO Manages.* More interaction on a two-way traffic between the Secretariat staff and TCC representatives as also contingent commanders and local heads. Generate your own surveillance and intelligence or information seeking as UN puts it. Work through traditional leaders and not be a practitioner of modern-day civics or social science. It often does not work in suburban culture and a way of life.
14. *UN Command and Control (C&C).* In a peacekeeping mission area, C&C is the responsibility of the UN, whereas discipline is a national responsibility. Some contingent commanders are often seen to refer to their parent armies on UN decisions of the FC, which is highly irregular and such contingent commanders need to be repatriated on breach of trust and violation of the UN C&C.

15. *NGOs*. NGOs are a great asset and must be drawn into the Blue Helmets' work scheme. They are always shy of getting close to people in uniform but since they have the goodies and you have the reach to deliver, it becomes necessary to draw them into mutual confidence and cultivate a partnership at work. The NGOs can only get as far as the roads can take them, so large gaps exist in their aid programme network. Hence our reach can be of assistance to them and also ensure that aid reaches all far-flung corners.
16. *Humanitarian Aid with a Purpose*. A major contradiction at work is that while the men folk are out in the bush fighting each other, their families back home are being supplied with medical aid and rations by humanitarian agencies, thereby leaving the man in the bush to remain in a state of hostility with no family pressures on him of how to feed them. Therefore, it becomes essential to think over the problem of how to separate the man in the bush from his weapon and make returning home to his family as his primary concern. In so doing, his actions in support of the militant groups in the bush become a secondary/milder concern for the fighting element that he is a part of. As a result the UN would have reduced the fighting potential of the factions at war with each other by a social strategy, least thought upon as of date.
17. *Funding*. All funding for peacekeeping must be routed under one roof: the UN Secretariat, and it should not be that various aid agencies or MS funding the UN agencies fund their respective agendas directly in a mission area. In so doing, all the money available will be better planned, managed, monitored and utilised with care in a cost-effective manner.
18. *Winning Hearts & Minds (WHAM)*. Winning Hearts & Minds is easier said than done. It is very scientific and sensitive at the same time. It is a chapter in itself. It is essential to obtain and retain consent and consensus from the locals.
19. *Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*. They must be repatriated to their original homes and not in places of new settlements. A lot more needs to be done by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

CONCLUSION

1. *Rename PK/PE as PSO*. PKOs must be renamed Peace Support Operations (PSO) as it gives it a wider connotation than peacekeeping

or PEO and will bury the unnecessary debates on chapters 6 and 7 and the ROEs.

2. *National Interest*. It is a redundant and out of place agenda of states looking for national interest in peacekeeping mission areas. Failed states have nothing to offer in lieu of the assistance being provided to them, until a mission ends and the state is on its own. It is only the UN's interest that must count when a mission is current.
3. *UN Not Short on Funds or Resources*. All that MS possess is meant to be shared with the UN also. So by that logic, the UN has it all, provided there is a will to share and do, and do it the best way. What is lacking is not the capacity or capability but the will and determination to be of assistance to the UN and to do it the UN Way! The UN has the best logistics and support system by way of communications, transport, office equipment, prefab shelters, food, fuel and water supply chain, aviation assets, air and sea lift capability, medical support, etc.
4. *From Zero State*. A mission set-up progresses from a zero state up the ladder; so, it can do anything and everything if there is a desire. Considering that rise in the graph, a lot is accomplished by all peacekeeping missions.
5. *Force Multipliers*. Media and Technology are the fundamentals of today's operational efficiency and the UN believes and caters for it all within all planning.
6. India is a very useful and fruitful TCC and must continue to be in earnest support of UN peacekeeping apparatus as a responsible and peace-loving MS of the UN.
7. Tremendous professional value in participating in UN peacekeeping by way of exposure to our troops and confidence in their own ability, as also, you sell and make India known to the world in every way possible—a significant psychological, morale and economic factor to our national interest, to be the best amongst the best, and attract investment into our rising economy.
8. I would end with three very relevant and appropriate quotes on the UN and its peacekeeping mechanism, and these say it all!

“It is not the UN that has let down the people but we who have not stood by the UN.”

—Olaf Palme

“Cannot Defend our Society by War for War is Total Destruction; But essential is to address the root causes of war and work around sustainable Negotiations which can build sound foundations of Peace – The Grim fact is that, We Prepare for war like Precocious giants and for Peace like Retarded pygmies.”

– Lester B. Pearson

I finally close with what Rajiv Gandhi had to say in 1986. “Human survival is too important to be left to the hands of only those who have power, power to destroy the world. They have monopoly of power, but not a monopoly of wisdom and how to keep the world safe!” Thank You.