Xi’s Nepal Visit Reveals a Grander Chinese Himalayan Approach

Not long ago, Beijing’s perspective towards Nepal was limited to that of a ‘good neighbour’ only.1 Though the presence of about 20,000 Tibetans in Nepal has been an issue of major concern to Beijing, it has carefully managed its relations with Nepal which it sees as a strategic geographic zone in the Himalayan valley. The Chinese outlook seems to be changing fast as evident from the outcomes of President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal on October 12-13, 2019. With growing emphasis on strengthening bilateral cooperation especially on building sub-regional connectivity,2 Beijing seems to be orchestrating a Himalayan approach in its relations with Kathmandu – revealing a grander Chinese policy in making.

On the side-lines of his Nepal visit, President Xi’s article published in Nepali newspapers sketched a bigger Chinese ambition with a view to forge “strategic and long-term” cooperation between the two sides.3 Stressing on a ‘renewed friendship’, Xi’s article was a curtain raiser to the joint statement which outlined resolute Chinese goals to promote “trans-Himalayan multi-dimensional connectivity network” in the region. Such ambitions are not unusual in Chinese strategic calculus — a similar approach could be noticed in China’s interactions with other immediate neighbours such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar in particular. What is striking about China’s recent outreach to Nepal is its effort to transform the relationship into a comprehensive partnership, aiming to integrate with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Himalayan valley.

In other words, Xi’s recent visit to Nepal could be viewed within the spectrum of China’s ‘neighbourhood’ policy that Beijing has been reinforcing for some time through greater strategic presence and multi-modal connectivity plans, and importantly, offering attractive financial aids. Orchestrating a pragmatic mode of comprehensive partnership, rather than just a simple form of engagement, is becoming the highpoint of China’s Himalayan approach.

Bilaterally, Xi’s visit to Nepal was the first-ever by a Chinese President since 1996. With more than 20 agreements, his visit outlined an ambitious Chinese approach not only to promote the flagship BRI-funded projects but also to link it strategically with its various trans-Himalayan connectivity projects that are being discussed between the two sides. For instance, the intended cooperation on Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini Railway project, restoration of Zhangmu/Khasa port, implementation of various highway projects in the Himalayan valley promoting transit–transport connectivity and plans to promote three north-south corridors in Nepal (Koshi Economic Corridor, Gandaki Economic Corridor and Karnali Economic Corridor) – all outlining China’s ambitions to deepen connectivity with Nepal,4 both within and outside the purview of the BRI.

Nepal, a signatory to the BRI, signed the Transit Transport Agreement (TTA) with China in September 2018, which in a way assured Nepal of access to seven transit points in China – four seaports (Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang) and three land ports (Lanzhou, Lhasa and Xigatse).5 Further, based on the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 21, 2018, both countries agreed to cooperate in the field of energy, hydropower, wind power, solar power, biomass energy and other kinds of new energy. While the ports would be enabling Nepal to end its transit dependence on India slowly, the same also operated as an assurance of continued economic as well as strategic relations between China and Nepal.

Xi’s recent visit to Nepal should also be seen beyond the purview of bilateralism. An upgrade in the China-Nepal relationship comes amidst Beijing’s effort to increase its influence in South Asia. Such Chinese intent was aptly noted during Xi’s first visit to India in September 2014. In his speech, he explicitly factored in all the South Asian countries including Nepal as being central to the BRI (then referred to as ‘One Belt One Road’).6

Further, the locus of geo-politics has been increasingly shifting towards the Indo-Pacific which is also encouraging China to accord more importance to Nepal and other immediate neighbours in the region. With many countries viewing China’s BRI doubtfully due to concerns over its opaque and unjust policies, creating financial debt burdens in the process, it has increasingly become a challenge for Xi to ensure the sustenance and success of the connectivity initiative, a focal point of China’s foreign policy. In this regard, Nepal’s enthusiastic stance towards the BRI comes as an advancement of China’s greater connectivity ambitions with a focus on the Himalayan region. The Chinese attempt is to gradually change Nepal “from a landlocked to a land-linked country”.7 For Nepal, inclusion in BRI means a much-wider strategic platform to connect with China as much as with the entire Himalayan region.

From envisioning cooperation between the two sides in the United Nations to multilateral trading regimes to various infrastructural development and regional connectivity projects, the two countries are increasingly exhibiting signs of an evolving relationship. However, the China-Nepal relations are not unidimensional. Trade and economic contacts are an important aspect. China remains the second largest import partner to Nepal with bilateral trade worth $1.523 billion in 2017-18, a shift from mere $445 million in 2009.8 Further, their commitment to promote exchange and cooperation in the fields of culture, education, tourism, traditional medicine, media, think tanks and youth at different levels re-emphasise a comprehensive outlook to their relations. China has offered 100 Confucius Institute scholarships to the Nepali side and initiated the ‘friendship city’ concept to strengthen the ties between Kathmandu and Nanjing and also Butwal and Xi’an. This approach of connecting city to city is a classic Chinese scheme, a part of its ‘development partnership’ strategy that is even evidenced in the case of India-China, China-Pakistan, China-Sri Lanka, China-Bangladesh and China-Maldives ‘Sister City’ cooperation framework.

Importantly, any advancement in the China-Nepal relations should also be perceived from the perspective of Beijing’s rising footprint in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, under Xi, China’s South Asia policy has been heavily influenced by connectivity and infrastructural initiatives such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), deep seaports at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan and Chittagong Port in Bangladesh. In a way, these only validate China’s traditional “peripheral diplomacy” that Xi revitalised through the October 2013 “Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference” by focusing on land and maritime domains. These projects give China strategic access into the Indian Ocean and expand its presence in the region to protect its sea lanes of communication (SLOC). In this regard, while developing relations with Nepal might not directly provide China access to the Indo-Pacific, a strategic dimension to the China-Nepal relations in tandem with China’s South Asia policy would help Beijing expand its influence in the region.

Beijing also acknowledges Nepal’s fervent yet cautious approach towards China and its connectivity initiatives, in the context of India’s staunch condemnation of the CPEC as well as the BRI. Nepal acknowledges the need to tread carefully between India and China so as to preserve its growth and territorial integrity.9 Aware of Nepal’s dependence and historically close relations with India, China too would be cautious not to hurt its developing partnership with India at the cost of its new strategic partnership with Nepal. This was aptly reflected in Wang Yi’s recent press briefing, post Xi’s visit to Nepal, where he stated that “no matter how the external situation unfolds, China would continue to create opportunities for both countries”, hinting at a long-term cooperation with both Nepal and India.10 China’s continuous pitch for a “China-India Plus” cooperation framework, as Wang Yi’s statement indicates, refers to an open South Asia policy that is much more engaging. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, former prime minister of Nepal, had espoused his vision of a trilateral cooperation between India, China and Nepal during his visit to New Delhi in April 2013.11 Since then, Nepal and China have been pushing for such a cooperation.

Beijing takes serious note of India’s rising profile as a power, mainly as a strategic pivot in the Indo-Pacific construct. 12 The same is encouraging China to view its relationship with India through a new spectrum, specifically after Xi’s visit to India for the Mamallapuram ‘informal summit’, just ahead of his trip to Nepal. Hence, China would aim to forge a partnership with Nepal without disrupting its growing engagement with India.

In brief, Xi’s visit to Nepal signifies China’s emerging approach towards its immediate neighbours. Solidifying relationship with Nepal strengthens China’s sub-regional outreach in the Himalayan valley. Xi’s Kathmandu visit thus sets a new parameter for the China-Nepal ties to imbibe a regional approach, moving away from the traditional interstate relations based on simple bilateral modes of engagement.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. China’s ‘good neighbourly’ policy witnessed a new beginning with its economy doing well towards the end of Jiang Zemin’s tenure, though historically it was Mao Zedong who emphasised on such a policy repeatedly. See “Full text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th Party Congress on Nov 8, 2002,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, November 18, 2002. Subsequently, Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society” proposition also emphasised on ‘good neighbourly’ policy. The same policy/strategy has been revitalised by the current president Xi Jinping. He has referred to China’s “good-neighbourly” policy on several occasions, beginning with the ‘Conference on the Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries’ held on October 24-25, 2013. See “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, October 25, 2013 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 2. The joint statements between China and Nepal have become more comprehensive over the years. See “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and Nepal,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, June 22, 2018; and “Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, October 13, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 3. Xi Jinping, “Toward Greater Progress of China-Nepal Friendship Across the Himalayas,” published in three Nepali newspapers, The Gorkhapatra Daily, The Rising Nepal and Kantipur Daily. For the English version of the article, see “Full text of Xi’s signed article on Nepali newspapers,” Xinhua, October 11, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 4. “Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, October 13, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 5. “Nepali gov't endorses protocol of Nepal-China Transit Transport Agreement: official,” Xinhua, March 15, 2019 (Accessed October 16, 2019)
• 6. “Special Address by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping,” Indian Council of World Affairs, Taj Palace, New Delhi, September 18, 2014 (Accessed October 30, 2019)
• 7. “The Road Ahead Is Long and Winding Though, A Start Will Bring An Arrival,” State Council and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on President Xi Jinping’s Attendance at the Second Informal Meeting Between Chinese and Indian Leaders in India and His State Visit to Nepal, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, October 17, 2019 (Accessed October 18, 2019).
• 8. “Nepal-China Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, February 2019; “Nepal Trade Summary 2009,” World Integrated Trade Solution, 2009; and “Nepal: Trade Statistics,” globalEDGE (Accessed October 16, 2019).
• 9. Bhairaja Panday, “Nepal now has to Balance not just India and China, but also the West,” Nepali Times, February 01, 2019 (Accessed October 29, 2019)
• 10. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, no. 7.
• 11. “India-Nepal Relations: Vision for the next Decade,” Report on Third Sapru House Lecture by H.E. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, former Prime Minister of Nepal, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, April 29, 2013 (Accessed October 30, 2019)
• 12. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, no. 7.