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Report on Visit of the Delegation from the National Defence College, UAE December 11, 2023 Other

A delegation from the National Defence College, UAE, led by Brig. Gen. Staff Pilot Khalifa Butti Thani Tarish Al Shamsi visited the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) on 11 December 2023. Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy made a presentation on the structure and role of the Institute and India-West Asia relations. Established in 1965, MP-IDSA is an autonomous body funded by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Government of India. The scope of research activities undertaken by MP-IDSA broadly includes issues relating to defence, internal and external security and international relations. Its governance is overseen by the Executive Council, traditionally presided over by the Defence Minister of India. Amb. Chinoy highlighted the diverse spectrum of research initiatives undertaken by the Institute's various Centres, shedding light on key issues and areas of research by the scholars. Emphasising MP-IDSA's contributions, he mentioned significant publications, specifying two esteemed peer-reviewed research journals: Strategic Analysis and Journal of Defence Studies.

Amb. Chinoy mentioned the training mechanism of the Institute in terms of capacity building through short modules for various stakeholders, including Defence Forces (NDC, DSSC, CDM), OFB, BSF Academy, ITBP, Customs, SSB, NTRO, IFS, State Governments and Young Parliamentarians. MP-IDSA has also served as a knowledge partner of MoD for the India-Africa Defence Dialogue, Aero-India and Defence Expo in Lucknow-2020 and Gandhinagar-2022. The Institute has also undertaken and completed study reports/projects on military equipment, cyber security, border infrastructure, defence cooperation, terror financing, border management and maritime security.

Amb. Sujan Chinoy provided a brief overview of India-West Asia relations, highlighting the historical and civilizational links and India’s position as a stakeholder in peace and security in the region. He emphasised that since 2014, high-level engagements have increased remarkably because of the leadership of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Modi adopted the “Think West” policy to deepen engagement in West Asia in economic, defence, security and strategic cooperation.

With regard to energy cooperation, Amb. Chinoy stated that the Gulf region is the most reliable energy source, supplying 60 per cent of India’s total oil imports. On a positive note, India is deepening engagement with Gulf countries in the green and renewable energy sector as there is a convergence of interests between India and Gulf nations to reduce carbon emissions.

He also highlighted India’s support to West Asian countries during the COVID-19 pandemic by providing Hydroxychloroquine tablets and medical equipment to the West Asian countries. India sent a team of 88 medical and healthcare professionals to the UAE.

Amb. Chinoy said that under Prime Minister Modi, defence and security cooperation between India and West Asia has deepened substantially. The number of joint exercises between the Army, Navy and Air Force of India and the West Asian countries has increased. India has invited Gulf countries to invest in ‘Make in India’ defence initiatives. Amb. Chinoy mentioned that ISIS networks in India’s neighbourhood are a matter of concern for India. Hence, India is enhancing cooperation in exchanging information relating to terrorist activities and other security challenges to combat threats. He also underlined piracy as a common threat to India and West Asia. For both, maintaining the safety of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) is extremely important. Since 2008, India has consistently deployed a naval ship in the Gulf of Aden. The importance of the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee, Ex Desert Flag, Zayed Talwar, IDEX, NAVDEX and space cooperation were also highlighted.

India-UAE partnership is multifaceted, and high-level exchange of visits signify the importance of the relationship. The UAE President visited India for the G20 Leadership Summit, and PM Modi visited UAE in December 2023 to participate in the COP28 Summit. The UAE is considered India’s special friend and was invited as a Guest Country for India’s G20 Summit. Both countries have convergence of interest on issues such as trade, connectivity, climate, green energy, terrorism and piracy.

The UAE is India’s third largest trading partner, with bilateral trade of around US$ 85 billion. Moreover, both countries signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in February 2022, and bilateral trade has increased by 15 per cent since the CEPA came into force in May 2022. The UAE is the seventh largest investor in India in terms of FDI and the second largest source of LNG and LPG. Remarkably, UAE is India’s second largest export destination, with US$ 31.61 billion in 2022-23. Amb. Chinoy also highlighted India’s connection with the UAE through 3.5 million Indian diaspora working and living in the UAE, contributing to the country’s progress. Notably, in 2022, India received US$ 20 billion from the UAE through diasporic remittances.

The UAE is the first international partner to invest in India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves. Besides, Indian companies have steadily increased their participation in the UAE’s energy sector. Under the mandate of I2U2, the UAE has pledged to invest US$ 2 billion to establish Integrated Food Parks in India.

In his remarks, the head of the NDC UAE delegation Brig. Gen. Staff Pilot Khalifa AlShamsi stated that the NDC UAE broadly covers aspects relating to international relations including military, economic, diplomatic and security as primary domains. He specified that NDC UAE, through its Strategic Security Studies Programme, prepares future military and civilian leaders of the highest calibre. He expressed hope for the future of the India-UAE Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and acknowledged India's support to the UAE during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Q&A Session

Questions relating to MP-IDSA’s research on evolving issues, security challenges for India, I2U2, India’s leadership in Global South and Research and Development (R&D) were asked by the members of the NDC UAE delegation. Amb. Chinoy stated that MP-IDSA engages experts/officials from both defence and civilian categories who are experts in different areas. Scholars of MP-IDSA regularly publish books, Op-eds, commentaries, and research papers in journals. Scholars also visit various places across the country and abroad to present papers at conferences.

On the issue of security challenges for India, Amb. Chinoy spoke about threats emerging from China, Pakistan and disruptions in maritime security. He described challenges relating to maintaining rapid and inclusive economic growth with peace and tranquillity on the periphery. On the issue of India’s leadership potential in Global South, Amb. Chinoy specified that India has already showcased its capacity to be a leader of the Global South by successfully holding the G20 Presidency. The successful conduct of the Voice of Global South Summit at the beginning and end of India’s G20 Presidency has showcased India’s priorities. India’s proposal to include the African Union in the G20 was highly appreciated and was approved by all members, showing the potential of Indian leadership of the Global South. Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) has been widely appreciated in the Global South as a remarkable capacity-building initiative.

With regard to R&D, Amb. Chinoy mentioned that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), under the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, is committed to empowering the nation with advanced defence technologies. With a mission to attain self-reliance in crucial defence technologies and systems, DRDO aims to provide the armed forces with cutting-edge weaponry and equipment aligned with the specific needs of the three Services.

Scholars from MP-IDSA emphasised enhancing collaborative efforts between maritime agencies of India and UAE, considering the adverse impact of climate change is on the rise. Suggestions were also given to deepen the joint counter-terrorism efforts by both countries.

(Report prepared by Mr. Abhishek Yadav, Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA)

Report of Monday Morning Meeting on Myanmar at Crossroads: Three Years of Coup and Civil War February 26, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Mr. Om Prakash Das, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, made a presentation on “Myanmar at Crossroads: Three Years of Coup and Civil War” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 26 February 2024. The session was moderated by Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

As the junta regime completes three years in power since the 2021 coup d’état, Myanmar finds itself embroiled in an increasingly destructive civil war. Although armed resistance has taken shape over the years, the country has experienced a significant surge in violence since October 2023. An unprecedented level of strategic coordination between several armed groups has won the rebels 35 towns since the launch of Operation 1027. The position of the junta becomes increasingly tenuous as the Myanmar military incurs loss of troops and territories. The enforcement of the People’s Military Service Law has led to further chaos among the general populace. Large-scale displacement and pervasive violence have precipitated a humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. Influx of civilians and defectors across the porous India-Myanmar border has necessitated a discussion on the future of the Free Movement Regime.

Detailed Report

The session commenced with opening remarks by Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.). Cmde. Singh provided an overview of the current crisis in Myanmar. Myanmar has been in a state of civil war since the overthrow of the civilian government by the Tatmadaw in 2021. Cmde. Abhay acknowledged 27 October 2023 as an inflection point in the democratic struggle of Myanmar. He observed that while the periphery of Myanmar has always been unstable, the core Bamar region is also beginning to see violence. The spread of violence across large swathes of the country has caused massive loss of human lives on both sides of the conflict.

Mr. Om Prakash Das commenced his presentation with a couple of maps aimed at geographically locating Myanmar within the broader region, as well as visualising the 7 politico-administrative divisions and the ethnic composition of the country. Among the 8 major ethnic groups of Myanmar, Bamar are the largest and most dominant ethnolinguistic community. A map visualising the spread of conflict across the country was also presented. The complex nature of territorial control and integrity in Myanmar is demonstrated by the fact that 40-50 percent of the country is currently controlled by various ethnic communities.

Having rejected the legitimacy of National League for Democracy’s victory in the 2020 general elections, the Burmese military launched a coup d'état less than three months later. The military takeover has since been met with widespread civilian and armed resistance, as well as international condemnation. An estimated 6000 civilian deaths have occurred within the initial 20 months of the coup. Latest reports indicate the detention of more than 26,000 Burmese nationals as political prisoners since the military coup. Burmese resistance at the highest level has taken an organised political form through the establishment of the National Unity Government- Myanmar’s government in exile. The NUG coordinates with the People’s Defence Forces (PDF)- an umbrella term for the various local militias that have emerged since the coup.

Mr. Das noted Operation 1027, an offensive against the junta in the northern Shan state, as a milestone in the anti-Tatmadaw resistance. Operation 1027 is a coordinated armed rebellion by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), comprising of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). 3BHA’s initial areas of influence were limited to Myanmar’s borders with India, China, and Bangladesh. The Arakan Army has a strong hold over the peripheral state of Rakhine. Several other Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) throughout the country have engaged the military in combat since October 2023. The Karenni Nationalities Defence Forces (KNDF) in the Kayah state, for example, launched Operation 1111 in November 2023. An unprecedented level of coordinated military strategy by the hitherto disparate factions has yielded significant victories for the rebels across two-thirds of the country.  Conversely, defeats at the hands of the armed rebels have led to low morale and weakened unit cohesion among the military troops. Over 14000 soldiers of the Myanmar army have defected since the 2021 coup. 4000 soldiers have reneged since the launch of Operation 1027 alone.

There also exists the case of an unfolding humanitarian crisis. The United Nations figures indicate the displacement of close to 2.6 million people within Myanmar. The civil war has also triggered the emigration of over 8 lakh Burmese nationals. Around 60,000 Burmese nationals are estimated to have taken refuge in India.

The junta government is currently contending with escalating casualties and defections amidst an unpopular war, compelling it to contemplate contentious measures such as mandatory military service to address manpower shortages. However, this initiative entails significant political risks, as evidenced by incidents of backlash among young adults in response to enforced mandatory military service. In this scenario, Mr. Das states that the throne of junta is shaking, as the periphery and southern regions are virtually out of control of the military.

The military strongly believes in a unique national narrative of its crucial guardian role. It employs both ideological loyalty and financial incentives to maintain the dedication of its officers. There had been no significant internal dissent that threatens the stability of Myanmar military until the 2021 coup.

Mr. Das also discussed the contradictions within the anti-junta forces. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and PDFs have different visions for the future of Myanmar and could face challenges in power-sharing and moderating their respective ideological positions.

After the coup, all the democratic forces came together and tried to structure their aspirations – including ethnic minorities. They published a new Federal Democracy Charter the main objective of which was the removal of the military dictatorship and abolishment of the 2008 constitution which gave the military a political role in the parliament. This charter deals with the questions about how certain issues need to be approached and highlights legal and political considerations to support interim institutions' constitution-building efforts.

Reflecting on India-Myanmar relations, Mr. Das emphasised on the fact that Myanmar has been an important country for India’s Look East, Act East and Neighbourhood First policies. He highlighted that Myanmar is an important member of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, and that Myanmar is India’s gateway to South-East Asia.

He highlighted India’s investments in various infrastructure projects, including the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Project that provides an alternative route to the significantly important Siliguri Corridor. Due to the civil war, the area from Sittwe to Paletwa (that falls in the Rakhine state) has now been captured by the Arakan Army. And the area between Paletwa to Mizoram border falls under the Chin State, and thus the project has reached a state of stalemate.

India has displayed a balanced approach towards Myanmar’s junta and to the pro-democratic movement, while officially advocating for the restoration of democracy in the country. India has also engaged with the junta, while creating a delicate balance between supporting democracy while maintaining pragmatic ties with the Junta to secure interest.

Concerning China’s role in Myanmar, Mr. Das said that, the latter is important for China to improve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and for China’s long-term Blue Ocean objective. Myanmar also serves as a trading outlet to the Indian Ocean for China’s inland province of Sichuan.

The speaker concluded by saying that the probability of the junta regaining its lost territories is very low. The junta, now in a defensive position, is trying to protect the supply routes. Although international actors may push for a negotiated reset, the democratic forces have shown inclination towards negotiating with the military.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General MP-IDSA, complimented Mr. Om Prakash Das for his presentation on a topical issue. He remarked that the international community has long had great expectations of Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi had moved the country towards greater democratic impulses, the United States wanted to normalise relations, and there existed interest in Myanmar’s economy. The air of optimism lasted five to seven years before the country descended into cyclical chaos. Amb. Chinoy identified two facets to the internal instability: The Junta’s difficulty in pacifying the periphery, and the pervasiveness of the PDFs that are engaged in action and counter-action against the junta. China has long had interests across the border. Amb. Chinoy opined that any kind of land connectivity, within the Kaladan multi modal project, is difficult to attain because of the sectional progress and changing situation on ground. He suggested that there may be merit in bypassing Myanmar through maritime routes if the land corridor is deemed infeasible in the finite future. According to Amb. Chinoy, hardening of borders in the last mile areas should be a priority. Identifying the different types of transgressions across the India-Myanmar border, he argued for centre-state government convergence on the future of the Free Movement Regime (FMR).  Amb. Chinoy invited Dr. Pushpita Das to shed some more light on the FMR and the challenges of fencing the border.

The MP-IDSA scholars posed a wide array of questions ranging from the cultural linkages between India and Myanmar to whether the growing unrest in Myanmar would have a bearing on separatist movements in Northeast India. Reference was made to the displacement of Rohingyas. The prospect of an outreach to the local ethnic groups, similar to the Chinese policy, was also discussed.Mr. Om Prakash Das provided insightful answers to the questions and comments raised by the Director General and the MP-IDSA scholars.

Report prepared by Ms. Aditi Dhaundiyal, Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting on “Antarctica: Indian Endeavours in the Icy Continent” February 19, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Commandant Manorajan Srivastava, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Antarctica: Indian Endeavours in the Icy Continent” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 19 February 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Uttam K. Sinha, Senior Fellow. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

India has long term geo-strategic interests in Antarctica. It has been sending scientific research expeditions continuously since 1981 and has two operational research stations, Maitri and Bharati in Antarctica. India received consultative status in 1983 by joining the Antarctica Treaty. The present scientific engagements however need to be further enhanced. Joint programs and multidisciplinary scientific studies in complex areas such as identification and study of high energy neutrinos originating within our galaxy and beyond, study of sub-glacial lakes and studies related to meteorites need to be encouraged. Exchange visits of Indian scientists to the South Pole and joint studies need to be explored.

Detailed Report

Dr. Uttam K. Sinha began the discussion by reflecting upon the intersection of geopolitical and geo physical aspects of international politics with regard to the relevance of Antarctica. He further explained the genesis of the word Antarctica before handing over the floor to Commandant Manoranjan Srivastava.

Comdt. Srivastava began with the brief physical, geographic and climatic description of the white continent, Antarctica, also called Continent of peace and science. Antarctica, being the fifth largest continent and covering nearly 10% of earth’s land surface, is an important part of the Earth’s ecosystem. It is a reservoir of almost 90% of earth’s freshwater. The fluctuation in climatic conditions in summer and winters is important as it plays a pivotal role in deciding the atmospheric features on the earth. Explaining the physical genesis of Antarctica as a part of Gondwana land, Comdt. Srivastava went ahead to explain the genesis of human conceptualization of the continent. Ancient Greek philosophers were the first to moot the idea of Antarctica. Ant- Artikos meant ‘the land opposite to Artikos’. Captain James Cook was the first navigator to tackle the problem of Antarctica. He crossed Antarctic Circle four times between 1772-1775 which enabled him to make the claim that ‘no man will ever venture further than I have done, and the land which may lie to the south will never be explored.’ The marine wealth which he discovered made voyages imperative in the next century.

Comdt. Srivastava then moved to an interesting ‘race to the pole’ debate where he covered the expeditions of Roald Amundsen and Robert Falcon Scott to Antarctica. He mentioned that the diversity of flora and fauna is quite limited in a sense that only 2% of Antarctica is free of ice. He also spoke about the effect of increased footfall of tourists on the wildlife biodiversity of Antarctica. He further explained the importance of ‘Krill’, an important link in the Antarctica food chain web.

On the issue of territorial claims, he stated that there are seven nations having territorial claims in Antarctica namely, Norway, France, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Chile. In early 20th century, Britain expanded its footprint in Antarctica in the lure of rich whaling resources. France entered the fray in 1924, followed by Norway. The dispute of territorial claims between Britain, Chile and Argentina has also been slated to reach the International Court of Justice but Argentina and Chile rejected it. The Antarctic Treaty 1959 came into force from 23 June 1961 and all the territorial claims, counter-claims and rights were put in legal cold storage. The short and crisp 14 articles of the Treaty laid to rest all contentious issues. However, challenges emerged due to the oil crisis in 1970s as well as the discovery of oil and minerals in Ross area of Antarctica. Antarctica was then hailed as the new Gulf. The Madrid Protocol of 1991, ratified in 1998 prohibits any mineral exploration from the region for next 50 years taking into consideration environmental concerns.

Comdt. Srivastava then spoke about Indian endeavours in Antarctica. He stated that India’s entry into the Antarctic Treaty system was in 1983. First the Indian vessel, with 21 member scientific team, left from the shores of Goa in 1981 to reach Antarctica via Mauritius. The three Indian stations in Antarctica are Dakshin Gangotri (1983), Maitri (1988) and Bharati (2012) with Maitri and Bharati being operational as on date. The Indian Antarctic science program consists of earth sciences, biological sciences, glaciology and environmental sciences etc. Joint programs and multidisciplinary scientific studies, studies on sub-glacial lakes, studies related to meteorites however need to be encouraged further.

Dr. Sinha reflected upon the significance of important personalities like Viceroy Curzon, and also about India’s early engagements in Antarctica.

The floor was opened for questions and comments. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, in his remarks, complimented the clarity and comprehensiveness of the presentation. Amb Chinoy spoke about the geopolitical contestation among the original seven claimants as well as the Treaty’s mandate that explicitly prohibits any such claims. Amidst the claims and counterclaims by major powers including Russia and the United States, Amb. Chinoy asked about the chances of future friction emanating from the geopolitical contestation in the region. Amb. Chinoy further alluded to the dual use features of the Chinese programs in Antarctica. He also asked about the issue of IUU fishing in the Antarctic waters, and its implications.

Comdt. Srivastava while highlighting the prospects of friction in the future with respect to potential claims and counter claims, reflected that the claims and counter claims of the parties have not vanished but are rather put into cold storage till 2048. The increasing demand for minerals, gas and oil may mount pressure on Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty in future. However, any such endeavors will need careful examination as it will do potential damage to the pristine environment and fragile ecosystem of Antarctica. He alluded to Research stations of Russia, Australia and China and various media reports on recent activities. He applauded the Antarctica Treaty system for its efforts to keep the region de-militarized and de-nuclearized. He also emphasized India’s recent endeavours such as support for protecting the Antarctic environment and co-sponsoring European Union’s proposal for designating East Antarctica and the Weddell Sea as Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and Indian Antarctic Act 2022 which extends the jurisdiction of Indian courts to Antarctica.

Report prepared by Mr. Abhishek Verma, Research Analyst, Internal Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting on Election and Opposition Politics in Bangladesh February 12, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik, Research Fellow, South Asia Centre delivered a presentation on “Election and Opposition Politics in Bangladesh” in the weekly Monday Morning Meeting held on 12 February 2024. The meeting was moderated by Dr. Gulbin Sultana, Associate Fellow, South Asia Centre. Scholars of the Institute attended the event.

Executive Summary

The 12th General Parliamentary Election was held in Bangladesh on 7 January 2024. The Awami League has won elections consecutively for the fourth time since 2008 by winning 222 seats in the National Assembly. The current opposition party, the Jatiya Party managed to secure 11 seats. The main opposition party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) boycotted the elections. The BNP has taken a position that there cannot be free and fair election under the incumbent Election Commission of Bangladesh. In this election, voter turnout was about 40 per cent which was considerably low compared to the past elections.

Detailed Report

In her opening remarks, Dr. Gulbin Sultana offered a brief overview of Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections and politics of Bangladesh.

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik started the presentation by elaborating the facts and figures of the 12th Parliamentary Election and opposition politics. She said that the Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina has won the elections consecutively for the fourth time and out of 300 seats they won 222 seats in this election. 28 registered political parties participated in this election, and nearly 2000 candidates contested. Out of 437 independent candidates 382 were from Awami League, and many would believe that they were propped up as dummy candidates to give a semblance of competition. BNP boycotted this election by saying that free and fair election was not possible under the present Election Commission. In 2018, the BNP had contested the election and managed to win only 7 seats. The BNP put forward two preconditions for its participation - resignation of Sheikh Hasina and establishment of a caretaker government.

Further, Dr. Pattanaik said that the two principal political parties, Awami League and BNP, had equal vote share in the past and in Bangladesh, all anti-Awami League forces veer towards the BNP as an alternative. The BNP depended on the Western countries to pressurise the Awami League. It did not have cadres motivated enough to engage in street fights with the ruling party cadres and therefore, the BNP’s stance that it would not allow the election to happen remained merely on paper. After the rally on 28th November 2023 and subsequent violence many of the top BNP leaders were arrested and many went into hiding. BNP cadres were demoralised as there was no one to lead them from the front. BNP did not make any attempt to engage with India as they had done prior to 2018 elections, according to Ms. Pattanaik.  

The Jamaat-e-Islami, an influential religious party in Bangladesh, also decided not to participate in this election. It had participated in the 2018 election as part of the broader alliance of opposition led by the BNP. Jamaat-e-Islami has been deregistered as a party in Bangladesh because its constitution militates against the Constitution of the country which is secular. However, JeI is not in a hurry to capture political power as they are interested in Islamisation of the society at large.

Dr. Pattanaik also discussed India's relations with Bangladesh. During the G20 summit, India facilitated the meeting between the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and President Biden. Those groups who are opposed to Hasina in Bangladesh carried out an ‘India Out’ campaign in the social media. However, this campaign did not get traction as majority of the essential goods are imported from India. She attributed the growing anti-Indianism to the prevailing perception in Bangladesh that India is responsible for Hasina’s continuation in power in Bangladesh.

She also held that the ruling Awami League had empowered the paramilitary force of Bangladesh, the Ansar Bahini, giving it power to arrest and detain prior to the election. The US had imposed visa restriction on anyone – individual and entities – who were seen as obstructing free and fair election in Bangladesh.

Questions and Comments

After the presentation ended, the moderator opened the floor for questions and comments. There was a question about whether Bangladesh’s policies facilitated collaboration between the private industries of the two countries. There was also a question on the role of China and how the people in Bangladesh perceived its role and the relationship between the political parties and China. Another question from the floor was on how long Awami League could endure in power and if there was any possibility of Awami League toning down its anti-BNP stance. There was also a query about the people of Bangladesh’s  views about the role of Japan, Russia, US and South Korea. Dr. Pattanaik responded to the comments and questions raised by the scholars of MP-IDSA.

Report prepared by Mr. Shailendra, Intern, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Report of Monday Morning Meeting on Gaza War: The Risk of Regional Escalation January 08, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Adil Rasheed, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, made a presentation on “Gaza War: The Risk of Regional Escalation” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 January 2024. Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA, moderated the session. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The Gaza War which has completed three months has no end in sight with the Israeli endgame not being clear to the other state and non-state actors. Israel has vowed to continue its offensive on Gaza until it achieves its three main objectives of completely dismantling Hamas, rescuing the hostages and creating deterrence. However, the conflict has spread into the region with other players such as the Hezbollah of Lebanon and Houthis of Yemen, both backed by Iran fighting against Israel. This has escalated the fear of the war spreading into the entire region which may see direct or indirect intervention by the US. The entire West Asian region is once again witnessing turmoil with no easy solutions in sight.

Detailed Report

Dr. Saraswat set the framework for the discussion by stating that the Israel-Hamas War has rapidly escalated across the region with external actors such as the Hezbollah playing an active role. She noted that Iran insisted that the Hamas attacks were entirely Palestinian actions but Iran-backed forces, especially Hezbollah, have opened new fronts against Israel. According to Dr. Saraswat, the escalation has been controlled as none of the actors want to fight a full-fledged war but there always remains the possibility of miscalculation and further escalation. She then spoke about the op-ed written by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett who suggested that Israel should directly take on Iran instead of the smaller regional non-state actors and spoke of a new Cold War between Iran and its proxies being referred to as the ‘evil empire’ and Israel and its allies as comprising the ‘democratic camp’ . She briefly mentioned the twin blasts by ISIS in Kerman. Dr. Saraswat pointed out how Israel is emboldened by regional circumstances, given it has not faced any concerted pushback from the Arab countries. She mentioned that the Israeli endgame does not appear very clear and there is a possibility of further entanglement with Iran.

Dr. Adil Rasheed began his presentation with the mention of the sudden Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023, which took place just a day after the 50th anniversary of the Yom-Kippur War. He says that three months into the war there is no clear indication of how it is going to play out, with no end in sight. Dr. Rashid mentioned the statement made by British journalist Julian Borger that the Middle East is moving towards a regional war since 7 October. He talked about the recent threats issued by Hezbollah, their increase in bombings, the manner in which attacks have started happening in Iran and the assassinations of leaders including the Deputy Chief of Hamas, Saleh al-Arouri, in Beirut. He pointed out that the region is definitely moving towards a much wider escalation with the Israel Defence Minister mentioning that Israel is fighting a seven-front war with Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran. There are other less conventional fronts that Israel might have to face in the coming times like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague where it might find any ruling on accusations of Palestinian genocide problematic. Another disturbing front is that of the global jihadist forces such as Al Qaeda and ISIS issuing threats and targeting Jewish, Israeli, and even American targets. There are tensions within the Netanyahu dispensation as well. The Cabinet was recently shuffled and the Foreign Minister had to resign.

Dr. Rasheed mentioned that the situation in the region three months ago, prior to the Hamas attacks was completely different. There were talks of regional integration including a possible Saudi-Israel rapprochement and economic alliances such as the I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), which all went into thin air after the war started. This displayed the pace at which geopolitics changes in West Asia.

Dr. Rasheed mentioned that 7 October was the bloodiest single day in modern Israeli history. Hamas launched several incursions from Gaza from land and air. Hamas militants breached high-tech border fences, disabled Israel’s robotic machine guns and penetrated deep into Israeli territories without facing much resistance. Rockets were fired into far away Israeli cities. There was large-scale massacre of civilians, women were raped and children beheaded but there was a paucity of investigations into the reports of beheadings and rapes. The Hamas attack was a 9/11 moment for Israel but it did not get as much global attention. He talked about Israel’s failure to raise the matter at the United Nations or the ICJ as Israel focused more on seeking revenge. The global audience saw Israel’s bombardment of Gaza which undermined the graveness of the Hamas attacks. Israel was unaware of the preparation and the level of sophistication achieved by Hamas in carrying out such an attack. Israeli and other global agencies were completely surprised by the sudden attacks. Hamas was never considered a well trained militia like Hezbollah and ISIS.

Dr. Rasheed listed out three reasons for which Hamas undertook such a massive operation. Firstly, it was to avenge the settler actions of Israel in the West Bank. Secondly, it was also due to Israel’s alleged violations into the al-Aqsa mosque. Lastly, the normalisation in Arab-Israel ties was allegedly threatening the Palestinian cause. Hamas was looking to capture more hostages to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners. Dr. Rasheed said that even though Israel’s actions might be questioned on moral grounds, one could understand their cause of origin. Israel cannot survive in a hostile neighbourhood unless it maintains unquestionable military superiority over its adversaries at all times. It cannot be judged as per the standards of western secular democracy as it was founded to be the only safe homeland for the Jews existing within a volatile region. Thus, Israel has to create deterrence and instill fear among its adversaries. In such a situation many far right leaders made unfortunate statements which were often blown out of proportion.

Dr. Rasheed noted that Israel has resorted to massive bombardment whose intensity out rivalled that of the Ukraine-Russia War, Syrian War and even the Second World War. He then detailed the 27 October ground offensive launched by Israel inside Gaza, followed by brief humanitarian pauses for supply of aid. He mentioned how the residents of northern Gaza had to migrate towards the south, and as the Israeli offensive kept moving south, some people started returning back to their homes in the north of Gaza. He spoke about how the withdrawal of the USS Gerald Ford from the region allowed Hezbollah to carry out more strikes.

Dr. Rasheed ended his presentation by speaking about the possible future strategy of Israel, where Benjamin Netanyahu wants to provoke Iran and the US to join the war, so that Israel gets more time to focus exclusively on driving Hamas out of Gaza. However, he also cautioned that Iran and Hezbollah would not be very keen on fighting a full-fledged war because of their domestic economic constraints.

Dr. Saraswat noted that West Asia should not be seen in exceptionalist terms as prone to violence and instability. Instead sources of insecurity, such as external penetration and authoritarianism need to be part of any analysis. She noted that the lack of a solution for the Palestinian issue hinders any talk of sustainable peace in the region. She also mentioned the lack of security dialogue among regional states. Dr. Rasheed added that the Hamas attacks had put a big dent on Israeli and Western security domination and had encouraged other jihadist outfits to carry out such attacks. The floor was then opened for questions and comments.

Questions and Comments

A number of queries and comments were made regarding Israel’s ultimate strategy and objectives, its cartographic stability in comparison to India, the matrix of comparison of Israel’s attacks with other wars, the role of media, the stand of the Jewish diaspora, the role of the international organisations and their resolutions, and the threat posed by Hezbollah and other regional actors.

Dr. Adil Rasheed responded to all the comments and questions. With regard to the international organisations, he noted that Israel does not bother much about it but it is the US under the Democrats which is worried about its image taking a hit domestically and globally. He said that apart from the influential Jewish diaspora, it is the significant Evangelical Christian population of the US which influences its policies towards Israel. He said that due to the increasing role of media, public opinion will gradually make more difference in influencing policies. On the way forward for Israel, he said that a two-state or a one-state solution may not be feasible. Israel may put in charge a non-Hamas led Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. He also cautioned that things may even go out of control at any moment of time. He also made a brief mention of the challenges faced by Egypt due to the conflict.

Report  prepared by Mr. Farhan Khan, Intern, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Russian Delegation Visit to MP-IDSA | Prospects of India-Russia Cooperation in the Arctic February 07, 2024 Other

A five-member delegation from Russian academia and universities dealing with projects related to the Arctic and International Studies in Petrozavodsk, St. Petersburg and Murmansk visited MP-IDSA on 7 February 2024 for an interaction with scholars at the Institute on the theme ‘Prospects of India-Russia Cooperation in the Arctic’. The Russian delegation included Dr. Anton S. Kovshov, Director and Ms. Ekaterina V. Serova, Deputy Director, the Arctic Center, Petrozavodsk State University, Petrozavodsk. Dr. Mikhail V. Vasyokha, Head of the Department of Marine Oil and Gas Engineering and Dr. Zhanna V. Vasilyeva, Head of the Department of Ecology and Technosphere Safety, were from Murmansk Arctic University, Murmansk. The fifth member of the delegation was Dr. Kirill A. Likhachev, Associate Professor of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia. The interaction was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, the Director General, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy formally welcomed the Russian Delegation to MP-IDSA. He highlighted the strengths of India-Russia bilateral relations and acknowledged that there exists strong cooperation between the two countries despite global geopolitical uncertainties. DG mentioned that the bilateral trade between India and Russia has surpassed the US$50 billion mark in 2023. He emphasised that these high trade figures are mainly a result of India’s increased imports of Russian hydrocarbons and there is a need to diversify our trade to new areas. DG highlighted the emerging importance of the Arctic region from environmental, economic and strategic perspectives. He mentioned that the limited cooperation in the working groups of the Arctic Council without Russia, which accounts for more than 50 per cent of the coastal extent in the region, remains a cause of concern. DG further mentioned that India supports the development of Russia’s Northern Sea Route and its Far East regions. He highlighted Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Act Far East Policy’ and emphasised that India in 2019 allocated a US$1 billion line of credit for the development of Russia’s Far East. DG acknowledged Russia’s decision to train Indian seafarers for Polar Regions and highlighted that Indian seafarers globally contribute 10 per cent of manpower for global shipping. He mentioned that as shipping activity in the NSR develops it offers further prospects for Indian seafarers in Arctic waters. Post these opening remarks, DG welcomed the presentations from the Russian delegation.

Dr. Anton S. Kovshov, Director, Arctic Center, Petrozavodsk State University, Petrozavodsk thanked Ambassador Chinoy for inviting them all to MP-IDSA. He acknowledged all the points made by Ambassador Chinoy and emphasised the need for more people-to-people cooperation between the two countries. Dr. Anton highlighted that the Arctic presents immense opportunities for both Russia and India and at the Arctic Centre, at Petrozavodsk State University their research remains focused on understanding multiple aspects of the Arctic. Dr. Anton highlighted that their Institute conducts multiple activities on Arctic Science, geo-economics, climate change, potential resources in the Arctic and other related aspects via seminars, conferences and publications in both Russian and English language. Dr. Anton highlighted that they are interested in better understanding India’s interests in the Arctic and welcomed the future participation of scholars from MP-IDSA in these. Dr. Anton then invited his colleague Ms. Ekaterina V. Serova to elaborate further on this very aspect.

Ms. Ekaterina V. Serova, in the proceeding slides of the presentation, highlighted the geographical importance of Petrozavodsk State University in the Republic of Karelia from the Arctic perspective. Ms. Serova highlighted India-Russia's increasing annual trade figures and mentioned that the Karelia region accounts for a significant portion of this trade. She then emphasised they are further exploring opportunities for undertaking research about the Indian market to promote Russian products produced by the Arctic SMEs. Ms. Serova mentioned that India can simultaneously seek opportunities for exploring the Russian Arctic region to promote the products of Indian SMEs. Ms. Serova mentioned that their Institute focuses on undertaking research on various Arctic-related projects and she highlighted funding opportunities for Indian researchers. She mentioned that the Gorchakov Fund holds two grant competitions per year and Indian researchers could consider applying to those. Ms. Serova mentioned that their Institute, ‘The Arctic Centre’ organised two major events i.e. ‘The Arctic Business School in Karelia’ and “The Expert Seminar on Science Diplomacy in the Arctic under Global Changes’ in the past that received huge participation. Lastly, Ms. Serova highlighted their Institute's major upcoming event ‘The Arctic: Our Global Neighbourhood’, scheduled for May 2024. She welcomed Indian participation in it via physical or online mode.

Dr. Kirill A. Likhachev made the second presentation and highlighted the opportunities for Indian scholars at Saint Petersburg State University. Dr Likhachev in his presentation mentioned that Saint Petersburg State University is celebrating its 300th anniversary in 2024 whereas the School of International Relations (SIR) is marking its 30th anniversary in February 2024. Dr. Likhachev highlighted that SIR in the past has hosted significant events focusing on International Relations, particularly the South Asia region where scholars from India and different parts of the world have participated in large numbers. He also highlighted the ‘Asian Dialogue Program’ of Saint Petersburg State University and mentioned that Dr. Ashok K. Behuria and Dr. Rajorshi Roy from MP-IDSA have participated in the same. Dr. Likhachev mentioned that they are hosting the 2nd Congress of International Relations Researchers, from April 25-27, 2024 and he welcomed participation from MP-IDSA scholars. Lastly, Dr. Likhachev emphasised though that there remain some complex geopolitical challenges between India and China, there is a need to restart trilateral dialogue between Russia-India-China, at least at scholars and expert levels. He concluded his presentation by highlighting that there are many existing issues of geopolitical concern in South Asia and Russia where both Indian and Russian scholars can undertake collective research in due course.

The third and final presentation was made by Dr. Mikhail Vasekha and Dr. Zhanna Vasileva jointly. Dr. Mikhail Vasekha started his presentation by highlighting that Murmansk remains the most important port city when it comes to the Arctic. He mentioned that Murmansk plays an important role in Russia’s Arctic connectivity and the city remains engaged in mining, fish processing and marine research. Dr. Vasekha emphasised that their research at Murmansk Arctic University focuses on Marine technologies, Arctic bioresources, Environmental technologies and technosphere safety, Arctic mineral and hydrocarbon resources and offshore logistics. He also mentioned that despite geopolitical challenges, they to an extent, have continued to maintain their existing cooperation with the universities of Scandinavian countries. Apart from this, he mentioned that the Murmansk Arctic University holds Summer and Winter schools in which MP-IDSA can consider participating. Dr. Vasekha lastly gave an overview of some of the ongoing and planned projects at Murmansk Arctic University that included the Development of Arctic Logistics', the Northern Sea Route and the Expansion of the Possibilities of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). He then invited his colleague Dr. Zhanna Vasileva to give a detailed account of some of the ongoing scientific projects on the Arctic at their university.

Dr. Zhanna Vasileva highlighted that her area of research mainly focuses on studying the scientific aspects of the Arctic. She mentioned that some of their ongoing projects include ‘Monitoring and assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from ships in the waters of the NSR’, ‘Assessment and forecast of the environmental impact of maritime transport and port development in the Barents Region’, ‘Low-Carbon Marine Logistics and Cross-Border Carbon Regulation in the Arctic’, ‘Development of solutions for the elimination of emergency oil spills and technologies for the restoration of natural environments in the arctic shelf’ and a project involving ‘the study of marine sediments (MS) of the arctic seas’.

In her presentation, Dr. Vasileva gave a detailed account of the various scientific methodologies that they are employing in the study of these projects. She also highlighted some of the possible results that are expected from these ongoing projects. Dr. Vasileva mentioned that they are open to collaboration and partnerships from Indian scientific communities, universities and research Institutes that are involved or interested in undertaking research in these domains. Lastly, Dr. Vasileva highlighted that the Murmansk Arctic University in collaboration with Russia’s ‘Roscosmos’ is opening a Space Information Center in 2024 at Murmansk Arctic University. She mentioned that this would be instrumental in the accumulation and processing of AIS information and Earth sensing data, for integration with additional databases on navigation (databases of ports and Administration of the Northern Sea Route) and security (the base of the Ministry of Emergency Situations) in the waters of the Northern Sea Route.

Both Dr. Mikhail Vasekha and Dr. Zhanna Vasileva made their presentations mainly in Russian Language which were simultaneously translated in English by Ms. Ekaterina V. Serova.   

Questions and Comments

The Director General, Amb. Chinoy complimented the members of the Russian delegation for their detailed presentations. He highlighted that ‘Arctic Tourism’ could become an important area for enhancing India-Russia bilateral cooperation. DG mentioned that there is immense potential in this regard where the Russian side could consider exploring opportunities in the Indian tourism industry. He mentioned that in the post-COVID pandemic recovery years, India’s outbound tourism has witnessed a significant increase.

Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha mentioned that India, despite being a distant country, remains well-informed regarding the geopolitical and environmental transitions in the Arctic. He also highlighted that India in 2022 came up with its first Arctic Policy document that presents a detailed account of India’s interests in the region.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy highlighted that India-Russia cooperation on any aspect in the Arctic could enhance bilateral cooperation between both countries. He asked the delegation if they could elaborate a bit on ‘How the developments in the Russian Far East have contributed to more attraction of Asian states interests towards the Arctic?’ He also asked the delegation to comment on China's increasing presence in the Russian Arctic.

Dr. Swasti Rao also asked the delegation about the increasing China-Russia cooperation in the Arctic. She further asked the delegation to comment on China’s increasing role in various energy projects in the Arctic.

Dr. Jason asked the delegation about the possibilities of expanding the business of Indian Film Industry in the Russian Arctic. He highlighted that the Arctic offers perfect locations for undertaking cinematographic shoots that could open business opportunities for Indian Bollywood Industry.

Ms. Anandita asked the delegation whether the Russian side is looking for possibilities of expanding Russian businesses via SMEs to Indian markets or whether this could also be explored the other way around.

All the members of the Russian delegation gave detailed remarks to all the comments raised. The interaction ended with a formal note of thanks and an exchange of books and mementoes from both sides.

Report prepared by Mr. Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting Report: The Evolving Dynamics in India-Philippines Defence and Security Relations February 05, 2024 1030 to 1300 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Temjenmeren Ao, Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, made a presentation on “The Evolving Dynamics in India-Philippines Defence and Security Relations” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 5 February 2024. The session was moderated by Ms. Shruti Pandalai, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The Republic of the Philippines constitutes an important part of India’s outreach to the Southeast Asian nations since the implementation of the Look East Policy. As India and Philippines complete 75 years of diplomatic ties, new avenues for cooperation have emerged in the current era of geopolitical flux. The developmental trajectory of the two Asian states as well as legitimate maritime security concerns have contributed to the intensification of bilateral relations. The India-Philippines defence and security relationship includes diverse areas of cooperation from joint naval exercises, to capacity building initiatives, regular exchange of views through various dialogue mechanisms and trade in high-tech military hardware. The Marcos Jr. administration seeks to engage with partners such as Japan, India, and France, among others, to counter Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea. Therefore, there exists vast potential for further engagement especially in the domain of maritime security and defence industry cooperation.

Detailed Report

The session commenced with opening remarks by Ms. Shruti Pandalai on the recent developments in the India-Philippines defence relationship. Ms. Pandalai made reference to the sale of US $374.96 million worth BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, expected to be delivered to Philippines by March 2024; extension of a line of credit for defence sales; and the expected posting of India’s defence attaché to Manila. As part of India’s ongoing Long Range Operational Deployment (LROD), INS Kadmatt, a domestically designed and produced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) corvette, was deployed in Manila in December 2023. The ASW corvette took part in a joint exercise with the Philippine Navy’s offshore partol vessel (OPV) BRP Ramon Alcaraz. This intensification of ties was contrasted with a deterioration in Philippines-China relations amid the looming threat of accidental escalation in the South China Sea. Ms. Pandalai noted that several experts are sceptical regarding the ability of the under-equipped Philippine Coast Guard and Navy to hold their own against the PRC’s maritime might. However, the U.S. defence treaty obligations to the Philippines bolster the Philippine defence in the South China Sea, thereby increasing the stakes for the PRC.

Dr. Ao commenced his presentation with a brief outline of the India-Philippines relationship, given the completion of 75 years of diplomatic ties between the two Asian nations. He elucidated that the two states formally established diplomatic relations on 26 November 1949. The geopolitical context of the Cold War dynamics, with a pro-US Philippines and a non-aligned India, hindered the strengthening of the relationship. India’s increased engagement with Southeast Asia post-Cold War, through the formulation of its Look East Policy, worked towards establishment of unique and diverse relationships within the region.

According to Dr. Ao, India’s concerns vis-à-vis the evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific, as manifest in initiatives such as SAGAR and IPOI, and the Act East Policy, remain limited to maintaining a favourable balance of power in the region. The Philippines approach to the region is routed through ASEAN’s 2019 policy document “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific” (AOIP). Peace, stability, and predictability are therefore the priorities of Philippines.  The emerging convergences from the geopolitical and geo-economic flux in the region have led to recalibration of relations between external actors (such as India, USA, and China) and Southeast Asian states like the Republic of Philippines. 

Noting the upward trajectory in the India-Philippines bilateral defence relations Dr. Ao highlighted the importance of the BrahMos deal in furthering defence and security ties. Defence relations, although relatively substantive, had hitherto remained rather basic.  The roadmap for defence ties was laid at the first India-Philippines Security Dialogue in 2004, held in Manila. Subsequently, an Agreement for Defence Cooperation was signed in 2006- elevating ties to the strategic level. Establishment of a Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) followed, with its first meeting in 2012. The contemporary security relationship between the two is driven by the common pursuit of maritime security, which has gained prominence, with increasing navy-to-navy and coastguard visits and exercises being undertaken.

Dr. Ao argued that the strain in China’s relationship with the Philippines, given the former’s aggression in the South China Sea, has worked to India’s favour. He explored the deterioration in Philippines-China ties through a comparison of the present and previous political dispensation’s handling of Chinese activity in the West Philippine Sea. The Rodrigo Duterte Government had sought a rapprochement with the PRC in the hope of attracting economic investments from the Asian giant amid tensions emanating from the 2016 Arbitral Award. President Marcos Jr., on the contrary, has been a vocal supporter of the 2016 ruling even prior to assuming office. Although there was speculation that Marcos would adopt a balanced approach, increased Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea has caused friction between the Philippines Government and the PRC. Dr. Ao noted that the joint statement issued at the 5th India-Philippines Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation (2023), is significant as India for the first time explicitly endorsed the 2016 Arbitral Award ruling in favour of Manila. India’s change of stance from a neutral position on the issue, to exhibiting a more outspoken and proactive position on the South China Sea toda, stems not only from ongoing tension with China in the LAC but is also rooted in its need to preserve peace and stability in the region.

Increasing Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea has also led to increased US-Philippines defence cooperation. The United States was granted access to four more military bases in the Philippines in 2023 and both sides have increased their joint military exercises.  The two states also held their second joint patrol earlier this year.  Being strategic allies, the US has repeatedly stated that any attack on Philippines, in the South China Sea would invoke the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty and therefore obligate Washington to defend Manila militarily. Dr. Ao also made mention of Japan’s Reciprocal Access Agreement negotiations with the Government of Philippines.

Dr. Temjenmeren Ao concluded that the defence and security relationship between India and Philippines is on an upward trajectory. He argued that the BrahMos deal is significant for India’s ties with Philippines and the larger region. In his assessment, it could lead to exports of other indigenous military hardware to Manila, and possibly diversify the market to include other Southeast Asian nations.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General MP-IDSA, complimented Dr. Ao for his presentation on a topical issue. He remarked on the role of the Philippines as a lynchpin of America’s projected power in the Indo-Pacific. According to him, the question that arises is therefore of whether the United States can continue to project said power in the region without the support of the Philippines.  Amb. Chinoy also discussed the strain in the bilateral relationship between China and the Philippines amid encroachments by Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea. He stated that the US ambiguity and the inconsistent approach of the Philippines towards China warrants a discussion on whether the Philippines can launch a sustainable opposition to the PRC. The Director General further questioned whether the Marcos-Duterte discord will have ramifications that could work in China’s favour. With reference to the evolving India-Philippines relationship, Amb. Chinoy stated that cooperation between the two nations is a given in the current geopolitical context. He suggested counter-terrorism as an avenue of security cooperation given the recent spate of terror attacks in the Philippines. 

The MP-IDSA scholars posed a wide array of questions ranging from possible linkages between the Maoist movements in India and the Philippines, to the shipment of BrahMos batteries. Reference was made to prevalence of piracy and drug smuggling routes in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea. The possibility of policy change in a post-Marcos era was discussed. 

Dr. Temjenmeren Ao provided insightful answers to the questions and comments raised by the Director General and the MP-IDSA scholars. 

Report prepared by Ms. Aditi Dhaundiyal, Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, MP-IDSA.

Report of Monday Morning Meeting on Pakistan Factor In India-Turkiye Relations January 29, 2024 Monday Morning Meeting

Mr. Abhishek Yadav, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on “Pakistan Factor in India-Turkiye Relations” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 January 2024. Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

India-Turkiye relations witnessed divergence during the Cold War but evolved with growing trade, reaching US$ 13.8 billion in 2022-23. While the bilateral trade and investment is growing in multiple sectors, the Kashmir issue remains a persistent political challenge. Turkiye has been supporting Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Additionally, defence collaboration is a key element in Pakistan-Turkiye relations, driven by factors like pan-Islamism and neo-Ottomanism, among others. There is a need for course correction from Turkiye to unlock bilateral potential between both G20 economies- India and Turkiye.

Detailed Report

Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan introduced the Speaker and delivered introductory remarks. He then invited the Speaker to make his presentation.

Providing a historical overview of India-Turkiye relations, Mr. Yadav highlighted that diplomatic relations between India and Turkiye were formally established in 1948, which got further strengthened through the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in December 1951, that explicitly articulated the principle of “perpetual peace and friendship” between the two nations. However, Cold War geopolitics led India and Turkiye to adopt different paths as India pursued a policy of non-alignment while Turkiye became a member of the West-led military alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Nevertheless, the relationship evolved over the decades, as evidenced by agreements signed between the two countries on areas like trade, taxation, tourism and customs cooperation.

Citing relevant statistics, the Speaker underscored that bilateral trade between India and Turkiye has witnessed impressive growth in recent years, rising from US$ 7.2 billion in 2017-18 to over US$ 13.8 billion in 2022-23. Mr. Yadav provided concrete examples and highlighted that while Indian companies have invested in Turkish automobile, pharmaceutical and IT sectors, Turkish companies have invested in Indian infrastructure and engineering industries, illustrating deepening economic cooperation.

The Speaker noted that high-level bilateral visits are an important indicator of the priority accorded by both nations to their relationship. In this context, he referred to Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to India in April-May 2017, when both countries signed key agreements on culture, training of diplomats, visa regulations, telecommunication and media tie-ups – underscoring the multi-sectoral focus. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Turkish President Erdogan reviewed the relationship at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Samarkand in September 2022 and the 18th G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023, and noted the increase in economic linkages and potential for further enhancement across sectors. Mr. Yadav also highlighted India’s prompt supply of humanitarian assistance under Operation Dost following Turkiye’s devastating earthquakes in February 2023 as a marker of bilateral cooperation and solidarity expressed by India.

Mr. Yadav spoke at length about the issues on which the two countries have differing viewpoints. He pointed out that Turkiye has consistently echoed Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir issue. Turkish leaders’ remarks on Kashmir have also sparked diplomatic tensions especially after the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, given India’s firm stand that Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is an integral and inalienable part of India. Mr. Yadav highlighted that multilateral platforms like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) had witnessed coordinated efforts by Turkiye and Pakistan to internationalise the Kashmir matter also through its OIC Contact Group on J&K. Trilateral partnerships between Pakistan, Turkiye and Azerbaijan have also emerged, which is demonstrated in joint military exercises and alignment on issues like Kashmir. The Speaker emphasised that Kashmir remains a principal point of divergence that has strained political relations.

According to the Speaker, defence cooperation is a key element catalysing the Pakistan-Turkiye strategic relationship. He enumerated various facets of cooperation in defence, including the purchase of Turkish naval vessels, helicopters and armed drones by Pakistan, assistance by Turkiye to upgrade Pakistani submarines and fighter aircraft, and the conduct of joint exercises and training. Mr. Yadav highlighted that the expanding defence collaboration has introduced an additional variable in the triangular dynamic between India, Pakistan and Turkiye.

Analysing the factors shaping Turkiye’s foreign policy orientation towards Pakistan, the Speaker identified elements like pan-Islamism, Neo-Ottoman ambitions to reclaim Turkiye’s historical glory and geopoliticalinfluence, and the strategic relevance of partnerships with countries like Pakistan on issues ranging from Kashmir to defence technology as key motivations. He pointed out that Islamic solidarity, historical legacy and contemporary policy priorities make Pakistan a coveted geopolitical partner for Turkiye. 

In conclusion, the Speaker observed that while India and Turkiye, as prominent G20 economies, have promising potential for cooperation across diverse sectors, Turkiye’s alignment with Pakistan on India’s internal affairs like Jammu and Kashmir has introduced certain complexities in bilateral ties. Mr. Yadav opined that notwithstanding the volume of trade, Turkiye’s partnership with Pakistan is driven by a multifaceted interplay of factors encompassing history, religious affinities, realpolitik considerations and global ideological postures. A course correction by Turkiye on Kashmir would likely contribute to a more balanced and constructive environment, fostering stronger ties between India and Turkiye. In summation, the Speaker highlighted that pragmatic diplomacy focused on mutual understanding and identification of shared interests would be imperative for India and Turkiye to fully harness the potential of their bilateral relations given the geopolitical intricacies at play.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy highlighted the historical and contemporary factors shaping bilateral relations between India and Turkiye. He mentioned the role of Indian troops, including Sikhs, Gurkhas, Muslims and Hindus, as part of the British force during the Gallipoli campaign. He outlined Indian support in the 1920s to Turkiye’s War of Independence, which led to the formation of the Turkish Republic. Mahatma Gandhi himself took a stand against the injustices inflicted on Turkiye at the end of World War I. Amb. Chinoy remarked that Turkiye has been raising the Kashmir issue and trying to seek a dominant leadership position in the OIC. He provided the Indian Government’s perspective on Cyprus and touched upon the dynamics of Turkish drones.

Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow, West Asia Centre, highlighted the geo-economics and geopolitics of economic corridors and subsequent Indian and Turkish response. Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, South Asia Centre, emphasised the rise of Erdogan’s leadership in Turkiye and noted surge in business-to-business relations between India and Turkiye. He also touched upon the significance of Turkish drones, Turkiye’s position on J&K and Turkiye’s soft power outreach in Pakistan, as evidenced by Turkish TV drama Ertugrul. Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre, mentioned about Turkiye’s unique geographical and geopolitical position and its distinct way of leveraging gains from both the West and Russia. He suggested that India will have to shed its classical approach to engage with Turkiye.

After the Q&A session, the Chair gave his closing remarks and ended the meeting.

The Report was prepared by Ms. Gayathri Pramod Panamoottil, Intern, West Asia Centre.

Interaction with Dr. Andreas Østhagen, from Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), Oslo, Norway January 19, 2024 Other

MP-IDSA organised an interaction with Dr. Andreas Østhagen, Senior Researcher, Arctic, Ocean and Russia programme from Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), Oslo, Norway on Friday, 19 January 2024. The theme of discussion was 'Emerging Geopolitics in the Arctic'. The Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy chaired the Session.

Executive Summary

The session covered issues on the geopolitics of the Arctic, highlighting Norway's role. The Speaker explored various aspects, including resources, routes, and climate change, and discussed emerging players. Emphasis was placed on governance through the Law of the Sea and the Arctic Council, with a mention of India's role in the region.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed Dr. Andreas Østhagen and Ms. Filippa Braarud, Second Secretary from the Royal Norwegian Embassy, New Delhi. Amb. Chinoy highlighted that India's connection with the Arctic region dates back to 1920 with the signing of the Spitsbergen Treaty.  He emphasised that India remains concerned regarding the geopolitical developments in the Arctic that have significantly impacted existing cooperation between states. He further mentioned that though the western states have terminated the existing cooperation with Russia, it is important to note that Russia accounts for more than 50 percent of the coastal extent in the region. He mentioned that despite strong western pressures India maintains strong bilateral relations with Russia. He further highlighted that India’s interest in the Arctic remains primarily scientific, unlike China that has larger economic and geostrategic objectives in the region. Ambassador Chinoy pointed out that India’s interests in the Arctic are in tandem with its partners and acknowledged Norway’s role in strengthening India’s scientific research in the Arctic. He mentioned that the Arctic offers multiple opportunities in the near future, for both India and Norway to deepen their bilateral cooperation in the region. 

Dr. Østhagen highlighted that the primary purpose of his visit is to establish connections for future collaboration and gain a deeper understanding of India's viewpoints and interests in the Arctic. He acknowledged India's growing role in the region and on the global stage as a significant power. Examining regional complexities and nuances, he pointed out that the Arctic extends beyond commonly considered factors like climate change, shipping routes, resources, and territory. He mentioned that though climate change and scientific research remain major drivers of states’ engagements in the region, there are several common myths about the Arctic that need to be noted. Dr. Østhagen  mentioned that there are no territorial issues between states in the Arctic and the only issues existing are with regard to extended maritime claims of states in the region. He pointed out that the resources estimates in the Arctic are overexaggerated and extraction of hydrocarbons and other form of minerals from the region is difficult and expensive. Similarly, he mentioned that despite Russia’s emphasis on the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a future shipping route, there will remain several navigational challenges.

In the second part of his presentation Dr. Østhagen highlighted China’s increasing role in the Arctic, and asserted that this remains a cause of concerns for all seven Arctic states. He highlighted that these concerns are further elevated by the Russia-China emerging partnership. He further stressed that Russia’s dependency on China is significantly increasing, that further adds to western countries concerns. He talked about the US-Canada maritime disputes in the region and highlighted the recent US unilateral action of claiming extended continental shelf claims in the Bering Sea and central Arctic Ocean.  Dr. Østhagen mentioned that there are no  maritime issues between the US and Russia in the Arctic. He highlighted that the maritime borders between both these states remain demarcated by the 1990 US-Soviet Agreement.

In the final part of his presentation, Dr. Østhagen gave an overview of the Arctic Council. He mentioned that though the Arctic Council is not the ‘only’ existing mechanism for Arctic governance, Norway’s core concern under its chairship is to keep the Arctic Council alive and going. He highlighted Russia’s nuclear capabilities in the North and mentioned that Russia is undertaking large scale military exercises in the region. Dr. Østhagen emphasised that with the Russia-China emerging threat perception in the Bering Sea, US is taking advanced measures to protect its interests in the region.

Amb. Sujan Chinoy acknowledged China’s emerging geo-economic and geo-strategic interest in the Arctic. He emphasised that as India’s interests in the Polar Regions increase, there is a serious need to focus on developing India’s independent infrastructure capabilities in these regions.

Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Non- Traditional Security Centre underscored the need to look beyond Arctic politics and recognise the importance of scientific exploration. He asked a question about the future role that Norway intends to play in the Arctic Council under its chairship.

Questions and Comments

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst enquired about the implications of the United States unilateral action for making extended continental claims in the Arctic. He questioned the validity of these claims and highlighted that US despite not ratifying UNCLOS has made these claims, that could have counter responses from Russia. He also asked a question regarding Norway’s parliamentary decision on opening up of the deep seabed mining in the Arctic and its implications from environmental perspectives.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, enquired about the Arctic States response to transboundary resource management. 

Commandant M. Srivastav, Research Fellow, discussed the prospects of opening up of the  Central Passage in the Arctic. He raised questions regarding the rationale behind creating new shipping routes and its impact on climate change. Additionally, he inquired about Norway's view on China's expanding interest, particularly observed in its second Belt and Road Forum in 2019. He further asked about China’s emerging collaboration with Russia on the North Sea Route (NSR) within China's Silk Road initiative.

Dr. Swasti Rao, Associate Fellow, inquired about Norway's approach to addressing tensions in the Arctic while holding the Arctic Chair. She sought insights into Norway's perception, highlighting the need to sustain cooperation with Russia for the Council's success, alongside considerations of the region's securitisation.

Dr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, raised inquiries regarding the geopolitical complexities affecting countries like Kazakhstan, especially in their attempts to diversify trade routes.

Ms. Filippa Braarud, Second Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy, New Delhi, stressed the importance of maintaining Arctic stability. She highlighted the extensive scientific cooperation with India, particularly focusing on the research operations in the Arctic. Ms. Braarud also mentioned the common challenges with regard to the coastal management of Norway and India. Lastly, she emphasised the significance of policy formulation through scientific cooperation in the region.

Dr. Østhagen responded to the comments and questions and stated that the Arctic Council will endure amid tensions. He highlighted Russia's shift toward China due to diversification of Arctic interests. He highlighted that Norway is adopting a pragmatic approach in balancing relations with Russia and NATO. He mentioned that the recent US claim on the extended continental shelf raises concerns. He further elaborated that the collective Western presence driven by the US and UK, is expected to increase military activity in the Arctic in response to Russia's remilitarisation. He concluded by stating that the Arctic experiences short-term tensions but holds long-term strategic investment potential.

The report has been prepared by Ms. Simran Rathore, Research Intern, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Event Report on The Prospect Foundation Delegation Visit to MP-IDSA January 18, 2024 Round Table

On 18 January 2024, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised an interactive session with The Prospect Foundation, Taiwan. The delegation from The Prospect Foundation was led by Dr. I-Chung Lai, President, The Prospect Foundation and the session was chaired by DG, MP-IDSA, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy.  The discussion was followed by Q&A.

Detailed Report

The session began with opening remarks from DG, MP-IDSA, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy. He observed that it is striking that Taiwan has gone into coalition politics and opined that this arrangement is likely to raise certain challenges in the legislature. Enquiring about Taiwanese perception about the election he invited Dr. I-Chung Lai to express his views on a range of issues including resurgence of Kuomintang (KMT) Party in the recent elections, Democratic People’s Party (DPP) and KMT’s present attitude towards the 1992 consensus, One China policy and potential reunification with China. Amb. Chinoy also asked Dr. Lai about Taiwanese understanding of the United States (US)’ commitment towards Taiwan’s defence in the light of present tensions, the unacceptable means of reunification for Taiwan, probable Japanese position in an event of crisis in Taiwan Straits and reversal of recognition of Taiwan by Nauru.  

Thanking Amb. Chinoy for his observations, Dr. I-Chung Lai expressed that the delegation visit reflected India’s importance in Taiwan’s strategy and Taipei’s intention to convey to New Delhi, its strategic outlook and plans for India-Taiwan ties post the elections.

Elaborating on Taiwan election results he contented that while William Lai Ching-te received forty percent of the votes, it did not mean that the other sixty percent opposed him. The Chinese interpretation that William Lai Ching-te’s position on China-Taiwan ties represents a minority view is incorrect. He emphasised that the election results do not reflect how Taiwanese feel about China-Taiwan relations. Commenting on the 1992 consensus, which is favoured by China, Dr. Lai informed that majority of the Taiwanese consider the consensus as a thing of past, especially after President Tsai Ing-wen declared in a public address in 2019 that Taiwan never accepted the 1992 consensus. He contended that future cross strait politics will have to take the general public view into consideration as Taiwan is a democracy.

With regard to US policy towards Taiwan, Dr. Lai, citing the Taiwan Relations Act and US’ Six Assurances to Taiwan, asserted that US does not recognise Taiwan as part of PRC. On Nauru’s breaking off of diplomatic ties, he opined that it demonstrated continuation of PRC’s coercion politics vis-à-vis Taiwan. He observed that Taiwan’s national strength and international standing will not be affected due to Nauru’s actions and that Taiwan will not engage in chequebook diplomacy to gain diplomatic recognition. Dr. Lai observed that the Beijing Government is unlikely to change its policy towards Taiwan, recognising the new political reality. However, due to China’s own internal economic troubles, interest in stabilising ties with the US and lack of military capability to launch invasion on Taiwan, the possibility of military conflict with Taiwan at present is low. Touching briefly on Japan’s position on Taiwan contingency, Dr. Lai opined that although Tokyo will be compelled to act due to alliance commitment with the US and threats perceived to its own security, the extent of Japan’s involvement in active combat scenario is uncertain. He concluded by stating that developing relations with powerful and friendly countries remains top priority for Taiwan.

Following, Dr. Lai’s presentation, Amb. Chinoy queried whether DPP still subscribed to the notion of ‘One China’ and whether Taiwan continues to engage in developmental activities with the countries who sever diplomatic ties with Taipei.

Responding to these questions, Dr. Lai informed that the idea of ‘One China’ was once temporarily entertained to facilitate cooperation between Republic of China (ROC) and PRC. However, PRC’s interpretation of ‘One China’ policy is unacceptable to Taiwan. With regard to Taiwan-Nauru ties, he informed that the future of bilateral cooperation depends on Nauru’s future reaction because there is precedent in Taiwan to continue programme assistance to countries who broke off diplomatic ties.

Finally, Amb. Chinoy enquired about Chinese goals in eschewing military tensions of the type seen in the aftermath of Nancy Pelosi’s visit. Dr. Lai affirmed that improving diplomatic ties with the US is one of the major goals. Also, as the repercussions to trade which happened due to the military blockade was serious, Beijing and other major powers like the US and Japan are reluctant to let escalate tensions to that level.

Mr. Fei Fan Lin, member of the delegation, concurred with Dr. Lai’s observations about lack of public support for the 1992 consensus in Taiwan. He informed that the Taiwanese consider ROC, Taiwan to be an independent sovereign and perceive no need to declare independence again.

Following the exchange, the Chair then opened the floor for question-and-answer session.

Q&A Session

A question from the Indian side concerned the issue of national identity in Taiwan, and the possibility of a ‘reconciliation of hearts’ between the Chinese and Taiwanese people. To this question, Dr. Lai answered by explaining that due to the internationalisation of the cross-Strait issue, other countries, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Australia, not to mention the United States, have a voice in the resolution of any conflict, and the cross- Strait dispute is no longer a binary one between opposing regimes. He also noted that China’s perception of Taiwan is that it is a vehicle to contain China with the collaboration of the United States. Mr. Lin also added to the answer to the above question by noting that President Tsai Ing-Wen had been careful during her tenure to cultivate a stance of equivocating Taiwan with the ROC. He noted that this was a stance the majority of Taiwanese people support and approve of. In response to another question on the impact of a US-China thaw on Taiwan in the coming four years, Dr. Lai noted that the cross-Strait issue is no longer dependent on the US-China-Taiwan trilateral, but has become truly internationalised. As evidence, he offered the new recognitions afforded to the importance of Taiwan by the leaders of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and the Philippines, as well as by democracies in Europe.

Another question from the Indian side concerned the movements of the youth vote in the recently-concluded general election, and whether the return of the DPP to power indicated support among the young for independence. Mr. Lin provided the answer to this question, informing the audience that the DPP had always embraced support from the youth. However, the reason the current election has thrown up surprising results (election of the DPP on forty percent vote share, emergence of the TPP as a third force) is because voters were in general fatigued by establishment parties such as the DPP and KMT. They were not concerned by national security issues, but instead voted on bread-and-butter issues such as housing prices and costs of living. Mr. Lin argued that the TPP, despite the high rates of support it received, does not have a positive policy platform, and revealed that the DPP is well aware of the need to bring back young voters to the DPP.

Members of the Indian side also inquired about whether China had succeeded in the general election in using disinformation and economic coercion to swing votes. By way of an answer, the Taiwanese side presented a mixed picture. In the field of economic coercion they were willing to concede that there was some limited effect of the suspension of tariff benefits accruing to trade with Taiwan under the ECFA signed with China, but noted that the impact was limited as the share of exports to China from Taiwan are declining as the New Southbound Policy diversified destinations for Taiwanese goods, with marked increases noted in trade with the US, Japan, ROK and Europe. India was held out by the Taiwanese side as a new frontier where trade opportunities could be diversified in future. Disinformation, however, has been successful in the assessment by the Taiwanese side, with Chinese-origin propaganda deepening divides in society that have only partially been filled.

In terms of future concerns, the Taiwanese side flagged two issues in particular: worries that the KMT, which has majorities in both the national legislature and municipalities, would pursue independent (party-level) negotiations with the CPC; and the legal hurdles standing in the way of repealing or renegotiating important economic agreements with the mainland to counter economic coercion.

A final query from the Indian side concerned the prospects for US-Taiwan defence cooperation in light of the recent election results. In his answer to the question, Dr. Lai asserted that the impact on US-Taiwan defence ties would become clearer when the identity of the incoming speaker and vice-speaker of the central legislature (the Legislative Yuan) becomes clear. However, he believed, existing projects such as Taiwan’s indigenous submarine programme would continue irrespective of the party in charge.

Before concluding, Amb. Chinoy took the opportunity to ask a set of questions to the Taiwanese side. Firstly, he inquired about the impact of Donald Trump returning to power in the US in 2024. Dr. Lai answered briefly that Taiwan enjoys bipartisan consensus in the US, and that the previous Trump administration’s record on Taiwan was very good, with several initiatives carried forward by the Biden administration. As such, there was no reason for concern.

Secondly, Amb. Chinoy inquired as to the Taiwanese side’s assessment of the US response should China attempt to occupy only the outlying islands such as Jinmen or Matsu. Dr. Lai said that whereas the Pescadores Islands are covered under the US-Taiwan Mutual Defence Treaty and the Taiwan Relations Act, Quemoy and Matsu are grey areas. In any case, he noted that an occupation of these islands would be sure to meet an armed response from Taiwan. However, the US response, if any, would be contingent on circumstances.

Finally, Amb. Chinoy inquired whether there had been any risk assessment of the possibility that Xi Jinping’s China Dream 2049 project would be incomplete without reunification with Taiwan, with the implication that he would take action before that date to ensure reunification. Dr. Lai answered that discussions in Taiwan on the China Dream are divided into two camps, one arguing that the China Dream must be completed before reunification is to be attempted, whereas the other argues that reunification is a necessary precondition to the China Dream. However, the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on the Chinese economy has put a dent in Xi Jinping’s purported legitimacy, which is predicated on continuous economic growth. Dr. Lai held that the China Dream is Xi’s personal project, not a “sacred manifesto” on the lines of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s policies, which were party lines followed by all members of the government. As such, should Xi leave the stage in China, there is no guarantee that his successor would follow through on it.

After the conclusion of the question-and-answer session, the Chair declared an end to the meeting.

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