The world is undergoing transformational changes. The ‘engine’ of manufacturing and growth shifted from the West to the East, primarily to East Asia in the last century. China’s opening up and reform policy led it to emerge as a primary engine of economic growth and the world’s largest trading nation. In recent years, growth and prosperity have spread to wider regions from East Asia to South East Asia, South Asia, and to the dynamic coast of Africa. The construct of Asia-Pacific as a sphere of economic dynamism in the last century has given way to the notion of Indo-Pacific, which has gained currency due to its inclusive nature, more reflective of the aspirations of people in a wider arc. Asia is a key plank of the Indo-Pacific and reflects the region’s aspiration for growth and prosperity. The future of the Asian continent is not contingent on the rise of any single great power – rather, on multiple civilisation and emerging powers that are striving to play a larger global role.
The global pandemic revealed the stresses and risks in critical supply chains. It has further fused trade and investment flows to geostrategic competition. The US and major European countries have long played a key role in Asia’s trade and economic rise as well as stability. The G20 is a forum most representative of the engagement between the US, Europe and developing countries not just in Asia but also in Africa and Latin America.
The “Asian age” or the “Asian century” in the era of Indo-Pacific is being redefined as a broader concept signalling the inevitable rise of different parts of Asia, which are home to some of the world’s most ancient civilizations. For the past two decades, if not more, Asia has re-emerged to shape global dynamics by involving many stakeholders from the extended neighbourhood of Africa, West Asia, Eurasia as well as the great powers that have a long-standing economic and security presence in different parts of Asia. According to McKinsey, Asia is expected to generate more than 50 per cent of the world’s GDP, and could account for nearly 40 per cent of global consumption, ushering in the ‘’Asian age’.
The onset of the ‘Asian Century’ —Asianization of world politics —has renewed focus on the continent and the promise it holds for the emerging global political order as Asia remains the main growth engine of the world. After all, Asia is today home to the world’s second, third and fifth-largest economies, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the power balance has shifted to Asia. There is, in fact, a repositioning of Asia with China and India emerging as dominant actors in global politics. Japan, as the world’s second-largest developed economy, is a potent power that is taking increasingly robust positions on defence and security issues. ASEAN too has emerged as one of the most dynamic regions in global economic and security paradigms. China’s exponential economic growth has aided its geopolitical rise. India has also witnessed sustained economic growth for the last three decades and is poised for an even higher rate of growth. Overall, post-Covid-19 Asia is on the path of economic recovery and Asia’s average growth stands at 6.9% according to the Asian Development Bank.
The continent’s heterogeneity in terms of its diverse culture, skilled manpower and availability of cheap labour, has made it a manufacturing hub and demonstrated its economic success. Economic growth has also brought in its own challenges in terms of ensuring macroeconomic stability, and sustainable growth as trade and investment issues are getting linked to uncertain global supply chains. As the Indo-Pacific countries strive to achieve their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is a growing emphasis on climate adaptation initiatives and green growth powered by green energy. However, the technologies required for energy transition are expensive and the Global South needs to find a way to make the transition sustainable with help from the developed nations.
An emerging Asia would prioritise important agendas such as access to drinking water, securing health, preserving bio-diversity, water security and water conservation and exploring opportunities in the blue economy. As climate change impacts agriculture and consequently food security, countries in the Indo-Pacific region would be compelled to focus on sustainable consumption alongside green transition.
In order to advance the SDGs in Asia, the existing digital divide needs to be bridged through uninterrupted, resilient and decentralized digital commons. China has taken a lead in offering ‘green infrastructure’ in its programme ‘infrastructure for tomorrow’ through its Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. It has an ambitious target of providing ‘cumulative climate finance approvals of USD50 billion by 2030’.Moreover, competing for investment and market access the rising economies of Asia, i.e., India, China and Japan, are keen to invest in mega infrastructural projects as a part of their geo-economic power projection. At the same time, Asian economies have been vying for greater connectivity in a bid to integrate economies of the region. China’s ambitious and aggressive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has challenged the status quo. Connectivity has become a core facet of both competition and cooperation. While originally centred on a Eurasian connectivity construct, the BRI has pushed its geographical boundaries to incorporate the Arctic, Africa, South East Asia and Latin America as well as parts of Oceania. It has now run into challenges of debt-traps and negative perceptions. Meanwhile, the US, EU and Japan are offering more transparent and sustainable alternatives to finance the infrastructure and connectivity deficit in the Indo-Pacific.
Asian infrastructure needs are estimated to be between US$ 22.6 trillion and US$ 26 trillion until 2030. The BRI is China’s attempt to take advantage of the existing gap in investment in the infrastructure and connectivity sectors thereby accruing strategic gains. This has led Asian economies like Japan to expand their investment in connectivity projects via the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI). India, through its concept of Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) has joined Japan in building alternatives to the BRI. The US too has launched multilateral ventures like the Blue Dot Network (BDN) and the Group of Seven (G7)-linked connectivity ventures, the Build Back Better World, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Partners in the Blue Pacific with like-minded states. With the launch of its Global Gateway in 2021, the European Union (EU) has emerged as the latest player entering the infrastructure and connectivity race.
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated wide-ranging discussions among major powers on supply chain diversification and the challenges of relying on a single source of supply. As a result, Australia, Japan, and India launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) to diversify supply chains and build sustainable networks that are resistant to future shocks. Maritime trading nations such as India, Australia and Japan remain best placed to take the SCRI forward, along with the cooperation of the US and Europe. There also exists immense potential for these countries to work with new partners in Africa and ASEAN region. Meanwhile, China has reintroduced Health Silk Road as part of its vaccine diplomacy. As a manufacturing hub of pharmaceuticals, India has provided equitable access to vaccines to countries around the world as part of the QUAD Vaccine partnership.
A multilateral institutional framework for global digital governance architecture is needed with Asian countries as stakeholders. However, Asia’s representation in the current multilateral organisations continues to be inadequate compared to its growing significance in world politics, It is pertinent to underline the need to transform global institutions like the United Nations by creating a new framework and reforming the existing multilateral fora to reflect the current international reality.
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), “by 2030, the prevalence of extreme poverty in the region [read Asia] is expected to drop below 1% [and the same time] about 25% of the population is projected to achieve at least middle-class status. With the shift of economic power to Asia, Asian concerns need to be reflected in the global financial order. The dominant international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, etc., need to be sensitive to the requirements of the developing nations that are keen to meet the SDGs.
One of the ways developing economies have attempted to address their concerns is to focus on minilateralism. Minilateralism has shaped new cohorts of like-minded nations to focus on micro issues that are considered important for the participating countries. Smaller groupings with similar objectives have emerged as the new and preferred mediums of strategic cooperation to advance national interests. Minilateralism focuses more on shared values and convergent interests. Such cooperation, including at the regional level, is likely to reshape the post-pandemic geopolitical order.
Multilateralism on the other hand would serve the interests of the Asian countries. This would call for the reordering of other UN-affiliated institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Health Organisation (WHO), and International Labour Organization (ILO) to reflect the essential character of the multipolar global order representing diverse interests. In addition, the reform of the international financial institutions in order to better provide finance for climate change adaptation and mitigation, infrastructure development and investments in the social sector would no doubt help the developing countries in Asia to meet the rising aspirations of their people as well as contribute responsibly to the global efforts to save the planet.
India has been a strong votary of UN reforms for many years. Speaking at the United Nations, Foreign Minister, Dr. S.Jaishankar said, “We not only need to increase stakeholdership but also enhance the effectiveness and credibility of multilateralism in the eyes of the international community and in the eyes of global public opinion. If this is to happen, member states from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Small Island Developing States should have credible and continuing representation in the Security Council. Decisions about their future can no longer be taken without their participation.” As of now, a few veto-wielding countries in the Security Council have exercised disproportionate control over the global agenda. This has not served the interest of an equitable and level playing field for all. The current composition of the Council reflects as Dr.Jaishankar stated, “the inequities and inadequacies of the way the world currently functions”. The undemocratic structure of current multilateral organisations that privileges only a few countries who want to control global political order at the cost of the aspirations of the majority of the countries have given rise to ‘mini-laterals’ that reflect the diverse interests, which the current global structure is unable to address. India has, on numerous occasions, emphasised the need to have an honest conversation on the reform of various multilateral institutions created 75 years ago and has expressed its disappointment over the lack of progress in regard to Security Council reforms. It is also imperative that there should be policy coordination among various multilateral groupings without which it will be difficult to cater to the needs of developing and underdeveloped nations in a cohesive manner.
On 1 December 2022, India has assumed the Presidency of the G20 which represents around 85% of the global GDP, over 75% of the worldwide trade, and about two-thirds of the world’s population. It has emphasized "One Earth, One Family, One Future” in the spirit of its ancient philosophy of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”. As the Chairperson of the grouping, India will champion the cause of the Global South and reforms. As a member of groupings such as BRICS, ASEAN, CICA, SCO, Quad, IBSA and CELAC, India would centre its efforts on ‘reformed multilateralism’ as a part of its endeavour to transform global institutions to suit the changing international power configuration in the context of the rise of the Global South.
Asia is now increasingly situated in the unfolding paradigms of the Indo-Pacific region. It is clear that regional power politics in Asia as well as their interplay with external powers will be a critical factor in determining the future of the region. In an integrated world, Asian security issues impact on the wider Indo-Pacific, and vice versa. Keeping these developments in context, the 21st Asian Security Conference aims to seek answers to the following questions:
- Why are reforms of multilateral institutions important? Two major developments are transforming the multilateral system. The first is the emergence of a number of key states as influential actors in the global political system. The second is a trend towards multi-polarity that is gaining momentum.
- In the global power transition, how is Asia situated in the era of the Indo-Pacific? What role can India play in this evolving paradigm?
- How are Asian powers responding to the New Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)? What will be the impact of SCRI on the evolving geo-economics of Asia?
- Will cooperation on non-traditional issues such as climate adaptability and energy transition strengthen multilateral actions? Can widely agreed-on general rules be formulated to cooperate on managing the global commons and in the provision of global public goods?
- What level of policy coordination is required within the complex of global institutions—such as the WHO, WTO, and the ILO—and which of these institutions should and can be reformed substantially?
- How will Bretton Woods's global financial institutions adapt to the rise of Asia and alternative sources of finance for infrastructure and connectivity?
- What would be the role of technology in bridging the digital divide? How to evolve a framework that will help in structuring an uninterrupted and resilient ‘digital commons’ and make technology affordable and accessible?
- What mechanisms can like-minded countries in Asia and the G20 devise that will serve as solutions to the threats of an impending recession, high inflation, and interrupted supply chains?
The Conference may be divided into four academic sessions over two days. Each Session may be of two hours duration and may accommodate 4-5 papers keeping the broad theme in mind.
