France began its military operation in Mali on January 11, 2013. The imminent threat of terrorists belonging to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) taking over Bamako forced the interim President of Mali to ask the French to intervene. Under the UN Security Council Resolution 2071 passed on October 12, 2012, an ECOWAS led force was to be formed with the help of Western partners notably United States, France and European Union. Later, UN Resolution 2085 created the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to help fight the terrorist threat in the north of Mali.1 However, the setting up of such a force was taking time and the terrorists were quickly gaining ground. Once the terrorists had captured Konna (700 kilometre from Bamako), it was evident that they would quickly move towards the capital. This made the French act with speed and initiate Operation Serval as it was called from January 12, 2013.
The objectives of the intervention were manifold. Firstly, the initial aim of French military operation was to protect Bamako from falling to the terrorists forces and halting the terrorist offensive.2 Secondly, the operation aimed at targeting rear bases of terrorists deep in the north of Mali in order to push them out of Mali and destroy their capacity to launch an offensive. Thirdly, the operations aimed at retaking towns occupied by terrorists subsequently to be secured by ECOWAS forces.3 Fourthly, the French military mission was aimed at maintaining the territorial integrity of Mali.4 And lastly, it had a much broader aim of fighting terrorism in Sahel region.5 So how did the French fair in their mission?
The French were more or less successful in achieving the first three objectives quite effectively. It is beyond doubt that without French intervention Bamako would have succumbed to jihadist forces. The alacrity with which the French responded in Mali had a severe impact on the conflict. The terrorists were not prepared for a swift French response and superior French forces were able to push terrorists back to northern Mali. As the terrorist offensive halted and Bamako was secured, ECOWAS forces joined the operations. The French forces, together with a 6000-strong Chadian force, were able to wrest the important cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao from terrorists hands, with ECOWAS forces left to secure these towns. However, the latter two French military objectives of securing territorial integrity of Mali and fighting regional terrorism have only been partially fulfilled.
Malian territorial integrity not a French priority
The French military aim was to protect the territorial integrity of Malian state that was threatened by terrorists belonging to AQIM and MUJAO. The other group that threatens Mali’s territorial integrity is the Tuareg separatist group Tuareg Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA). The French have no wish to get involved in protracted conflict by getting involved with an issue that is internal to Malian polity. Although France has supported talks between Malian government and MNLA, its military never aimed to mediate conflict between Malian government and Tuareg separatists by protecting the former against the latter. In fact, the MNLA had supported French military operations to drive out AQIM and MUJAO fighters from northern Mali. There is a growing feeling in Mali that the French will use the Tuareg separatists to fight the Islamists if the need arises.6 Therefore, the French are not trusted mediators in the conflict between the Malian state and the MNLA. France wanted to conduct swift and effective operations and quickly hand over the peacekeeping activities to the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). The swiftness with which the United Nation’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) took over operations in Mali was due to French eagerness to hand over the peacekeeping operations to the UN and get out the theatre of action once the terrorists had been contained.7
The MINUSMA with its 8,321 military personnel has primary responsibility of protecting northern Mali and extending State authority.8 Yet, there seems to be limited success as Tuareg rebels are still able to challenge the weak state authority and the weak Malian military is not able to control Tuareg strongholds in the north. In May 2014, the Tuaregs launched a major offensive as it retook the town of Kidal from Malian military and later extended control over the towns of Anefis, Aguelhok, Tessalit, Menaka, Ansongo, Anderamboukane and Lere.9 Hence it seems that MINUSMA is not present in northern Mali and is largely focussed on maintaining security in southern Mali. Many countries participating in MINUSMA are not willing to post their troops in the north due to the fear that they may be targeted by terrorists of the AQIM and affiliated groups.10 This underscores the point that only a strong and professional Malian military can protect Malian territorial integrity. The training of Malian military is being conducted by European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali. EUTM began in February 2014 and is going to last till May 2016. With such a long time period, there is a possibility that the EUTM would be able to deliver a very effective training program.
The Tuareg question needs to be settled by Malians themselves in order to preserve their territorial integrity. The Tuareg represent only one tenth of the 16 million population of Mali and hence do not possess numerical strength to pose an existential threat to the Malian state.11 Moreover, MNLA which drove the 2012 rebellion calling for separate state of Azawad does not represent the mainstream Tuareg perspective.12 Tuareg groups are themselves divided into three categories; those who support secular MNLA and the cause of Azawad state, those that are close to Islamist Ansar Dine and have pan-regional agenda and those that support the status quo.13 Groups like the Arab Movement of Azawad do not support armed rebellion against government and want to work closely with Malian the state for betterment of north. In any case, many in northern Mali favour closer integration with the south as the north lacks resources for development.14
Apart from Mali, Tuaregs are also present in neighbouring countries of Niger, Libya and Algeria, although they do not form a majority in any of these countries.15 These countries have a stake in ensuring that Tuaregs and the Malian state make peace. Although currently the state of Azawad only encompasses northern Mali, a maximalist interpretation of Azawad would mean some parts of Niger, Algeria and Libya.16 Hence Tuareg separatism might spill over across the borders. In the past, neighbours like Libya under Qaddafi, had mediated Tuareg conflicts by investing in the north, giving incentives to Tuaregs to join the Islamic Legion and arbitrating conflicts between Tuaregs and Malian state.17 Qaddafi’s fall ruptured the economic and political fabric in the region that kept Tuaregs in check. Algeria which has also in past mediated conflicts between the Tuaregs and the Malian state, is now stepping up its efforts to bring both conflicting parties to the negotiating table. It hosted a peace conference with the Malian government and the Tuareg rebels on July 16, 2014 at Algiers.18
The Tuareg problem is nothing but a problem of nomadic and pastoralist communities of northern Mali not being able to integrate in the modern economy. Before its decline in the 17th century due to the advent of sea trade, northern Mali was an important trading hub in trans-Saharan trade. Currently, it faces huge economic problems compared to southern Mali which thrives on agriculture and mining. While Mali is very poor country, Tuareg dominated areas of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal have poverty rates of 77 per cent, 78.7 per cent and 92 per cent respectively.19 This explains why Tuaregs have rebelled four times since independence against the Malian state.20 The regional partners, neighbouring countries, international donors and Malian government need to work towards long-term settlement of Tuareg separatism by socio-economic integration of Tuaregs within the Malian society.
Fighting regional terrorism: from Mali to the Sahel
Let us assess the objective of fighting terrorism. Within Mali, the simultaneous French air attacks on the terrorist rear bases deep in northern Mali severely impeded terrorist capacity to launch attacks in Mali.21 In broader terms, the French were able to seriously destroy the capacity of AQIM and MUJAO to launch an offensive in Mali. These groups continue to launch terrorist attacks within Mali but do not have the wherewithal to launch a military offensive for territorial gains in Mali.22 There are around 1000 French troops still stationed in Mali for counter insurgency operations. However, the French were only able to scatter terrorists away from Mali, dispersing them into the Sahel region.23 The French offensive has driven terrorists into southern Libya and northern Niger, much closer to the Mediterranean and this poses greater threat to European energy infrastructure in Algeria, Niger and Libya.24 For instance France has significant economic interest in the Sahel, especially Niger. French mine third of the uranium from the uranium mines located in Niger.25 Around 80 per cent of French electricity is generated from nuclear energy.26 Hence supplies of uranium from Niger are very essential for French power sector. So the French attention has now shifted from Mali to wider Sahel region in order to fight terrorism. After ending Operation Serval, France has launched a counter terrorism operation encompassing the Sahel region. Operation Barkhan, as it has been named, will be headquartered in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena.27 Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad will be joining the French in this operation.28 An additional 2000 French troops will be joining this operation along with 1000 already present in Mali.
The French are not the only ones involved in securing Sahel region. The United States has been assisting and backing French military operations in Sahel. The United States had assisted the French in the Mali operations by providing air refuelling facility.29 The United States has established small bases in Central African Republic, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo in order to assist Ugandan forces pursuing Lords’ Resistance Army. The United States and French forces share facilities at Djibouti, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.30 The French Combined Air Operations in Chad has a small United States liaison detachment.31 During the visit to Washington, D.C. in January 2014, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian had termed US military’s partnership with France in Africa as “indispensable”.32 France perceives the security of the Sahel region as containment of risk emanating from chaos in Libya.33 United States also seems to support this view having seen its embassy attacked in Benghazi. Therefore, it seems that both France and United States have common interest in securing Sahel against terrorist threat.
Containment of the terror threat in Sahel secures Europe, particularly its Southern parts; hence France has an interest in securing the region. However, France will not try to address the deep rooted political and socio-economic factors that are at the core of the Malian conflict as well as conflicts in other parts of Sahel. Here local, national and regional organisations would have to take a lead and not look towards north of Mediterranean for assistance.
1. The Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was converted to United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25, 2013 under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2100.
2. François Heisbourg (2013), “A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,
55(2), p. 11.
7. Simone Hayson (2014), “After the French intervention: what role for ECOWAS and the AU?”, Security and
Humanitarian Crises in Mali: The role of the regional organisations, HPG Working Paper, pp. 9-10.
11. François Heisbourg (2013), “A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,
55(2), p. 11.
12. Richard Reeve, “Security in the Sahel: Part I – Stabilising Mali in 2013-14”, Global Security Briefing, Oxford Research
Group, January 29, 2014, at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/
Security%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Part%201%20Januray%202014.pdf
15. Simone Hayson (2014), “From rebellion to foreign intervention: intersecting humanitarian and security dimensions”,
Security and Humanitarian Crises in Mali: The role of the regional organisations, HPG Working Paper, pp.4-5.
17. Islamic Legion was a Libyan-sponsored pan-Arab paramilitary force created by Colonel Qaddafi. It was part of his
dream to create a pan-Islamic state of Sahel. The legion consisted mostly of immigrants from poor countries of Sahel
region
24. Richard Reeve, “Security in the Sahel: Part II- Militarisation of the Sahel”, Global Security Briefing, Oxford Research
Group, February 5, 2014, at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/
Security%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Part%202%20February%202014_0.pdf
29. Richard Reeve, “Security in the Sahel: Part II- Militarisation of the Sahel”, Global Security Briefing, Oxford Research
Group, February 5, 2014, at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/
Security%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Part%202%20February%202014_0.pdf
The Limits of French Military Intervention in Mali
More from the author
Objective of French military intervention in Mali
France began its military operation in Mali on January 11, 2013. The imminent threat of terrorists belonging to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) taking over Bamako forced the interim President of Mali to ask the French to intervene. Under the UN Security Council Resolution 2071 passed on October 12, 2012, an ECOWAS led force was to be formed with the help of Western partners notably United States, France and European Union. Later, UN Resolution 2085 created the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to help fight the terrorist threat in the north of Mali.1 However, the setting up of such a force was taking time and the terrorists were quickly gaining ground. Once the terrorists had captured Konna (700 kilometre from Bamako), it was evident that they would quickly move towards the capital. This made the French act with speed and initiate Operation Serval as it was called from January 12, 2013.
The objectives of the intervention were manifold. Firstly, the initial aim of French military operation was to protect Bamako from falling to the terrorists forces and halting the terrorist offensive.2 Secondly, the operation aimed at targeting rear bases of terrorists deep in the north of Mali in order to push them out of Mali and destroy their capacity to launch an offensive. Thirdly, the operations aimed at retaking towns occupied by terrorists subsequently to be secured by ECOWAS forces.3 Fourthly, the French military mission was aimed at maintaining the territorial integrity of Mali.4 And lastly, it had a much broader aim of fighting terrorism in Sahel region.5 So how did the French fair in their mission?
The French were more or less successful in achieving the first three objectives quite effectively. It is beyond doubt that without French intervention Bamako would have succumbed to jihadist forces. The alacrity with which the French responded in Mali had a severe impact on the conflict. The terrorists were not prepared for a swift French response and superior French forces were able to push terrorists back to northern Mali. As the terrorist offensive halted and Bamako was secured, ECOWAS forces joined the operations. The French forces, together with a 6000-strong Chadian force, were able to wrest the important cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao from terrorists hands, with ECOWAS forces left to secure these towns. However, the latter two French military objectives of securing territorial integrity of Mali and fighting regional terrorism have only been partially fulfilled.
Malian territorial integrity not a French priority
The French military aim was to protect the territorial integrity of Malian state that was threatened by terrorists belonging to AQIM and MUJAO. The other group that threatens Mali’s territorial integrity is the Tuareg separatist group Tuareg Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA). The French have no wish to get involved in protracted conflict by getting involved with an issue that is internal to Malian polity. Although France has supported talks between Malian government and MNLA, its military never aimed to mediate conflict between Malian government and Tuareg separatists by protecting the former against the latter. In fact, the MNLA had supported French military operations to drive out AQIM and MUJAO fighters from northern Mali. There is a growing feeling in Mali that the French will use the Tuareg separatists to fight the Islamists if the need arises.6 Therefore, the French are not trusted mediators in the conflict between the Malian state and the MNLA. France wanted to conduct swift and effective operations and quickly hand over the peacekeeping activities to the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). The swiftness with which the United Nation’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) took over operations in Mali was due to French eagerness to hand over the peacekeeping operations to the UN and get out the theatre of action once the terrorists had been contained.7
The MINUSMA with its 8,321 military personnel has primary responsibility of protecting northern Mali and extending State authority.8 Yet, there seems to be limited success as Tuareg rebels are still able to challenge the weak state authority and the weak Malian military is not able to control Tuareg strongholds in the north. In May 2014, the Tuaregs launched a major offensive as it retook the town of Kidal from Malian military and later extended control over the towns of Anefis, Aguelhok, Tessalit, Menaka, Ansongo, Anderamboukane and Lere.9 Hence it seems that MINUSMA is not present in northern Mali and is largely focussed on maintaining security in southern Mali. Many countries participating in MINUSMA are not willing to post their troops in the north due to the fear that they may be targeted by terrorists of the AQIM and affiliated groups.10 This underscores the point that only a strong and professional Malian military can protect Malian territorial integrity. The training of Malian military is being conducted by European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali. EUTM began in February 2014 and is going to last till May 2016. With such a long time period, there is a possibility that the EUTM would be able to deliver a very effective training program.
The Tuareg question needs to be settled by Malians themselves in order to preserve their territorial integrity. The Tuareg represent only one tenth of the 16 million population of Mali and hence do not possess numerical strength to pose an existential threat to the Malian state.11 Moreover, MNLA which drove the 2012 rebellion calling for separate state of Azawad does not represent the mainstream Tuareg perspective.12 Tuareg groups are themselves divided into three categories; those who support secular MNLA and the cause of Azawad state, those that are close to Islamist Ansar Dine and have pan-regional agenda and those that support the status quo.13 Groups like the Arab Movement of Azawad do not support armed rebellion against government and want to work closely with Malian the state for betterment of north. In any case, many in northern Mali favour closer integration with the south as the north lacks resources for development.14
Apart from Mali, Tuaregs are also present in neighbouring countries of Niger, Libya and Algeria, although they do not form a majority in any of these countries.15 These countries have a stake in ensuring that Tuaregs and the Malian state make peace. Although currently the state of Azawad only encompasses northern Mali, a maximalist interpretation of Azawad would mean some parts of Niger, Algeria and Libya.16 Hence Tuareg separatism might spill over across the borders. In the past, neighbours like Libya under Qaddafi, had mediated Tuareg conflicts by investing in the north, giving incentives to Tuaregs to join the Islamic Legion and arbitrating conflicts between Tuaregs and Malian state.17 Qaddafi’s fall ruptured the economic and political fabric in the region that kept Tuaregs in check. Algeria which has also in past mediated conflicts between the Tuaregs and the Malian state, is now stepping up its efforts to bring both conflicting parties to the negotiating table. It hosted a peace conference with the Malian government and the Tuareg rebels on July 16, 2014 at Algiers.18
The Tuareg problem is nothing but a problem of nomadic and pastoralist communities of northern Mali not being able to integrate in the modern economy. Before its decline in the 17th century due to the advent of sea trade, northern Mali was an important trading hub in trans-Saharan trade. Currently, it faces huge economic problems compared to southern Mali which thrives on agriculture and mining. While Mali is very poor country, Tuareg dominated areas of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal have poverty rates of 77 per cent, 78.7 per cent and 92 per cent respectively.19 This explains why Tuaregs have rebelled four times since independence against the Malian state.20 The regional partners, neighbouring countries, international donors and Malian government need to work towards long-term settlement of Tuareg separatism by socio-economic integration of Tuaregs within the Malian society.
Fighting regional terrorism: from Mali to the Sahel
Let us assess the objective of fighting terrorism. Within Mali, the simultaneous French air attacks on the terrorist rear bases deep in northern Mali severely impeded terrorist capacity to launch attacks in Mali.21 In broader terms, the French were able to seriously destroy the capacity of AQIM and MUJAO to launch an offensive in Mali. These groups continue to launch terrorist attacks within Mali but do not have the wherewithal to launch a military offensive for territorial gains in Mali.22 There are around 1000 French troops still stationed in Mali for counter insurgency operations. However, the French were only able to scatter terrorists away from Mali, dispersing them into the Sahel region.23 The French offensive has driven terrorists into southern Libya and northern Niger, much closer to the Mediterranean and this poses greater threat to European energy infrastructure in Algeria, Niger and Libya.24 For instance France has significant economic interest in the Sahel, especially Niger. French mine third of the uranium from the uranium mines located in Niger.25 Around 80 per cent of French electricity is generated from nuclear energy.26 Hence supplies of uranium from Niger are very essential for French power sector. So the French attention has now shifted from Mali to wider Sahel region in order to fight terrorism. After ending Operation Serval, France has launched a counter terrorism operation encompassing the Sahel region. Operation Barkhan, as it has been named, will be headquartered in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena.27 Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad will be joining the French in this operation.28 An additional 2000 French troops will be joining this operation along with 1000 already present in Mali.
The French are not the only ones involved in securing Sahel region. The United States has been assisting and backing French military operations in Sahel. The United States had assisted the French in the Mali operations by providing air refuelling facility.29 The United States has established small bases in Central African Republic, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo in order to assist Ugandan forces pursuing Lords’ Resistance Army. The United States and French forces share facilities at Djibouti, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.30 The French Combined Air Operations in Chad has a small United States liaison detachment.31 During the visit to Washington, D.C. in January 2014, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian had termed US military’s partnership with France in Africa as “indispensable”.32 France perceives the security of the Sahel region as containment of risk emanating from chaos in Libya.33 United States also seems to support this view having seen its embassy attacked in Benghazi. Therefore, it seems that both France and United States have common interest in securing Sahel against terrorist threat.
Containment of the terror threat in Sahel secures Europe, particularly its Southern parts; hence France has an interest in securing the region. However, France will not try to address the deep rooted political and socio-economic factors that are at the core of the Malian conflict as well as conflicts in other parts of Sahel. Here local, national and regional organisations would have to take a lead and not look towards north of Mediterranean for assistance.
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25, 2013 under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2100.
55(2), p. 11.
Humanitarian Crises in Mali: The role of the regional organisations, HPG Working Paper, pp. 9-10.
facts.shtml (Last accessed July 28, 2014)
situation-report/mali-tuareg-separatists-announce-significant-gains#axzz38k6c0KaQ
Group, February 5, 2014, at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/Security%20in%
20the%20Sahel%20Part%202%20February%202014_0.pdf
55(2), p. 11.
Group, January 29, 2014, at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/
Security%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Part%201%20Januray%202014.pdf
Security and Humanitarian Crises in Mali: The role of the regional organisations, HPG Working Paper, pp.4-5.
dream to create a pan-Islamic state of Sahel. The legion consisted mostly of immigrants from poor countries of Sahel
region
Group, February 5, 2014, at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/
Security%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Part%202%20February%202014_0.pdf
2013, at http://qz.com/49198/when-it-comes-to-energy-the-sahel-could-be-to-france...
14, 2014, at http://allafrica.com/stories/201407151005.html
Group, February 5, 2014, at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/
Security%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Part%202%20February%202014_0.pdf
www.defensenews.com/article/20140126/DEFREG01/301260021/French-Defense-M...
www.defensenews.com/article/20140126/DEFREG01/301260021/French-Defense-M...
India`s Approach to West Asia: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities
Political Islam: Parallel Currents in West Asia and South Asia