Somalia is undergoing a period of instability as Al-Shabaab – a terrorist organisation having declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda – has continued to wreak havoc across the state and nearby states. The primary motivation behind these efforts is to overthrow Somalia’s Western-backed government and to implement its extremist, hard-line version of the Sharia law. While efforts have been made by organisations such as the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, the African Union and the United Nations, Al-Shabaab attacks have continued not only in Somalia but all across East Africa. The incidences of these terror attacks has grown exponentially. For instance, in March 2019, Mogadishu witnessed seven Al-Shabaab attacks in a week with the insurgent group claiming the lives of close to thirty people.1
One of the most prominent initiatives taken by the African states is African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM was created under the aegis of African Union’s Peace and Security Council in 2007, as a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the AU, with the approval of the UN.
AMISOM and its limitations
It is difficult to stabilise areas void of a functional central government or absent peace processes. In such situations, the problem of combating transnational armed groups which use asymmetric and terror tactics while retaining deep connections with the local population becomes increasingly complex. Yet, African states have come together to combat the impending problem of Al-Shabaab and protect the Somali state against the terrorist group. Countries such as Burundi, Djibouti, and Ethiopia have provided troops; while countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have contributed police personnel. Uganda and Kenya have provided both. Over the years of its presence in Somalia, AMISOM has had many victories. One of the major victories came a decade after its deployment in Somalia in 2017 when Somalia held parliamentary and presidential elections in a relatively stable atmosphere. AMISOM has also been responsible for preventing several attempted attacks by Al-Shabaab. While AMISOM has been successful in limiting these attacks and pushing Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu, its efficiency has been in question since its inception.
Firstly, while the Al-Shabaab is extremely resilient and adaptive and AMISOM faces serious challenges in the area of logistics and supplies. AMISOM operates in an environment where everything ranging from troop deployment to equipment is controlled by the troop-contributing country and not the mission. This minimises the control that force commanders have to direct their own forces as the troop-contributing countries exercise more control from within their own territory than the force commanders can within Somalia. This often delays or hampers operations. AMISOM lacks the requisite force enablers (transportation or communications) and force multipliers (combat aircrafts, infantry fighting vehicles or heavy artillery) to deliver on its mandate effectively which hampers its ability to hold liberated areas. Finally, Al-Shabaab has knowledge of the local culture and language along with an intelligence arm it uses to collect information from the population under its control. This ensures that Al-Shabaab has better access to intelligence, which is one of the biggest hindrances faced by AMISOM.2
There has also been a gap between the mission’s capabilities and its mandated tasks. It is limited by certain political, operational and structural challenges. Owing to the differences among countries contributing troops to it, AMISOM has seldom functioned as a unified mission. It has struggled to carry out the non-military aspects of stabilisation. It has also failed at enabling Somalia’s political elites to reconcile and implement a workable national security architecture focused on defeating Al-Shabaab. As a result, AMISOM has its operations curtailed while waiting for the establishment of effective local security forces by the Somali politicians which would allow it to draw down.
Kenya’s Participation
There have been criticisms regarding Kenya’s role in AMISOM. This is due to its own troubled relations with Somalia. Kenya, as Somalia’s neighbouring state, has been facing threats and several attacks from Al-Shabaab. While this justifies its contributions in AMISOM, there are certain other factors which need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, Kenya and Somalia have been going through interstate conflicts at various levels. Due to this, in the past, Kenya has declared Somalia an enemy state, denied refugee status to those fleeing from Somalia to Kenya and recently, during a maritime dispute, also sent back the Somali ambassador to Kenya.
There are perhaps deeper incentives for Kenya’s participation in AMISOM. There is a potential mismatch between the public justifications and the possible drivers of deployment.3 These drivers could be – political advantages relating to international prestige along with external partnerships; economic support for the domestic security sector; gaining access to external sources of finances, a wager in its own conflict with Somalia.4 Kenya has been perceived as a strategic ally of the US in its counter-terrorism efforts in the continent since the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi. This has led to Kenya becoming one of the largest recipients of Western foreign aid and security assistance on the continent.
Another reason for Kenya’s contributions could be its underlying desire to make the vast semi-arid north-east safe for tourism and foreign direct investment. Terrorist activities there would not only affect tourism but also deter potential foreign investors. This could be justified as merely a few months after the Kenyan army began the incursions into the Southern part of Somalia, a billion-dollar deal with South Sudan was signed and less than half a year later, Kenya announced the discovery of oil for the first time. Moreover, an extremely relevant driver for Kenyan contribution to AMISOM and Somalia could be to improve the Kenyan army’s image which got tainted due to reports of smuggling ties5 and procurement scandals6, which has been successful so far.
Future for Somalia
Transition plans show that AMISOM will depart from Somalia in 2020.7 It is necessary that both, the state of Somalia and AMISOM, take effective measures to ensure that the transition from AMISOM forces to Somali National Security Forces does not lead to a destructive fate for Somalia.8 The concern though is the Somali armed forces are not ready yet for this transition. Building an effective Somali National Security Force is complicated as clan and other personal loyalties have in the past trumped apparent loyalties to the federal governments, and the senior officer corps has been riddled with tendencies towards nepotism and corruption. It will be difficult to build a set of genuine national security forces when there is no widespread agreement on what constitutes the Somali ‘nation’ and how it should be governed. The future of Somalia thus hangs in balance.
Ms. Aarushi Vikram has been Intern, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.
8. Paul D. Williams, "Stabilising Somalia: The African Union Mission and the Next Stage in the War against Al-Shabaab", The RUSI Journal, 159 (2): 52-60. doi:10.1080/03071847.2014.912803.
AMISOM amidst the Dangers of Al-Shabaab
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Somalia is undergoing a period of instability as Al-Shabaab – a terrorist organisation having declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda – has continued to wreak havoc across the state and nearby states. The primary motivation behind these efforts is to overthrow Somalia’s Western-backed government and to implement its extremist, hard-line version of the Sharia law. While efforts have been made by organisations such as the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, the African Union and the United Nations, Al-Shabaab attacks have continued not only in Somalia but all across East Africa. The incidences of these terror attacks has grown exponentially. For instance, in March 2019, Mogadishu witnessed seven Al-Shabaab attacks in a week with the insurgent group claiming the lives of close to thirty people.1
One of the most prominent initiatives taken by the African states is African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM was created under the aegis of African Union’s Peace and Security Council in 2007, as a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the AU, with the approval of the UN.
AMISOM and its limitations
It is difficult to stabilise areas void of a functional central government or absent peace processes. In such situations, the problem of combating transnational armed groups which use asymmetric and terror tactics while retaining deep connections with the local population becomes increasingly complex. Yet, African states have come together to combat the impending problem of Al-Shabaab and protect the Somali state against the terrorist group. Countries such as Burundi, Djibouti, and Ethiopia have provided troops; while countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have contributed police personnel. Uganda and Kenya have provided both. Over the years of its presence in Somalia, AMISOM has had many victories. One of the major victories came a decade after its deployment in Somalia in 2017 when Somalia held parliamentary and presidential elections in a relatively stable atmosphere. AMISOM has also been responsible for preventing several attempted attacks by Al-Shabaab. While AMISOM has been successful in limiting these attacks and pushing Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu, its efficiency has been in question since its inception.
Firstly, while the Al-Shabaab is extremely resilient and adaptive and AMISOM faces serious challenges in the area of logistics and supplies. AMISOM operates in an environment where everything ranging from troop deployment to equipment is controlled by the troop-contributing country and not the mission. This minimises the control that force commanders have to direct their own forces as the troop-contributing countries exercise more control from within their own territory than the force commanders can within Somalia. This often delays or hampers operations. AMISOM lacks the requisite force enablers (transportation or communications) and force multipliers (combat aircrafts, infantry fighting vehicles or heavy artillery) to deliver on its mandate effectively which hampers its ability to hold liberated areas. Finally, Al-Shabaab has knowledge of the local culture and language along with an intelligence arm it uses to collect information from the population under its control. This ensures that Al-Shabaab has better access to intelligence, which is one of the biggest hindrances faced by AMISOM.2
There has also been a gap between the mission’s capabilities and its mandated tasks. It is limited by certain political, operational and structural challenges. Owing to the differences among countries contributing troops to it, AMISOM has seldom functioned as a unified mission. It has struggled to carry out the non-military aspects of stabilisation. It has also failed at enabling Somalia’s political elites to reconcile and implement a workable national security architecture focused on defeating Al-Shabaab. As a result, AMISOM has its operations curtailed while waiting for the establishment of effective local security forces by the Somali politicians which would allow it to draw down.
Kenya’s Participation
There have been criticisms regarding Kenya’s role in AMISOM. This is due to its own troubled relations with Somalia. Kenya, as Somalia’s neighbouring state, has been facing threats and several attacks from Al-Shabaab. While this justifies its contributions in AMISOM, there are certain other factors which need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, Kenya and Somalia have been going through interstate conflicts at various levels. Due to this, in the past, Kenya has declared Somalia an enemy state, denied refugee status to those fleeing from Somalia to Kenya and recently, during a maritime dispute, also sent back the Somali ambassador to Kenya.
There are perhaps deeper incentives for Kenya’s participation in AMISOM. There is a potential mismatch between the public justifications and the possible drivers of deployment.3 These drivers could be – political advantages relating to international prestige along with external partnerships; economic support for the domestic security sector; gaining access to external sources of finances, a wager in its own conflict with Somalia.4 Kenya has been perceived as a strategic ally of the US in its counter-terrorism efforts in the continent since the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi. This has led to Kenya becoming one of the largest recipients of Western foreign aid and security assistance on the continent.
Another reason for Kenya’s contributions could be its underlying desire to make the vast semi-arid north-east safe for tourism and foreign direct investment. Terrorist activities there would not only affect tourism but also deter potential foreign investors. This could be justified as merely a few months after the Kenyan army began the incursions into the Southern part of Somalia, a billion-dollar deal with South Sudan was signed and less than half a year later, Kenya announced the discovery of oil for the first time. Moreover, an extremely relevant driver for Kenyan contribution to AMISOM and Somalia could be to improve the Kenyan army’s image which got tainted due to reports of smuggling ties5 and procurement scandals6, which has been successful so far.
Future for Somalia
Transition plans show that AMISOM will depart from Somalia in 2020.7 It is necessary that both, the state of Somalia and AMISOM, take effective measures to ensure that the transition from AMISOM forces to Somali National Security Forces does not lead to a destructive fate for Somalia.8 The concern though is the Somali armed forces are not ready yet for this transition. Building an effective Somali National Security Force is complicated as clan and other personal loyalties have in the past trumped apparent loyalties to the federal governments, and the senior officer corps has been riddled with tendencies towards nepotism and corruption. It will be difficult to build a set of genuine national security forces when there is no widespread agreement on what constitutes the Somali ‘nation’ and how it should be governed. The future of Somalia thus hangs in balance.
Ms. Aarushi Vikram has been Intern, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.
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