Soft border is neither an option nor a means to resolve the India-China border dispute. In Chinese conceptualization where borders are innately strategic frontiers, the idea of soft border is a misnomer. India should keep a distinction between the notions of soft border and boundary resolution.
India, in 2005, acquired the observer status in the SCO. It has also expressed its desire to join the SCO as a full member. It is believed that China would try and delay India's entry as full member in this regional organisation, whereas Russia along with the Central Asian countries would continue to support India's full membership in the SCO. New regional and global order would demand greater cooperation between India and China in future.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are not necessarily two contending trade liberalising models, but their import and arrival have posed sti
In keeping with the theme ‘IAF Deep Multidimensional Change 2032: Imperatives and a Roadmap’, this article focuses on the responses to the external threat challenges that are likely to be face by IAF
The long expected Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation (BDCA) was signed between the governments of India and China on 23 October 2013 in Beijing, during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr M
It has been a year of unstable regional security with the endless conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s half-hearted struggle against the remnants of the al Qaeda, Sri Lanka’s inability to find a lasting solution to its ethnic problems and Nepal’s new found inclination to seek neutrality between India and China.
The India-China relations in 2013, in spite Depsang incident, had a more positive than negative tone. Premier Li chose India as his first overseas stop and the pronouncement to deepen ties with India as “strategic choice” along with promise to make “greater efforts” to resolve boundary issue. Equally positive voice came from the Indian leadership for rejecting the relevance of “containment” in favour of “cooperation” that could bring more gains instead.
China’s border intrusions have been bolstered by a steady and committed expansion of its military hardware and infrastructure in Tibet and neighbouring provinces. The improvement of surface transportation near the LAC has resulted in larger military presence and augmented rapid deployment capacities of the PLA and the PLAAF.
In this final part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan deliberates that if India and China make a calibrated move for working together in Afghanistan, the outcome could be more harmonizing than conflicting. So when India reviews its post-2014 Afghan policy, the China factor should not be seen in a zero-sum perception for many in the West may press India playing a countervailing role to China.