The outcome of the NSG plenary in Seoul is most likely to be the admission of India to the NSG, denial or postponement of a decision on Pakistan’s application, but deferment of both announcements to a later date.
It was not in Pakistan’s interest that the NSA meeting should take place. It is to their credit that they managed to do that by waving a red flag at the Indians through their first briefing on the planned NSA talks by mentioning their invitation to the Hurriyat leaders for a meeting in Delhi prior to the NSA talks.
An Indian application for NSG membership should face less resistance than what china had faced. Such an option is certainly worth an attempt instead of waiting indefinitely for the NSG PGs to arrive at a consensus on inviting India.
This Issue Brief looks back at the implementation of the JPOA and examines the extent to which the recent framework (JCPOA) agreed upon at Lausanne adheres to the letter and spirit of the JPOA, specifically as it relates to the pledge to treat the Iranian nuclear programme “as that of any non-nuclear state party to the NPT”.
While the exact nature of the understanding between the two countries is yet to be announced and in fact may never be officially released, it is possible to offer an outline of the possible “memorandum” with possible understandings on all the three liability issues as well as the administrative arrangements.
There is a general feeling among analysts that while US government lawyers may have been satisfied that the CLNDA is compatible with CSC in light of explanations offered by the Indian government, this view is being reportedly challenged by nuclear industry lawyers.
During PM Modi’s visit to US, one of the topics that is likely to be high on the agenda will be the still incomplete US-India nuclear cooperation by way of sales of nuclear reactors to India because of the Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.