Dr. Ashok Kapur is a Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. This article was first published in the IDSA Journal, 3(4), April 1971, pp. 485-509. An abridged version of the original is republished here.
It is possible to argue that India’s nuclear strategy seems to have changed, but this does not necessarily at present mean a change in the fundamentals of India’s nuclear policy as these were outlined in the late 1940s and the 1950s. The nuclear test appears to have damaged the NPT, and the test implies a re-orientation in India’s relations with China and the Super Powers.
This article deals with two questions: first, what is the security framework in which an Indian decision-maker must operate? Secondly, what are the specific policy restraints which affect Indian decision-making? Both these questions are cast in terms of Indian nuclear policy and it is assumed that the actual existence of a conventional Indian military deterrent against China and Pakistan is a ‘given’ in the present military and political equation in South Asian politics. The argument of this paper centres on the problem of defining ‘security’.
