
Some Lessons of the 1962 NEFA Debacle

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Commenting in the *Times of India* in July 1986 on the Chinese intrusion across the McMahon Line in the Kamang district of Arunachal into the Sumdorong Chu Valley, Nikhil Chakravarty wrote, "If India uses force to dislodge China, this will be used to show up India as an unfriendly power, unreliable where its smaller neighbours are concerned. If India does not go in for such a move, this restraint will be misread as proof of being supine in her dealings with China."¹

One wonders if the latter part of this comment was the sort of reasoning—to avoid being labelled supine—which led the Army being ordered on September 22, 1962 to evict the Chinese from Dhola. The Chinese had crossed the Thagla ridge on September 8 and had come down to the Indian post at Dhola on the Namka Chu in Kameng and threatened to cut it off. It is necessary to recapitulate events leading to this incident which culminated in the Sino-Indian conflict commencing on October 20, 1962.

"Liberation" of Tibet

When the Chinese moved into Tibet in October 1950, India expressed its concern and the hope that "the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and nobody else."² However, India, like the rest of the world, accepted the Chinese action. In December 1953, the Government of India initiated negotiations in Beijing on the relations between India and Tibet in the hope that by settling all outstanding issues which had been inherited from the past, the relations of friendship and cooperation between the countries would be greatly strengthened.³ On April 29, 1954, the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibetan Region of China and India was signed. The Government of India then relinquished all extra-territorial rights

and privileges in Tibet which were inherited by New Delhi from the British government and recognised that Tibet was a region of China.⁴ These included the right to station an Indian political agent at Lhasa, the right to maintain trade agencies at Gyantse, Gantok and Yatung as well as post and telegraph offices along the trade route to Gyantse and the right to maintain military escorts at Yatung and Gyantse...⁵

After their move into Tibet, the Chinese concentrated on building roads, establishing garrisons and generally strengthening their military potential in Tibet. India was anxious to maintain friendly relations with China. The 1954 agreement had enunciated the five principles of peaceful coexistence, Panchsheel and the 1950s were a period of cordiality marked by the slogan, "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" Although a committee headed by General Himmat Singh was constituted in 1952 to study the military threat to our northern border, its recommendations even in regard to creating the communications infrastructure were pursued with no urgency. The Border Road Development Board was set up only in 1960. No thought was given to raise, train and acclimatise forces for operational tasks in high altitude areas. The Indian Army, which was over two million-strong during the second world war, had been drastically run down immediately after the war. In the fifties, a "post-trouble" Army of 300,000 was being talked about. Because of India's adverse relations with Pakistan, the actual strength in the period 1960-62 was about 500,000. It was only after the 1962 hostilities with China that mountain divisions organised to operate on India's northern border were raised and the strength of the Army went up to 900,000 in 1970.⁶

Border Dispute

Chinese maps published in 1950 soon after the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China showed its boundary with India right up to the Brahmaputra foothills. In reply to India's protest in February 1951, the Chinese assured the Government of India that these maps "are not official maps" but were old maps prepared during the Chiang Kai-Shek regime.⁷ During his visit to China in October 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru mentioned to Chou En-Lai that he had seen some maps recently published in China which gave a

wrong borderline between the two countries and the latter repeated the explanation given in 1951, that they were reproductions of old maps. However, in 1958, a magazine, *China Pictorial*, published maps which claimed four divisions of NEFA (Kamang Subansiri, Siang and Lohit), some areas in the north of UP, large areas in Ladakh and a big slice of Bhutan.⁸ India's protest dated August 24 1958 and offer of its Political Map brought a reply dated November 3, 1958 that the boundary of China will be drawn after survey and consultations with neighbours.⁹

Dispute over the Sino-India border surfaced in 1954. On July 17 1954, the Chinese counsellor in India gave a note to the Ministry of External Affairs that Indian troops armed with rifles had crossed the Niti pass on the UP-Tibet border and intruded into Wu-Je. The Indian reply of August 27, 1954 stated that "A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in the Hoti Plain which is Southeast of the Niti Pass."¹⁰ India maintained a seasonal post at Bara Hoti which withdrew in winter. On June 28, 1955, India informed the Chinese Counsellor that a party of the Chinese was camping at Hoti.¹¹ Apart from claim to Bara Hoti, the Chinese claimed area up to Hupsang Khad on the Indian side of Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh and their patrol crossed Shipki La in September 1956.¹²

The most serious claim came to light in 1958 when, in reply to an Indian note about its patrol of nine men in Ladakh that was missing since the end of August, the Chinese replied that the men had been arrested by their frontier guards on September 8-12, snooping on the Sinkiang-Tibet highway.¹³ The Chinese had completed the Lhasa-Sinkiang highway in 1957 which, according to the Indian note to the Chinese, "enters Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilganag, runs north-west to Amtogar runs northwest through Yangpas, Khaiti Dawan and Haji Langar which are all in indisputable Indian territory..."¹⁴ This road through Aksai Chin continues to be perhaps the most contentious issue in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Political Asylum to Dalai Lama

In June 1951 China formalised the "unification" of Tibet by a treaty, but ideologically Tibet remains unreconciled to date. The

first major revolt in Tibet took place in early 1956. Unrest continued and in 1958 the Dalai Lama is reported to have sought asylum in India. Early in 1959 trouble spread and he crossed over to India on March 31. Jawaharlal Nehru confirmed this in the Lok Sabha on April 3 and announced that political asylum had been granted at his request.¹⁵ The Chinese government expressed great displeasure at this and the warm reception given to the Dalai Lama.

Several border incidents took place in 1959. On August 7 a section-strong Indian border post at Khenzeman in the Kameng Frontier Division (FD) of NEFA was pushed back by 200 Chinese troops to the bridge at Drokung Samba. On August 25, another weak Indian post at Longju in the Subansiri FD was surrounded by two to three hundred Chinese troops. On August 26 the Chinese encircled this post again. There was exchange of fire and the Indian post withdrew under pressure.

The Chinese do not accept the McMahon Line; they contend China was not signatory to the Simla Convention of 1913-14. Further, there is dispute over its alignment. In the Thagla Ridge-Khenzeman area, China holds that the line runs through Drokung Samba bridge. There are differences also in the alignment of the border in the Western (Ladakh) Sector, the Central (Himachal and UP) Sector. There was protracted and exhaustive correspondence between Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-lai between December 1958 and December 1959. The two prime ministers met in Delhi in April 1960, and subsequently three rounds of discussions were held among officials of India and China by November 1960, but no progress was made and the matter was left unresolved.

Basically, China maintained that the Sino-Indian boundary is not formally delineated and some differences exist between the boundary lines drawn on the maps of the two countries which require survey and mutual consultation. India contended that in three different sections—Ladakh, Sikkim and NEFA, covering much the larger part of the border—the boundary as shown on its maps is supported by geography, in some cases by tradition and treaties in others. (The 1842 treaty between Kashmir and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa in respect of the Ladakh sector. The Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890 in respect of Sikkim and the McMahon Line in case of NEFA). The remain-

ing portion from the tri-junction with Nepal to Ladakh is also traditional and follows well-defined geographical features. The meeting of the two prime ministers in April 1960 could not devise a way out and the official talks failed. It is believed that China indicated that it would accept the McMahon Line in the eastern sector if India would accept the line of actual control in Ladakh.¹⁸

Forward Policy

In October 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru visited China at the invitation of the Chinese government. On his return, he stated in November, "I am convinced that China, entirely for its own sake, wants peace, wants time develop itself and thinks in terms of three or four five year plans."¹⁷ After the August 1959 incidents mentioned earlier, he made a statement in the Lok Sabha on August 28 in which he gave information about the road through Aksai Chin, a post established by the Chinese at Spanggur in Ladakh, the incidents at Khenzeman and Longju and said, "we have, in fact, placed this border area of NEFA directly under the military authorities."¹⁸ What this implied in effect was that the Assam Rifles in NEFA were placed under the Army. The overall assessment even after the Khenzeman and Longju as well as the incidents in Ladakh was that these were isolated incidents. "I cannot imagine that all this is a precursor of anything more serious. I do not think they will attack."¹⁹

This assessment accounts for India adopting the policy of establishing forward posts to assert its claim on territory it felt was its own. The strength of the post or the ability to maintain it or build up on it were supposedly of no consideration as China was not likely to start a war. If India did not assert a claim on its territory, China was likely to establish its posts and claim the territory. Therefore, it was argued that India should establish as many forward posts as possible. It was in pursuance of this policy that a post was established in June 1962 at Dhola which the Chinese maintained was north of the McMahon Line.

Thorat, who was GOC-in-C Eastern Command from May 1957 to May 1961, records his amazement at the fact that during this period, the Government of India refused to admit that there was

any danger to India from China. Thimayya agreed with his recommendation that the defence of NEFA should be included as an operational task of Eastern Command and it should be provided additional troops for it, but this recommendation was brushed aside by Krishna Menon.²⁰ Thus, Eastern Command had no troops to induct into NEFA when it was made its operational responsibility in August 1959. 4 Infantry Division was ordered to move from Punjab to Assam and one of its bridges concentrated in the foothills area of NEFA by the first week of December 1959. In the absence of roads for induction or subsequent maintenance and as the availability of air supply was limited, it was necessary to restrict the quantum of troops for deployment. It was therefore possible to locate only one battalion at Tawang by August 1960. The other two battalions were kept well back at Tenga Valley.

As is well known, there is a marked difference in the terrain on the Indian and the Tibetan sides of the border. The Indian side receives fairly heavy rainfall and the mountains are covered with dense forests. There is thick snow in the winter. The Tibetan side is bare and cold, with light snowfall. It is easy of access and arterial roads with link roads to the border had been taken in hand since 1951 and had been well established by 1960. India set up the Border Road Development Board only in 1960 and it takes time to construct roads in the prevailing terrain conditions. Only a start had been made in 1962 when India gave its Army the task to evict the Chinese.

Secondly, as mentioned earlier, in the fifties, India was anxious on force reductions. The 500,000 strong Army of the early sixties was Pakistan-oriented and so deployed. The specially tailored mountain divisions with animal transport for first echelon loads of weapons and ammunition of combat units and artillery suitable for such terrain were raised only after the 1962 hostilities. In these circumstances, in October 1959, Thorat proposed plans for the holding of defences along the line Tawang-Ziro-Along-Hayuliang which should be provided road and airheads and forward of which strong posts should be established to give warning and to impose delay. He felt that dispersing his force on a thin red line all along the border would serve no purpose. Rather, the aggressor should be drawn in to add to his maintenance difficulties while Indian forces would be deployed on such tactical

features where these could be maintained and supported.²¹

He opposed the so-called forward policy. "It was my unshakable conviction that if I were to listen to the Defence Minister, adopt his Forward Policy and send troops to the McMahon Line without adequate maintenance cover, I would be sending them to certain defeat and death."²²

All the same, with the background of his assessment of no possibility of a war with China, Krishna Menon implemented his policy of establishing forward posts in small strength purely to show the flag and some of these were established in disputed areas, like the one at Dhola.

The Namka Chu Battle

Dhola post was established in June 1962. On September 8, the Chinese descended from the Thagla ridge and threatened to cut it off. It was a small Assam Rifles post, under the command of a JCO established on the south bank of Namka Chu in keeping with the belief that the Chinese would not attack and the basic philosophy of forward policy mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. The Chinese had occupied the Thagla ridge and had sent about a company-strong force to Dhola.

7 Infantry Brigade was the only Army formation in Kameng FD. 9 Punjab and 1 Sikh were its two battalions and it had just one battery of mountain guns in support. Its third battalion, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, was concentrated at Misamari near Tezpur on its way to Yol in Kangra Valley. Its task was the defence of Tawang; Bum La-Tawang being the main axis of ingress in Kameng FD.

Brig J.P. Dalvi, the brigade commander, had instructions issued to the post commander at Dhola to hold his ground, conveyed to him that a link up will be established, and had the Assam Rifles post at Lumpu alerted (Lumpu is two days' march from Dhola).

9 Punjab located at Tawang, four days' march from Dhola, was also alerted. On September 9, it sent a detachment to Lumpu. These precautionary measures were taken in consultation with 4 Infantry Division with its headquarters at Tezpur and 33 Corps which was operationally responsible for the Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA border with Tibet.

On September 10, 9 Punjab was ordered to move to Lumpu and 7 Infantry Brigade was warned to be prepared to move forward to deal with the Chinese investing Dhola. 1 Sikh was to be left behind at Tawang with the task of defending the Bum La-Tawang axis. Thus began the diversion of 7 Infantry Brigade from its task of the defence of the vital ground of Tawang. The tactically insignificant post at Dhola on the Namka Chu; a gorge with dominating heights on both sides; on a mountain stream which could be crossed anywhere in the winter months, a post established purely to stake the Indian claim right upto McMahon Line, became the cause of this diversion. The implementation of the "forward policy" had put India into this military precarious position.

Dalvi records that the corps and division commanders conferred with the Army Commander at Tezpur on September 12, 1962 and informed him that the task of clearing the Chinese was beyond the capability of troops in Kameng FD.²³ At a conference held in the Ministry of Defence on September 14, General Thapar, the Army chief, warned the government of the consequences of any armed action by the Indian Army in view of the many deficiencies from which it suffered there. Lt. Gen. Daulat Singh, the Western Army Commander, stated that the Chinese were in a position to annihilate the defending Indian forces in Ladakh. Lt. Gen. L.P. Sen, the Eastern Army Commander, was equally blunt about the weaknesses of the Indian forces in NEFA²⁵.

In the meantime, the deployment of 7 Infantry Brigade on the Namka Chu continued. On September 13, 9 Punjab was ordered to move forthwith and it started deploying on this stream on September 15 where it encountered Chinese shouting in Hindi, "Withdraw from Namka Chu. It is Chinese territory. Do not mar friendship by border incidents." The brigade commander reached the Namka Chu on September 19 and commenced detailed reconnaissance with officer commanding 9 Punjab. This battalion was now deployed on bridges I to IV. The move of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles ex Misamari was cancelled and this battalion as well as 2 Rajput awaiting move to Mathura ex Charduar were directed to join 7 Infantry Brigade and reached Lumpa area around September 26.

While these moves were taking place, a meeting was called in

Delhi on September 22 to discuss the Thagla situation presided over by the Deputy Minister for Defence. The Prime Minister and the Defence Minister were abroad. At this meeting, Thapar asserted that the Chinese could easily reinforce their strength opposite Dhola, retaliate elsewhere in NEFA or attack our posts in Ladakh.²⁵ He was told that for political reasons there was no alternative but to undertake the task of evicting the Chinese from Dhola area. Thapar demanded a written order which was issued under the signature of a joint secretary.²⁶ This task was given to 4 Infantry Division through Eastern Command and 33 Corps. 7 Infantry Brigade was the only formation available to do this task and it had hardly any artillery support. Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh, who was GOC 33 Corps, repeated his protest about the impossibility of evicting the Chinese without a massive build up. Therefore, there was a situation of a reluctant military being overruled for political reasons.

The Defence Minister returned on September 30 and the Prime Minister on October 2. On October 3, the 4 Corps HQ was created and Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul was appointed its GOC. This was obviously to overcome the reluctance of Umrao Singh to accept what he and his formation commanders considered militarily unrealistic tasks. These tasks of eviction of the Chinese from the Namka Chu and containing Thagla were now given to 4 Corps and through 4 Infantry Division to 7 Infantry Brigade which was all GOC 4 Corps had by way of resources.²⁷ Furthermore, the build up of even this brigade to around Namka Chu was held up due to logistical reasons; the one ton road axis to Tawang was in a precarious condition. Beyond Tawang it was four to five days' march and maintenance would primarily be by inadequate air transport in difficult terrain by para/free drops.

On October 4, Kaul reached Tezpur and accelerated the concentration of 7 Infantry Bde. He flew into Lumpu on October 5 and ordered 2 Rajput and 1/9 GR to move to Namka Chu the next day. He was at Dhola on October 7 where he met Dalvi and was sobered somewhat on seeing the position on the ground *vis-à-vis* ammunition holdings, supplies and difficulties in the way of air drops and, what was even more important, the tactical unsuitability of the Dhola post as well as the domination of the Namka Chu by the Chinese at Thagla.²⁸ Dhola post on the Namka Chu

had no tactical significance. Thagla ridge on the North of Namka Chu with the Chinese and Tsangdhar plateau-Hathungla on the South, in Indian hands, were the areas of tactical importance.

According to Dalvi's assessment, by October 4-5, the Chinese had already located a well-stocked and well-supported brigade at Thagla and were moving a whole division to this area.²⁹ By October 10 Kaul was convinced of the untenability of the Indian position in the Namka Chu gorge and that the task of expelling the Chinese was beyond Indian capability.³⁰ In response to a signal he sent, he was called to Delhi where, at a conference held on October 11 presided over by Nehru at which Krishna Menon, the COAS, the Army Commander and Kaul were present, it was decided to change 4 Corp's task to that of the defence of the present position.³¹ In light of the observations already made in regard to the tactical unsuitability of the Namka Chu gorge, this was militarily a disastrous decision even if 7 Infantry Brigade had been well-stocked and well-supported both operationally and administratively, which it wasn't. The brigade and the divisional commanders had no doubt that in the face of the Chinese build up, the brigade should hold a compact defence at Lumpu, south of the heights of Tsangdhar-Hathungla. However, Kaul records that Krishna Menon, the COAS and the Army Commander visited him at Tezpur on October 17. Menon emphasised the political importance of holding on to our defensive position at Tsangle.³² This post was north of Namka Chu and was reached via Bridge V on this stream. Thus, the orders to hold the present positions from Bridge I to Tsangle, a 12-mile stretch along the Namka Chu, was a political decision and ensured the decimation of the brigade.

The Chinese attack came at 5 a.m., October 20. Dalvi estimates that two brigades attacked the Rajput and Gorkha positions in the Dhola area (bridges III and IV) while a brigade was directed to Tsangdhar between bridges IV and V and another towards Hathungla on the Khenzeman-Drokung Samba-Zimithaung axis to cut off the routes of withdrawal.³³ The Rajputs and the Gorkhas fought valiantly but by 8 a.m. their positions, which had no artillery support to speak of, were overrun. The Grenadiers and the Punjabis, in areas of bridges I and II, were bypassed.

One column of Chinese proceeded from Nyam Jang Chu towards Tawang.

Lessons of 1962

Lessons that follow from the events leading up to and including the battle of Namka Chu are worth deliberating upon as history has the habit of repeating itself. Firstly, India did not expect the Chinese to take any largescale aggressive action in regard to the border dispute and had made no preparation for the defence of the Indo-Tibetan border. On the other hand, China had made all military preparations; infrastructure of arterial and link roads, adequate and well-supported forces, development of forward posts and the stocking of warlike stores and supplies. In these circumstances, it was most unwise to work the country into a frenzy over Chinese incursions in Ladakh and NEFA over a period of time and make them believe that the situation could be dealt with militarily. A tough military posture is ill-advised when a nation is not in a position to back it by military strength.

Secondly, military courses of action adopted by a country should be in keeping with its military capability. Adversaries have a fair idea of each others' strength and weakness. China knew fully well that India had inadequate forces and no infrastructure in Ladakh or NEFA to position and sustain forces of the size that could resist the strength that China was able to field in these sectors. The adoption of provocative forward policy was, therefore, not advisable and the sound advice of Thimayya and Thorat should not have been disregarded. India should have adopted a low military profile and made intensive preparations.

Thirdly, when the forward policy was challenged, the new military leadership cautioned their political bosses. Heed should have been paid to professional opinion. The politico-military interaction in an environment of impending hostilities in September-October 1962 was most unsatisfactory. In the absence of the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, the government ordered the eviction of the Chinese from the Dhola area, ignoring professional advice and the evidence of their build up. This is an important lesson in the field of decision making at the national level. The supremacy of the PM and the Cabinet is unquestionable

but decisions should take cognisance of professional advice. Even if Krishna Menon had been assured by Marshal Chen Yi in Geneva that China would not resort to war to settle the border dispute, note should have been taken of the Chinese build up.

The fourth lesson relates to political interference in the organisational field of the Army. The military leadership in the field, the brigade, division and corps commanders, protested repeatedly against the plan to evict the Chinese from Dhola area. This was taken as reluctance on the part of Umrao Singh, the Corps commander, to get a move on. A novel solution was worked out: to raise a new corps headquarters with a new commander to be given the responsibility of operations in NEFA Kaul, who was appointed the commander of 4 Corps, the new corps which took over the NEFA sector from 33 Corps, records that it was decided on October 3 by the government and the Army chief to raise a new corps.³⁴ This apparent political decision created a situation where a new headquarters occupied with mundane chores like funding accommodation, collecting furniture, typewriters, stationery and waiting for officers and personnel to arrive, was made responsible for dealing with a live confrontation situation. Posted from an instructional appointment at the Staff College, as GSO-I (Operations) of this headquarters at 12-hours notice, I arrived in Tezpur to find my earnest effort to grasp the operational situation diverted somewhat by such chores. If Umrao Singh's refusal to toe the line was considered the problem, the responsibility of NEFA could have stayed with 33 Corps, which could have been moved to Tezpur and given a new commander. Umrao Singh could have raised the new headquarters at Shillong, retaining responsibility for the remainder of 33 Corps territory—Assam and Nagaland.

Fifthly, when at the PM's conference on the night of October 11 it was decided to rescind the orders to evict the Chinese, the choice of the defensive position to be held by 7 Infantry Brigade should have been left to the Army. Tying it down to holding the Namka Chu gorge was disastrous. What ground the Army should hold is a tactical issue. Admittedly, the pulling back of the brigade to either Tsangdhar-Hathungla or further south to Lumpu would have involved loss of face. The cardinal sin was the diversion of the brigade to Namka Chu from its task of defence of Tawang.

Having committed this, India should have cut its losses and taken up a compact brigade defence on tactically suitable ground. The military defeat it suffered by not doing so was worse than the loss of face involved in a tactical withdrawal.

The Present Position

India is now better prepared. The infrastructure and logistics are on a better footing. The border is held by adequate forces, acclimatised and trained for operations at high altitudes. There is, however, scope for better artillery support as also for provision of sufficient heliborne capability to enable a speedy build-up of troops for crucial cross country offensive and defensive missions.

India has ten to eleven mountain divisions, primarily for the Sino-Indian border. In addition, there are local and paramilitary forces like Ladakh Scouts and Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Tibet is reported to have only eight regular infantry and six local force divisions under the South West Military Region (MR) of China with its headquarters at Chengdu. Of course, the PLA has 12 armoured, 119 infantry and 97 local force divisions deployed in 11 MRs. A large force is deployed in the MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia. Improvement of Sino-Soviet relations could lead to a pull-back of forces but is not likely to result in any change in the overall allocation of forces to various fronts in the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the order of battle currently earmarked for the Sino-Indian border is fairly balanced.

China has also increased its logistical capability in Tibet. A petroleum pipeline has been brought into Tibet from mainland China. A three-phase 834 km-long railway line has been completed into Tibet from Qinghai. The logistical support available to the Chinese in Tibet has been assessed as the ability to sustain 21 divisions for 70 days. If hostilities break out on the Sino-Indian border, China is likely to make a show of force in all the areas of its claim and choose two or three objectives for a somewhat deeper penetration, within its claim, for temporary occupation. Its aim would be achieved by such peripheral operations. The paucity of communications in the way of axes would limit operations to brigade fronts except in the case of axis Bum La-Tawang and the Chumbi Valley. The latter could sustain a corps front

operation from either side of the border. However, a series of major thrusts into the Brahmaputra Valley for longterm occupation would not be sustainable particularly during the winter months.

So much for respective military strengths, capabilities and the likely peripheral nature of the Chinese objectives. In this connection, the relevant issue at this juncture is to assess why China has ingressed into Sumdorong Chu Valley, particularly as an understanding was reached at the fourth round of official talks held at Beijing in 1984 to maintain status quo all along the border pending a final settlement. Most political commentators are agreed that the Chinese wish to stress that their package offer does not imply the acceptance of the McMahon Line as the border in the eastern sector. Rather, it is a concession offered by China in return for which it would like India to make concessions in the Western sector.

The Government of India's stand to continue to strive for a peaceful settlement of the boundry dispute is, therefore, commendable. The media should also ensure that the first lesson of the NEFA episode is taken note of and no unnecessary agitation is caused in the minds of the people suggesting military courses and eviction.

The military factor is, of course, very pertinent to the solution of the border dispute by negotiation. In this context, plans for the defence of the Sino-Indian border must ensure capability of counter-riposte: the vulnerability of the Lhasa-Xinjiang highway via Gartok-Demchok-Rudok is worthy of note. The relevance of the other lessons of 1962 to any situation of confrontation that might develop is too obvious to need any elaboration.

NOTES

1. Nikhil Chakravarty, "Political Diary—The Chinese Shift," *Times of India*, July 27, 1986.
2. Part of the statement made by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Parliament on December 7, 1950.
3. D.R. Mankekar, *The Guilty Men of 1962*, The Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968, p. 11.
4. *Ibid*, p 12.

5. B.K. Desai, "Sino-Indian Relations" in V.B. Karnik (ed) *China Invades India*, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1968, p. 152.
6. See *The Military Balance*, IISS, London.
7. B.K. Desai, Op cit, page 137.
8. Indu Patel "The Border Problem" in *China Invades India*, Op. cit. p. 187.
9. Ibid, p 187.
10. Ibid, p 183.
11. Ibid, p 183
12. Ibid, p 185
13. Ibid, p 186
14. Ibid, p 186
15. B.K. Desai, Op cit, page 175.
16. D.R. Mankekar, Op cit, page 31-32.
17. *The Hindu*, November 14, 1954, quoted by B K. Desai, Op cit, p 155-156.
18. J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder*, Thacker & Company Ltd. Bombay 1969.
19. Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted by J.P. Dalvi, Op cit, p 42.
20. S.P.P. Thorat, *From Reveille to Retreat*, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 1986.
21. Ibid, p 197 and 198
22. Ibid, p 202.
23. J.P. Dalvi, Op cit. page 192.
24. D.R. Mankekar, Op cit, page 46.
25. J.P. Dalvi, Op cit, page 229.
26. D.R. Mankekar, Op cit, page 47.
27. In his book "*The Untold Story*", Allied Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1967, on his appointment as GOC, 4 Corps consisted only of 5 and 7 Infantry Brigades under 4 Infantry Division (Page 366). Of these only 7 Infantry Brigade was deployed in Kameng.
28. B.M. Kaul, *The Untold Story*, Op cit, pp. 370, 373, 375-376.
29. J.P. Dalvi, Op. cit, p 259 and 269.
30. B.M. Kaul, Op cit; p 383.
31. Ibid, p 386
32. Ibid, p 389
33. J.P. Dalvi, Op cit, p 367
34. B.M. Kaul, Op cit, p 364.