

Getting Tough with China: Negotiating Equitable, not “Equal”, Security

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China in 1988 got the Rajiv Gandhi government, which was weakened domestically by the Bofors scandal, to accept, among other things, the Joint Working Group (JWG) as the medium for settling the border dispute.¹ Last November, during the JWG session preceding President Jiang Zemin's state visit, the two countries formally initialled a document which accepted the Indian formulation of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as the instrumentality for improving bilateral relations.

The provisions in this accord have been discussed with the Chinese at least since Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Beijing in September 1993.² China, for its part, realises that CBMs can promote its concept of “mutual and equal security.” New Delhi, on the other hand, has alighted on CBMs without any clear ideas other than the hope that they will do for Indo-Pak and for Sino-Indian relations, what they managed to do in Europe, namely, usher in peace.³

Considering the apparent eagerness with which the two governments are seeking a “constructive and cooperative relationship oriented towards the 21st century”—to quote from the official statement issued after the tenth meeting of the JWG on August 4-5, 1997—it was a relief to find that the Indian team led by Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath had not signed on the dotted line indicated by Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and, in effect, given away the store.

That this relief is only temporary and may be followed by the implementation of a detailed, final CBMs document seriously compromising national security, is suggested by two things. One, the exchange of the instruments of ratification concerning measures to demilitarise the border. And, secondly, the two “hobble” factors in dealing with a hardheaded and aggressive China.

These are: (i) New Delhi's pixilated views of foreign policy means and ends and of the balance of forces and interests coupled to its historic

habit of misreading Chinese intentions and policies; and (ii) the Indian government's deciding on the CBM route to peace without any forethought. This last has led to the jettisoning of the principle of abundant caution that ought to be the mainstay of any policy of rapprochement with China and, in the event, to the disregarding by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of the Indian military's misgivings about the strategy, tactical and operational implications and consequences of some of the CBMs being discussed.⁴

Means and Ends

Like all long wars, the Cold War too has ended leaving in its wake a somewhat contrived yearning for world peace comprising equal parts of fatigue and misplaced hope. Such sentiments have not escaped the Indian government predisposed to woolly thinking. It is in earnest about realising the peace dividend and is convinced that the conditions are ripe for negotiating an "equitable world order."⁵

Rightly, it has prioritised the need for a more just regional system. The five-pronged "Gujral Doctrine" attempts to cultivate the lesser states in the region on the basis that India "expects no reciprocity" from Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives and is prepared to "go the extra mile" to accommodate them.⁶ As a policy, in effect, of subsidising economic development in these countries, it has the potential for pacifying the neighbourhood and, by creating powerful vested interests, to secure it against outside forces and influences with an anti-India bent. This is sophisticated *realpolitik*.

But no such finesse is evident in the proposed handling of Pakistan and China. The Gujral Doctrine not only leaves Pakistan out of its South Asian structure but groups it with China as a country needing ministering with "Confidence Building Measures."⁷ So Pakistan is to be treated on par with, and tackled in the same manner, as an unscrupulous and militarily destabilising China—the source of serious insecurity for India, Asia and the world at large!⁸ There's the rub—the signal lack of realism in equating Pakistan, a military nuisance, and the primary security threat, China.

The preferred means—CBMs—to effect some sort of *modus vivendi* with these two adversarial states reveals the soft and fuzzy core of the Doctrine. For one thing, however exact and purposive the concept may seem and its champions may ballyhoo, "Confidence Building Measures" are actually quite "imprecise," there being no "consensus" about what they really mean or entail or, for that matter, how CBMs differ from regular arms control measures. There is even "confusion" about what

confidence-building regimes are intended to achieve and, as between two unequal sides, whose confidence they are supposed to bolster.⁹

Indeed, it is because such basic issues remain unaddressed that the CBMs agreed upon so far by India and Pakistan have failed to generate the necessary momentum for peace in the subcontinent.¹⁰ In the event, why should more of the same vis-a-vis that country make any difference? And, if these measures have not worked with Pakistan, which can be easily contained, why does New Delhi expect them to produce results where a more wily and militarily wilful China is concerned?

To configure policy around CBMs may be an exercise in futility. But there is a fundamental reason why the implied efficacy of CBMs is suspect: they may, in fact, increase confidence without in the least enhancing security. There could even be an inverse relationship between the level of confidence inspired by a CBMs accord and the level of security obtained.

The classic example of this, of course, is the 1954 Sino-Indian Accord. From the Indian point of view, it was meant to reassure China about Indian intentions on Tibet and, at the same time, to firm up the Indian belief that by getting Beijing to pledge support for the five principles of Panchshila, it had succeeded in extracting a Chinese commitment to eschew the use of force to settle disputes. It was a clever way, from the Indian perspective, of denaturing the residual Chinese threat.

In reality, what that agreement did was to hit India with a quadruple whammy! It lost India the formidable Tibetan buffer state and, as a player with inherited rights in "an unresolved" territorial issue, diplomatic leverage. It also legitimised Chinese occupation and absorption of Tibet; and, military-wise, it made India's position untenable all along the border and, permanently imperilled it in the strategic realm.¹¹ The 1954 treaty was a straightforward CBMs agreement which, perhaps, inspired mutual confidence in the short term, but markedly degraded Indian security over the long haul.

But the Gujral policy raises an even more basic question: does the research for an "equitable world order" not encompass a more equitable regional arrangement vis-a-vis China?¹² If it does not, then it would be an egregious compounding of a strategic error, which let Tibet pass into Chinese hands without the least resistance by Delhi. If it does, then is there a down-side to the confidence-building measures of the kind presently engaging the government that the MEA has not thoroughly examined? And, are there better alternatives?

Confidence-Building Measures as Liability

In the main, the CBMs that are being discussed are designed to pare

force levels and to realise phased withdrawals from certain denoted areas. As against the Indian military's worry generally about the strength of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) all along the border and in the Tibetan hinterland, the Chinese motive for this CBM is their concern about Indian actions in 1986-87 which established strong positions on the Hathung La Ridge in the Kameng Division of Arunachal Pradesh, in northern Sikkim and in north-eastern Ladakh.¹³

The significance of the Indian military's brazenness in pushing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to beyond the watershed of the Thagla Ridge on the McMahon Line and of not withdrawing in the face of Chinese bluster, was not lost on Chairman Deng Xiao Ping and his cohorts. Beijing feared that the well equipped Indian forces could push the LAC Tibet-wards in other sectors too, which realisation led to their acknowledging that their policy of taking "a chicken knife to a bullock" was proving counter-productive and that a more peaceful approach was needed.¹⁴

The other CBMs in the 1996 document curtail, prohibit or limit, among other things: (a) "strategic reconnaissance" and local violations of air space by rotary and fixed-wing aircraft; (b) large scale war exercises; (c) electronic interference with each other's radio traffic; and (d) "offensive patrolling," including long range patrols. And they seek to defuse incidents between the eyeballing forces by facilitating interaction between local land force commanders using newly laid direct telephone links.¹⁵ As CBMs go, these latter measures are unexceptionable.

But because Beijing believes that time is on its side, it would be politic "to make haste slowly" even with regard to these CBMs and to drag out discussion on these issues at the JWG meetings.

MiG-25s, for example, are available for high altitude photo recce as is indigenous satellite imagery and these can easily replace helicopter sorties for forward observation and intelligence-gathering. Electronic eavesdropping and electronic warfare is all very well if one made use of the material gathered. But because Indian Military Intelligence, Signals Intelligence and Research and Analysis Wing have together only a handful of so-called "Chinese language experts," most of whom, moreover, are of extremely poor quality, the bulk of the radio traffic, in any case, remains unprocessed and is, therefore, wasted.¹⁶ In a situation in which the radio traffic is not properly "read," the commitment not to engage in electronic warfare exacts only a marginal cost.

And, finally, with the well-entrenched frontier posts in secure and, in great many instances, hardwired communications with the brigade commander, the possibility of armed patrols wandering off into enemy territory and sparking off an inadvertent war, is minimal.

The requirement to pull back from Hathung La and other similarly established forward positions is, however, less benign and is the crux of several new security problems India may be saddled with consequent upon acceptance of these CBMs. These, therefore, have to be resisted through delaying and postponing tactics, at the level of the expert group attached to the JWG whose brief is to work out the implementation details. (Here, the "time is not ripe" negotiation strategy that the Chinese have excelled at, recommends itself.)

The specific pullback distance of 40 km mentioned in Press reports is one critical area of contention. (The Chinese have some practice in negotiating such CBMs. Provisions like curtailing military patrols and withdrawal of military forces to an equal distance—vis-a-vis Nepal, it was a 20-km-wide demilitarised zone—were originally featured in the China-Nepal talks leading to a border treaty.)¹⁷ The other equally if not more deleterious provision in Article III of the CBMs accord has to do with limiting the number and quality of tanks, long range artillery (with calibre larger than 75 mm) and surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles the two countries can deploy in the designated forward zones along the border.¹⁸

The imprudence in withdrawing from strongly-held strategic positions along the undemarcated border is highlighted by the terrain anomalies, which are stacked against this country. The 40-km withdrawal by India and China conceived, presumably, on "as the crow flies basis," means that even as the PLA forward forces are carried back over an established network of motorable feeder roads to more secure encampments on the Tibetan plateau, the Indian Army has to negotiate a hard climb all the way from the heights down to around six thousand feet before vehicles can ferry them back and across, in many instances, to the foothills.

In case of another sudden doubleback by Beijing from a policy of cold peace to hot war—which is as likely as not in the future—the PLA can easily and speedily mobilise for operations and mount a major attack from their staging areas in south-eastern and south-western Tibet and catch us just as unprepared as they did in the winter of 1962. This in the main is because the high altitude acclimatised PLA soldiers will be fighting downhill even as rapidly gathered Indian troops will be fighting desperately at a huge disadvantage upmountain trying merely to recoup positions abandoned vide the CBMs agreement. Considering that it takes anywhere up to three months to condition an average soldier for high altitude warfighting,¹⁹ the question is: is that kind of time available to Indian forces contending with a sudden outbreak of hostilities?

Now consider the sub-Articles controlling the quantity and quality of important weapons systems in the border zones. Tanks, restricted to the Ladakh region, are admittedly a minor part of the military presence of either country on the Indo-Tibet border. The most likely point of armoured ingress by the PLA is through the Demchok Triangle—an area where the Northern Army anticipates attack by nearly a regiment's worth of Chinese tanks and armoured infantry combat vehicles. A matched Indian armoured force is positioned there at great cost to deter the Chinese.

Nevertheless, if this Indian tank regiment is to relocate away from the Demchok Triangle, there will be little by way of mobile resistance against possible activity Leh-wards by the light cavalry element of the two PLA Integrated Group Armies stationed in Tibet and even more by two of the four recently developed "rapid response" airborne units with integral artillery tasked for operations in this area—the 149th Division of the 13th Group Army in the Chengdu Military Region (MR) adjoining India and the 63rd Division of the 21st Group Army in the Lanzhou MR orientated for action in Xinjiang.²⁰

From the Chinese point of view, it is desirable to get the Indian forward armoured force out of the immediate tactical picture and as far back from the border as possible for two reasons. One, to minimise the quality of resistance to the PLA's deployment of shock forces, as pointed out earlier, and to delay the advance of an Indian force responding to air-dropped Chinese troops. And secondly, to deny the Indian armour in-place the option of quickly breaking out of the constricted Demchok funnel and on to the Tibetan plateau to cut the strategic Aksai Chin Highway, in the first instance. Were that highway to be severed at several points by an armoured force, the Chinese will have to focus on the intruders, even as the Indian Army thereafter is engaged in consolidating its presence astride the PLA's life-line to Lhasa. Other than wresting the initiative, what such action will do is force the Chinese on to the defensive and, for a change, to fight on India's terms. The Chinese tactical disadvantage on the battlefield, moreover, is bound to have a sobering effect on their conduct at the negotiating table and in diplomatic exchanges.

Regarding the long range artillery, the reason for the Chinese advocacy of withdrawal is clear. The PLA can muster guns with a lot more range and, therefore, can afford to draw back gun and mortar batteries a certain distance and still hit Indian targets. India has no such extended strike capability. It has no mountain-use variant of the 155 mm FH-77B howitzer in its inventory and nothing larger than the 105 mm light field gun for use in Ladakh and a 120 mm mortar for use in the

north-east, which last falls within the CBMs net and is to be repatriated rearwards. In contrast, China is presently inducting into its frontline a NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation)-produced 203 mm gun of both the towed and self-propelled variety, able to fire a 100 kg shell some 50 km.²¹

Then there is the issue of designated geographical zones in which force concentrations are to be thinned out. While the exact locations of these zones have not been revealed, there is a well-merited apprehension that this is no more than a Chinese ploy to clear out to the maximum extent possible potential axes of attack.

The most one-sided provision with long-term negative consequences for Indian security, however, has to do with the emplacement of ballistic and air defence missiles. While the pullback distances have not so far been publicised for any type of weapon, the fact is that the notional nuclear deterrence provided by the 150-200-mile ranged Prithvi, pending the development and deployment of the intermediate range Agni ballistic missile, will suffer grievously on two counts. In terms of the missile's ability to reach meaningful targets even within Tibet and, because of the implied understanding to deploy these weapons systems in a dispersed manner, in terms of economising on and simplifying a survivable Prithvi command and control (C&C) system, which is best achieved by co-location of these missiles.²² The imperatives for economising and for a technically uncomplicated C&C are specially relevant in the initial stages of operating a strategic deterrent.

If the military CBMs are a little too skewed²³ to inspire confidence, the non-military measures being talked about from the Narasimha Rao government's days may have even more devastating consequences. For instance, the then Commerce Minister, Pranab Mukherjee crowed about the potential for growth of the \$360 million Sino-Indian trade on overland routes through Yadong on the Sikkim-Tibet border and the Shipki Pass in the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet sector. Such views were enthusiastically received by the Chinese government.²⁴ And for very good reasons as it turns out. Such border trade, as A.P. Venkateswaran, the former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador in Beijing, points out, will be a boon to the Chinese military in Tibet, which is hampered by weak logistics support. With China importing military end-use items, like kerosene, through Calcutta, the PLA will be enabled to maintain, he writes, an even larger, more battle-ready force along the border with India.²⁵

Confidence and Security-Building Measures

Obviously, something is radically wrong not just with the Indian government's thinking about what constitutes vital national interests

and about ways to secure them, but also with the Indian negotiating style. How else to explain the usual outcome of negotiations with China which invariably favours that country?

Ernest May has observed on the basis of a study of intelligence estimates of adversary countries in the period before the onset of World Wars I and II, that there is simply no defence or protection against "beliefs which turned out to be baseless."²⁶ New Delhi's policy has from Jawaharlal Nehru's days suffered from a strong conviction, apparently unshaken by adverse experiences, that China is in the final analysis a friendly sort of country which India can do business with.

An informed observer confirms that the MEA is split between those of the "Nehruvian school" who believe exclusively in diplomacy to prevent conflict, and those belonging to the more "influential" school which views Chinese military build-up as oriented chiefly towards the larger American threat and who, in effect, are planning for the country to escape the worst of US "hegemonism" by seeking indirect protection in the aggressive policies and programmes of the lesser hegemon, China!²⁷

This last is an example of convoluted ideas that spawn over-clever policies which end up tripping Indian interests. That the Chinese military capabilities so built up are in fact being primed for action, and, in any case, can as easily be turned, against India has apparently not occurred to the votaries of either of these schools of thought.

If the aim is finally and formally to reduce India to a client state and that too of a lesser power, there may be more honest ways of doing it. But if the intention is aggressively to protect national security without appearing abruptly to change tack, then using the CBM-stream to switch the negotiations to appropriate Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), offers a way out.

The central problem that any CSBM-parleys between well-armed and militarily-poised adversaries across a long border are faced with is how to render a surprise attack by either party to the accord ineffective. This was as true of the confrontation in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as it is between Arab countries and Israel or India and China.²⁸

China is not only advantaged by the large, manoeuvrable military mass it has stationed in Tibet but also by geography. CBMs promoting "mutual and equal security" only complicate the problem, primarily because these have been interpreted by the Chinese in the literal sense to mean the numbers of weapons pulled back, of withdrawal an equal distance from the LAC, and so on. In practical terms, such measures while at best occasioning a slightly wider firebreak, hugely upset an

existing stable security system. And they worsen the essentially imbalance of physical factors which prevents Indian forces from mobilising, even with a shortened warning time, at least sufficiently to give the Chinese a pause for thought.

Here the slew of CSBMs painstakingly negotiated in the 1970s and the 1980s in Europe provide a model. One of the main reasons for the eventual success of the conventional military reduction talks in Stockholm, for instance, was, ironically, the original attitude of total distrust of each other. It led to a mutually agreed, if "transparent", growth of the conventional military deterrence capabilities²⁹ of the opposing blocs. Because of resource constraints and successful communication of peaceful intent as well as of resolve over time, there eventuated a plateauing out of capabilities of the two sides, whence negotiated force reductions became feasible.³⁰

The more crucial aspect of both the European conventional military reduction negotiations and of the US-USSR strategic arms limitation and, later, reduction, talks was that the objective agreed upon was to obtain tactical and strategic equivalence of effect. This mandated going beyond strict equality in terms of decreases in the number of armaments arrayed on both sides, etc., to compensatory measures to negate the existential edge enjoyed by either side. Thus, NATO members were required to thin out their conventional forces on their side of the line, and the Soviets to almost completely withdraw their forces from all Central European countries which now became a cushion separating the two Cold War military alliances. Likewise in the strategic arms field, the Soviets were compensated for the inferior quality of the terminal guidance and vectoring technologies onboard their nuclear warheaded missiles by permitting them a larger number of ICBMs with greater throw-weight in their arsenal.

These are lessons India should not ignore. The aim of Sino-Indian CSBMs ought to be the realisation of "equitable" security—a concept that does not merely equate apples and oranges, but is more discriminating in attaining a balance in the total operational milieu of the opposing forces. It will, therefore, become necessary for India to be compensated for the plateau prepositioning of the Chinese troops by vastly "disproportionate" distances from the LAC that the PLA main force will have to withdraw. The demilitarisation, in the event, ought to include in its ambit not just a 40-km-wide belt on either side of the India-Tibet border, but all of Tibet. A schedule, however protracted, for a substantial thinning out of the PLA from Tibet ought, therefore, to top the Sino-Indian negotiation agenda.

Only such CSBM terms will obviate the legitimate Indian fears of a

sudden and unprovoked PLA strike across the LAC. The political undergirding for such measures may be found in the 1954 Accord signed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai, which implied New Delhi's recognition of the "Tibet region of China" only so long as Tibet retained its "autonomous" status.

As to what exactly is "autonomy" and how to interpret it in the Sino-Tibetan context can be the grist for the CSBM talks. The 1954 treaty, however, does provide India a legal cover for exhuming that agreement and for espousing security-building measures to demilitarise Tibet. This will regain for India, as it will for China, the unique buffer state which had kept peace between the two countries for a millennium. And it may provide Beijing a face-saving solution assuming, of course, that it is serious about wanting enduring peace in the region of its soft underbelly.

There are other reasons why this is an opportune time to begin shoving the present one-sided CBM dialogue towards the more far-reaching and mutually beneficial CSBMs. The impact of increasing diplomatic, military and trade pressures on Beijing from the US and the West generally is bound to tell, sooner rather than later.³¹ China may think it best, under the circumstances, to neutralise some of the pressure fronts if it sees New Delhi making common cause with the US with regard to regional security and on Tibet, and with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states to hem in China on the southern flank. The infrastructure for a broad anti-China security framework is being laid with defence agreements of various kinds that India has signed with Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore.

Depending on the success of such measures as the appointment of the American Tibet envoy, who is tasked with safeguarding the special religious, social and cultural character of lamaist Tibet, and of such moves as the one to deny entry to China into the World Trade Organisation and of the orchestration of pressures on a whole host of human rights issues, what could eventuate by way of Chinese compromises on these several fronts could be a just accommodation of Indian interests. Beijing, while demilitarising Tibet could reserve for itself the right, in theory, to reintervene in force if the situation warranted. This will sustain the fiction of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while serving India's security goals.

Another set of mixed military and political CSBMs would have to deal with the troubling matter of Chinese arms sales and transfers of sensitive military technologies to countries in India's proximity. Beijing has come up with a lot of obfuscatory statements—but no clear policy—to explain, say, the sale of the CSS-2 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia, and the

onpassing of the shorter range M-9/M-11 missiles and technology, together with designs for nuclear gravity bombs and missiles warheads, to Pakistan.

The Chinese are of the opinion that this is an issue that mostly disturbs Western countries and resent the international effort "to curb the development of China and its interactions with the world."³² This is evidence of India's traditionally weak-kneed response to such activity. Such protest as New Delhi lodges does not rise above the proverbial squeak which, in turn, persuades Beijing that it can afford to discomfit India some more. As precondition for the success of CSBMs, Beijing must be made to understand that two can play at this game and unrestrained arms supplies to "an enemy of an enemy" is not the prerogative of China alone. As proof of its seriousness, an accelerated Indian programme to sell missiles³³ and even "peaceful" nuclear technologies to states on the Chinese periphery—principally Vietnam, which China fears far more than it does India—would impress Beijing greatly with its tit-for-tat rationale.

Confidence and security-building measures are understandably very difficult to negotiate, and demand an iron nerve and a steely resolve, but above all else an absolute conviction that China can be beaten down, if the need arises, by forceful means. Alas, the MEA, like the current peace-minded Prime Minister Inder K. Gujral, has never properly appreciated the military power of the state and may not be up to the job.

At the tenth JWG meeting, for example, no protest was reportedly made against the recent armed Chinese incursions into India,³⁴ and Foreign Secretary Raghunath is supposed to have only very "gently and gingerly" brought up this subject at the inaugural session.³⁵ Such diplomacy is unlikely to register on the Chinese, who have had enviable success negotiating with little artifice with rival powers.³⁶

NOTES

1. Source: a retired senior MEA official.
2. See Press reports at the time. For example, Manoj Joshi, "Sino-Indian Pact on LAC Likely," *Times of India*, New Delhi, September 4, 1993.
3. Speech by External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral at the United Service Institution of India, January 23, 1997; written script, p. 7.
4. The military's apprehensions about the CBMs on the anvil, and especially those relating to a "pullback" by troops from the border were made known as early as the China visit by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in September 1993. Refer Manoj Joshi, n. 2. See also Pravin Sawhney, "Border Positions may be Eased," *Indian Express*, September 3, 1993.
5. n. 3.
6. *Ibid.*

7. Ibid.
8. There is a growing literature on the subject of the threat posed by China. For a geo-political assessment of the danger to India from China and Pakistan, see Bharat Karnad, "India's Weak Geopolitics and What to do About it" in Bharat Karnad ed., *Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990s and Beyond*, (New Delhi. Viking, 1994). For an articulation of the China threat to the US, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China: The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1997, and for a more generalised analysis of the aggressive Chinese mindset, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1996.
9. Andrew Mack, "CSBMs and Military Security," Working Paper No. 83, Peace Research Centre, School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, May 1990; p 1.
10. See Bharat Karnad, "Key to Peace in South Asia: Fostering 'Social' Links Between the Armies of India and Pakistan," *The Round Table, the Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, April 1996, for an analysis of CBMs, successful in Europe, but inappropriate in the South Asian context.
11. Karnad, n. 8, pp. 20-24, 30-31, 38-39.
12. The substance of "equitable" security vis-a-vis China was first discussed in Karnad, *Ibid.*, p. 41-47.
13. Manoj Joshi, "Coming Closer: Sharad Pawar's China Visit," *Frontline*, August 28, 1992.
14. See Gary Klintworth, "Chinese Perspectives on India as a Great Power" in Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon eds., *India's Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power?*, (Delhi. Oxford University Press, 1992) for an Australian Intelligence analyst's view.
15. Sawhney, n. 4, for the 1993 understanding and the official 'fact sheet' published in the Press in November 1996. See "The Four Agreements," *The Hindu*, November 30, 1996
16. Source: a senior military officer.
17. Arthur Lall, *How Communist China Negotiates*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 197. See Lall's very revealing treatment of the Sino-Nepalese negotiations leading to the border treaty of October 5, 1961, pp 193-201.
18. A paraphrase of Article III in the CBMs accord may be found in an official "fact sheet" distributed to the Press. See "The Four Agreements" in *The Hindu*, November 30, 1996.
19. Source: senior officer formerly in the Army's Eastern Command, involved in training units for mountain warfare.
20. "PLA Airborne Brigades Become Divisions," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, October 2, 1993.
21. "China's Artillery Extends its Reach," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, May 8, 1993.
22. See Bharat Karnad, "Cooking our Goose," *Seminar*, Annual, January 1997.
23. A.P. Venkateswaran writes: "Of the agreements to be signed...none is of particular significance or use to India. On the other hand, all of them are relatively beneficial to China." See his "Leave the Boundary Problem Alone," *Indian Express*, December 13, 1991.
24. "New Sino-Indian Trade Points in Sikkim, HP Proposed," *Economic Times*, June 4, 1993.
25. Venkateshwaran (sic), n. 23.
26. Ernest R. May, "Conclusions: Capabilities and Proclivities" in Ernest R. May ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the two World Wars*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 503-542.

27. Sujit Dutta, *China and Arms Control*, Draft Paper presented at the inaugural Senior Fellows Monthly Seminar, August 5, 1997, p. 27
28. See the discussion of parallel themes in the US-USSR and Arab-Israeli contexts in Mack, n. 9, p. 3.
29. See *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Report of the European Security Study*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
30. John Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference*, (London: Pergamon-Brassey's 1988).
31. The US Congress on June 16, 1997, specifically earmarked areas for the Pentagon to put the tourniquet. Among the recommended actions are the imposition of sanctions for sale of cruise missiles to Iran, restrictions on relaying military information to China via the ongoing military-to-military programmes, and the cut off of strategic technologies by all means to the Chinese military relating to the development of AWACS, long range air defence missiles, precision and stealth weaponry, etc., including exerting pressure on likely sources of such technology, like Israel. See Barbara Opall, "Congress Pushes Clinton to Tighten Screws on China," *Defense News*, June 23-29, 1997.
32. These statements are attributed to the faculty of the Sichuan Institute of International Friendly Contact. See the *Report on a Visit to China by an IDSA Delegation, November 9-19, 1993*, p. 10.
33. DR&DO is supposed to have recently asked for permission to export indigenously-developed missile systems, components and technologies to various interested countries, including Indonesia, Laos, Nepal and Malaysia. See Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Industry Pushes for Wider Exports" *Defense News*, July 28-August 3 1997
34. Manash Ghosh, "India's Concern Over Chinese Intrusions," *The Statesman*, August 4, 1997.
35. Source: a former senior MEA official.
36. Lall, n. 17 While a bit dated, it is still the best primer on the subject. Lall retired as the Indian Permanent Representative at the United Nations and participated in various multilateral negotiations involving the Chinese, particularly the 1962 Conference on Laos in Geneva.